

Violence Reduction in Joliet, Illinois:
An Evaluation of the Strategic Tactical Deployment Program

Prepared by:

Robert M. Lombardo

Ira Sommers

Loyola University, Chicago

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	viii
Introduction	1
Literature Review	5
Hot-Spot Policing	6
Police-Corrections Partnerships	8
Evidence-Based Policing	13
Strategic Tactical Deployment	16
Area-Based Crime Response	18
Probation Cooperation	19
Parole Cooperation	22
Parole Compliance Checks	23
Community Outreach and Education	25
Summary of STD Effort	26
Evaluation	26
Theory of Change	28
Logic Model	29
Qualitative Methods	30
STD Meeting Observations	30
Field Observations and Interviews	31
Findings	31
Quantitative Methods	34
STD Areas	34

Data	35
Research Design	37
Results	41
Difference-in-Difference Poisson Regression Models	46
Conclusion	49
Study Limitations	50
References	52

List of Tables

Table 1 Exchange of Information with Probation	20
Table 2 Sample Parole Compliance Check Findings	24
Table 3 Number of Observations and Interviews	31
Table 4 Number of Shots Fired and Robberies, January 2005 – September 2011	35
Table 5 Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery	42
Table 6 Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery STD Areas (Sectors 11, 16, 22)	45
Table 7 Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery, Non-STD Areas	46
Table 8 DiD Poisson regression Results of Confirmed Shots Fired	48
Table 9 DiD Poisson regression Results of Robberies	48

List of Figures

Figure 1 Kernel Density Map	17
Figure 2 Tag Line and Logo – It’s OK to Report Gun Violence in Joliet	26
Figure 3 Logic Model	29
Figure 4 Confirmed Shots Fired, January 2005 – September 2011	36
Figure 5 Robberies, January 2005 – September 2011	37
Figure 6 Confirmed Shots Fired for STD Areas (Sectors 11, 16, 22), January 2005 – September 2011	43
Figure 7 Confirmed Shots Fired for Non STD Areas, January 2005 – September 2011	45

Appendix

Appendix 1 Strategic Tactical Deployment Meeting Report

Appendix 2 Strategic Tactical Deployment Activity Summary Report

Appendix 3 Field Interview Card

Appendix 4 Strategic Tactical Deployment Map

Appendix 5 Strategic Tactical Deployment Roll-Call Training

Appendix 6 Exchanges of Information with Probation

Appendix 7 Intelligence Bulletin

Appendix 8 Parole Compliance Check Findings

Appendix 9 Joliet SMART Policing Logo and Tag Line Design Contest

Executive Summary

From October 2010 through September 2012, the Joliet, Illinois Police Department engaged in the Strategic Tactical Deployment (STD) program aimed at reducing gun violence. The program involved the weekly analysis of crime data and the subsequent deployment of STD officers in the coming week. While similar to hot-spot policing, the STD strategy was supplemented with the exchange of information with probation and parole authorities in an effort to remove violent offenders from the community. The Joliet Police Department also participated in a community outreach program to increase citizen reporting of gun violence and subsequent cooperation with the police.

The purpose of this study, funded by the Office of Justice Programs, was to evaluate the success of the Strategic Tactical Deployment effort. To accomplish this evaluation, researchers used both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. The qualitative analysis utilized a process evaluation to determine the extent to which the Joliet Police Department understood and implemented the proposed research strategy. Qualitative data were gathered through observations of STD meetings, field observations, and interviews of program participants. The goal of the qualitative analysis was twofold. First, researchers sought to determine the extent to which the STD program was implemented by Joliet police personnel. Second, qualitative methods were utilized to discover the utility of the exchange of information between police and probation/parole authorities.

Quantitative methods were used to determine: 1) whether the STD process had an impact on gun violence in Joliet, 2) whether violent crime was impacted by the STD strategy, and 3) the impact of enhanced cooperation with probation and parole authorities. Data analyzed included indicators of violent crime, the location of STD zones, and police activity measures. The police

activity measures were used to measure the impact of increased law enforcement efforts within the STD deployment zones. Measures included the number of strategic tactical deployments, the number of arrests affected by STD personnel, and the number of probation/parole contacts made by STD personnel. Sociological and demographic variables were also included to control for potential differences between the STD areas. To further assess and clarify the potential impact of the STD strategy on violent crime, we conducted an interrupted time series quasi-experiment.

Overall, the Joliet Police Department was successful in implementing the STD process: crime and intelligence data were analyzed, STD areas were determined, officers were redeployed to the STD hot spot areas, and information was regularly exchanged with probation and parole authorities. In addition, a time-series analysis provided evidence that the STD intervention did lead to reduced levels of gun violence. While modest, greater reductions in shots fired calls were achieved in the STD areas when compared to the non-STD areas, however, both areas had reductions. Although the results indicate a reduction in shots fired during the intervention periods, these reductions were not statistically significant. While these findings support the argument that directed police patrols can have a positive effect on crime further research is called for.

Introduction

The Joliet Police Department is the fourth largest municipal law enforcement agency in the state of Illinois employing 247 sworn officers with an operating budget of \$37,986,375. In 2009, Joliet handled 111,274 calls for service and made 6,575 arrests. The 2010 U. S. Census reports that the city of Joliet has a population of 147,133 persons, covering an area of 38.3 square miles.

Joliet is located 35 miles southwest of the city of Chicago in Will County, the fastest-growing area of the state of Illinois. Founded over 150 years ago, Joliet once had a strong manufacturing-based economy that has since diversified into other areas. As a result, Joliet enjoyed an 89% population increase in the twenty years between 1990 and 2010. Even with this significant population increase, Joliet has enjoyed a decreasing crime rate. Over the past ten years, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) violent crime (homicide, criminal sexual assault, and aggravated assault) decreased by 52% per 100,000 residents. Unfortunately, some types of violent crime, specifically gun violence, were not represented in this trend.

As an older, industrial city, Joliet has long struggled with a formidable gang problem. After a relatively quiet decade, gang-related shootings began to increase in Joliet in 2006. Gang-related shootings ranged from a low of 78% of all shootings in 2005 to a high of 84% in 2007. While other types of violent crime were falling in Joliet, gun related crime continued to rise. The need for strategies to control gun crime became critical. If police could get more guns off the street, hopefully, there would be fewer gun crimes.

Joliet police have identified 3,142 active gang members in their city, and an estimated 10,000 associates. In 2010, a documented shooting incident (homicide, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, or reckless discharge of a firearm) occurred every two days in Joliet. This number does not include “shots fired” calls, where no tangible evidence

is found that a shooting occurred, nor does it include unreported incidents. To exacerbate this problem, officers often encounter a multitude of witnesses, all of whom are unwilling to provide any information about the shootings, the direct result of which has been an arrest rate of only 16% over the past 5 years for these types of offenses.

In 2007, the Joliet Police Department implemented an intelligence-based, rapid response program to address the shooting problem. Dubbed “Strategic Tactical Deployment,” this program involves weekly analyses of the following incidents: shootings, weapons seizures, robberies, criminal sexual assaults, drug arrests, burglaries, burglaries to motor vehicles, gang-related graffiti, recent gang intelligence, and parolee information. All are discussed with key members of the department and a collaborative decision is made (based on spatial and temporal analysis) of the best way to deploy patrol resources in the coming week.

Even though Joliet experienced short-term success with the Strategic Tactical Deployment initiative, police recognized that such “hot-spot” policing may be more effective when practiced in conjunction with a tailored, problem-solving strategy. Research on effective problem-oriented policing methods to address gun violence suggest that several approaches may be taken including arrest warrant sweeps targeting known offenders, creating witness incentives, and implementing a “pulling levers” focused deterrence strategy.

Given the large number of probationers and parolees in the city, Joliet police began a new problem-solving approach. In cooperation with the Will County Adult Probation Department and the Illinois Department of Corrections, an information sharing partnership was forged between all three agencies. The intelligence-based, police deployment strategy generated from the weekly Strategic Tactical Deployment meeting was expanded to include information and participation from these two agencies; the final goal being to reduce gun violence in Joliet.

On average, 2,000 people are sentenced to probation in Will County every year, the majority of whom reside in Joliet. Due to large caseloads, 98% of these persons receive only two or three home visits a year from probation officers. There are also approximately 600 parolees living within the city limits at any given time. A key proposition in criminology is that a significant proportion of crime is committed by a relatively small group of persistent or prolific offenders. Targeting these individuals, so the argument goes, will be one of the most effective ways of delivering reductions in crime (Moffitt, 1993; Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972). Although the specific numbers of persistent offenders and recidivism for Joliet is unavailable, the Urban Institute found that 59% of all Illinois offenders were rearrested within three years of release from prison (Yahner and Visser, 2008).

The Strategic Tactical Deployment program expanded Joliet's hot-spot policing effort from several perspectives: partnership with probation and parole, evidence-based policing, increased communication and public outreach, and formal evaluation. The goal of evidence-based policing is to turn research into practice. The STD program incorporated a number of proven "smart policing" activities including strategic manpower deployment, a "compstat" model command and control function, and a collaborative partnerships with the Will County Adult Probation Department and the Illinois Department of Corrections in an effort to reduce gun violence.

The new collaborative approach included strong information-sharing partnerships between the Joliet Police Department and probation and parole, beginning with the dissemination of the names, addresses, and terms of release of current probationers and recent parolees. This information was analyzed, integrated, and shared at Strategic Tactical Deployment meetings, where weekly geo-focused Strategic Tactical Deployment assignments were made. By distributing this information, street-level officers were able to use probation/parole information

to assist them in their shooting investigations. Police officers also became additional, around the clock, eyes and ears for probation and parole authorities.

The results of the use of probation/parole information by field personnel were also integrated into future Strategic Tactical Deployment meetings in order to implement an evidence-based policing approach to the gun violence problem in Joliet. This “feedback loop” allowed Joliet to evaluate their successes and failures and to apply what they learned on a real-time basis. For example, a number of specific applications of sharing probation and parole information were utilized:

- Gang-involved parolees and probationers were identified, monitored, and cross-checked on a regular basis with shooting incidents.
- Joliet police officers assisted Illinois Department of Corrections parole officers when they conducted sweeps of parolees.
- Top ten lists of problem individuals were collectively created increasing information among participating agencies,
- Joliet police notified probation and parole of problem probationers/parolees, thus enabling them to attend STD meetings and share additional information on these persons.
- Attending STD meetings apprised probation and parole officers of current hotspots in Joliet, thereby increasing probation and parole officer safety.
- Joliet police officers accompanied probation officers when they confiscated weapons after a court conviction, thereby reducing the number of weapons available on the street.
- Probation and parole violations were used to apprehend suspects and witnesses in homicide and shooting investigations who might be willing to provide information once they were in custody.
- Joliet police officers cooperated in building cases on parolees and probationers who had violated the terms of their release.

These and other applications of probation/parole information were continually analyzed at the STD meetings in order to determine the best practice use of probation and parole information as well as other collaborative approaches to addressing gun violence.

Finally, community policing has demonstrated the importance of involving citizens in law enforcement efforts. Whether the police are successful or not, citizens are often more satisfied with police efforts that include the local community. As such, Joliet's Strategic Tactical Deployment program was expanded to include a marketing campaign to enlist the cooperation of local residents. This campaign not only sought citizen input, but also targeted community members who witnessed shootings and were reluctant to come forward with information.

While violent crime in Joliet has decreased following the national trend, the purpose of this study is to determine what percentage of this reduction can be attributed to the STD process. Before beginning the evaluation, Joliet personnel and Loyola University researchers reviewed the relevant academic research in order to gain a greater understanding of evidence-based and hot-spot policing, as well as police corrections partnerships. A review of this research is contained in the following section.

Literature Review

The Joliet Strategic Tactical Deployment (STD) initiative is a crime reduction strategy aimed at reducing gun violence. The STD process involves identifying areas with the highest rates of violent crime and allocating additional police resources to these areas in an effort to reduce gun-related crime. The STD effort is supplemented by an exchange of information with probation and parole authorities in an effort to identify and remove violent offenders from the community. Thus this effort not only targets geographic areas, but also active offenders. As such, the STD process combines both elements of hot-spot policing and police/probation partnerships.

This research follows an evidence-based approach. The goal of evidence-based policing is to turn research into practice. This section provides an overview of the literature on hot-spot policing, police/probation partnerships, as well as a review of evidence-based policing.

Hot-Spot policing

A hot spot is an area that has a greater than average number of crimes or where people have a greater than average risk of victimization. Hot-spot policing is a police strategy that directs additional police resources to these areas to suppress crime through preventive patrol and criminal apprehension. Hot-spot policing has become a core strategy of American policing. Directed patrols, problem-solving, and proactive arrest strategies are all routinely used by police agencies to apprehend criminals in high-crime areas. Hot-spot policing emerged from a body of research suggesting that crime is not spread evenly across the urban landscape, but concentrated in high-risk places (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Weisburd, Maher, and Sherman, 1992).

The emergence of hot-spot policing contrasted with earlier views of crime control. Studies such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al, 1974), research on calling the police in Minneapolis (Spelman and Brown, 1984), and the RAND Criminal Investigation Study (Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia, 1977) all challenged the ability of the police to control crime. Recent research, however, has shed new light on the effectiveness of the police. For example, Weisburd and Sherman (1995) conducted research that challenged the findings of the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment. Working with the Minneapolis Police Department, the authors studied the effect of increases in patrols at 55 of 110 crime hot spots within the city. Hot spots were defined as small clusters of addresses with frequent calls for police service. After one year of study, the authors concluded that substantial increases in patrol reduced crime and disorder in high crime areas.

In spite of success in Minneapolis, hot spot-policing has been criticized for displacing crime to other areas (Repetto, 1976). That is, police intervention simply causes criminals to move to unprotected places. At the same time, there is a body of research that argues that the effects of hot-spot policing spill over into places adjacent to the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994). For example, the Kansas City Gun experiment examined whether gun crimes were displaced into the seven patrol beats contiguous to the target area (Sherman, & Rogan, 1995). Contrary to the displacement argument, none of the contiguous beats showed significant increases in gun crime and two of the contiguous beats reported significant decreases in gun crimes.

The Kansas City Gun experiment was also important because it supported the argument that intensive police patrol near gun crime hot spots could lead to a reduction in violent crime. According to the Kansas City argument, added patrols increased gun seizures, which in turn reduced violent crime (Sherman and Rogan, 1995). In addition, it was believed that increased patrol visibility in the hot spot areas would generally deter all other types of crime. While the authors admit that their quasi-experimental design requires further testing, their results suggest that directed patrols can reduce gun violence.

In 1997, Indianapolis implemented a 90-day directed patrol project similar to the Kansas City study in an effort to reduce gun violence, “drive-by” shootings, and homicides. The results of the evaluation indicate that directed police patrols in gun-crime hot spots can reduce gun violence by increasing the seizures of illegally carried firearms (McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss, 2002). In Indianapolis, the police worked closely with citizens within the targeted communities to secure community support and address their concerns. The researchers found that gun crime declined 6 percent in the areas of intervention, while increasing 8 percent in similar comparison

areas. They concluded that “focused deterrence” (targeted enforcement) sent a message of increased surveillance to those individuals most likely to commit gun-related crimes.

Hot-spot policing is supported by both rational choice (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Rational choice theory argues that offenders calculate the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of actions and, from these calculations, make a choice that maximizes the expected benefits. Rational choice models assume that the range of alternatives open to actors is constrained by the environment and by the situations within which they make their decisions (Simpson, 2006). As such, it could be argued that hot-spot policing increases the potential cost of crime because of the added police presence and the resulting increased chance of apprehension. Routine activities theory argues that three elements must be present for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and the absence of a capable guardian. This “crime triangle” can be directly affected by hot-spot policing. Hot-spot policing, by its very nature, increases the number of capable guardians (police) within a particular area or at a specific place thus deterring crime.

Hot-spot policing generally involves the increased use of routine police strategies such as preventative patrol. Hot-spot policing, however, can also be combined with problem-solving strategies such as tavern closings, zero-tolerance enforcement, and police-corrections partnerships. In fact, evidence suggests that hot-spot policing may be more effective when combined with other crime-control strategies.

Police-Corrections Partnerships

Police intervention has long been recognized as an effective way to prevent crime. A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the effectiveness of police intervention is partnership with correctional agencies. Police-corrections partnerships seek to reduce crime through the

added supervision of offenders. While police typically seek out “new” crimes, establishing relationships with probation and parole authorities gives police the added ability of removing criminals from the community for violating the conditions of their probation or parole. This added supervision carries a message of both specific and general deterrence by providing an additional mechanism of offender incapacitation and informing the criminal community that crime will not be tolerated.

In 1999, Parent and Snyder reviewed fourteen police-corrections partnerships for the National Institute of Justice. Included in this review was an analysis of six “enhanced supervision” programs involving police, probation, and parole authorities. While the authors provided scant empirical evidence on how well these police-corrections partnerships worked, criminal justice practitioners and policymakers continue to show great interest in the potential of these approaches.

Probably the most widely known example of police-corrections cooperation is Boston’s Operation Night Light, an innovative program that teamed police and juvenile probation officers. Operation Night Light paired one probation officer and two police officers, who together made surprise visits to the homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk probationers during the evening and overnight hours. Unlike police officers, probation officers have broad authority to stop and question offenders and, in some cases, immediately revoke their probation if the offender violates its conditions. Begun in 1992, Operation Night Light was considered to be an important part of Boston’s overall crime reduction strategy. So successful was Operation Night Light that more than twenty jurisdictions around the country have created some form of police-probation cooperation based upon the success of the Operation Night Light program.

Recognizing the lack of empirical support for police-probation partnerships, Worrall and Gaines (2006) conducted an analysis of a police-probation partnership program carried out in San Bernardino, California. Analyzing city-wide arrest statistics, the authors conducted an interrupted-time-series analysis using juvenile arrest data as a proxy for juvenile crime arguing that a decline in arrests represented a decrease in crime. Following the implementation of the Nightlight program, arrests for assault, burglary, and theft declined in San Bernardino, but had no effect on juvenile arrests for robbery and motor vehicle theft.

The Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI) also teamed police and probation officers in an effort to reduce violent crime. Two nights per week, MAVI teams performed home visits targeting offenders who had a history of violent crime, firearms offenses, and gang involvement. MAVI teams also participated in saturation patrols of high-crime areas of the city. While no formal evaluation of the program was conducted, the study concluded that conducting home visits accompanied by police officers had a significant impact on probation success and provided police with an invaluable opportunity to meet those under correctional supervision in their community.

A similar program was begun in Vancouver, Washington. The Vancouver police, working with the Clark County sheriff's office and the Washington Department of Corrections, began home visits of high-risk gang members in an effort to reduce gang crime. Parole officers used their authority to search the offender and the portion of the residence that he occupied. If a parole officer observed a violation of the law, the offender was placed under arrest. If they suspected criminal activity outside of the area occupied by the offender, police officers obtained a warrant to search the remaining portion of the premises. While crime continued to rise during the initiative, police felt that the program had encouraged people to report gang crime to the police.

In New Haven, Connecticut, Project One Voice formed a partnership between the local police and the state's probation and parole authorities. The goal of the project was to reduce drug-related and violent crime by providing enhanced supervision of the most criminally active offenders who were on probation, parole, or pretrial release. Twice a week, a team of one police officer and one probation officer patrolled New Haven and stopped probationers who they suspected of violating the conditions of their supervision. They also conducted unannounced home visits to confirm residency and curfew compliance. When police officers patrolled without probation officers, they carried notebooks identifying those probationers and parolees who they believed to be involved in gang activity and drug sales as well as information about their probation and parole restrictions. Like other enhanced supervision programs, no evaluation of Project One Voice has been conducted. In spite of the lack of a formal evaluation, local authorities believe that the heightened surveillance of probationers has led to increased conformity to supervision requirements.

Another innovative program was begun by the Redmond, Washington Police Department and the Washington State Department of Corrections. Named Smart Partners, the program had three components. The first involved training police officers as volunteer parole officers, who conducted random curfew and home visits to ensure that parolees were complying with their mandated curfews. It should be noted that police officers were not permitted to enter a parolee's residence without permission. Failing to give permission, however, was a violation of the offender's conditions of supervision. If the police officer was allowed to enter the residence and observed evidence of a crime, he could make a lawful arrest. The second component involved the notification of the department of corrections each time a person under correctional supervision came into contact with the police. The third component involved the notification of

the department of corrections each time a person on parole was booked for a criminal offense. While the Smart Partners' program has never been formally evaluated, it has been expanded to more than fifty cities and counties within Washington State.

In 1996, The Maricopa County Probation Department began the Neighborhood Probation project in an effort to reduce recidivism in the Coronado district of Phoenix, Arizona. Included in the project was a reciprocal relationship with local law enforcement. Police officers spent time in neighborhood probation offices, familiarizing themselves with probationers and provided backup for probation officers making home visits. In return, probation officers used their broader search powers to aid in police investigations. Like the other programs reviewed here, Maricopa County's neighborhood probation project has not been evaluated, but officials believe that the program has contributed to a decrease in crime in the Coronado district.

As this review has shown, there has been great interest in police-corrections partnerships. In spite of these efforts, however, there has been little formal evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs. Additionally, not all the literature on police-corrections partnerships has been positive. Studying police-probation partnerships, Corbett (1998) identified three problems that can occur when multiple agencies work together: organizational lag, mission creep, and mission distortion. Organizational lag occurs when administrators introduce a new program without adequately funding or staffing the effort. Mission creep occurs when the cooperative effort expands the duties of existing personnel. Finally, mission distortion occurs when participants overstep their authority such as police officers who use home visits as a pretext to search for guns and drugs without seeking a search warrant.

Evidence-Based Policing

Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research to guide police practice (Sherman, 1998). Evidence-based policing traces its origin to the medical profession where practice based in research is routinely used to treat patients. In the early 1990s clinicians at McMaster's University began using the term "evidence-based medicine" to define the systemic use of published research as the basis of clinical decision making (Claridge and Fabian, 2005). Noted criminologist Lawrence Sherman (1998) proposed that the concept of evidence-based research be applied to policing arguing that policing should be more like medicine. Sherman (1998) defined evidence-based policing as using "the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers."

Traditionally, police work has been guided by the experience of the officers and not empirical evaluation. How a police officer acted in a specific situation was largely based on previous experience or the experiences of other police officers. Police believed that experience was the best teacher and that it gave them superior judgment (Sherman, 1984). Every situation was unique and, as a result, practices could not be generalized even if there was scientific evidence to support them. Experience taught lessons to police officers that they considered crucial to effective performance and career longevity (Bayley and Bitter, 1984).

Dempsey and Frost (2008) argue that police departments have traditionally been unwilling to deviate from "the way we've always done things mentality." In fact, Sherman (1984) argued that some police officers suffer from the "funnel effect" of experience. As time passes, they have less and less knowledge about how their actions affected a situation because of their reliance on past experience. Nevertheless, police have continued to allow experience to shape their goals, tactics, and presence (Bayley and Bitter, 1984). As a result, police practices remain untested.

Criminal justice decision making has been based on anecdotes, media attention, and political pressure (Sherman, 1998). Evidence-based policing shifts the focus of criminal justice decision making to the assessment of police practices through the collection of data, scientific analysis, and the creation of measureable outcomes.

Experience not only set the standard for police practice for many years, but was also believed to be better than empirical research. In fact, Hubert Williams (2010), writing for the Police Foundation, reports that it was a common view among police administrators and managers that they, like doctors, engineers, and lawyers, were the experts in the field of public safety. The boots on the ground, who put their lives on the line every day to protect the public were the experts; and they neither required nor desired outsiders who knew little, if anything, about their work to tell them how to do their jobs. Police officials were not only skeptical of outside involvement, but were also resentful of academics who they believed wanted to obtain police data and information for research purposes in order to promote themselves as experts in a field they knew little about.

While most police departments continued to hold experience in high regard, in the 1970s some police departments began participating in experimental research as a direct result of the influence of the Police Foundation (Williams 2010). The introduction of experimental research into policing by the Police Foundation was a major factor in breaking down the barriers between research and policing. It also opened the door for criminologists to become actively involved in empirical research. Three research experiments, sponsored by the Police Foundation, pushed research and ultimately evidence-based policing into the forefront: the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, and the Newark Fear Reduction Study.

All three of the above studies demonstrated the importance of research in policing. Kansas City and Newark opened their doors to research when experience was considered the best indicator of police effectiveness. These police departments helped to change policing from an institution known for being conservative and resistance to change, to suddenly standing out as the leader in criminal justice innovation (Weisburd and Eck, 2004:43). Even though each of these studies was unique, the overarching message from them is that police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best (Williams, 2010). As the number of challenges faced by the police increase, the demand for cost-efficient ways to achieve the goals of the police mission also increase. These studies show that the best way to establish cost-efficient methods is to base practice on empirical research. Evidence-based policing provides police departments with a level of expertise that is not achievable by basing practice solely on experience.

In spite of all the attention given to evidence-based policing, it is not without its critics. Sherman (1998) argues that problem-oriented policing is the basis of evidence-based policing. Those solutions that work become evidence-based practices. Bullock and Tilley (2009), however, argue that problem-oriented policing, in spite of its popularity in academic circles, has had little success. This position is supported by Herman Goldstein (2003), the father of police-problem solving, who wrote that “there was no discernible, sustained, consistent effort within policing to make the basic premise that ‘knowledge informs practice’ a routine part of policing.” While police may be slow to adapt evidence-based practices, and some doubt the success of problem-oriented policing, Goldstein’s (1990) seminal work and its link to community policing have led to numerous examples of police developing nontraditional responses to police problems including the highly touted Boston Gun Project, which focused on reducing youth violence by

analyzing crime patterns, creating solutions, and evaluating their impact; the same process employed by Joliet's Strategic Tactical Deployment program.


Strategic Tactical Deployment

The Joliet Police Department implemented the Strategic Tactical Deployment (STD) program in 2007. Each week, the Joliet Police Department holds a compstat-like meeting attended by supervisory and command personnel, during which current crime conditions are reviewed. Two computer-driven projectors are used to provide information about serious crimes, identify recent parolees and gang members, and provide other intelligence information. The presentation is created by the police department's intelligence analyst and a handout of the presentation is generally available. The city of Joliet is broken down into three police districts: East, Central and West. Specific attention is given to gang crimes, gun violence, and drug activity in each of these areas. This strategy was intended to supplement routine patrol and provide an offender-specific focus to regular police operations.

During the meeting, Strategic Tactical Deployment areas are chosen for the following week based upon a spatial and temporal analysis of the data. STD deployments are determined by reviewing the past thirty day, and hour and day of week, patterns of violent crime. In addition, kernel density maps (see Figure 1) are created based on the past week's activity (drug arrests, gang contact, parole contact, probation contact, robbery, weapon seizures, shots fired, aggravated discharge, reckless discharge, aggravated battery with a firearm, and homicide). Inputs are weighted depending upon the severity of the incident and STD areas are chosen for the upcoming week based upon the as collaborative discussion and the hotspot maps.

Figure 1

Kernel Density Map



STD deployments typically occur on weekends during the evening hours from 9:00 PM until 1:00 AM. Depending on manpower availability, one or two additional patrol units are assigned to preventative patrol in the STD areas each evening. The STD initiative is a voluntarily overtime program funded by a grant from the U. S. Bureau of Justice Assistance. The officers are asked to focus on violent crime and gang activity and are not required to answer routine calls for police service.

Those attending the STD meetings are also provided an STD Meeting report (Appendix 1), which is also available electronically to all Joliet police personnel over the department's computer system. The report contains detailed information about serious crime in each of Joliet's three police districts. The report also contains information about recent arrestees, parolees, and probationers residing in Joliet. (This information is not included in the appendix of this report for privacy reasons.)

New STD Activity Summary Reports (Appendix 2) and Field Interview Cards (Appendix 3) have been created for the STD program in order to accurately gather data for the project's evaluation. Officers assigned to STD patrols are also provided with an STD map (Appendix 4)

and are required to complete the STD Activity Summary Report, which has been redesigned to capture the following information: arrests, offense reports taken, compliance tickets issued, field interview cards written, weapons confiscated, foot patrol activity, traffic stops made, traffic citations issued, parking citations issued, and vehicles towed.

In addition, the STD Activity Summary Report includes the following STD Guidelines:

- Patrol only within the area designated on the map on the back of the report
- Field Interview (FI) Cards must be completed on all contacts made
- Zero tolerance should be utilized in the targeted areas

Activity is monitored on a weekly basis; those officers who fail to show enforcement activity are barred from future participation in the program. Although specific officers are assigned to the STD program, the whole police department is made aware of the STD effort and the STD area boundaries.

Area-Based Crime Response

On 26 August 2012, the Joliet Police Department changed the name of the Strategic Tactical Deployment (STD) program to Area-Based Crime (ABC) Response. Joliet announced that the name was changed in order to expand the program by infusing offender-based strategies into the already existing place-based program. While Joliet had focused on the exchange of information with probation and parole from the inception of the program, it was felt that greater communication was needed between the participating agencies. This new effort would continue to exchange information as in the past, but with a greater emphasis on working with both probation and parole to revoke the probation and parole status of violent offenders. In addition, Joliet announced that the program would now be managed by a committee of supervisory and command officers and increase its focus utilizing the following four discrete strategies:

- Better communication with probation and parole
- Enhanced data analysis
- Expanded intelligence processes to provide additional information to patrol officers
- Better focus on hot spot areas including parole sweeps, targeting of known offenders, and tracking tension between gang members.

To further gain cooperation and buy-in from patrol officers, roll call training sessions were held. The training was attended by every police officer involved in the STD program and included a twelve-slide presentation and a question and answer period (Appendix 5). Included in the training were:

- the purpose of the program
- the need for accurate and complete field interview and arrest information
- the need to maintain strict STD area integrity

Probation Cooperation

An important part of each STD meeting was the exchange of information with the Will County Adult Probation Department. (Juvenile probation did not participate in this program.) A probation supervisor is assigned to the STD project and attends each STD meeting. Joliet maintains a database of all adult probationers, based on updates from Will County Probation. This database is cross-checked on a daily basis with all police contacts: field interview cards, arrests, suspect information. All probation contacts were forwarded to Will County Probation each week prior to the STD meeting in order to allow them to research problem probationers and respond to questions at the weekly meeting. Table 1 provides a list of the exchanges of information that occurred during the first eight months of the study.

Table 1

Exchanges of Information with Probation

November 2010 – June 2011

Date	Police Action	Probation Response
11/18/2010	FI Card-warned for trespass @ housing authority	Petition for hearing
12/3/2010	Traffic	No action
12/3/2010	Driving Under Influence (DUI)	Petition for hearing
12/3/2010	Possession Controlled Substance (PCS)	Revoked - 3 yrs IDOC
12/13/2010	Burglary	
12/16/2010	Warrant	Petition for hearing
12/16/2010	Arrest	No action
01/07/2011	FI Card	No action
01/07/2011	Aggravated Battery	Revoked
01/07/2011	Armed Robbery	
01/07/2011	Criminal Trespass	No action
01/07/2011	PCS	Petition for hearing
01/07/2011	Aggravated Battery	Revoked - 5 yrs IDOC
01/20/2011	Battery & Resisting	Revoked
01/24/2011		Revoked-IDOC
01/28/2011	Unlawful Use Weapon (UUW) & PCS	
01/28/2011	Criminal Trespass	Petition for hearing
01/28/2011	Arrest	Revoked-1 yr IDOC
01/31/2011	Resisting arrest	
02/08/2011	Burglary warrant	Petition for hearing
02/22/2011	UUW	Petition for hearing
02/22/2011	Burglary	
02/25/2011	UUW	Revoked
03/03/2011	Burglary	Revoked
03/04/2011	Drunken disorderly	Petition for hearing
03/15/2011	FI Card -- Looking into cars	Petition for hearing
03/15/2011	Obstruction	Revoked
03/15/2011	Aggravated Battery	Petition for hearing
03/15/2011	FI Card, Traffic, Gang	Petition for hearing
03/15/2011	Retail Theft	Petition for hearing
03/18/2011	Criminal Trespass & UUW	Petition for hearing
03/31/2011	Disorderly Conduct	Petition for hearing
03/31/2011	Telephone Threats	Petition already pending

04/1/2011	Burglary Intelligence	
04/7/2011	Warrant arrest	
04/11/2011	Intelligence, GD drug dealer	No action
04/15/2011	Cannabis	
04/19/2011	Intelligence, <u>Homicide</u>	Referred Juv. Probation
04/20/2011	Impersonating police, UUW, PCS	
05/10/2011	Intelligence, Vice Lord	Petition for hearing
05/11/2011	Intelligence, Moved into Joliet	
05/20/2011	Shot on housing authority grounds	No action
05/26/2011	Probation inquiry	
05/26/2011	Obstruction of Justice	
05/26/2011	Cannabis	No action
06/03/2011	Arrest	PTR
06/03/2011	Cannabis	Revoked
06/07/2011	Intelligence, warrant	
06/14/2011	Intelligence, moved into Joliet	
06/16/2011	Arrest	Petition for hearing
06/16/2011	PCS	Petition for hearing
06/16/2011	Criminal Trespass	Petition for hearing
06/16/2011	Probationer shot	
06/16/2011	FI Card, Running from shooting	
06/16/2011	FI Card	
06/24/2011	Criminal Trespass	No action
06/24/2011	Criminal Trespass	No action
06/30/2011	Cannabis	No action
06/30/2011	FI Card, Suspicious activity	No action

Information was also exchanged between probation and the police on a case by case basis. Over 201 exchanges of information were documented. The first eight months of exchanges are listed in Table 1. The remaining exchanges are listed in Appendix 6. An example of a noteworthy exchange occurred in March 2011 when the Joliet police reported that a known gang member had shot himself while cleaning his gun. Probation took the information back to their office and determined that the shooting “victim” was on probation. At the next STD meeting, probation indicated that they had violated the gang member for possession of a firearm and sent him to state prison.

While adult probation officers in Illinois are empowered by statute (730 ILCS 110/11) to make on-view arrests of any probationer found to be in violation of the conditions of his probation, the Will County Probation Department does not allow its officers to make on-view arrests, or conduct probation compliance checks assisted by the Joliet Police Department. All potential violations brought to their attention by the Joliet Police Department are the subject of a petition for revocation filed in the Will County Circuit Court. The State then has the burden of going forward with the case and proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Joliet police also produced Intelligence Bulletins informing their officers of probation conditions imposed on known violent offenders (See Appendix 7). For example, one Joliet gang member was precluded from being within 1,000 feet of Joliet Housing Authority property and from associating with known gang members. Any officer observing the subject violating one of these provisions was directed to complete an incident report and forward it to the Will County Probation Department. Joliet police personnel were also informed when a probation violation warrant was issued by the Will County Court.

Will County Probation reported that the STD process allowed them to identify more probation violators. While they receive notice of subsequent arrests of probationers from the Will county courts, exchanging information with the Joliet Police enabled them to identify more offenders and identify offenders in a more timely fashion particularly those offenders charged with misdemeanor offenses. Exchanging information with the Joliet police also allowed probation to identify more technical violations.

Parole Cooperation

Joliet police also maintained a database of all parolees released in their area based on updates from the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). This data was cross checked on a

daily basis with all police contacts: field interview cards, arrests, suspect information. This information was then made part of the weekly STD meeting report.

Parole Compliance Checks

As part of their parole monitoring efforts, the Parole Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections conducts unannounced parole compliance checks throughout the state. These compliance checks help to ensure that parolees are complying with the requirements of their parole. IDOC agents typically enlist the cooperation of municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies in conducting these operations. The IDOC is committed to cooperative compliance efforts such as Joliet's Strategic Tactical Deployment program.

When released from prison, all parolees are given specific parole conditions, which they are required to follow. Parolees must reside in the residence established for their parole and must allow agents of the IDOC to search their person and the portion of their residence that they control (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7). Parolees are also required to submit to a urinalysis test as instructed by an agent of the IDOC. Compliance checks generally have three main objectives: ensuring that parolees live at the address reported to the IDOC, ensuring that parolees are drug free, and ensuring that parolees comply with the conditions of their parole.

During the compliance checks, entry into the residence is made by IDOC personnel with Joliet police assisting. IDOC agents interview the parolee, search his room, and occasionally gather a urine specimen. If contraband is found during the check, the parolee is charged with a new crime and arrested by Joliet police. A person charged with violating a condition of parole is entitled to a preliminary hearing before a hearing officer of the Illinois Prison Review Board. However, no preliminary hearing is necessary when the revocation is based upon a new criminal charge and a finding of probable cause.

The following is an example of a parole compliance check conducted by the IDOC and Joliet police personnel. On 19 May 2011, the Joliet police accompanied IDOC personnel as they checked the compliance status of nineteen (19) IDOC parolees. The targets of the compliance check were chosen by Joliet police personnel based upon their knowledge of gun violence and gang activity in Joliet. All total 5 compliance checks were conducted. (See Appendix 8 for a complete list of the parole compliance check results).

Table 2
Sample Parole Compliance Check Findings
19 May 2011

Subject	In Compliance	Not in Compliance	Comment
1		X	Reported to D.O.C.
2	X		
3	X		
4		X	Arrested
5		X	Reported to D.O.C.
6		X	Arrested for cannabis
7	X		
8	X		
9	X		Interviewed re. shooting
10		X	Reported to D.O.C.
11		X	Reported to D.O.C.
12		X	Referred to E.M.
13		X	Arrested with drugs
14	X		
15		X	Referred to E. M.
16	X		
17	X		
18	X		
19		X	Referred to E. M.

Parole compliance checks were also used on a case-by-case basis to assist in solving violent crimes. For example, it came to the police department's attention that a parolee, who was a member of the Latin King's criminal street gang, had information about a recent homicide in the

city of Joliet. At the request of Joliet police personnel, the IDOC conducted a parole compliance check at the gang member's home. During the compliance check, the gang member was found to be in possession of ten grams of cannabis and subsequently turned over to the Joliet Police Department for processing. During questioning, the parolee provided the names of three Latin King gang members who were believed to have committed the murder. The parolee also provided information about the whereabouts of the gun used in the shooting.

Community Outreach and Education

While the Joliet Police respond to every instance of gun violence, they often encounter witnesses who are unwilling to report information that is needed to solve shootings and other gun related crime. As part of the STD effort, the Joliet Police Department formed the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing to encourage citizen cooperation in the reduction of gun violence. The committee is made up of representatives from the University of St. Francis, the Joliet Chamber of Commerce, the Joliet Township High School, the Joliet Park District, the Joliet YMCA, the Forest Preserve District of Will County, the Joliet Spanish Community Center, and the Forest Park Community Center.

Utilizing the expertise of the Mass Communications Department of the University of St. Francis, an intensive campaign was developed to assure residents that they could safely come forward and cooperate with the police. The marketing campaign involved the local housing authority, community centers, businesses, social service agencies, and the faith community in disseminating our message of violence reduction. In addition, the Joliet Neighborhood Oriented Policing Team also disseminated information in their daily contacts with community members.

The campaign began with a contest to develop a SMART policing logo and tag line (See Appendix 9). The purpose of the contest was to create an easily recognized slogan that portrayed

the goal of the STD effort. The logo contest began in January 2011. Over seventy potential logos and tag lines were submitted. Online voting was managed by the University of St. Francis, who were also used to determine the winner. All total 1,398 votes were cast. Three finalists were chosen on March 15, 2011. The following logo and tag line “It’s OK to Report Gun Violence in Joliet” was chosen.

Figure 2

Tag Line and Logo



Summary of STD Effort

In summary, the STD strategy encompassed:

- the analysis of crime and incident data
- the exchange of information with probation and parole authorities
- the identification of crime hot spots
- the deployment of STD personnel to hot spot areas
- the use of aggressive preventative patrol activities

Joliet police believe that engaging in these activities reduced violent crime in their city, and is the focus of the following evaluation.

Evaluation

The evaluation used a multi-level design addressing the implementation of the program and whether the expected outcomes actually occurred. Both qualitative and quantitative data were analyzed. Members of the Criminal Justice Department at Loyola University conducted analyses to gauge the implementation and impact of the Strategic Tactical Deployment program using the Strategic Tactical Deployment areas as the unit of analysis. These areas vary according to the violent crime rate and there is a wide range of reliable and accurate data available at this level of analysis.

To explore the implementation and impact of the Strategic Tactical Deployment process, several measures were used. The first was a simple dichotomous measure of whether or not Strategic Tactical Deployment areas were moved to correspond to increased gun violence. The second was the identification of gang members on probation or parole. Additionally, a number of activity measures were used to gauge the implementation and effectiveness of each type of probation/parole police deployment including: the number of probation/parole briefings received by patrol personnel; the number of probation/parole violations encountered; the number of probation/parole violations reported to the Will County Probation Department and the Illinois Department of Corrections; the number of times that Joliet police action led to the revocation of probation or parole, and; the number of times that probation/parole cooperation led to the arrest or removal of a violent offender from the community.

To assess the impact of the program, Loyola University researchers used several indicators of violent crime including: homicides, shootings (aggravated battery with a firearm), and armed robbery. They also controlled for socio-demographic variables taken from the 2000 Census consistent with social disorganization theory.

Several evaluation strategies were used to assess the effect of the probation/parole collaboration effort. To assess program implementation, observations of Strategic Tactical Deployment meetings by members of the research team were combined with semi-structured face-to-face interviews with agency personnel involved in the project. These interviews included staff from the Joliet Police Department as well as from the Will County Probation Department and parole agents from the Illinois Department of Corrections. To measure program impact on crime, base-line crime and calls-for-service data were collected for an extended period of time prior to the implementation of the program, and these data were then compared to post-intervention data in order to determine if the collaboration with probation/parole reduced the level of crime and violence in the targeted community areas.


Evidence-based policing requires police practices to be based on empirical research. Common research designs include classical experimental designs, quasi-experimental designs, and observational research techniques. Because of the difficulty of creating control groups when dealing with random violent crime, this analysis uses a quasi-experimental design. The research design employed a time-series analysis tracking the effect of the STD effort over an extended period of time (7 years). Using time-series analysis, the researchers compared pre-test data to the data collected in years one and two of the experiment. Utilizing before treatment data allowed researchers to compare the effects of the application of the STD program.

Theory of Change

The theory of change employed in this evaluation follows the logic model presented in Figure 3. This logic model is used to illustrate how the program's performance measures are related to the goals of the research design and provides an explicit presentation of the expected changes and their relation to a particular intervention. Following this approach, experimental

Figure 3
Logic Model

Strategic Tactical Deployment
 Joliet, Illinois Police Department
 Logic Model



programs become theory in practice. The goal of research is to determine whether the theory as implemented worked.

Qualitative Methods

A process evaluation was used to evaluate the Strategic Tactical Deployment (STD) program. The process evaluation studied the early development and implementation of the STD program, assessing whether strategies were implemented as planned and whether expected output was actually produced. Data collection took place over a twenty-four month period from October 2010 to September 2012. One field researcher collected the data assisted by Joliet personnel. The field researcher communicated regularly with the Joliet Police Department, the Will County Probation Department, and the Illinois Department of Corrections. Two qualitative approaches were used to assess the implementation of the STD program: meeting observations and field observations. The field observations included both riding with STD patrol officers, and observing parole compliance checks.

STD Meeting Observations

Researchers meet with the Joliet crime analyst on several occasions to determine how STD briefings were prepared and STD areas were chosen. Both researchers and graduate students also attended weekly STD Meetings. STD handouts were obtained for each meeting attended. The handouts contained:

- Year to date comparisons of violent crime
- Last 30 day comparisons of violent crime
- Recent firearms seizures
- Information on recent arrestees by patrol district
- Photos of recent arrestees by patrol district

- Probationer and parolee contacts by patrol district
- Identification of Intensive Probationers by patrol district
- Identification of Home Detention/Monitoring persons by patrol district
- Shooting incidents by patrol district

Field Observations and Interviews

Researchers conducted field observations through scheduled “ride-alongs” with STD personnel. Ride-alongs were conducted to understand the types of activities occurring in the STD deployment areas. Field observations were combined with interviews of the STD officers. Ride-alongs began by explaining the purpose of the observations and asking the officers to sign a consent form indicating that they understood the purpose of the research and their rights as research participants. STD officers were generally asked three broad questions: what they knew of the STD project; what they thought of the STD project; and what suggestions they had to improve police, probation, and parole cooperation. All responded that the STD program had great potential and that cooperating with probation and parole was a sound law enforcement strategy. While probation information was available from weekly bulletins and the in-station computer system, Joliet police officers unanimously responded that having the information available to the officer on the street via in-car computer would be a great improvement.

Table 3

Number of Observations and Interviews

	Police	Probation	Parole	Total
STD Meetings	14			14
STD Ride-Alongs	5			5
Parole Compliance Checks			3	3
Interviews	13	2	1	16

Findings

The Joliet Police Department successfully completed the following activities during the two-year course of this study:

- Identified gang members residing in Joliet
- Identified Joliet residents who were on intensive probation
- Identified suspect shooters
- Conducted spatial analyses of the locations of probationers and parolees in Joliet
- Created top ten lists of probationers and parolees in Joliet
- Conducted parole compliance sweeps with the Illinois Department of Corrections

This information was disseminated to Joliet police command and supervisory personnel at the weekly STD meetings. It was also made available on the department's internal computer network. Approximately 100 STD reports were created and disseminated within the Joliet Police Department during the two-year course of this study. While Joliet police personnel were generally happy with the STD program, some patrol officers felt that this information was not readily obtainable by field personnel. Although probation and parole information was available on the department's computer system, it was not searchable from the patrol car.

Another problem faced by the Joliet police department was their inability to focus parole enforcement in the STD areas. Either there were too few parolees in the STD area at the time it was targeted or there were more violent gang-member parolees residing in other areas of the city. While the inability to focus parole enforcement may have impacted the original research design, it may also have had the unintended effect of expanding deterrence to other areas of the city resulting in a positive city-wide intervention.

Finally, after a very successful tag line and logo contest (It's OK to Report Gun Violence in Joliet), Joliet police were unable to track the number of tips received as a result of the program. Tips from citizens were routed to the police department's hot line. Although the hot line received 527 calls from citizens resulting in 122 arrests, Joliet police were not able to determine which were the result of the gun violence reduction project.

The Will County Adult Probation Department also successfully participated in the Strategic Tactical Deployment effort. A supervisor from their office attended every STD meeting, shared information with Joliet Police personnel, and was willing to cooperate in any way possible. However, the fact that the court did not allow its probation officers to make on-view arrests of probationers found in violation of the conditions of their probation, limited the potential effects of probation violation enforcement. Additionally, in spite of meetings with the Will County State's Attorney, Joliet police were not able to create a system of imposing geographic limitations precluding gang members from returning to gang specific gang locations. Nor was Joliet able to create a system to disseminate probation restrictions to Joliet police personnel.

The Illinois Department of Corrections also successfully participated in the Strategic Tactical Deployment program. IDOC representatives attended STD meetings, exchanged information with Joliet police personnel, and conducted parole sweeps throughout the city of Joliet. Unless arrested on a new charge, no one was taken into custody by the IDOC for a parole violation. All violations were referred to the Illinois Prison Review Board for adjudication. While IDOC personnel referred all violators to the review board, they reported that the board was reluctant to revoke the parole of anyone found guilty of a minor technical violation. Illinois prisons currently house 14,000 more inmates than they were designed to hold. As a result, there is great reluctance to revoke parole of an inmate for a technical violation.

Quantitative Methods

The quantitative component of this project was used to determine whether the STD program had an impact on gun violence in Joliet. Analyses were conducted to answer the following questions: 1) Was violent crime reduced in the Strategic Tactical Deployment areas? 2) What was the effect of probation/parole cooperation? 3) What factors (demographic characteristics) other than the STD program may have been responsible for reductions in violent crime?

Strategic Tactical Deployment Areas

The Joliet Police Department is broken down into three districts: East, Central, and West. Both the East and Central Districts have six sectors (beats). The West District has five sectors. The average size of Joliet's seventeen sectors is 2.2 square miles. Virtually all Strategic Tactical Deployments occurred in Sectors 11, 16, and 22. The STD area was chosen as the unit of analysis. While most police departments limit the collection of data to the beat/sector level, the Joliet Police Department also collects a wide range of data at the STD level. Four officers typically worked each Strategic Tactical Deployment. Over the course of the study period Joliet police devoted approximately 5,375 man hours to the STD effort. During this time, the officers engaged in directed patrol within the STD areas, conducted field interviews of suspects, engaged in foot patrol, issued parking and traffic citations, and made misdemeanor and felony arrests when appropriate.

Rational choice theory argues that hot-spot policing deters crime because of the added police presence and the resulting increased chance of apprehension. Following this line of reasoning, it could be argued that police activity is directly related to the amount of crime in a given area. As such, it is hypothesized that the following police activities had a direct effect on violent crime in the STD areas: violent index crime arrests, unlawful use of a weapon arrests, narcotic arrests,

disorderly conduct arrests, field interview cards written, firearms recovered, and traffic citations issued.

The Data

The data provided by the Joliet Police Department (JPD) were gathered in the form of monthly counts for shots fired and robberies from January 2005 through September 2012. In total, there were 93 observation points: 24 pre-STD monthly counts and 69 post-STD monthly counts. The post-STD data points were divided into two program components: STD only (46 months) and STD + Probation/Parole (23 months). The enhanced STD program component consisted of periodic probation and parole sweeps across the city. During the 23 months of program operation, there were 1,320 probation contacts resulting in 737 arrests (55.8%) and 1,605 parole contacts resulting in 928 arrests (57.8%). A similar percentage of probation and parole arrests were made in the STD areas (sectors 11, 16, 22), 33.9% and 35.2%, respectively.

Joliet had experienced 3,989 reported shots fired and 1,242 robberies over the 93-month study period. Of the 3,989 reported shots fired, however, 79.3% (3,165) were confirmed by the Joliet police officers. Thus, all subsequent data related to shots fired are based on confirmed reports. The table below summarizes the number of shots fired and robberies by the respective program components.

Table 4


Number of Shots Fired and Robberies, January 2005 – September 2012

	Pre-STD (1/05-12/06)	STD only (1/07-10/10)	STD + Probation/Parole (11/10-12/11)	Totals
Shots Fired	746 (23.6%)	1631 (51.5%)	788 (24.9%)	3165
Robberies	270 (21.7%)	690 (55.6%)	282 (22.7%)	1242

Table 4 presents the number of Joliet shots fired and robbery incidents between January 2005 and September 2012. After the implementation of the STD strategy, the mean monthly count of shots fired and robbery incidents increased by 12.81% and 25.24%, respectively, from pre-test monthly means of 31.08 (shots fired) and 11.25 (robbery) incidents to post-test monthly means of 35.06 and 14.09 incidents. The data in Figure 4 illustrate the monthly counts of confirmed shots fired across the 93-month study period.

Figure 4


Confirmed Shots Fired, January 2005 – September 2012



The data in Figure 5 show the monthly counts of robberies across the study period. Although the average monthly counts of robberies increased from the pre-to-post periods, there was a 18.3% decline in average monthly robberies between the STD and STD+ periods.

Figure 5

Robberies, January 2005 – September 2012



Research Design

To further assess and clarify the potential impact of the STD strategy on shots fired and robbery, we conducted an interrupted time series quasi-experiment. Time series designs attempt to detect whether an intervention has had an effect significantly greater than the underlying trend. They are useful in program implementation research for evaluating the effects of interventions when it is difficult to randomize or identify an appropriate control group. Data are collected at multiple time points before and after the intervention. The multiple time points before the intervention allow the underlying trend to be estimated, the multiple time points after the intervention allow the intervention effect to be estimated accounting for the underlying trend. Time series designs increase the confidence with which the estimate of effect can be attributed to the intervention, although the design does not provide protection against the effects of other events

occurring at the same time as the study intervention, which might also improve performance.

Typically, a time series has three unobserved components, namely:

- Trend (T) – the long-term upward or downward movements of the time series due to influences such as population growth or general economic development.
- Seasonal fluctuations (S) – a regular periodic pattern that repeats from year to year (e.g., the number of shots fired increases in summer months).
- Irregular component (I) – represents the non-systematic movements of the series caused by events of all kinds not captured by the other components (e.g., random error).

If a time-series model does not account for these sources of error, the intervention analysis will be confounded. To account for trends in the time series, we included a simple trend variable for linear trends and a trend-squared variable for curvilinear trends. The trend variable was simply the month number from the start to the end of the time series (i.e., for the January 2005 through September 2012 series, the trend variable ranged from 1 to 93. The trend-squared variable was calculated by taking the square of the trend variable. However, the trend-squared measure did not improve the fit of the model to any of the pre-intervention time series; consequently, this variable was dropped from the analytic models.

The issue of seasonal fluctuations (i.e., seasonality) is particularly relevant for both the shots fired and robbery data in Joliet. Not surprising, the peak months for shots fired were the summer months (May – August). Forty-one per cent of the confirmed shots fired incidents occurred during these months. Similarly, the peak months for robbery were May-September accounting for 46.4% of robbery incidents. Seasonal fluctuations in data make it difficult to analyse whether changes in data for a given period reflect important increases or decreases in the level of the data,

or are due to regularly occurring variation. To search for the measures that are independent of seasonal variations, statistical methods have been developed to remove the effect of seasonal changes from the original data to produce seasonally adjusted data. The seasonally adjusted data provide more readily interpretable measures of changes occurring in a given period, reflecting real movements without misleading seasonal changes.

In the current study, seasonal adjustment of the time series data was carried out with the SPSS seasonal decomposition program (X-12-ARIMA). This method is based on a moving-average technique and is more sophisticated and able to provide adjustments customized to the characteristics of individual series. The components of a time series are estimated using weighted moving averages, or filters, on the series. Trend filters smooth the short-term fluctuations out of a time series, leaving the long-term movements -- the trend. By definition, the seasonally adjusted estimates will contain an estimate of the underlying trend and the irregular components.

To identify whether there was a serial autocorrelation component, we analyzed the pre-intervention time series. We used Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to detect whether the monthly counts of shots fired and robbery events were serially autocorrelated (i.e., the number of events made in January 2005 was significantly correlated with the number of events in February 2005, and so on). The pre-intervention time series data did not show significant serial autocorrelation; therefore we did not estimate an autoregressive component in our model. We also ran an OLS model on the pre-intervention time series for shots fired and robberies (seasonalized monthly shots fired counts = constant + trend + trend² + error; seasonalized monthly robbery counts = constant + trend + trend² + error) and analyzed the residuals using the Durbin–Watson Test (shots fired result = 1.78; robbery result = 1.). The Durbin–Watson Test ranges from 0 to 4. First-order serial correlation does not exist when the

Durbin–Watson statistic is close to 2.

The key outcome variables in our assessment of the STD intervention were the monthly number of confirmed shots fired and robberies. Since the underlying data were counts, a Poisson regression in a log-linear model was selected to analyse the time series data. Poisson regression applies where the dependent variable is a *count* (e.g. crime incidents, cases of a disease) rather than a continuous variable. It assumes the response variable has a Poisson distribution whose expected value (mean) is dependent on one or more predictor variables. Typically the log of the expected value is assumed to have a linear relationship with the predictor variables. As Crawley (2007, p. 527) notes, linear regression is not appropriate for such data since (1) the linear model might lead to the prediction of negative counts; (2) the variance of the response variable is likely to increase with the mean; (3) the errors will not be Normally distributed, and (4) zeros are difficult to handle in transformations.

The aim of the time series approach was to isolate and evaluate the direct impact of the implementation of the STD only and STD plus interventions on reported offenses in Joliet. To accomplish this three dummy variables were created to represent the three distinct program periods (i.e., pre-STD, STD only and STD + probation/parole) in order to estimate the effects of the intervention on the monthly counts of shots fired and robberies. It also is important to consider that potential reductions in shots fired and robbery associated with the STD intervention could be influenced by other factors. Therefore we also included covariates to control for any changes in the monthly counts of shots fired and robberies that could be associated with other factors such as changes in Joliet’s percent of minority population, the unemployment rate and the number of police officers. Furthermore, the models control for the number of drug arrests across the pre and post intervention periods. Over the 7.75 year period there were 5,619 drug arrests

(1,567 pre-intervention and 4,052 intervention drug arrests). Controlling for drug arrests may be of consequence in light of research on the impact of zero tolerance policing strategies on crime reduction. Studies have shown that aggressive enforcement activities by uniformed patrol officers targeting illicit drug sale locations and illegal drug activity can produce short-term reductions in street level drug dealing as well as reductions in many other types of criminal and disorderly behavior (Braga et al., 1999; Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995). For example, aggressive patrolling of suspected drug locations in Jersey City involving stops and searches by patrol officers resulted in reductions in crime not only at the drug locations, but for several surrounding blocks as well (Braga et al., 1999; Weisburd and Green, 1995).

Results

Table 5 presents the results of the Poisson regression models for shots fired and robbery. Poisson regression models have the defining characteristic that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional variance. Goodness of fit tests based on the Deviance and Pearson residuals were used to assess whether the model assumptions have been violated. Each should approximately equal its degrees of freedom and so Value/df (value divided by degrees of freedom) should be close to one. The data show that the Poisson regression model is a good fit. Next, the Omnibus Test, a test to determine if *all* of the estimated coefficients are equal to zero (a test of the model as a whole), was statistically significant.

The parameters for the independent variables were expressed as incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated coefficients). Incidence rate ratios are interpreted as the rate at which things occur; for example, an incidence rate ratio of 0.65 would suggest that, controlling for other independent variables, the selected independent variable was associated with a 35% decrease in the rate at

which the dependent variable occurs. To ensure that the coefficient variances were robust to violations of the homoskedastic errors assumption of linear regression models, Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimators were used.

Table 5
Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery

Variable	Shots Fired			Robbery		
	B (SE)	IRR	p-value	B (SE)	IRR	p-value
Trend	.006 (.006)	1.01	.170	-.003 (.007)	.997	.672
unemployment	.000 (.016)	1.00	.975	-.025 (.021)	.976	.241
% minority pop.	.294 (1.07)	1.34	.783	1.63 (1.40)	5.12	.245
# police officers	.001 (.002)	1.00	.477	.000 (.002)	1.00	.920
Monthly # drug arrests	.001 (.002)	1.00	.595	.004 (.003)	1.00	.136
STD only	-.123 (.126)	.885	.329	.453 (.191)	1.57	.018
STD + probation/parole	-.368 (.235)	.692	.118	.436 (.355)	1.55	.220
intercept	2.89 (.133)	---	.000	1.61 (.236)	---	.000

Shots fired: Deviance = 205.08, Pearson Chi-square = 202.45 Value/df = 2.41/2.38
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 22.75, df = 7, p = .002

Robbery: Deviance = 166.09, Pearson Chi-square = 154.18 Value/df = 1.95/1.81
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 42.40, df = 7, p = .000

Controlling for the covariates, the STD and STD+ program interventions were associated with a statistically significant decrease in the monthly number of shots fired. According to the incidence rate ratios, the STD only and STD + probation and parole components were associated with a 11% and 31% decrease in the monthly number of shots fired events, respectively.


However, these decreases did not differ significantly from the pre-intervention period (p = .329

and .118, respectively).

On the other hand, the data indicate increases in the number of robberies for both the STD and STD+ components. The increase in robberies during the STD only period was significantly different from the pre-STD time period (57% increase, $p = .018$). However, the increase in robberies during the SDT+ intervention period did not differ significantly from the pre-program period.

To further assess the potential impact of the STD strategy, we conducted a time series analysis for shots fired in the STD target areas only. Specifically, monthly shots fired and robberies were assessed for sectors 11, 16 and 22. Figure 6 indicates that the average number of monthly shots fired increased by 18% when comparing the pre-STD to the STD time period and 20% when comparing the pre to the STD+ period.

Figure 6
Confirmed Shots Fired for STD Areas (Sectors 11, 16, 22),
January 2005 – September 2012



The data in Table 6 indicate that both the STD only and STD+ program components were associated with decreases in the monthly number of shots fired. According to the incidence rate ratios, the STD only component had a 22% percent decrease in the monthly number of shots fired events and the STD+ component had a 27% reduction. However, these reductions were not significantly different from the pre-intervention period. The data also indicate that the monthly counts of robberies increased during the intervention period. Although not statistically significant, robberies increase 59% and 97% during the STD only and STD+ program periods, respectively. It is important to note that the overall model for monthly robberies was not significant, thus indicating a poor model fit. Most likely, the poor model fit was due to low monthly frequencies and too many zero counts.

Table 6

Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery

STD Areas (Sectors 11, 16, 22)

Shots Fired

Robbery

variable	B (SE)	IRR	p-value	B (SE)	IRR	p-value
trend	.003 (.007)	1.00	.659	-.008 (.013)	.992	.529
unemployment	.027 (.023)	1.03	.244	.013 (.045)	1.01	.766
% minority pop.	1.39 (1.88)	4.02	.459	.933 (3.04)	2.54	.759
# police officers	.000 (.003)	1.00	.993	.002 (.005)	1.00	.703
Monthly # drug arrests	.006 (.007)	1.01	.358	-.006 (.011)	.994	.602
STD only	-.248 (.211)	.780	.238	.464 (.366)	1.59	.205
STD + probation/parole	-.321 (.360)	.725	.372	.678 (.629)	1.97	.281
intercept	1.70 (.334)	---	.000	.539 (.489)	---	.270


Shots fired: Deviance = 203.27, Pearson Chi-square = 191.24 Value/df = 2.39/2.25
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 14.09, df = 7, p = .050

Robbery: Deviance = 169.56, Pearson Chi-square = 159.75 Value/df = 2.00/1.88
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 7.35, df = 7, p = .394

The same analysis was conducted for shots fired in the non-STD target areas only. Figure 7 indicates that the average number of monthly shots fired increased by 15% when comparing the pre-STD to the STD time period and 4% when comparing the pre to the STD+ period.

Figure 7

Confirmed Shots Fired for Non-STD Areas, January 2005 – September 2012



The data in Table 7 show that neither the STD only nor the STD+ program components were associated significantly with reductions in the monthly number of shots fired. The data do indicate reductions in monthly shots fired, but these decreases were not significantly related to the intervention. This is not surprising since these sectors were not the primary focus of the STD intervention. In addition, there was a significant inverse relationship between the number of Joliet police officers and shots fired in the non-STD areas.

Table 7

Poisson Regression Results for Shots Fired and Robbery, Non-STD Areas

variable	Shots Fired			Robbery		
	B (SE)	IRR	p-value	B (SE)	IRR	p-value
trend	-.005 (.007)	.995	.529	-.003 (.007)	.997	.633
unemployment	.002 (.025)	1.00	.939	-.037 (.023)	.963	.103
% minority pop.	2.89 (1.87)	17.99	.122	1.29 (1.63)	3.64	.429
# police officers	-.005 (.002)	.995	.053	.001 (.002)	1.00	.765
Monthly # drug arrests	-.004 (.004)	.996	.299	.006 (.004)	1.01	.107
STD only	-.084 (.217)	.919	.699	.557 (.216)	1.75	.010
STD + probation/parole	-.047 (.379)	.954	.901	.518 (.387)	1.68	.181
intercept	3.13 (.231)	---	.000	1.33 (.304)	---	.000

Shots fired: Deviance = 177.40, Pearson Chi-square = 171.35 Value/df = 2.334/2.255
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 26.946, df = 7, p = .011

Robbery: Deviance = 137.11, Pearson Chi-square = 129.20 Value/df = 1.61/1.52
Likelihood ratio Chi-Square = 38.12, df = 7, p = .000

The data in Table 4 also indicate increases in robberies for both the STD and STD+ components. There was a statistically significant increase (75%) in robberies during the STD-only component as compared to the pre-STD time period. Similarly, though not statistically significant, there was a 68% increase in monthly robbery counts during the STD+ period.

Difference-in-Difference Poisson Regression Models

The impact of program outcomes can be estimated by computing a double difference, one over time (before-after) and one across subjects (between beneficiaries and non beneficiaries). The basic logic behind this difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation is one where outcomes are

observed for two groups for two time periods. One of the groups is exposed to a treatment in the second period but not in the first period. The second group is not exposed to the treatment during either period. In the case where the same units within a group are observed in each time period, the average gain in the second (control) group is subtracted from the average gain in the first (treatment) group. This removes biases in second period comparisons between the treatment and control group that could result from permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the result of trends.

The outcome Y_i is modeled by the following equation:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma t_i + \delta (T_i \cdot t_i) + \epsilon_i$$

where the coefficients given by the Greek letters α , β , γ , δ , are all unknown parameters and ϵ_i is a random, unobserved "error" term which contains all determinants of Y_i which our model omits.

The equation coefficients have the following interpretation:

α = constant term

β = treatment group specific effect (to account for average permanent differences between treatment and control)

γ = time trend common to control and treatment groups

δ = true effect of treatment

In the current evaluation, we used a DiD panel regression design to assess whether the rate of change in shots fired in the STD target areas (Sectors 11, 16, 22) was significantly different than the non-target sectors between pre-intervention and post-intervention periods. Similar to the models presented above, the DiD regression model of shots fired counts was estimated by general linear modeling using the Poisson distribution. The analysis included a dummy variable for STD vs. non-STD sectors and a dummy variable for pre and post intervention time periods.

The model also included controls for percent minority population, unemployment rates and average monthly drug arrests.

Table 8 contains the post-intervention by target area interaction estimate (δ = true effect of treatment) for 7.75 years (January 2005 – September 2012) of observations (n = 3,134). The interaction estimate (δ = -.004, p = .910) indicates that there was no significant difference in the relative change between pre-intervention and post-intervention periods in confirmed shots fired between targeted and non-targeted sectors.

Table 8
DiD Poisson regression Results of Confirmed Shots Fired

Variable	Coefficient	SE	IRR	p-value
Targeted Sectors	-.004	.035	.996	.910
Intercept	4.08	.001	---	.000

Table 9 contains the post-intervention by target area interaction estimate of 1, 242 robbery observations. The interaction estimate (δ = -.013, p = .852) indicates that there was no significant difference in the relative change between pre-intervention and post-intervention periods in robberies between targeted and non-targeted sectors.

Table 9
DiD Poisson regression Results of Robberies

Variable	Coefficient	SE	IRR	p-value
Targeted Sectors	-.013	.071	.987	.852
Intercept	4.06	.021	---	.000

Conclusions

A number of studies have examined the application of problem oriented policing to hot spots (Baker & Wolfer 2003; Braga et al. 1999; Braga & Bond 2008; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Weisburd & Green 1995), and most of these have shown that the efforts reduced some forms of crime and disorder. Results, however, have been more mixed with respect to violent crime. Studies by Cohen and Ludwig (2003) and McGarrell, et al. (2001) found that directed police patrol aimed at violent-crime hotspots help to reduce gun-related crime. On the other hand, interventions studied by Mazerolle et al. (2000), Sherman, Gartin and Buerger (1989) and Weisburd and Green (1995) did not reduce violence. Additionally, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) and Taylor et al. (2011) found that the deterrent effects of police patrol in crime hot spots for violent crimes were generally non-significant, though in the expected direction. Braga's (2007) meta-analysis of results from five randomized experiments suggests that the effects of hot-spot policing are most pronounced on disorderly behaviors; although violent and property crimes declined on average across the studies, these effects were not statistically significant overall. The lack of significant effects could reflect the impulsive, expressive nature of many violent crimes (which may make them harder to prevent) and the rarity of violent crime in very small locations. Alternatively, the particularly high concentration of violence in a relatively small number of places would seem to weigh in favor of using hot spots strategies to curb violence.

With regard to the current evaluation, the results are consistent with those found in the studies cited above (Braga, 2007; Mazerolle et al., 2000; Sherman, Gartin & Buerger, 1989; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Taylor, et al., 2011; Weisburd & Green, 1995); that there were no statistically significant effects of the intervention on violent crime (i.e., shots fired and robberies).

Although the results indicate a reduction in shots fired during the intervention periods, these reductions were not statistically significant. Similarly, though greater reductions in shots fired were achieved in the STD sectors compared to the non-STD sectors, both areas had reductions in shots fired and there was no significant difference in the relative change between pre-intervention and post-intervention periods in shots fired between targeted and non-targeted sectors. Furthermore, there was no difference between the STD only and STD+ components for shots fired.

The lack of a statistically significant difference in shots fired between targeted areas and non-STD sectors may be explained in a number of ways. First, the aim of intervention was to do something about violent crime wherever it presented itself in the city. Thus, although sectors 11, 16 and 22 were the primary patrol areas, STD patrols did intervene in other sectors. Second, the probation and parole component was a citywide intervention and did not specifically target the primary STD sectors. Third, it is possible that although the primary target sectors were 11, 16 and 22, the intervention could have spillover effects to adjacent neighborhoods.

Correspondingly, the STD intervention had no effect on robberies. In fact, robberies increased significantly during the STD-only time period. Similarly, though not statistically significant, there was an increase in monthly robbery counts during the STD+ period. Also, there was no significant difference in the relative change between pre-intervention and post-intervention periods in robberies between targeted and non-targeted sectors.

Study Limitations

Although the results show a city-wide *decline* (though not significant) in shots fired during the STD intervention period, it is important to note that there are several potential limitations in the evaluation. First, alternative activities within the city—such as other police activities, major

social or political changes, or other community strategies—may also be responsible for the observed trends. Second, the observed decline in shots fired might be nothing more than simply part of the secular nationwide declining crime trend. Third, the STD intervention was based on the identification of crime hot spots, the deployment of STD personnel to hot spot areas and the use of aggressive preventative patrol activities. STD deployment occurred primarily during weekends between the hours of 9PM to 1AM. Analysis of counts of confirmed shooting during these days and times revealed no difference across intervention time periods. Specifically, in the pre-intervention period, 46.2% of shots fired occurred between 9PM and 1AM, Friday – Sunday. There was no significant reduction in the number of shots fired during the STD only intervention (45.7%) or the STD + probation/parole intervention (47.1%). These results were replicated when comparing STD sectors with non-STD areas across the three time periods. The percent of shootings during the weekend between 9PM – 1AM during the pre-intervention period for STD areas was 43.5% and for non-STD sectors 46.0%. During the STD only intervention time period the respective percentages were 43.3% and 45.0% and during the STD+ time period the respective percentages were 45.1% and 46.0%. Consequently, it is not clear from the aggregate data how much influence STD patrols had on the overall decline in shootings. Fourth, and most important, the evaluation of STD lacked any real experimental design or variable(s) that captured its activities and systematically compared them to trends in similarly situated comparison neighborhoods or cities. Therefore, it is not possible to authoritatively attribute the declining trend in shots fired to the STD intervention. Clearly, there is a need for further systematic experimentation on the impact of STD and similar interventions on violent crime.

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



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


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Appendix 1

STD Meeting Report




Violent Crime, East District



East Shots

	This Week	Past 30 Days	YTD 2011	YTD 2010	% change
11	3	16	37	29	28%
12	0	7	18	40	-55%
13	2	5	12	9	33%
14	0	1	5	7	-29%
15	5	9	28	37	-27%
16	6	8	29	53	-45%
	16	46	129	175	-26%




East Robberies

	This Week	Past 30 Days	YTD 2011	YTD 2010	% change
11	0	1	4	6	-33%
12	0	0	1	4	-75%
13	0	1	3	4	-25%
14	1	2	7	3	133%
15	0	0	2	4	-50%
16	0	0	5	5	0%
	1	4	22	26	-15%




East Weapons

	This Week	Past 30 Days	YTD 2011	YTD 2010	% change
11	0	3	4	9	-56%
12	0	3	12	21	-43%
13	0	0	1	1	0%
14	0	0	1	4	-75%
15	1	2	9	23	-61%
16	1	1	9	11	-18%
	2	9	36	69	-48%





East Drug Arrests

	This Week	Past 30 Days	YTD 2011	YTD 2010	% change
11	1	5	22	42	-48%
12	0	1	20	59	-66%
13	0	1	6	14	-57%
14	1	1	10	42	-76%
15	1	13	35	74	-53%
16	0	7	48	48	0%
	3	28	141	279	-49%



Violent Crime, Central District



Appendix 2

Strategic Tactical Deployment Activity Summary Report



JOLIET Police Department

**Strategic Tactical Deployment
Activity Summary Report**



Date	
Weekday	
Hours	

Officer Name/#	
Officer Name/#	
Area	

STD GUIDELINES

- Patrol only within the area designated on the map on the back;
- FI Cards **MUST** be completed on all contacts made;
- Zero Tolerance should be utilized in the target areas

Incident Type	Total
Arrests	
Offense reports	
Compliance tickets	

Incident Type	Total
FI cards	
Weapons	
Foot patrol	

Incident Type	Total
Traffic stops	
Traffic citations	
Parking citations	
Vehicle tows	

Arrest/Offense CR #	

Foot Patrol locations	
Foot Patrol hours	

Stop/Vehicle tow locations	

Narrative/Description of Events

NOTE

STD Supervisors are responsible for the completion of the activity log for the assignment. All paperwork will be signed off by the STD Supervisor, with copies to be placed in the Division Commander's mailbox for review. Supervisors are responsible for the productivity of the officers assigned to the STD detail. Underperforming teams will be subject to a conference with the Division Commander. **Those officers and supervisors who do not meet the expectations and responsibilities of the STD assignment will not be allowed to sign up for additional details.**

Supervisor Signature _____

Appendix 3

Field Interview Card



FIELD INTERVIEW CARD

DATE _____ TIME _____ SECTOR _____
 CONTACT ADDRESS _____
 PLACE NAME _____ PLACE TYPE _____

NAME (L,F,M) _____
 SEX _____ RACE _____ DOB _____
 HT _____ WT _____ HAIR _____ EYES _____
 NICKNAME _____
 HOME ADDRESS _____
 CITY, STATE, ZIP _____
 HOME PH _____ CELL PH _____
 EMPLOYER/SCHOOL _____

TATTOO/LOCATION

VEH MAKE _____ MODEL _____
 COLOR _____ YEAR _____
 PLATE # _____ STYLE _____

1-28 04/01/11

GANG AFFILIATION

CHECK ALL APPLICABLE

- ADMITS HIS/HER MEMBERSHIP _____
- IN THE COMPANY OF IDENTIFIED GANG MEMBERS
- TATTOOED WITH GANG SYMBOLS
- INVOLVED IN GANG RELATED CRIMES
- PHOTO WHICH INDICATES GANG AFFILIATION
- CONTACTED IN THE FIELD BY POLICE PARTICIPATING IN GANG RELATED ACTIVITIES
- WEARS GANG COLORS
- IN POSSESSION OF GANG PARAPHERNALIA

ASSOCIATES

S/R/DOB _____

S/R/DOB _____

S/R/DOB _____


S/R/DOB _____

REASON FOR CONTACT

EVENT # _____
 OFFICER _____ BADGE _____

Appendix 4

STD Map



Appendix 5

STD Roll-Call Training




Joliet Police Department

Expanding Strategic Tactical Deployment

Funded October 2010 to September 2012

The police are supported by Grant No. 2010-00001 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The Bureau of Justice Statistics is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which is part of the Department of Justice. Statistics is the national system of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on crime, justice, and the criminal justice system. The Bureau of Justice Statistics is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which is part of the Department of Justice. Statistics is the national system of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on crime, justice, and the criminal justice system.



Awards



Intensely competitive grant

Joliet one of sixteen grants nationwide (Funded in 2nd Round)

Others include LA, Cincinnati, Savannah, Lowell MA, Lansing MI

All different projects, interests, goals




Purpose is to apply evidence-based practices to real world policing problems

City of Joliet Crime Situation



Premise of Proposal:

- Even though UCR violent crime has gone DOWN, shooting activity has gone UP
- Joliet has lots of gang members
- Many witnesses are unwilling to provide information on shootings
- Arrest rate is 16% for shootings

Funding Distribution

- \$208,000 for JPD officer overtime (\$26,000 match)
 - Feb-Nov-Dec: 2-man cars 1/week
 - Jan-Mar-Apr-Sept: 2-man cars 2/week
 - May-Jun-Jul: 2-man cars 3/week
- \$22,880 for Probation officer overtime
 - 1 Officer 1/week for 2 years
- \$4,100 for mandatory grant meetings
- \$57,309 for evaluation
- \$26,620 for Parole officer overtime
 - 24 Parole Sweeps (2 officers, 2 supervisors)





City of Joliet Crime Situation

What we said we'd do


- Shared intelligence to increase public safety between JPD, Probation, Parole
- Increase efficiency of hot-spot policing by implementing other problem-solving strategies
- Increase in revocations of probationers/parolees
- Decrease in shootings
- Produce a formal evaluation of program





Specific Activities/Solutions

- Directed patrol
- Saturation patrol
- Sweeps of known offenders
- Tracking of tensions between gang members
- Witness incentives
- Pulling levers
- Dissemination of probationers, parolees information
- Formal cross-tabulation of data
- Spatial analysis of gang members on probation and parole



Team Members

1. Joliet Police Department
2. Loyola University Chicago
3. Will County Probation Department
4. Illinois Department of Corrections
5. University of St. Francis Solutions Resource Center

- ◆ City of Joliet Marketing Department
- ◆ Joliet Chamber of Commerce

Planning, Data Collection & Research

- ◆ Community outreach and education campaign
 - ◆ Seek citizen input on how to increase information sharing by witnesses
 - ◆ Cross-functional committee developed
 - ◆ Easy-to-understand concept promoting ease and necessity of reporting shooting details
 - ◆ Promoted through Joliet Chamber of Commerce, City of Joliet Marketing Department, community organizations, social service agencies, faith community

Evaluation Strategies

1. Loyola will:
 1. Observe STD meetings
 2. Interview participants (internal and partners)
 3. Crunch numbers
 - ◆ Quasi-experimental design.
 - ◆ Pre and post analysis with comparison sites.
 - ◆ Analysis of crime incidents and calls for service.
 - ◆ Assess displacement and diffusion of benefits.
 - ◆ Assess impact of sociological and demographic variables.
 - ◆ Interview participants.

What This Means For YOU

- Availability of STD overtime
- Intensive tracking of STD Activity Sheets
- Strict adherence to area integrity
- Additional information provided to STD Officers weekly
- Need for accurate, complete FI information
- Formal evaluation of our activities - lend legitimacy to our activities
- Top Ten Offenders List

New STD Activity Summary Sheets

New FI Card

Appendix 6

Exchanges of Information with Probation

July 2011 – September 2012

Date	Police Action	Probation Response
07/12/2011	Intelligence, gang member	Revoked for driving w/o license
07/12/2011	Criminal trespass	Petition for hearing
07/12/2011	Intelligence, gang member	Petition, technical violations
07/18/2011	Intelligence, police impersonator	Petition for hearing
07/22/2011	<u>Gang murder suspect</u> pot arrest	Expedited revocation 4 years DOC
07/25/2011	Resisting arrest	Petition for hearing
07/25/2011	Gang member, failure to appear warrant	Revoked
07/25/2011	Arrest	Revoked
07/25/2011	DUI arrest	Terminated
07/26/2011	Known gang member	Petition, technical violations
07/27/2011	<u>Gang murder suspect</u>	Revoked, technical violations
08/01/2011	<u>Gang murder suspect</u> pot arrest	Revoked, technical violations
08/03/2011	Gang member UUW, shooting witness	Petition for hearing
08/03/2011	Gang member, warrant arrest	No action
08/03/2011	Traffic arrest	No action
08/03/2011	Disorderly conduct arrest	Revoked technical violation
08/04/2011	Intelligence, drug dealer; McHenry arrest	Petition for hearing
08/05/2011	Criminal trespass to land	Revoked
08/05/2011	Shoplifting arrest	No action
08/08/2011	Residential burglary	No action
08/12/2011	Retail theft	No action
08/12/2011	Criminal trespass to land	Revoked
08/18/2011	Assault	Petition for hearing tech. violations
08/18/2011	Auto theft	Revoked
08/25/2011	Failure to appear warrant	Petition for hearing
08/25/2011	Mob action	No action
09/06/2011	Gang member, criminal trespass to land	Revoked
09/07/2011	Gang member, controlled substance	Revoked
09/12/2011	Shooting victim	Revoked, technical violations
09/19/2011	Known gang member	No action taken
09/19/2011	Gang member arrest	Revoked
09/23/2011	Felony arrest	Revoked
09/26/2011	Gang member, Unlawful Use Weapon (UUW)	Petition for hearing
09/30/2011	Arrested for domestic violence	Revoked
10/11/2011	Burglary intelligence	No action
10/13/2011	Lives with shoplifter	Revoked, technical violations
10/13/2011	Known shoplifter	Revoked, technical violations
10/17/2011	Arrested for retail theft	No action
10/17/2011	Retail theft	Revoked
10/17/2011	Battery & criminal trespass	Petition for hearing
10/17/2011	Drug paraphernalia	Petition for hearing
10/17/2011	Gang member burglary discharged,	Petition for hearing
10/17/2011	Delivery controlled substance	No action
10/18/2011	Gang member	Contacted INS
10/19/2011	Intelligence, new warrant	No action
10/20/2011	Disorderly conduct arrest	No action

10/26/2011	Intelligence	Revoked, technical violations
11/03/2011	Intelligence drug dealing	No action
11/04/2011	Intelligence, fleeing police no arrest	Petition for hearing
11/14/2011	Uuw & drug paraphernalia	No action
11/14/2011	Intelligence, outlaw motorcycle gang member	No action
11/14/2011	Aggravated battery	Warrants issued
12/01/2011	Gang member, felony arrest	Revoked
12/06/2011	Counterfeiting suspect	Revoked
12/07/2011	Intelligence, in company of pot users	Revoked, technical violation
12/14/2011	Gang member, fleeing police no arrest	No action
12/20/2011	Intelligence, narcotics	No action
12/22/2011	Counterfeiting arrest	No action
12/29/2011	Uuw	No action
01/17/2012	Domestic violence	No action
01/17/2012	Intelligence, gang member with drug dealers	Petition for hearing
01/17/2012	Warrant arrest	No action
01/17/2012	Failure to appear	No action
01/17/2012	Fleeing police	Revoked
01/18/2012	Burglary	No action 01/20/2012
01/23/2012	Intelligence, dog fighting & domestic violence	Revoked
01/27/2012	Top 10 gang member	Petition for hearing
01/27/2012	Intelligence, curfew hours	No action
02/16/2012	Intelligence, gang member	No action
02/23/2012	Intelligence, shooting suspect	No action
02/27/2012	Theft	No action
03/05/2012	Convicted felon	Public housing eviction
03/06/2012	Intelligence, robbery	Revoked
03/09/2012	Intelligence, sex offender	No action
03/14/2012	Theft	Petition for hearing
03/15/2012	Resisting arrest	Revoked
03/28/2012	Misdemeanor arrest	Petition for hearing
03/28/2012	Drug arrest	No action
03/28/2012	Gang member, criminal trespass	Petition for hearing
04/02/2012	Intelligence, robbery	No action
04/04/2012	Probationer in company of Uuw	Revoked
04/04/2012	Gang member shot	Revoked, technical violations
04/04/2012	Felony arrest	Petition for hearing
04/04/2012	Arrest	Petition for hearing
04/09/2012	Intelligence, witness intimidation	No action
04/10/2012	Arrest	Petition for hearing
04/16/2012	Gang member, Uuw	Petition for hearing
04/17/2012	Intelligence, gang member	No action
04/18/2012	Criminal trespass to land	Petition for hearing
04/18/2012	Retail theft	Revoked
04/18/2012	Warrant arrest	Petition for hearing
04/18/2012	Domestic violence	Petition for hearing
04/18/2012	Traffic citation	No action
04/18/2012	Intelligence, battery	Revoked, technical violations
04/30/2012	Intelligence, Cook County arrest	Petition for hearing
04/30/2012	Warrant arrest	No action
04/30/2012	Arrest	No action
05/07/2012	Felony arrest	Petition for hearing
05/21/2012	Fleeing police	Petition for hearing
05/22/2012	Gang member arrest	No action
06/07/2012	Intelligence, drug sales	No action
06/18/2012	Armed robbery	Petition for hearing

06/27/2012	Intelligence, associating with gang members	No action
06/27/2012	Shooting suspect	Referred to probation officer
07/02/2012	Warrant arrest	No action
07/09/2012	Intelligence, harassing court officers	No action
07/10/2012	Warrant	No action
07/12/2012	Warrant, failure to appear	Revoked
07/13/2012	Arrest, failure to appear	No action
07/16/2012	<u>Gang murder suspect</u>	Revoked
07/23/2012	Intelligence, drug dealing	No action
08/01/2012	Criminal damage to property	Petition for hearing
08/07/2012	Intelligence, gang member	No action
08/08/2012	Intelligence, associating with gang members	No action
08/08/2012	Resisting arrest	Revoked
08/08/2012	Cannabis	Petition for hearing
08/08/2012	Criminal trespass	Petition for hearing
08/08/2012	Domestic violence	Revoked
08/14/2012	Fail to register sex offender	Petition for hearing
08/14/2012	Intelligence, gang member	No action
08/15/2012	Obstruction justice	Petition for hearing
08/15/2012	Burglary	Petition for hearing
08/15/2012	Domestic violence	Petition for hearing
08/15/2012	Intelligence, probation curfew	In compliance
08/15/2012	Intelligence, probation curfew	In compliance
08/15/2012	Intelligence, probation curfew	In compliance
08/15/2012	Intelligence, probation curfew	In compliance
08/30/2012	Domestic violence	Referred to Kendal County
08/30/2012	Failure to appear & controlled substance	Probation warrant
08/30/2012	Driving w/o license	Probation warrant
08/30/2012	Intelligence, associating with gang members	No action
09/04/2012	Intelligence, gang member	No action
09/12/2012	Intelligence, associating with criminal	No action
09/12/2012	Intelligence, associating with criminal	No action
09/12/2012	Arrest, failure to appear	Petition for hearing
09/12/2012	Theft	No action
09/13/2012	Fleeing police	Petition for hearing
09/25/2012	Intelligence	Petition for hearing
09/26/2012	Domestic battery	No action
09/26/2012	Intelligence, associating with criminals	No action
09/26/2012	Obstructing justice	No action

JOLIET Police Department

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN INFORMATION for POLICE

DATE: ASSIGNED: #



Cat Burglar

Will County Adult probation is in the process of revoking the probation of Cat Burglar. As a result of a court hearing, Burglar had two new conditions placed on his bond for the petition to revoke. Burglar cannot be within 1,000 feet of Housing Authority Property and he may not have contact with know gang members. Any officer who observes Burglar in violation of these conditions should complete a "Probation Violation" report and forward a copy to Will Co. probation.

**** Law Enforcement Sensitive****

**For Law enforcement Use Only
Not for Public Dissemination**

Appendix 8

Parole Sweeps

Sweep Number	Date	Number of Parolees Visited
1	20 January 2012	
2	21 December 2011	9
3	19 May 2011	19
4	12 August 2011	15
5	14 march 2012	13

Appendix 9

Joliet Smart Policing Logo and Tag Line Contest

The logo for the City of Joliet, featuring the word "JOLIET" in a large, black, serif font with a decorative, slightly gothic style.

150 W. Jefferson Street, Joliet IL 60432

Media Release

Contact: Communications Office 815.724.4462 rbarker@jolietcity.org

January 20, 2011

Joliet Launches SMART Policing Community Logo Contest

The City of Joliet and the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing is issuing a challenge to the area's talented and creative individuals to enter a design contest and create the official logo and tag line that will represent the community campaign toward Joliet SMART Policing initiatives. The logo and tag line will premier in spring of 2011, and will be used in all mediums of marketing this campaign.

As a part of the overall SMART Policing effort, members of the Joliet area community have formed the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing to assist in the goals of: **encouraging the reporting of gun violence as well as methods of safe, anonymous reporting techniques via phone and text.**

The committee is made up of representatives from: the University of St. Francis, Joliet Region Chamber of Commerce, Joliet Township High School, Joliet Park District, Joliet Area YMCA, Forest Preserve District of Will County, Spanish Community Center, Forest Park Community Center, and additional community agencies assisting the City of Joliet and Joliet Police Department.

The SMART Policing campaign extends from the grant initiatives received by the Joliet Police Department to help reduce gun violence in the City of Joliet. As gun violence continues to be a problem, the Joliet Police Department continually work hard to solve these crimes; however, detectives often encounter witnesses that are unwilling to report information to help solve the crime/shootings.

The community campaign being developed will work to introduce the message that **it's okay to report information**. A creative of a successful Logo & Tag Line will help convey this message and lead to increase arrests of shooters, fewer shootings in neighborhoods, and safer communities for residents.

The logo and tag line do not have to include the term "SMART Policing." The Logo and tag line should engage, excite and encourage community members to make a personal connection to the need to report gun violence and the *Crimestoppers* anonymous phone and "text-a-tip" reporting methods.

To Enter:

To participate in the Joliet SMART Policing Logo and Tag Line Contest participants must submit a complete entry. A completed entry will be comprised of:

Joliet SMART Policing Logo and Tag Line Design Contest Rules

Calling all artists and creative community members to be part of a community effort to help make our area safer!

Background

The Joliet Police Department has received a SMART Policing Grant to help reduce gun violence in the City of Joliet. Currently, gun violence continues to be a problem in our city, even though other types of violent crime have decreased. The Joliet Police Department continually works hard to solve these crimes; however, detectives often encounter witnesses that are unwilling to report information to help solve the crime/shootings.

A community campaign is being developed to help introduce the message that it's okay to report information. A successful message will help lead to the following:

- Increased arrests of shooters
- Fewer shootings in neighborhoods
- Safer communities for residents

There are currently two methods in place that community members can use to report tips anonymously through *Crimestoppers*: 1) traditional phone line (911) 2) a new program, "text-a-tip", that is currently being launched throughout all of Will County. Further information about the Will County *Crimestoppers* program is available at: <http://www.crimestoppersofwillcounty.org>.

Contest Objective

The City of Joliet and the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing is seeking talented and creative individuals to enter a design contest to create the official logo and tag line that will represent this community campaign. The logo and tag line will premier in spring of 2011, and will be used in all mediums of marketing this community campaign.

As a part of the overall SMART Policing effort, members of the Joliet area community have formed the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing to assist in the goals of: encouraging the reporting of gun violence as well as methods of safe, anonymous reporting techniques via phone and text.

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The logo does not have to include the term "SMART Policing." The Logo and tag line should engage, excite and encourage community members to make a personal connection to the need to report gun violence and the *Crimestoppers* anonymous phone and "text-a-tip" reporting methods.

For more information on the Joliet SMART Policing Initiative, please visit www.cityofjoliet.info and click on the "SMART Policing" icon



150 W. Jefferson Street, Joliet IL 60432

Media Release

Contact: Communications Office 815.724.4462 rbarker@jolietcity.org

2

February 8, 2011

**Top Ten Finalists Posted for Public Voting
In the Joliet SMART Policing Community Logo & Tag Line Design
Contest at www.cityofjoliet.info**

The City of Joliet and the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing would like to thank the community for its outpouring of over 75 entries in the Joliet SMART Policing logo & tag line design contest. Online voting for the top ten entries is open to the public, and will take place from February 28, 2011 through March 11, 2011 at noon CST. Click on the SMART Policing icon at www.cityofjoliet.info

The winning logo and tag line will be used throughout the City of Joliet in numerous marketing efforts for the upcoming campaign. Winning entries will be posted online on March 15, 2011, with prizes as follows:

- First prize: I-Pad
- Second prize: \$100 Visa gift card
- Third prize: \$50 Visa gift card

In addition, the first prize winner will be recognized at a Joliet City Council meeting where they will receive a certificate of recognition.

The logo and tag line will be ranked by the number of online votes received. Contest winners will be notified by phone by or before March 15, 2011. In the event of a tie, the sub-committee of the Joliet Community Committee for SMART Policing will determine the winner. Only one vote is allowed per computer.

The Community Committee for SMART Policing is made up of representatives from: the University of St. Francis, Joliet Region Chamber of Commerce, Joliet Public Library, Joliet Township High School, Joliet Park District, Joliet Area YMCA, Forest Preserve District of Will County, Spanish Community Center, Forest Park Community Center, and additional community agencies assisting the City of Joliet and Joliet Police Department.

The City of Joliet is the fourth largest city in the state of Illinois, located just 45 miles southwest of Chicago's Loop. Home to over 152,000 residents, in addition to thriving businesses and attractions, the City of Joliet is easily accessible by rail, auto and bus transit. A perfect place to live, work and play, Joliet is constantly striving to promote growth and diversity. For more information on Joliet visit www.visitjoliet.org or call 815.724.4000.

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