Lansing Neighborhood Stabilization and Youth Violence Initiative: Smart Policing Initiative

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an effort to address the problems of violent crime, illegal drug sales and associated crime and disorder, and neighborhood decay associated with crime, Lansing city and police leaders launched a comprehensive crime reduction initiative in 2010. The overall initiative was known as PEACE standing for "Police Enforcement and Community Engagement." The PEACE initiative included multiple funding streams, data-driven planning and decision-making, and a combination of enforcement, intervention, prevention and community development strategies. This report presents a description of the development of PEACE, its key accomplishments, assessment of the impact, and lessons learned.

Key Accomplishments

- Development of an ongoing partnership between Lansing Police Department (LPD) and Michigan State University (MSU) to support problem analysis, assessment, evaluation, feedback consistent with the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) model.
- Increased understanding of the key factors driving violence and the links between drug offending and violence. As a result, the emphasis shifted from an initial geographic focus on two neighborhoods to a regional "violent street groups" focus.
- Effective implementation of the Drug Market Intervention program and capacity developed for ongoing focused deterrence strategies.
- A new casework management model was developed and delivered for lower-level drug offenders resulting in successful outcomes for individuals who otherwise may have become more heavily involved in the criminal justice system.
- Development and strengthening of partnerships between LPD, other local, state and federal law enforcement, prosecutors (Ingham County and U.S. Attorney's Office), MSU, community organizations (Boys and Girls Club, Primas Civitas), neighborhood and faith leaders.
- Development of a primary youth prevention program in collaboration with the Boys and Girls Clubs and working with approximately 80 youths at any time.
- Community engagement to raise awareness about crime and safety issues, and the impact of crime and violence on individuals, families and the community. This included a number of high visibility and well-attended events.

Key Evaluation Findings

- Measurement and analysis of crime trends resulted in ambiguous findings. Although crime declined somewhat in targeted areas, it was consistent with declines in the comparison areas and citywide. This may indicate some other factor was generating the crime reduction. Alternatively, the expansion of the initiative from target neighborhoods to a focus on street groups operating throughout the city and region may have had a crime reduction effect.

- Similarly, the citizen survey did not reveal significant changes among residents in the target areas or compared to citizens from other parts of the city. This may reflect the fact that citizens already rated their neighborhoods as relatively safe and that they generally had quite positive attitudes toward the Lansing police. This may indicate a lack of a program effect or it may suggest a "ceiling" effect whereby it was unlikely that the survey would detect major changes in citizen attitudes, at least in a positive direction. The survey was further complicated by a highly publicized voting ballot on a millage to increase police funding and avoid police layoffs.
- Ten of the 18 drug offenders referred to service successfully completed their programs with no re-arrests and numerous indicators of success in areas of education, employment, drug abstinence, and parent-child relations.
- Interviews with inmates in the local jail did not reveal significant changes over time in perceived deterrence but did reveal that offenders perceived the DMI approach as more fair and effective.

Lessons Learned
- It is critical to match problem analysis with interventions in order to use limited resources in a focused way that delivers effective crime reduction and prevention. In the present example, the partners moved from an initial geographically-focused DMI approach when subsequent analysis suggested a focus on violent streets groups that were using technology to arrange drug sales and were operating throughout the metropolitan region as opposed to fixed geographic locations.
- All of the interventions would likely have had more effect if they could be more focused (e.g., on the key groups believed to be involved in violence; current "hot spot" locations) and delivered more consistently to increase intensity.
  - The increased summer enforcement patrols made sense given the seasonality of Lansing crime patterns. Such strategies would benefit from identification of current hot spots and should they re-occur throughout the year as indicated by ongoing crime analysis.
  - The call-in meetings should be centered on violent street groups and have either a group focus (typically involving individuals on probation or parole) or a Drug Market focus (as was used in the present project).
  - The hot spot policing should focus on micro-places (a specific address or street segment) and should couple enforcement with place management, nuisance abatement, code enforcement, and collaboration with the Land Bank.
- Given the challenge of limited resources, there is a greater need for the SPI approach to provide ongoing problem analysis to support the timely and focused delivery of intensive interventions to high risk people, places, and groups.
  - Continuing the research partnership through the Violent Crime Initiative (VCI) creates an opportunity to build on the PEACE Project and maintain a SPI model.
- The enforcement strategies gain legitimacy when supported by parallel prevention (e.g., Boys and Girls Club) and community engagement activities. Future assessment of at-risk youth and efforts to link high-risk youths to the Boys and Girls Club prevention program (or similar efforts) are warranted.

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In an effort to address the problems of violent crime, illegal drug sales and associated crime and disorder, and neighborhood decay associated with crime, Lansing city and police leaders launched a comprehensive crime reduction initiative in 2010[2]. The overall initiative was known as PEACE standing for "Police Enforcement and Community Engagement." The PEACE initiative included multiple funding streams, data-driven planning and decision-making, and a combination of enforcement, intervention, prevention and community development strategies.

The current report focuses on the overall PEACE initiative but with particular attention on the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) that was supported by Bureau of Justice Assistance funding. The report provides a description of the development and implementation of Project PEACE. It also presents evaluation findings for the impact of Project PEACE. Finally, the report discusses the lessons learned and capacity building associated with the police-researcher collaboration, a central component of the SPI.

Development of Project PEACE

Project PEACE built upon a set of research-based principles that have emerged over the last few decades for addressing violent crime and disorder. These include police-research partnerships to support systematic problem analysis and problem solving (Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010), place-based and people-based strategies (Braga and Weisburd, 2010; Sherman, 2007), and comprehensive interventions that combine enforcement (suppression), intervention, prevention, and community development (National Gang Center, 2010).

The research partnership involved collaboration between the Lansing Police Department (LPD), the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University (MSU), and the additional PEACE partnering agencies. The research partner model followed practices that emerged from Boston Ceasefire (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 2001), the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) (Roehl et al., 2008), and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010). A key element involved ongoing problem analysis to provide strategic and tactical intelligence to support the enforcement, intervention, prevention and community development strategies. Additionally, the research partners provided information about evidence-based and promising strategies. Finally, the research partners provided ongoing assessment and evaluation of evidence of impact.

The primary enforcement component involved proactive enforcement through targeted police patrol as well as undercover drug enforcement and warrant service provided by LPD's Special Operations Unit. The targeted police patrols primarily involved increased proactive patrols during early summer months. This was primarily a place-based strategy focused on traditionally high crime neighborhoods. The Special Operations Unit provided ongoing proactive enforcement utilizing both people-based and place-based investigations. The additional

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[2] Initial funding was provided through award 2009-DG-BX-0215 from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance. The award was announced in fall 2009 with the initiative beginning in 2010. This report represents the final report for this award. These funds were complemented by funding from U.S. Department of Justice Juvenile Accountability and Project Safe Neighborhoods grants. The funds from these various grants funded complementary but distinct components of enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community development. As will be discussed subsequently, the actual implementation of the project began in summer 2010 with targeted enforcement.

enforcement component involved collaboration between the Ingham County Prosecutor's Office, the U.S. Attorney's Office (Western District of Michigan), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), to support federal prosecution of violent and gun-crime, high priority, defendants.

An additional enforcement component that included intervention, prevention, and community engagement was based on the focused deterrence model of Boston Ceasefire, SACSI, and PSN (Kennedy, 2009; McGarrell, 2010). Initially this involved implementation of the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) as originally developed in High Point, NC (Corsaro et al., 2012). The DMI strategy was implemented in two target neighborhoods. This involved call-in meetings with lower level offenders associated with drug dealing and subsequent social support provided through a case management approach. Over time, street level intelligence suggested that drug dealing in Lansing had moved from an overt, neighborhood based model to a technologically-driven model where drug deals were made using cell phones and mobile meeting locations that took place throughout the city and its surroundings. Consequently, the strategy evolved from a place-based DMI intervention to a focus on mobile, violent street groups.

The additional intervention and prevention components of PEACE were provided through mentoring provided through a coalition of faith leaders and youth prevention/intervention provided by the Boys and Girls Club.

There were several components of the community engagement strategy. One aspect involved community collaboration in DMI through community presence and expression of a community voice during the DMI call-in meetings. Another component involved community awareness of the problem of violence, the impact on individuals, families, and the community, and an effort to "break the silence" in terms of community expression of anti-violence norms and values. The final component involved community development through collaboration with the Ingham County Land Bank. The objective was to respond to problem properties in the targeted areas and, where appropriate, to revitalize or tear down condemned properties.

The development of these strategies as well as information about their implementation will be described in the next section. Following that discussion, findings from the research and evaluation component will be presented. The Report will conclude with lessons learned and recommendations for Lansing as well as other communities that may be able to learn from this experience with the SPI model. Before moving to these sections, however, it is important to consider the context influencing the community, the police department, and crime in Lansing.

Economic Context

Project PEACE was implemented just as the impact of the national recession was having its effect on state and local budgets. This affected all U.S. communities and law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The impact for Michigan communities, and Michigan law enforcement agencies was particularly dramatic, however. The prior decade had witnessed continual declines in automobile industry employment. This resulted in a decade long decline in local and state tax revenue, cuts in revenue sharing from the state to local communities, and budget and personnel reductions for most law enforcement agencies. The housing and mortgage crisis resulted in further reduction in local property taxes and the associated recession resulted in further loss of state and local revenue. For Michigan local governments and law enforcement agencies, this meant that the budgetary reductions came on top of a decade of reductions. LPD did not avoid these reductions. Whereas the department had 261 total officers in 2000, this was

reduced to 226 in 2010 (-13%). Subsequent reductions reduced this to 188 in 2011 (-28% since 2000).[3] The reductions created challenges for LPD in maintaining proactive enforcement strategies. They also created evaluation challenges, as will be discussed subsequently.

Development and Implementation of the Strategies

The SMART Policing component of PEACE, supported by a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, was announced in fall 2009 with an initial launch in early 2010. Initial activities of the project involved briefings by the MSU team for LPD on the High Point DMI model as well as the development of a relationship between MSU team members and the information specialist for LPD that manages crime data and produces crime maps for the department. This resulted in data sharing protocols and the MSU team began to conduct analyses to provide LPD for consideration as two target areas were selected and other parts of the city were considered as potential comparison areas. The MSU team also used this period to develop a community survey that was implemented by the Center for Survey Research at MSU in late spring 2010.

During this period, LPD working with the Mayor's Office, decided to expand on the initial DMI model to develop Project PEACE. This involved locating additional funding streams and establishing partnerships with groups like the Boys and Girls Club of Lansing (youth violence prevention), local community leaders (community engagement and awareness) as well as a coalition of faith leaders (mentoring).

The initiative was initially coordinated by the Lieutenant of the Special Operations Unit. When the original Lieutenant retired, a LPD Captain who had developed the PEACE initiative took over the coordination role along with the Lieutenant for Special Operations who was responsible for day-to-day enforcement and the DMI component. Monthly meetings were held to coordinate the initiative and typically involved LPD command staff (with the Chief attending at key times), the Lieutenant and a Sergeant of the Special Operations Unit, a Resource Allocation Manager, a community leader whose family had experienced the tragic shooting death of a young daughter, representatives from the Boys and Girls Club, a representative of a key non-governmental organization dedicated to supporting economic growth in the region (Primas Civitas), and the MSU team of researchers. On occasion, other leaders from government and the community would attend.

Target Areas

The two target areas chosen included an Eastside neighborhood (bordered by Mifflin, Kalamazoo, Interstate 496, and Pennsylvania Avenues), and a Westside neighborhood known as Churchhill Downs (bordered by Pleasant Grove, Holmes, Jolly, and Waverly Avenues) (See Figure 1). These areas were chosen based on levels of crime and known neighborhood leaders. That is, these were not necessarily the neighborhoods with the highest levels of crime but were areas with crime problems but also a community infrastructure to support community engagement. The East side neighborhood was comprised of approximately twenty-five hundred residents, while the West Side is a tad larger with approximately thirty-seven hundred residents.

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[3] Other Michigan communities that experienced significant reductions in the police force from 2000 to 2010 include Detroit (4.184 to 2,890); Flint (321 to 132); Pontiac (170 to 76); and Saginaw (136 to 104) (FBI 2001, 2011, 2012).

The majority of residents in both neighborhoods are Caucasian and there appeared to be an even split between the percent population male and female.

Enforcement Activities

Initial enforcement activities were implemented in June 2010 with proactive enforcement activities in the two target neighborhoods. During an approximate two month period beginning in late June, up to 23 officers were deployed in these areas for six hour shifts on late Friday and Saturday evenings. The officers used combinations of directed police patrols in marked cars, undercover vehicles, bicycle and foot patrols. During the 2010 heightened enforcement period, 85 arrests were made, 38 criminal investigations launched, 14 narcotics investigations were implemented, and three handguns were recovered. Similar enforcement initiatives were launched during the June-July period in 2011 and 2012 based on historical and contemporary crime patterns that showed heightened levels of crime in the summer months.

The DMI component of the initiative involved drug arrests in the target areas along with identification of lower level drug offenders who might be appropriate for diversion from prosecution with involvement in a "call-in" session. The identification of clients was based on joint screening between the lieutenant of the Special Operations Unit and a Chief Deputy Prosecutor assigned to the DMI initiative. The Lieutenant and Prosecutor considered factors such as prior criminal history and involvement in violent crime in distinguishing between so-called "A list" cases that would be prosecuted and "B list" candidates who would be invited to the call-in meeting.

Participants in the call-in sessions ("B listers") were invited to participate in a social services case management program under the direction of a Resource Allocation Manager. Drawing on the experience of several other DMI sites, the Resource Allocation Manager developed an offender assessment form and conducted an interview with the DMI clients to assess needs, identify risks and assets, and develop a plan of support intended to assist the client end their substance use and/or their involvement in illegal drug sale activity.

The initial call-in meeting occurred in July 2010 and involved three DMI clients. This first call-in focused on candidates in the Eastside target area. The second call-in focused on the Churchhill Downs target area and took place in November 2010. Seven individuals attended the meeting. The third call-in occurred in August 2011. This meeting included 20 probationers who were recommended to attend by their probation officers, as well as nine DMI attendees. A fourth call-in meeting was conducted in February, 2012 and included four attendees.

Call-in candidates received a letter from the Chief of Police inviting the candidate to the call-in meeting. Candidates were told they had been identified as being involved in criminal activities but that they would not be arrested at the meeting. The letter also explained that failure to attend the meeting would result in "serious criminal sanctions." The DMI team leaders worked with area residents and social service providers prior to the meetings to explain the initiative and enlist their support and participation. The meeting involved presentations by the Resource Allocation Manager; the Lieutenant, the Chief of Police, the County Prosecutor, a Special Agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and several community leaders drawn from the faith community and neighborhood associations. The message conveyed included several themes. First, the crime, violence and drug dealing is unacceptable and needs to stop. Second, that evidence already supported the arrest and prosecution of the attendees but that they were being offered a second chance. Third, that the community hoped the participants

would make the right choice and would support their efforts in doing so but that they supported the police and prosecutor if the drug dealing, violence and crime continued. The meeting included posters of other individuals who had been arrested and prosecuted (or facing prosecution) with the goal of communicating a deterrent message. The Resource Allocation Manager explained a variety of social services and forms of support that were available to the attendees and asked the participants to meet with her following the meeting. Arrangements were then made for the attendee to meet with the Resource Allocation Manager during the next few days for an interview and completion of the offender assessment form. Behavioral contracts were signed by the clients. For attendees taking this step, the Resource Allocation Manager served as a case manager assisting the clients navigate and access services. A variety of community social service providers were accessed including the Resolution Services Center

The additional enforcement component consisted of ongoing targeted enforcement conducted by the Special Operations Unit, often in collaboration with ATF and other federal and state law enforcement. The Special Operations Unit focused on criminal organizations and networks involved in violence and drug dealing. These cases often became the "poster children" for call-in meetings and for referrals of lower level offenders to call-in meetings.

Prevention and Intervention

The key prevention program was developed and delivered by the Boys & Girls Club of Lansing. The organization provided mentoring and positive enhancement life skills for the youth in the area. During the school year this involved an after school program with a variety of services and activities for neighborhood youths. A special component of the program was developed to provide transportation for neighborhood youth to the Boys and Girls Club. The youth prevention specialist at the Boys and Girls Club also established relationships with the schools serving the target areas. This was a mechanism for recruiting youths to the Boys & Girls Club, monitoring the academic performance of youth involved in programs, and identifying potential problems at an early stage. During the summer, a broad set of activities occurred in Hunter Park within the Eastside target area. These included sports activities (basketball, flag football, tennis, soccer, kites and Frisbees). The Boys & Girls Club engaged high school coaches as well as athletes and volunteers from Michigan State University to provide coaching and support the activities. Other programs involved different youth development activities such as arts and crafts, gardening, field trips, tutoring, and two gender specific groups. The programs included themes of staying in school and avoiding crime, violence, and substance abuse. An approximate 80 youths participated on a daily basis in the summer program.

The PEACE initiative also coordinated with faith leaders and provided mentoring training to 25 individuals who were matched with at-risk young men (over time a lack of female mentors was identified as a limitation). This program was funded for one year (primarily to cover the costs of training) (all 25 mentees were reported to have passed to the next grad) although the program leaders reported that the mentors planned to continue beyond the year.

Additional key activities included Community Engagement. This involved a Stop the Silence campaign that involved community awareness around issues of violence prevention. These efforts were led by an LPD Captain working with a community leader who had suffered the loss of a daughter through gun violence. Periodic community activities were scheduled that included community marches, often at locations where homicides and shootings had occurred; a

wrap-around event at a school emphasizing the Stop the Silence message; a three-on-three youth basketball tournament that educated the community about Project PEACE and Stop the Silence.

The final community engagement activity involved collaboration with the Lansing Land Bank. The Land Bank has the ability to provide funds for the rehabilitation or demolition of seized properties. The goal was to eliminate problem properties within the target areas. Unfortunately, this aspect of the PEACE program did not seem to develop as initially envisioned.

Evaluation

Crime Trends

Data for the city of Lansing and the target areas were collected from January 2009 to May 2012. The analyses technique employed compared five data points: Time 1 (pre-intervention November 2009 to April 2010); Time 2 (May 2010 to October 2010); Time 3 (November 2010 to April 2011); Time 4 (May 2011 to October 2011); and Time 5 (November 2011 to May 2012). These data were analyzed with descriptive statistics and spatial ARCGIS techniques.

During the study period, the city of Lansing experienced a slight decrease in violent and drug crimes from Time 1 (pre-intervention) to Time 5 (See Table 1 and Figure 2). There were slight increases during summer time periods (Time 2 and Time 4); however, that is to be expected since crime usually increases during the summer months. Taking seasonal trends into account, the appropriate comparisons are Time 1 with Times 3 and 5, and Time 2 with Time 4. This suggests a decline from 239 violent incidents per month in Time 1 compared to 207.3 and 194.8 per month in Time 3 and 5, respectively. Similarly, during Time 2 when PEACE was just being launched, violent crime was at its highest level of 274.5 violent incidents per month. This dropped to 242.7 during Time 4.

The target and comparison areas followed very similar trends to the city patterns. In the east side target area, violent crime remained relatively stable. Seventeen violent incidents were reported during the pre-intervention Time 1, twenty incidents during Time 2, sixteen during Time 3, twenty-one during Time 4, and 16 during Time 5. A visual examination of the geocoded data confirms this pattern as they show the general stability of violent crime incidents in this neighborhood (See Figures 3 to 7). One homicide occurred in this neighborhood during the study period (Time 4). Finally, over half of the violence in this neighborhood involved simple assaults.

The west side neighborhood of Churchill Downs experienced a more visible decrease in violent crime. During the pre-intervention period, fifty-two violent incidents were reported in the neighborhood. The number of violent incidents decreased to forty-four during Time 2, further decreased to thirty-seven during Time 3, significantly increased to sixty-nine during Time 4, and decreased again to forty-six during Time 5 (See Table 1 and Figure 2). Again, it is important to note that violent crime as a whole increased throughout the city during Time 4 so the increase in Churchill Downs mimics a citywide pattern. Similar to the east side neighborhood, one homicide incident occurred in Churchhill Downs during Time 4 of the study, and approximately half of the violent crime incidents in this neighborhood involved simple assaults. Interestingly, the geocoded analyses also shows that violent crime is not spread throughout the neighborhood, but that it concentrates in a small number of street segments (See Figures 3 to 7).

As previously discussed, our analyses revealed the drug markets in Lansing were unlike other cities that have implemented DMI and Smart Policing strategies. Lansing's drug markets are on average not "open air," but instead operate within residences and other "closed" locales. Drug dealers and users tend to rely on referrals whereby a drug user needs a recommendation from someone the drug dealer trusts. Once that connection is made, the drug users contact the dealers via cell phone to arrange drug pick-ups and payments in select locations. Officers indicate that one common method is to arrange pick-ups and payments in local supermarkets. During the exchange it is not uncommon to have the buyer drop off the money in one of the garbage cans, and the dealer then drops of the drugs in the same place once the money is collected. As a result, investigating drug markets and trafficking operations takes a lot of time and meticulous planning on the part of the police.

Despite the aforementioned challenges, drug incidents decreased during the study period in the city as whole and target neighborhoods. Two hundred and ninety-nine drug incidents were reported in the city during the pre-intervention Time 1. At the end of the study period (Time 5), the number of drug incidents in the city decreased to one hundred and eighty-two (See Table 2). In the east side target neighborhood, incidents decreased from eight pre-intervention to two incidents during Time 5. The bulk of drug arrests in the neighborhood are related to the use and distribution of marijuana and narcotic equipment violations. In Churchill Downs, drug incidents were rare decreasing from two incidents pre-intervention to one during Time 5, though the neighborhood experienced slight increases during Times 2, 3, and 4 (See Table 2 and Figure 8). These increases were likely due to more focused drug enforcement in the neighborhood. Similar to the east side neighborhood, the bulk of drug incidents in the area are related to the use and sale of marijuana and narcotic equipment violations.

The visual geocoded analyses of drug incidents further elucidate this trend (See Figures 9 to 13). Interestingly, it appears that drug incidents in Churchill Downs do not concentrate in the violent street segments of the neighborhood. However, given the limited number of incidents and the fact that drug incidents also reflect police activity, the data are difficult to interpret.

Like the violent crime trends, these results are open to several interpretations. One, the shift to more closed network and mobile drug dealing may have made it more difficult to detect drug crime incidents. Second, the reduction in police resources may have also resulted in lower rates of detection of drug incidents. Third, the DMI approach combining may have had an impact but if this is the case it spread beyond the target areas.

Citizen Perceptions

In order to gauge the effect of the intervention on resident perceptions of crime, disorder, and the criminal justice system, a telephone survey of people living in the two treatment and two comparison neighborhoods was conducted. A pre-test post-test design was utilized in order to control for potential pre-existing differences between neighborhood residents on constructs of interest. The pre-test survey was conducted during the month of May 2010, and the post-test was conducted between September 14th and November 4th of 2011. The telephone survey was conducted by the Michigan State University Office of Survey Research, which is part of the Institute of Public Policy and Social Research. A total of 469 respondents participated in the

pre-test survey, with an adjusted conditional response rate of 72.2 percent[4] (The American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2011). The post-test included 419 total respondents, with a corresponding response rate 54.6 percent. Of the post-test respondents, a total of 210 persons were re-interviewed from the pre-test sample, and thus direct comparisons of responses from these panel respondents are also utilized in this report.

In addition to basic demographic questions, the survey included a number of questions related to respondent attitudes toward the police and legal system, perceptions of their community, as well as how they viewed their community's crime problem and their fear and perceived risk of being victimized. Tables 4 and 5, to be discussed subsequently, provide a description of the scales used to examine changes in community residents' attitudes about these issues that may have been impacted by the intervention. In addition to these scales, the survey also included individual items pertaining to such things as crime problems in their respective neighborhoods and the associated police response to such issues.

We will proceed by first describing the sample utilized in the study in relation to the Lansing, Michigan community overall. Then we will discuss the pattern of change in community perceptions associated with the intervention. In particular, we will discuss both the absolute level of and changes in resident perceptions of: the severity of the crime problem in their respective neighborhoods, the effort of police to solve these particular problems, the likelihood of arrest and imprisonment for drug dealing, perceptions of procedural justice, the legitimacy of the police in the Lansing, MI area, perceived risk and fear of victimization, and perceptions of collective efficacy in their neighborhood.

Citizen Survey Sample and Description of Items and Scales

Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample utilized to gauge resident perceptions of issues associated with crime and victimization in the Lansing, MI community. The intervention under evaluation targeted two distinct neighborhoods in the city, and thus our community survey targeted these two neighborhoods (i.e., Treatment 1, Treatment 2) along with two comparison areas (i.e., Comparison 1 and Comparison 2) in the city. Overall, there were more female respondents in the sample, as they comprised 62.8 percent of the pre-test respondents, 66.0 percent of those added at the post-test, and 62.9 percent of the panel sample members. These figures are higher than the 2010 Census figures for Lansing as a whole, where it was estimated that 51.6 percent of the entire population was female (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). While roughly 12.6 percent of the Lansing population reported Hispanic ethnicity according to Census figures, 5.4 percent of our pre-test sample, 10 percent of our post-test sample, and 1.9 percent of our panel sample reported this as their ethnic origin, respectively. With respect to race, the U.S. Census Bureau (2012) estimated the Lansing population was 61.2 percent white, 23.7 percent black, and 15.1 percent of some other race. Our pre-test and panel sample contained a higher percentage of white respondents (67.2% and 75.2%, respectively) and a lower percentage of black persons (20.5% and 18.1%, respectively) than those reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012). The sample added at the post-test contained a slightly greater percentage of black respondents (27.8) than at pre-test and fewer white (60.3) persons. From an education standpoint, U.S. Census Bureau (2012) figures suggested that 86 percent of residents had a high

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[4] More specifically, this figure was calculated using the response rate four (RR4) guidelines of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (2011) standard definitions manual. Adjusted figures ranged from 59.0 percent for RR1 to 79.3 percent for RR6.

school education or greater, while our sample was slightly more educated, with 94.3 percent of our pre-test, 90.4 percent of the post-test, and 97.1 of our panel respondents reporting at least a high school education.

Table 4 presents the items included in the survey related to assessments of the respondent's neighborhood that comprised the various scales created for the subsequent analyses. As the Table indicates, these items measured items including collective efficacy, assessment of the crime problem, perceived risk of victimization, and fear of victimization.

Collective efficacy refers to the extent that local residents interact with and look out for one another, and are likely to call the police when necessary. The findings suggest fairly high levels of collective efficacy and very few changes from time 1 to time 2. The ratings of neighborhood crime problems tended to range between "minor problem" and "not a problem" but also reveal very few changes from time 1 to time 2. The perceived risk of victimization for various offenses tends to show relatively low levels of perceived risk and little change over time. Finally, the fear of crime measures indicate relatively low levels of fear and little change.

Table 5 is similar but focuses on perceptions of the Lansing Police. The items focus on procedural justice, legitimacy, perceived likelihood of arrest and prosecution for drug dealing, and the police effort to respond to neighborhood crime problems. The results indicate an overall favorable impression of the police with little change over time. Procedural justice refers to the extent to which the police treat people with respect, listen to people, and explain decisions. Lansing residents tend to agree to strongly agree with positive ratings on these items. Similar results emerge from the police legitimacy items that include indicators of respect for the police, support for the police, and beliefs that the police treat people equally. Citizens believe it is likely that someone selling illegal drugs will be arrested, prosecuted and incarcerated. Finally, citizens give the police generally positive ratings in terms of their effort to address neighborhood crime problems. They give somewhat higher ratings for dealing with crime problems such as theft and burglary, drug dealing and gangs than they do with abandoned buildings and loitering.

In the subsequent sections we focus on changes over time in these perceptions as well as differences between residents of the target areas compared to residents in the comparison areas.

Citizen Survey Findings

We next turn our attention to resident perceptions of the absolute level of the crime problem in their respective neighborhoods, and whether there were systematic differences across our treatment and comparison areas in this regard. Table 6 provides this information, including how neighborhood residents rate the effort of the police in solving these issues. Overall, mean level observations with respect to all crimes included in the survey suggested that crime in each neighborhood is rated between being a "minor problem" and "not a problem." One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) analyses suggested there were systematic differences (p < .05) between neighborhoods in the level of theft, drug dealing, and abandoned buildings at both times 1 and 2, however. At time 1, Bonferonni post hoc tests suggested that comparison area 2 was the outlier in all instances, having reported significantly fewer problems with theft at time 1 than treatment area 1, as well as less severe drug dealing and problems with abandoned buildings than target area 2. Bonferonni post hoc tests suggest that there were significant differences in perceptions of theft as a problem at time 2, with treatment area 1 reporting a significantly worse problem with this crime than treatment area 2 and comparison area 2. Comparison area 2 also reported a

significantly fewer issues with drug dealing than comparison area 1, and fewer problems with abandoned buildings than treatment areas 1 and 2 at time 2.

With respect to police effort to solve these issues in each neighborhood, residents were equally likely to report that police were either making some effort or a lot of effort to solve these issues. In fact, there were no significant differences across neighborhoods in perceptions of police effort at either time 1 or time 2.

Supplementary analyses suggested that there were few systematic changes between neighborhoods across time. Specifically, we conducted one-way ANOVA analyses of mean changes in the perceived severity of crime and police effort to solve these issues across neighborhoods among panel respondents (n = 210). The only statistically significant change across neighborhoods was for perceived police effort in controlling loitering, with Bonferonni post hoc tests revealing that, contrary to treatment expectations, treatment area 2 reported a slight reduction in police effort (mean change = .13) in this regard while comparison area 1 reported an increase perceived police effort (mean change = -.27), resulting in a significant (p < .05) difference in change between these two neighborhoods. All other one-way ANOVA analyses of mean change across neighborhood were non-significant.

Table 7 provides information on resident perceptions of the likelihood of arrest and imprisonment for drug dealing across our treatment and comparison neighborhoods. Responses ranged from one to four, with one equal to "very likely," two equal to "somewhat likely," three equal to "somewhat unlikely," and four equal to "very unlikely." Results suggested that, on average, Lansing residents in our four neighborhoods under study believed it was "somewhat likely" that drug dealers would be arrested and imprisoned for their crimes. There were no significant differences across neighborhoods at either time 1 or 2, and analyses of potential neighborhood differences in change across time also suggested no neighborhood level effects associated with the intervention.

Respondents were asked about how police officers in their respective neighborhood treat people with whom they come in contact, which we labeled procedural justice (see Table 5). Table 8 provides results of one-way ANOVA analyses related to this scale across neighborhoods and time. There were significant differences in mean responses across neighborhoods at both time 1 and time 2 (p < .05). At time 1, Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between comparison areas 1 and 2, as comparison area 1 (mean = 1.79, s.d. = .68) reported significantly (p < .05) lower levels of procedural justice than comparison area 2 (mean 1.52, s.d. = .68). At time 2, there were significant differences between treatment areas with respect to procedural justice, as treatment area 1 (mean = 1.56, s.d. = .67) reported greater perceived procedural justice than treatment area 2 (mean = 1.83, s.d. = .69). There were no significant changes in neighborhood level mean attitudes across time, however.

Differences in neighborhood level attitudes related to police legitimacy were also assessed using one-way ANOVA analyses (see table 9). Again, while there were significant differences in police legitimacy across neighborhoods at time 1 and time 2 (p < .05), there were no significant changes in this construct across time. Specifically, Bonferonni post hoc tests suggested that comparison area 2 (mean = 1.38; s.d., .50) reported significantly better attitudes toward the police at time 1 than comparison area 1 (mean = 1.62, s.d. = .62) and treatment area 2 (mean = 1.66, s.d. = .75). At time 2, treatment area 2 (mean = 1.73, s.d. = .68) reported significantly worse (p < .05) police legitimacy than treatment area 1 (mean = 1.47, s.d. = .63), comparison 1 (mean = 1.51, s.d. = .51), and comparison area 2 (mean = 1.53, s.d. = .68).

With respect to respondent perceptions of their risk and fear of victimization, survey results, presented in Table 10, suggest little programmatic impact. While, on average, respondents suggested that the overall risk of victimization was "somewhat unlikely," and they were only "a little afraid" at both waves of data collection, these figures remained relatively unchanged across time. Specifically, one-way ANOVA analyses revealed no systematic changes in these constructs across neighborhoods from time 1 to time 2. The only significant difference between neighborhoods was for the perceived risk of victimization at time 2, wherein comparison area 1 (mean = 2.87, s.d. = .83) reported a significantly greater probability of victimization than comparison area 2 (mean = 3.20, s.d. = .73).

Lastly, residents were asked about their neighborhood's ability to look out for one another and solve community problems, or what we refer to as collective efficacy (see Table 4). Table 11 provides the results of one-way ANOVA analyses of neighborhood differences in these constructs. Overall, there were no differences across neighborhoods with respect to collective efficacy at either time 1 or 2. There was, however, a significant difference in change in collective efficacy from time 1 to time 2 ($p < .05$). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed a significant difference ($p < .05$) in change between treatment area 1 (mean = .10, s.d. = .40) and comparison area 1 (mean = -.10, s.d. = .34), consistent with programmatic expectations.

Overall, results of the community survey suggest little in the way of programmatic response. The overall pattern of results suggests no systematic change in community level attitudes and perceptions consistent with what one might expect given the investment of time and resources as part of the Lansing Neighborhood Stabilization and Youth Violence Initiative in treatment neighborhoods. One reason for the failure to find changes in respondent attitudes and perceptions across time may be that, on average, respondents already held relatively positive attitudes about their respective community conditions before implementation of the program. For instance, crime was already viewed as either a "minor problem" or "not a problem" *before* the initiation of the intervention. Similarly, overall attitudes about police effort (see table 6), procedural justice (see table 8), and police legitimacy (see table 9) were positive, and residents felt relatively safe with respect to their fear and perceived risk of victimization (see table 10). Together, these figures suggest there may have been a "ceiling effect," whereby there was little room for improvement with respect to the constructs used in the community survey. In the end, however, with the exception of collective efficacy, there was no evidence of successful programmatic impact on community level attitudes and perceptions.

Participation in DMI

As noted earlier, one of the primary components of the PEACE Initiative was the Drug Market Intervention (DMI). The DMI is principally intended to address neighborhood-level crime and disorder, a secondary goal is to support lower level drug dealers without histories of violence to remove themselves from continued involvement in illegal drug use and sales (Kennedy and Wong, 2009; Corsaro et al., 2012). As noted above, four call-in meetings occurred during the course of the PEACE Project.

As displayed in Table 12, 39 lower level drug dealers and users were deferred from prosecution and referred to a DMI call-in meeting. Of these, 23 attended the meeting (59%). Of the 23, 18 (81%) were referred to services and participated in a case management process. Ten of the 18 individuals successfully completed a six-month long individualized program that included a wide variety of services such as employment assistance, vocational training, substance

abuse counseling, parenting skills, and housing. These 10 individuals also avoided any new criminal charges assessed over a period of at least six months and as long as two years (depending on when initially arrested). This represented a success rate of 43% for all call-in attendees and 56% of those referred for services. This rate of success is difficult to interpret due to a lack of a comparison group and because some of the "failures" were arrested on original charges as opposed to new charges (thus this may be an under-estimate of program success).

Despite the lack of a comparison group, there was evidence that the program had a significant impact on the 10 successful program completers. All of the successful cases were shown to be drug-free through drug testing and a number of these individuals reported that they were drug free for the first time in years. At least five were working and a similar number had either completed their GED, were attending high school, or were enrolled in college. A significant number had also regained custody of their children. Given that prior research shows high rates of recidivism for drug-involved offenders (e.g., Roman, Townsend and Bhait, 2003), the fact that these ten individuals have remained crime and drug free for six months to several years represents personal success and reduced criminal justice expenses.

Jail Surveys

The research team conducted a small scale (n=319) survey of inmates at the Lansing city jail over a three year period (2010-2012) to examine inmates' perceptions of illegal drug markets in the Lansing metro area and their interaction with local law enforcement officials. The surveys were done in person, the researcher read the questions to the participants and recorded their responses. The following paragraph provides an overview of the survey results.

Table 13 shows the characteristics of the sample. Most of the respondents were male (83.6%), 34.4% of the respondents identified as White, 58.5% as Black or African-American and 5.1% as Hispanic. The mean age of respondents was 30, and these jail inmates had extensive involvement in the criminal justice as they averaged over eight prior arrests.

As would be expected given their arrest histories, the jail inmates had less favorable attitudes toward the police when contrasted with the prior data from Lansing residents. For example, for only two of the items, "I have respect for the police" and "people should support the police," did over half the respondents agree (52.9% and 74.1%, respectively). Most respondents felt like the police do not treat people in their neighborhood with dignity or respect (53.1 %) and do not take time to listen to or explain their decisions to the people they deal with (53.7% and 53.5 % respectively). Similarly, most do not feel that the police are honest (58.9%) (see Table 14). There were also few changes over time although there were somewhat more positive responses in 2012 compared to the prior years.

The next set of items asked the jail inmates about the chances of being arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for buying drugs and for selling drugs. These items were intended to measure changes in perceived deterrence, particularly for drug selling. These were key goals of the Drug Market Intervention (DMI) component of the PEACE initiative.

Overall, most respondents reported that the ability to buy drugs was easier (41.3%) or about the same (48.8%) as compared to a year before they took the survey. The risk of getting arrested for buying drugs was about the same (61.5%) or higher (17.9%) as compared to a year before and the risk of getting arrested for selling drugs was about the same (61%) or higher (27.7%). Finally, most respondents felt that the chances of getting arrested for buying drugs were poor, but if arrested the chances of getting convicted and going to prison were good (Table 15).

For selling drugs, they thought the chances of getting arrested were good, and if arrested the chances of getting convicted and going to prison were good to very good (Table 16).

Respondents did report a higher risk of arrest, conviction, and incarceration for drug sales as opposed to purchase. There were, however, few differences observed over time that would have suggested that the drug market intervention message had permeated the jail population.

In addition to the main jail survey, 52 of the surveyed inmates also responded to questions in relation to two short vignettes that examined their perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of a law enforcement program similar to the DMI compared to a traditional law enforcement approach to open air drug markets. The purpose of the vignette survey was to learn of the perceptions of those who are the subject of traditional enforcement. The DMI was largely designed by enforcement officials with input from academic researchers and thus it is important to understand how real and potential drug offenders perceive DMI in contrast to traditional enforcement.

The vignettes posed the questions in relation to two hypothetical cities. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four versions (Version A, n=15; Version B, n=10; Version C, n=12 and Version D, n=12) of the vignette pairings. The four versions featured slightly varying descriptions of traditional drug enforcement compared to the DMI-like approach. The vignettes altered the order of the description to minimize the impact of question ordering. An example of one of the vignette pairings is provided below (see Appendix):

> Two cities are taking different approaches to drug enforcement. We would like your opinion about the effectiveness and the fairness of each approach. In city A, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. All ten individuals with prior felony convictions were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records had the charges dismissed (Traditional Enforcement).

> In city B, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. The ten with serious prior records were prosecuted and imprisoned. The ten without serious prior records were not immediately prosecuted, but were warned that if they continue to deal drugs they would also be prosecuted and imprisoned. They were also provided with an opportunity to participate in services such as job training, mentoring, and drug treatment (DMI).

When asked how effective each approach would be in reducing neighborhood crime a clear pattern emerged in favor of the DMI approach (Version A: 19.2% compared to 5.8%, Version B: 23.1% compared to 1.9%, Version C: 9.8% compared to 3.8%, Version D: 13.5% compared to 3.8). Similar patterns emerged when asked about the fairness of each approach for offenders and the citizens in the neighborhood. In only one pairing (Version D for fairness to offenders) did DMI not stand out as the more fair approach. An examination of the data found that most respondents who believed that the DMI approach was fairer to the offenders and the

citizens also believed that the DMI approach was the most effective at reducing neighborhood crime (see Table 17).

In summary, although the number of respondents is limited for each version of the vignette, an exploratory examination of the descriptive statistics shows that most respondents believe that the DMI approach would be more effective and fair. The results are consistent with the logic model behind the DMI approach (Rivers, Norris and McGarrell, 2012).

Summary and Conclusions

The Lansing PEACE initiative was a multi-faceted effort to enhance public safety through data-driven problem solving, focused deterrence including the DMI strategy, prevention, and community engagement. The initiative built on best practices and followed the principles of the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Smart Policing Initiative (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2012). We conclude the report by describing key accomplishments, evaluation findings, and lessons learned.

Key Accomplishments

SPI is a strategic problem solving model building on best practices such as Boston Ceasefire, SACSI, and PSN (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 2001; Roehl et al., 2008; Klofas, Hipple, and McGarrell, 2010). It emphasizes research partnerships to support ongoing problem-solving and data-driven decision-making. It also includes partnerships to support enhanced information sharing, additional resources, and more comprehensive interventions. Finally, it seeks to build capacity through these processes and partnerships to support continual problem solving and learning. Measured against these goals, PEACE was a clear success.

Although there had been a long-standing relationship between LPD and MSU, there had not been the type of research partnership as developed in PEACE but rather episodic joint projects. The PEACE process solidified these relationships and expanded the number of researchers collaborating with LPD.

One outcome of this partnership was a greater understanding of the evolution of drug dealing in Lansing and its connection to violence. The original assumption of a connection between drug-dealing groups and violence proved correct. The related assumption of geographic-based drug markets proved incorrect. Rather the analyses and associated street-level intelligence revealed a shifting drug market whereby technology and mobile location "meets" for the sale of drugs was becoming predominant. Although this negated the original focus on geographically-based open drug markets, it demonstrated the value of the SPI approach that calls for data-driven and intelligence-based processes to better understand crime dynamics and to develop appropriate interventions and crime reduction strategies.

Additional partnerships were developed in the PEACE initiative. Some of these were criminal justice focused and built on Project Safe Neighborhoods relationships involving local, state and federal law enforcement, county and federal prosecution. Eventually this evolved into a regional enforcement task force known as the Violent Crime Initiative (VCI). The VCI follows SPI principles and is intended to become the vehicle for responding to violence associated with violent street groups. It emerged as a data-driven approach built on lessons learned in PEACE and represents an effort to sustain the SPI approach.

Other partnerships expanded beyond criminal justice. These included primary prevention programs developed through partnership with the Boys and Girls Club and touching the lives of a significant number of area youths. It also included relationships with the faith community resulting in the training of a group of mentors and involvement in the DMI. Finally, these partnerships included a number of community engagement activities to increase awareness of crime and safety issues, encourage cooperation with the police, and support victims.

In addition to these partnerships, capacity was built in Lansing for focused deterrence strategies through the DMI program. Many partnering agencies, and individuals within these agencies as well as various neighborhood groups, participated in the four call-in meetings. This resulted in a group of key actors familiar with the focused deterrence model and capable of using this approach to address either group violence or drug markets.

The DMI experience also resulted in a new approach to case management for lower level drug offenders. As noted above, 18 individuals were referred to this program as opposed to being formally arrested and prosecuted. For 10 of these 18 this resulted in life-altering changes including remaining drug free, gaining employment, earning degrees and being re-united with children. This capacity now exists in Lansing although local officials will need to determine whether to fiscally support this component that was grant-supported.

Evaluation Findings

One aspect of the research partnership was to assess the impact of the PEACE initiative on public safety and attitudes toward the police. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons the evaluation findings are ambiguous and likely to be disappointing for officials seeking clear answers. The main problem with the evaluation was that it was originally designed as an assessment of a geographic-based set of interventions in two distinct neighborhoods of Lansing. Further, the initial focus was on evaluating a geographic-focused DMI strategy. As the PEACE initiative unfolded, however, attention shifted from neighborhood based open drug dealing to violent street groups involved in drug dealing. Given this shift, it was unlikely to detect programmatic effects given the original evaluation design.

With these caveats in mind, crime trends did decline in the final year. However, this was consistent throughout the city, the comparison areas, as well as the target areas and thus it is impossible to attribute the decline to PEACE. Continued assessment of longer term trends, assuming continuation of the SPI approach in the VCI, will provide a better test of the crime reduction efficacy of this model.

The citizen survey was similar. There were few differences between time 1 (pre-PEACE) and time 2 (post-PEACE) suggestive of PEACE having an impact on perceptions of crime, fear of crime, and attitudes toward the police. On the other hand, citizen's responding to the survey generally found their neighborhoods to be safe and had positive attitudes toward the police. It would have been difficult to find dramatic improvements, particularly given the mismatch between the program design and the lack of open air drug dealing in the target neighborhoods.

The jail survey suggested that inmates viewed the DMI approach as one that is more fair and likely to be more effective. This is an important finding as research shows that individuals who view police practices as fair and respectful are more likely to comply with the law (Tyler, 2003).

Finally, as noted above, although careful evaluation findings (e.g., with a control group) were not available, the limited findings for individuals participating in the DMI case management intervention were quite promising.

Lessons Learned

The accomplishments and the evaluation findings also lend themselves to lessons learned and recommendations for moving forward. First, it is critical to match problem analysis with specific interventions in order to use limited resources in a focused way that delivers effective crime reduction and prevention. In the present example, initial discussion about the DMI model resulted in a focus on two neighborhoods that in the past had experienced drug selling problems. However, when subsequent analyses and street-level intelligence revealed questions about the level of open-air drug dealing in these two neighborhoods, the PEACE partners moved from a geographically-focused DMI approach to a focus on violent streets groups. This was based on the finding that dealers were using technology to arrange drug sales, and were operating throughout the metropolitan region as opposed to fixed geographic locations. A goal of future SPI approaches would be to ensure the problem analysis is in place prior to the intervention design.

Second, all of the interventions would likely have had more effect if they could be more focused and delivered more consistently to increase intensity. In the Lansing context this would mean a focus on the key groups believed to be involved in violence as well as current "hot spot" locations in contrast to historic hot spots. The emphasis on violent street groups does not mean the irrelevance of geographic hot spots. As the maps presented herein reveal, there are hot spots in Lansing. However, it does not appear that these are necessarily tied to open drug dealing. Consequently, hot spot policing should focus on micro-places (a specific address or street segment) and should couple enforcement with place management, nuisance abatement, code enforcement, and collaboration with the Land Bank.

Third, the increased summer enforcement patrols made sense given the seasonality of Lansing crime patterns. It appears that future summer implementation would benefit from identification of current hot spots and also should re-occur throughout the year as indicated by ongoing crime analysis.

Fourth, given the challenge of limited resources, there is a greater need for the SPI approach to provide ongoing problem analysis to support the timely and focused delivery of intensive interventions to high risk people, places, and groups. This is the goal of the continuing research partnership through the Violent Crime Initiative (VCI) that seems to create an opportunity to build on the PEACE Project and maintain a SPI model.

Finally, the enforcement strategies gain legitimacy when supported by parallel prevention (e.g., Boys and Girls Club) and community engagement activities. Research shows that prevention is most effective when focused on high-risk youths (Melde et al., 2011). Thus, future assessment of at-risk youth and efforts to link high-risk youths to the Boys and Girls Club prevention program (or similar efforts) is warranted.

Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Target & Comparison Areas

Table 1: Violent Crime Trends

	Time 1 Count/Per Month	Time 2 Count/Per Month	Time 3 Count/Per Month	Time 4 Count/Per Month	Time 5 Count/Per Month
City	1434/239	1647/274.5	1244/207.3	1459/242.7	1364/194.8
East Side	17/2.8	20/3.3	16/2.7	21/3.5	16/2.3
Churchhill Downs	52/8.7	44/7.3	37/6.2	69/11.5	46/6.6
Comparison 1	40/6.7	36/6	32/5.3	26/4.3	22/3.1
Comparison 2	40/6.7	61/10.2	41/6.8	43/7.2	44/6.3

Figure 2: Violent Crime Trends (Z-Scores)

Figure 3

Violent Incidents: November 2009-April 2010

Figure 4

Figure 5

Violent Incidents: November 2010-April 2011

Figure 6

Violent Incidents: May 2011-October 2011

Figure 7

Violent Incidents: November 2011-May 2012

Table 2: Drug Crime Trends

	Time 1 Count/Per Month	Time 2 Count/Per Month	Time 3 Count/Per Month	Time 4 Count/Per Month	Time 5 Count/Per Month
City	299/49.8	229/38.2	194/32.3	133/22.2	182/26
East Side	8	6	3	4	2
Churchhill Downs	2	12	6	4	1
Comparison 1	6	7	3	1	3
Comparison 2	3	0	2	0	0

Figure 8: Drug Crime Trends (Z-Scores)

Figure 9

Drug Incidents: November 2009-April 2010

Figure 10

Figure 11

Drug Incidents: November 2010-April 2011

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
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
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
Table 3: Survey Respondent Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Time 1 n	Time 1 %	Time 2 n	Time 2 %	Panel Sample n	Panel Sample %
Neighborhood						
Treatment 1	105	22.4	108	25.8	50	23.8
Treatment 2	107	22.8	116	27.7	46	21.9
Comparison 1	151	32.2	108	25.8	63	30.0
Comparison 2	106	22.6	87	20.8	51	24.3
Total	469		419		210	
Sex						
Male	168	37.2	71	34.0	78	37.1
Female	284	62.8	138	66.0	132	62.9
Age [mean, (standard deviation)]	54.9	(15.6)	53.0	(17.1)	58.3	(13.2)
Ethnicity						
Hispanic	24	5.4	21	10.0	4	1.9
Race						
White	315	67.2	126	60.3	158	75.2
Black	96	20.5	58	27.8	38	18.1
Other	58	12.4	25	12.0	14	6.7
Education Level						
Less than High School	23	5.1	16	7.7	6	2.9
High School Graduate	279	62.2	121	57.9	124	59.0
College Graduate	144	32.1	68	32.5	80	38.1
Marital Status						
Married	201	45.1	76	36.3	102	48.8
Single, never married	85	19.1	53	25.4	29	13.9
Other	159	35.7	80	38.2	79	37.6

notes: All percentages represent valid percent figures. Demographic statistics for time 2 only include those 209 respondents added to the survey at this wave.

Table 4: Views on Neighborhood Conditions and Crime at Time 1 and Time 2				
	Time 1		Time 2	
	(n = 469)		(n = 419)	
Scales/Variables	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
Collective Efficacy (1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree)	**1.96**	**0.63**	**1.94**	**0.66**
1. People in my neighborhood occasionally have a block party during the summer months.	2.98	1.11	3.01	1.16
2. People in my neighborhood are likely to call the police to report an accident.	1.54	0.83	1.54	0.85
3. People in my neighborhood are likely to call the police to report a crime.	1.53	0.82	1.53	0.86
4. People in my neighborhood go out of their way to help each other, such as by giving each other rides or helping shovel snow.	2.07	0.92	2.00	0.94
5. People in my neighborhood watch out for each other's children when they play outside.	1.91	0.98	1.90	0.99
6. People in my neighborhood are likely to provide information to police to help find a suspected criminal.	1.70	0.91	1.63	0.85
[Scale Alpha = .75]				
Severity of Neighborhood Crime Problem (1 = A Major Problem; 2 = Minor Problem; 3 = Not a Problem)				
1. Over the past two months in your area, has theft or burglary been a major problem, a minor problem or has it not been a problem at all?	2.55	0.64	2.39	0.66
2. Over the past two months in your area, has drug dealing been	2.37	0.74	2.38	0.71
3. Over the past two months in your area, have gangs been	2.77	0.50	2.78	0.47
4. Over the past two months in your area, have abandoned buildings been	2.57	0.65	2.49	0.70
5. I would also like to know about loitering, that is, groups of people just "hanging out," as a possible problem. Over the past two months in your area, has this been	2.53	0.69	2.52	0.66
Perceived Risk of Victimization (1 = very likely to 4= very unlikely)	**3.08**	**0.80**	**3.04**	**0.79**
1. How likely do you think it would be for someone to break into your house while you are home?	3.16	0.93	3.15	0.92
2. How likely do you think it is that someone who has a gun or knife would try to rob you in your neighborhood?	3.02	0.97	2.91	0.96
3. How likely do you think it is that someone will assault you in your neighborhood?	3.08	0.92	3.06	0.92
[Scale Alpha = .81]				
Fear of Victimization (1 = very afraid to 4= not at all afraid)	**3.18**	**0.85**	**3.20**	**0.85**
1. How afraid are you of someone breaking into your house while you are home?	3.26	0.93	3.23	0.93
2. How afraid are you of someone robbing you with a gun or a knife in your neighborhood?	3.10	0.97	3.14	1.03
3. How afraid are you of someone assaulting you in your neighborhood?	3.18	0.93	3.21	0.93
[Scale Alpha = .89]				

Table 5: Attitudes Toward the Police and Prosecution at Time 1 and Time 2				
	Time 1		Time 2	
	(n = 469)		(n = 419)	
Scales/Variables	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.
Procedural Justice (1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree)	**1.70**	**0.74**	**1.68**	**0.72**
1. The police in my neighborhood treat people with dignity and respect?	1.61	0.76	1.61	0.79
2. The police in my neighborhood take time to listen to people?	1.67	0.84	1.65	0.84
3. The police in my neighborhood explain their decisions to people they deal with?	1.85	0.91	1.79	0.89
[Scale Alpha = .85]				
Police Legitimacy (1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree)	**1.57**	**0.64**	**1.56**	**0.63**
1. I have a great deal of respect for the police.	1.45	0.72	1.44	0.71
2. I feel proud of the police.	1.59	0.81	1.64	0.83
3. Overall, the police are honest.	1.69	0.87	1.66	0.82
4. I feel people should support the police.	1.26	0.55	1.22	0.52
5. The police enforce laws consistently when dealing with all people in my neighborhood.	1.65	0.81	1.65	0.83
6. The police provide the same quality of service to all citizens in my neighborhood.	1.77	0.95	1.73	0.92
[Scale Alpha = .89]				
Likelihood of Arrest and Imprisonment for Drug Dealing (1 = Very Likely to 5 = Very Unlikely)				
1. How likely is it that a person selling drugs in your neighborhood will be arrested?	2.14	1.03	2.13	1.03
2. How likely is it that a person arrested for selling drugs in your neighborhood will be prosecuted and imprisoned?	2.25	1.01	2.29	0.99
Police Effort in Responding to Neighborhood Crime Problems (1 = A lot of Effort; 2 = Some Effort; 3 = No Effort)				
1. How much effort do you think the police have made in dealing with theft and burglary in your area in the last two months?	1.88	0.67	1.79	0.62
2. How much effort do you think the police have made in dealing with drug dealing in your area in the last two months?	1.94	0.68	1.84	0.69
3. How much effort do you think the police have made in dealing with gangs in your area in the last two months?	1.99	0.72	1.86	0.74
4. How much effort do you think the police have made in dealing with abandoned buildings in your area in the last two months?	2.28	0.76	2.16	0.79
5. How much effort do you think the police made in dealing with loitering in your area in the last two months?	2.17	0.73	2.06	0.75

Table 6: Resident Perceptions of the Severity of Community Crime Problems and Police Effort to Control Crime

Severity of Neighborhood Crime Problems in Lansing (1 = A Major Problem; 2 = Minor Problem; 3 = Not a Problem)

	Theft				Drug Dealing				Gangs				Abandoned Buildings[c]				Loitering			
	Time 1[c]		Time 2 [a,c]		Time 1[e]		Time 2 [f]		Time 1		Time 2		Time 1[e]		Time 2 [c,e]		Time 1		Time 2	
Neighborhood	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Treatment 1	2.42	0.67	2.17	0.71	2.34	0.78	2.33	0.74	2.80	0.47	2.76	0.47	2.58	0.65	2.41	0.76	2.50	0.71	2.46	0.68
Treatment 2	2.52	0.66	2.48	0.60	2.21	0.74	2.34	0.70	2.72	0.57	2.80	0.45	2.40	0.74	2.38	0.73	2.41	0.72	2.48	0.67
Comparison 1	2.55	0.65	2.35	0.70	2.37	0.73	2.30	0.71	2.78	0.48	2.74	0.54	2.57	0.65	2.52	0.66	2.55	0.70	2.45	0.73
Comparison 2	2.72	0.57	2.58	0.54	2.59	0.68	2.58	0.65	2.77	0.49	2.86	0.38	2.73	0.51	2.72	0.56	2.65	0.59	2.70	0.49
Total	2.55*	0.64	2.39*	0.66	2.37*	0.74	2.38*	0.71	2.77	0.50	2.78	0.47	2.57*	0.65	2.49*	0.70	2.53	0.69	2.52*	0.66

Effort of Police to Solve Neighborhood Crime Problems in Lansing (1 = A lot of Effort; 2 = Some Effort; 3 = No Effort)

	Theft				Drug Dealing				Gangs				Abandoned Buildings				Loitering			
	Time 1		Time 2		Time 1		Time 2		Time 1		Time 2		Time 1		Time 2		Time 1		Time 2	
Neighborhood	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Treatment 1	1.79	0.64	1.69	0.60	1.94	0.72	1.77	0.69	1.94	0.70	1.80	0.76	2.26	0.77	2.17	0.84	2.09	0.76	2.01	0.77
Treatment 2	1.94	0.67	1.90	0.62	1.94	0.63	1.92	0.67	2.05	0.70	1.86	0.69	2.33	0.76	2.17	0.81	2.12	0.71	2.11	0.77
Comparison 1	1.95	0.66	1.73	0.58	1.94	0.67	1.74	0.69	1.95	0.72	1.82	0.74	2.27	0.73	2.10	0.74	2.15	0.71	1.97	0.68
Comparison 2	1.80	0.70	1.84	0.69	1.97	0.72	1.96	0.72	2.04	0.78	2.01	0.76	2.27	0.79	2.20	0.78	2.33	0.74	2.19	0.78
Total	1.88	0.67	1.79	0.62	1.94	0.68	1.84	0.69	1.99	0.72	1.86	0.74	2.28	0.76	2.16	0.79	2.17	0.73	2.06	0.75

* = Significant Difference Across Neighborhoods (ANOVA) p < .05

For significant Bonferonni Post Hoc Tests (p < .05) a = Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2; b = Treatment 1 vs. Comparison 1; c = Treatment 1 vs. Comparison 2; d = Treatment 2 vs. Comparison 1;
e = Treatment 2 vs Comparison 2; f = Comparison 1 vs. Comparison 2

note: Difference in difference analyses revealed one significant difference across time, with comparison area 1 demonstrating a significant increase in community perceptions of police effort to resolve issues of loitering in their neighborhood. These analyses were limited to panel sample respondents.

Table 7: Perceived Likelihood of Arrest and Imprisonment by Neighborhood and Across Time

| | Likelihood of Arrest for Drug Dealing | | | | | |
| | Time 1 | | Time 2 | | Change (T2-T1)[1] | |
Neighborhood	**Mean**	S.D.	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Treatment 1	**2.15**	1.00	**1.95**	0.97	**-0.02**	0.95
Treatment 2	**2.21**	1.01	**2.26**	1.01	**0.05**	0.95
Comparison 1	**2.18**	1.02	**2.08**	1.02	**-0.13**	0.85
Comparison 2	**2.02**	1.07	**2.22**	1.13	**-0.11**	1.05
Total	**2.14**	1.03	**2.13**	1.03	**-0.06**	0.94

note: There are no significant differences across place or time.

| | Likelihood of Imprisonment for Drug Dealing | | | | | |
| | Time 1 | | Time 2 | | Change (T2-T1)[1] | |
Neighborhood	**Mean**	S.D.	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Treatment 1	**2.32**	0.98	**2.30**	0.99	**-0.05**	1.18
Treatment 2	**2.41**	1.04	**2.33**	0.89	**-0.08**	1.08
Comparison 1	**2.14**	0.96	**2.17**	1.02	**-0.12**	1.27
Comparison 2	**2.16**	1.07	**2.38**	1.05	**-0.07**	1.24
Total	**2.25**	1.01	**2.29**	0.99	**-0.08**	1.19

notes: There are no significant differences across place or time.

Response categories were coded as: 1 = Very Likely; 2 = Somewhat Likely;
3 = Somewhat Unlikely; 4 = Very Unlikely.

[1] Models comparing change over time include only panel sample respondents.

Table 8: Resident Perceptions of Procedural Justice Across Neighborhoods and Time

| | Procedural Justice | | | | | |
| | Time 1 | | Time 2 | | Change (T2-T1)[1] | |
Neighborhood	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Treatment 1	**1.68**	0.69	**1.56**	0.67	**0.05**	0.53
Treatment 2	**1.76**	0.81	**1.83**	0.69	**0.13**	0.73
Comparison 1	**1.79**	0.68	**1.69**	0.71	**-0.12**	0.56
Comparison 2	**1.52**	0.68	**1.62**	0.81	**-0.01**	0.56
Total	**1.70***	0.74	**1.68***	0.72	**0.00**	0.60

* $p < .05$ (ANOVA)
note: Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between comparison areas
1 and 2 at time 1. Post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between treatment areas
1 and 2 at time 2.

Response categories range from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree.

[1] Models comparing change over time include only panel sample respondents.

Table 9: Resident Perceptions of Police Legitimacy Across Neighborhoods and Time

	Police Legitimacy					
	Time 1		Time 2		Change (T2-T1)[1]	
Neighborhood	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Treatment 1	**1.58**	0.65	**1.47**	0.63	**-0.07**	0.55
Treatment 2	**1.66**	0.75	**1.73**	0.68	**0.11**	0.49
Comparison 1	**1.62**	0.62	**1.51**	0.51	**-0.04**	0.38
Comparison 2	**1.38**	0.50	**1.53**	0.68	**0.07**	0.42
Total	**1.57***	0.64	**1.56***	0.63	**0.01**	0.46

* $p < .05$ (ANOVA)

note: Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that comparison area 2 was significantly different than comparison area 1 and treatment area 2 at time 1. Post hoc tests revealed significant differences between treatment areas1 and 2 as well as between treatment area 2 and comparison

area 1 at time 2. Response categories range from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree.

[1] Models comparing change over time include only panel sample respondents.

Table 10: Perceived Likelihood and Fear of Victimization by Neighborhood and Time

Perceived Risk of Victimization

	Time 1		Time 2		Change (T2-T1)[1]	
Neighborhood	**Mean**	S.D.	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Treatment 1	**3.02**	0.85	**2.99**	0.87	**0.00**	0.52
Treatment 2	**3.10**	0.84	**3.12**	0.69	**-0.01**	0.49
Comparison 1	**3.01**	0.82	**2.87**	0.83	**-0.16**	0.59
Comparison 2	**3.23**	0.66	**3.20**	0.73	**0.01**	0.70
Total	**3.08**	0.80	**3.04***	0.79	**-.05**	.58

note: Bonferonni post hoc tests for time 2 suggest a significant difference between comparison areas 1 and 2 on perceived risk of victimization.

Fear of Victimization

	Time 1		Time 2		Change (T2-T1)[1]	
Neighborhood	**Mean**	S.D.	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Treatment 1	**3.11**	0.86	**3.18**	0.87	**0.07**	0.65
Treatment 2	**3.20**	0.88	**3.24**	0.80	**0.05**	0.69
Comparison 1	**3.15**	0.83	**3.06**	0.90	**-0.15**	0.53
Comparison 2	**3.27**	0.86	**3.33**	0.83	**0.07**	0.61
Total	**3.18**	0.85	**3.20**	0.85	**0.00**	0.62

note: There were no significant differences across place or time.

Respective respone categories ranged from 1 = Very Likely/Afraid; 2 = somewhat likely /somewhat afraid; 3 = somewhat unlikely/a little afraid; 4 = very unlikely/not at all afraid.

[1] Models comparing change over time include only panel sample respondents.

Table 11: Respondent reports of collective efficacy by neighborhood and across time

	Collective Efficacy					
	Time 1		Time 2		Change (T2-T1)[1]	
Neighborhood	**Mean**	S.D.	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Treatment 1	**2.21**	0.33	**2.24**	0.38	**0.10**	0.40
Treatment 2	**2.27**	0.34	**2.25**	0.38	**-0.07**	0.36
Comparison 1	**2.25**	0.33	**2.25**	0.34	**-0.10**	0.34
Comparison 2	**2.31**	0.37	**2.34**	0.38	**0.05**	0.34
Total	**2.26**	0.34	**2.27**	0.37	**-0.01***	0.37

* $p < .05$ (ANOVA); Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed a significant difference
in change in collective efficacy between treatment 1 and comparison 1 communities.

[1] Models comparing change over time include only panel sample respondents.

Table 12 Participants in DMI Program

Date	Invitees	Attended	Referred to Services	Successfully Completed Services
July 2010	5	3	3	2
November 2010	16	7	5	2
August 2011*	11	9	6	3
February 2012	7	4	4	3
Total	39	23	18	10

Table 13: Characteristics of arrestee sample

	2010	2011	2012	Total
Gender – percent male	82.8	90.5	88.4	83.6
Race/Ethnicity				
Black	60.3	42.9	72.3	58.5
Hispanic	4.6	9.5	1.2	5.1
White	33.3	42.9	27.0	34.4
Age (mean)	30.2	29.9	30.5	30.2
Number prior arrests (mean)	8.34	8.62	8.15	8.37

Table 14: Attitudes toward the police among arrestees

	2010	2011	2012	Total
Agree police treat people in neighborhood with dignity and respect	42.7	42.9	42.5	42.7
Agree police take time to listen to people	44.7	30.0	49.5	43.1
Agree police explain their decisions to people they deal with	48.2	31.6	47.3	46.5
Agree I have respect for the police	53.2	50.4	55.1	52.9
Agree I feel proud of the police	33.9	35.5	32.6	34.0
Agree the police are honest	42.4	30.3	50.2	41.1
Agree people should support the police	74.7	68.4	79.2	74.1

Table 15: Arrestees attitudes toward drug buying drugs

	2010			2011			2012		
	P	**G**	**VG**	**P**	**G**	**VG**	**P**	**G**	**VG**
The chances of getting **arrested** for buying illegal drugs	50.9	27.3	21.8	38.1	33.3	28.6	49.5	28.0	22.6
The chances of getting **convicted** for buying illegal drugs	19.2	41.3	39.5	23.8	28.6	47.6	19.7	39.9	40.4
The chances of going to **prison** for buying illegal drugs	42.2	29.2	28.6	38.1	38.1	23.8	41.8	30.2	28.0

P – poor; G- good; VG- very good

Table 16: Arrestees attitudes toward drug selling drugs

	2010			2011			2012		
	P	**G**	**VG**	**P**	**G**	**VG**	**P**	**G**	**VG**
The chances of getting **arrested** for selling illegal drugs	25.3	38.2	36.5	5.0	70.0	25.0	23.2	41.6	35.3
The chances of getting **convicted** for selling illegal drugs	19.5	38.5	42.0	4.8	52.4	42.9	17.9	40.0	42.1
The chances of going to **prison** for selling illegal drugs	27.5	36.5	35.9	20.0	45.0	35.0	26.7	37.4	35.8

P – poor; G- good; VG- very good

Table 17: Arrestees attitude toward the DMI (vignette results)

Which approach is more effective at reducing neighborhood crime?	Traditional	DMI
Vignette A	5.8	19.2
Vignette B	1.9	23.1
Vignette C	3.8	9.8
Vignette D	3.8	13.5

Which approach is fairer to the offenders in the neighborhood?	Traditional	DMI
Vignette A	3.8	19.2
Vignette B	5.8	19.2
Vignette C	2.0	11.8
Vignette D	9.6	9.6

Which approach is fairer to the citizens in the neighborhood?	Traditional	DMI
Vignette A	7.7	15.4
Vignette B	7.7	15.4
Vignette C	0	11.8
Vignette D	7.7	13.5

Appendix

Vignette A

Two cities are taking different approaches to drug enforcement. We would like your opinion about the effectiveness and the fairness of each approach. In city A, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. All ten individuals with prior felony convictions were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records had the charges dismissed (Traditional Enforcement).

1. How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

2. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

3. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

4. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

In city B, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. The ten with serious prior records were prosecuted and imprisoned. The ten without serious prior records were not immediately prosecuted, but were warned that if they continue to deal drugs they would also be prosecuted and imprisoned. They were also provided with an opportunity to participate in services such as job training, mentoring, and drug treatment (DMI).

1.   How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

2. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

3. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

4. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

5. Which approach do you believe is more effective in reducing neighborhood crime?

    City A   City B   Neither

6. Which approach do you believe is fairer to the offender?

    City A   City B   Neither

7. Which approach do you believe is fairer to citizens in the neighborhood?

    City A   City B   Neither

8. Which approach do you believe is fairer to society in general?

    City A   City B   Neither

Vignette B
Two cities are taking different approaches to drug enforcement. We would like your opinion about the effectiveness and the fairness of each approach. In city A, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. The ten with serious prior records were prosecuted and imprisoned. The ten without serious prior records were not immediately prosecuted, but were warned that if they continue to deal drugs they would also be prosecuted and imprisoned. They were also provided with an opportunity to participate in services such as job training, mentoring, and drug treatment (DMI).

9.   How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

10. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

11. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

12. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

In city B, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. All ten individuals with prior felony convictions were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five individuals without serious records had the charges dismissed (Traditional Enforcement).

1. How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

2. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

3. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

4. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair
5. Which approach do you believe is more effective in reducing neighborhood crime?

   City A   City B   Neither

6. Which approach do you believe is fairer to the offender?

   City A   City B   Neither

7. Which approach do you believe is fairer to citizens in the neighborhood?

   City A   City B   Neither

8. Which approach do you believe is fairer to society in general?

City A   City B   Neither

Vignette C

Two cities are taking different approaches to drug enforcement. We would like your opinion about the effectiveness and the fairness of each approach. In city A, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. Five of the individuals with prior felony convictions were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five of the individuals with prior felony convictions were placed on probation. All ten of the individuals without serious records had the charges dismissed (Traditional Enforcement).

13.   How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

14. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

15. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

16. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

In city B, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. The ten with serious prior records were prosecuted and imprisoned. The ten without serious prior records were not immediately prosecuted, but were warned that if they continue to deal drugs they would also be prosecuted and imprisoned. They were also provided with an opportunity to participate in services such as job training, mentoring, and drug treatment (DMI).

9.   How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

10. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

11. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

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Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

12. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

13. Which approach do you believe is more effective in reducing neighborhood crime?

   City A   City B   Neither

14. Which approach do you believe is fairer to the offender?

   City A   City B   Neither

15. Which approach do you believe is fairer to citizens in the neighborhood?

   City A   City B   Neither

16. Which approach do you believe is fairer to society in general?

   City A   City B   Neither

   Vignette D
   Two cities are taking different approaches to drug enforcement. We would like your opinion
   about the effectiveness and the fairness of each approach. In city A, 20 individuals were arrested
   for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony
   convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior
   records. The ten with serious prior records were prosecuted and imprisoned. The ten without
   serious prior records were not immediately prosecuted, but were warned that if they continue to
   deal drugs they would also be prosecuted and imprisoned. They were also provided with an
   opportunity to participate in services such as job training, mentoring, and drug treatment (DMI).

17.   How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

18. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

19. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

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20. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

In city B, 20 individuals were arrested for selling crack cocaine in one neighborhood. Ten of those arrested had prior felony convictions and had previously committed violent offenses. Ten did not have serious prior records. Five of the individuals with prior felony convictions were prosecuted and imprisoned. Five of the individuals with prior felony convictions were placed on probation. All ten of the individuals without serious records had the charges dismissed (Traditional Enforcement).

17. How effective do you believe this approach is to reducing neighborhood crime?

Very effective Effective   Somewhat effective   Not very effective Not at all effective

18. How fair do you believe this approach is to the offender?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

19. How fair do you believe this approach is to citizens in the neighborhood?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

20. How fair do you believe this approach is to society in general?

Very fair   Fair   Somewhat fair   Not very fair   Not at all fair

21. Which approach do you believe is more effective in reducing neighborhood crime?

City A   City B   Neither

22. Which approach do you believe is fairer to the offender?

City A   City B   Neither

23. Which approach do you believe is fairer to citizens in the neighborhood?

City A   City B   Neither

24. Which approach do you believe is fairer to society in general?

City A   City B   Neither

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