



Pharr Smart Policing Initiative*

Final Report

Prepared by


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This Smart Policing Initiative Project would not been possible except for the enthusiasm of Chief Ruben Villescascas of the Pharr Police Department, who wanted to find innovative ways to control crime to enhance public safety in Pharr. He had Robert Garcia of the Pharr PD write the Smart Policing Initiative Grant and he invited Drs. S. George and Lynn Vincentnathan, professors at the University of Texas – Pan American, to help with the project.

PROJECT FACILIATORS:

- Pharr Police Department: While many PD personnel and court officials (the court is housed in the same building with the PD) were involved in developing and carrying out this research from the chief to patrol officers, the following were especially helpful in the design and carrying out of the projects:
 - Chief Ruben Villescascas
 - Robert Garcia, the Pharr PD Project Coordinator, who wrote the grant and was the main link between the university researchers and the police department.
 - Assistant Chief Joel Robles
 - Allan Cantu, the Domestic Violence Coordinator
 - The C.A.P.E. (SPI-trained) police officers: Officers David Treviño, Irving Segura, Chris Hernandez, and all others involved at various times.
- University of Texas – Pan America research team:
 - S. George Vincentnathan, D.Crim., Professor, Department of Criminal Justice.
 - Lynn Vincentnathan, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and Department of Sociology and Anthropology
- Smart Policing Initiative Program, including help and guidance from Dr. Michael White, SPI Subject Matter Expert.



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We gained a lot of information from attending the SPI conferences in Washington, DC, their various webinars, and the SPI panels at the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences conferences. We learned a lot that guided us in planning for and conducting the projects, and in training the police officers for the project.

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Pharr is a small South Texas city on the border with Mexico. It is beset by poverty and crime, with some cross-border drug trafficking and an imminent threat of Mexican cartels infiltrating and recruiting local gang members, which is happening in other cities along the border in the Rio Grande Valley (see Hastings 2014; Reagan 2013). The primary focus of Pharr's Smart Policing Initiative project was to reduce crime in ways that were both feasible for the Pharr Police Department with its limited resources and effective in addressing the roots of crime to bring about more lasting changes. The following three SPI projects developed to help accomplish this objective were found to be successful:

1. A place-based hotspot project, referred to as C.A.P.E. or Community Awareness Police Enforcement, which combined community-oriented policing with problem-oriented policing, making use of ATV patrolling. The idea was to facilitate the reduction of crime by reducing social disorder and disorganization, which provide conditions conducive for crime.
2. An offender-based project focusing on man-on-woman domestic violence offenders and their rehabilitation through attending a Peace Committee session at the police station and receiving follow-up calls and necessary assistance and referrals.
3. A false alarm reduction project that could save the PD financial and personnel resources that could be better used to control crime.

1. THE C.A.P.E. PROJECT:

The CAPE police went through training on community-oriented policing and problem-oriented policing using the SARA model of scanning, analyzing, responding, and assessing. They were informed about various crime theories, such as "broken windows," social disorganization, routine activities, and situational crime control theories. The CAPE police were encouraged to be agents of change and come up with innovative solutions to disorder and crime problems the community.

The PD had two ATVs to use for the CAPE project. These helped in scanning the Baker treatment area to which they were assigned. Being open vehicles enabled the officers to establish better relations with the residents and businesses in the beat along the lines of foot or bicycle patrolling. Even before the project started, upon receiving the community survey, several residents called into the PD to report crimes, one leading to a large cross-border drug bust. In this way the survey itself led the people to know that the police were concern about them, which served as a "treatment." This indicated that the community would be responsive to this form of CAPE policing.

The CAPE police, apart from introducing the ideas learned in their training, made innovative responses to problems uncovered in their scanning, which are described in this report. This gave them a sense of professional pride, especially when they received positive responses from the community.

The research findings support the effectiveness of this CAPE project in (1) reducing violent crime significantly, and (2) uncovering crime that is usually not reported. Qualitative and other

information from various sources suggests that people in Baker were reporting more property crimes due to the CAPE project than they would have without it, so the increase in property crimes reported to the police in Baker during the research period is thought to be an artifact of this more accurate reporting and not necessarily an increase in actual property crimes.

The CAPE activities helped:

1. increase community trust in the police and cooperation with them
2. reduce fear of crime
3. reduce fear of retaliation for reporting crime
4. increase willingness to report crime
5. increase community efficacy, facilitating the community's better control of their area and their personal self-control

The lessons learned are that ordinary patrol officers, given training as provided in the CAPE program and free rein, can become innovators in crime control and gain professional pride in doing so. Another lesson was that community members are eager have the police "there for them." Toward the end of the project one resident expressed fear to a CAPE officer that once the project is over the police won't be there for them and the people would be afraid to report crimes again, and their neighborhood would again become a high crime area. The CAPE officer assured him they would continue the project after the grant period. The PD has indeed continued the CAPE project in other areas, even expanding it, but not in Baker, where reactive traditional patrolling was resumed, with only occasional community policing. The research team recommended that CAPE be resumed in Baker, and it seems it will. The problem is there are not enough police and resources at this time to expand CAPE to the satisfaction of Pharr residents.

2. THE MAN-ON-WOMAN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (MOWV) OFFENDER PROJECT:

This project used systematic random sampling to select MOWV offenders as they came into the police department with Class C misdemeanors, after their arrest and a brief stay in jail (note that the PD, jail, and municipal court are housed in the same building). The Domestic Violence Coordinator, whose regular duty was to assist domestic violence victims, contacted the offenders and gave them the option of participating in the Peace-Making Program. This involved the offender individually appearing before a Peace Committee at the police station -- it was supposed to be between the jail and court, but ended up being held upstairs from that area -- and receiving follow-up calls. Originally the judge had said he could reduce their \$315 fine for participating in the program, but this failed to happen, as the City needed the fine money.

The Peace Committee was originally composed of the DV Coordinator, the Judge, the PD Project Coordinator (who had experience in dealing with victims and offenders), the bailiff, and the PD Chaplain, but due to scheduling issues it was usually only the DV Coordinator, the Project Coordinator, and sometimes the bailiff. Later, when the bailiff was not able to participate, the Booking Supervisor (Jailor) became part of the Peace Committee and participated. The Peace Committee using both caring and rigid approaches spoke to the offender about his crime and its

negative ramifications for himself and his family, and how he should treat his wife with respect and dignity as an equal.

Twenty MOWV offenders selected in this way went through this program and 20 other MOWV were simply “followed” by checking records on them to see if they had reoffended.

After the project was over, the DV Coordinator contacted the offenders in both the treatment and comparison groups, and the victims of these offenders, conducting an exit survey.

While the official police records showed that none of the treatment group offenders recidivated on MOWV, two offenders from the comparison group reoffended; however, this difference did not reach statistical significance due to the low numbers. The victim survey revealed that 3 treatment group offenders had beaten them again, while 8 comparison group offenders had done so; again statistical significance was not reached, though it came closer ($p = .08$). However, on the question about whether the offender had improved, the victims reported that the treatment offenders had significantly improved over the comparison offenders.

On the basis of these quantitative results the MOWV Offender Program is deemed a success. Furthermore, DV Coordinator found a marked difference in tenor during the final exit calls between the treatment and comparison groups. The treatment group offenders were respectful, appreciative, and more open about how life and family relations were going for them, as well as appreciative for the Peace-Making Program – one suggesting it should be available to all DV offenders – while the comparison group offenders tended to be more gruff and unresponsive.

This program is also being continued at the PD.

3. FALSE ALARM REDUCTION PROJECT:

A door-hanger in both English and Spanish was created with information about (1) the financial and crime costs of false alarms, and (2) 12 tips to avoid false alarms. Police officers were instructed to hand this out or leave on the door if no one was there when responding to false alarms. It was to be given out only on the west side of Pharr, with the east side as the control.

The results were that false alarms did reduce by 16% from 2012 to 2013 on the west (treatment) side. However, they reduced by 27% on the east (comparison) side. Therefore, it is uncertain it was the door-hangers having the impact. It could have been the door-hangers were being handed out on both sides, or that west-side residents were sharing the information with east-side friends and relatives. There is also the issue of the west side having many more businesses (which seem immune to correcting their false alarm problems) than the east side, which is mainly residential.

However, since printing the door-hangers and having a PD website with the same information do not cost too much and do not take up too much police time, this project could be continued.

IN SUMMARY, all three projects were either successful or appear to have been successful, and they are either being continued after the grant period ended, or can easily be continued.

II. BACKGROUND ON PHARR AND THE GRANT PROPOSAL:

Pharr is a medium-sized city near the southern tip of Texas on the U.S.-Mexico border, with a population of 73,790 and covering a 21 square mile area, spanning 2.5 mi east-west and 12 miles north-south. A major highway runs through Pharr to the Pharr International Bridge that crosses over to Reynosa, Mexico. It is adjacent to the City of McAllen to the west, Edinburg to the north, San Juan to the east, and Reynosa, Mexico to the south. It is part of the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission metropolitan statistical area and the McAllen-Reynosa (Mexico) transnational metropolitan area. Pharr’s population is 93% Hispanic and 36% of its residents live below the poverty line. The city experiences border-related problems, such as drug trafficking and dealing, gang problems, and some Mexican cartel infiltration. While its crime rates are not as high as some other places in the South, they are high enough to be of concern, especially in its hotspot areas (see Table 1, with rates also for the hotspot areas of study within Pharr).

TABLE 1: Crime Rates per 1,000 for U.S., Texas, Pharr, research and other areas, 2011-2013¹
 (Pharr rates, yellow background; rates above Pharr’s, red; rates below Pharr’s, green)

	2011			2012			2013		
	Index	Property	Violent	Index	Property	Violent	Index	Property	Violent
United States	32.92	29.05	3.87	32.56	28.7	3.88	30.99	27.31	3.68
South	38.01	33.71	4.30	36.50	32.27	4.24	34.98	30.95	4.04
Texas	38.70	34.83	4.09	37.70	33.62	4.09	36.58	32.58	4.00
Texas – Metro Cities	40.70	36.46	4.24	39.28	35.04	4.25	37.98	33.74	4.23
Amarillo, Texas	45.59	40.43	5.17	42.67	37.41	5.26	39.51	34.26	5.24
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission MSA	42.51	39.56	2.95	40.89	37.69	3.19	39.81	36.95	2.87
Pharr	37.60	34.11	3.56	35.52	31.83	3.70	37.09	34.00	3.09
Baker	34.06	24.41	9.65	24.52	18.60	5.92	27.99	24.07	3.92
Charlie	33.49	20.83	9.76	25.67	21.74	3.93	27.31	23.15	4.16
Las Milpas ¹	24.62	20.79	3.83	19.62	16.91	2.70	33.40	29.25	4.16

¹Data are from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports and the Pharr PD
²Crime data for Las Milpas may underreported, as a high portion of residents there are undocumented and fearful of the justice system; furthermore the PD’s New World data system (which was used only for Las Milpas) underreports crimes.

Originally three following projects were proposed, but later revised:

1. Place-Based policing of hot spots with rapid enforcement tactics, increased police visibility, and development and use of confidential informants.
2. Offender-based policing, identifying high risk offenders and applying a treatment.
3. Holistic Problem-Oriented Policing that addresses place, offender, and victim conditions, using the SARA model to analyze crime and implement treatments.

The idea was to select 30 areas in Pharr, 15 for these three treatments and 15 as comparison areas.

III. PLANNING AND SCANNING:

In the nine-month planning phase, we (Robert Garcia and the university research team) came to realize that Pharr was not large enough to have 30 areas, and lacked the police personnel to conduct such a large experiment. We eventually settled on three projects, **(1) a place-based COP-POP project** with one treatment and one comparison area (later two comparison areas),

which would combine the thrusts of place-based and holistic POP strategies with added community-oriented policing; (2) **offender-based intervention for domestic violence offenders**; and (3) **a false-alarm reduction project** that resulted from complaints about false alarms from dispatchers, patrol officers, and the April 2012 Pharr Police Officer Survey about the high volume of false alarms taking up valuable police time and financial resources that could be used to control crime.

1. **Police Survey:** An in-house survey was administered to 81 of the available 100 police personnel of the Pharr Police Department on in April 2012. A few highlights of the findings pertinent to our projects were as follows:
 - a. Results regarding which crimes are of concern, combining information from those who ranked with those who did not rank their concerns:

TABLE 2: Police concern about various crimes (in percent) – 81 respondents, 0 missing

Concerned about	Burglary	Domestic Violence	Drug Dealing	Drug Trafficking	Gang Activity	Robbery	Homicide	Home Invasions	Sexual Assault	Juvenile delinquency	Auto Theft	Illegal Drug Use	Kid-knapping	Human trafficking	Disorderly Conduct
Concerned	67.9	67.9	66.7	59.3	58.0	55.6	53.1	51.9	50.6	45.7	45.7	42.0	39.5	39.5	34.6
Not as Concerned	32.1	32.1	33.3	39.5	42.0	44.4	46.9	48.1	59.4	54.3	54.3	58.0	60.5	60.5	65.4

- b. Questions: In your opinion what is the most time-consuming police work? (all 81 respondents, whether they chose 1 or more types of police work; one point was given for each type they selected)

TABLE 3: What is the most time-consuming police work?

	responding to alarms	maintenance of order	property crimes	responding to domestic disturbances	violent crimes	helping services	vice	responding to illegal drug matters
yes	30.9	29.6	24.7	22.2	12.3	12.3	2.5	1.2
no or not as much	69.1	70.4	75.3	77.8	87.7	87.7	97.5	98.8

c. Which strategies do you think would help most to reduce crime in Pharr?

TABLE 4: Crime Reducing Strategies (in percent) all 81 respondents answered each question		
Would the following help to reduce crime in Pharr?	Yes	No or not as much
a. using data about crime, criminals, and victims to understand the nature and extent of crime	48.1	51.9
b. involving community people to control crime	60.5	39.5
c. involving stakeholders (businesses, bars, hotels, and residents) in controlling crime	22.2	77.8
d. cooperative team-policing	59.3	40.7
e. target-hardening (protecting places and people from crime)	30.9	69.1
f. domestic violence control programs	28.4	71.6
g. deployment of police to hotspots	63.0	37.0
h. educating the public on crime-preventive measures	45.7	54.3
i. working with community schools and youth groups	44.4	55.6
j. referring problem people to counseling	9.9	90.1
k. monitoring probationers and parolees under supervision	25.9	74.1
l. monitoring ex-cons not under supervision	14.8	85.2
m. making more arrests	25.9	74.1
n. prosecuting cases more effectively	37.0	63.0
o. incarcerating more offenders	30.9	69.1

From this survey we noted that **domestic violence** was of high concern to police officers. This gave us the idea that for the offender-based project, we could develop a program targeting domestic violence offenders (man-on-woman violence offender) to help reduce recidivism. The Pharr PD already has services for the victims. Although this is a highly intransigent problem, we felt if a new, offender-based approach could help reduce recidivism, this could have a positive effect against domestic violence and crime in general, by keeping families together and ending the cycle of abuse.

We also noted that responding to **alarms** (about 90% in Pharr are false alarms) was considered the most time-consuming work, which was supported by other complaints we heard from dispatchers and police officers in passing. Since these false alarm calls are costly and consume police time, taking police away from responding to or preventing real crime, we wanted to include a false alarm reduction project, figuring this would complement the other two strategies.

2. **Community Scanning**: Early in 2012 during the initial planning phase, after driving around neighborhoods and areas with crime map in hand mostly on Saturday mornings, the researchers came to the conclusion that an important factor associated with higher levels of crime was **social disorganization**, as shown in less neighborly interactions (less or no people

out and about and less or no socializing) and various physical and social incivilities, often mentioned under the “broken windows” theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1990). This included gang graffiti, unkempt yards (with trash, junk, tall grass and weeds, untrimmed shrubs and trees), deteriorated homes and commercial buildings, abandoned buildings, vacant lots, etc. We found that lower crime areas were not necessarily where wealthy or middle class people lived, but some very low/no crime areas inhabited by lower income people, with small homes and/or mobile homes. However these low crime areas did exhibit the opposite of these social disorganization signs mentioned above and exhibited “collective efficacy” (see Sampson, *et al.* 1997). Further, these low crime areas included not only Anglo elderly “Winter Texans” (there is an influx of elderly people from northern states into the Rio Grande Valley during the winter), but also areas with young and mixed age Hispanics. On the other hand, even some newer, more middle class neighborhoods without many of the more “ugly” physical conditions, but with some graffiti and lacking signs of neighborly interactions had somewhat higher levels of crime; the researchers figured this in part may be due to their newness and lack of neighborhood cohesion, another aspect of social disorganization. These factors led the researchers and Robert Garcia to select hotspot treatment and comparison areas of high crime rates that most greatly exhibited signs of physical disorder and social disorganization, and to consider how the police in their capacity might be able to plant seeds of community organization, contributing to community efficacy, by employing a unique combination of COP, POP, and intelligence-led policing strategies we and the PD developed. We felt that controlling these disorders could help reduce crime if collective efficacy could be promoted, as has been found in other studies (see Sampson, *et al.* 1999; Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). Consequently we focused on building close relationships between the public and the police.

3. **Community Survey:** In May 2012 a mail-in Community Survey, developed by the university researchers and Robert Garcia, was administered to the Baker treatment and Charlie comparison areas we had planned to use in the place-based project. Only 81 of the 2000 who received the survey (and received a follow-up postcard) returned it, which itself seems to indicate some level of public indifference.

One of the issues that arose in speaking with PD personnel was they suspected patrol officers were not entering into assigned neighborhood patrol areas much, but driving around the peripheries. The Community Survey indicated this; the vast majority of the people in the treatment and comparison areas felt they needed more patrolling in their neighborhoods. The survey also indicated that the residents felt crime was rampant in their neighborhoods and they feared crime. This is understandable from the fairly high level of victimization reported in the survey.

On the survey 81% of respondents (in the treatment and comparison areas) answered that they needed more police patrolling in their neighborhood (excluding the 16% who replied “not sure”) – 93% in the treatment area versus 72% in the comparison area. Tables 5 and 6 give some results from this survey regarding perceptions and fear of crime, what the Baker and

Charlie residents felt would reduce crime, as well as their victimizations and whether those crimes were reported to the police.

The two highest responses to what respondents thought would help reduce crime was “better relations between the police and community” (87%) and “increasing police patrols” (86%).

TABLE 5: Community Pre-Project Survey – general questions about crime	
<p>Fear of crime: felt “somewhat unsafe” to “very unsafe”:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 59% re burglary 2. 51% re going out at night 3. 48% re vandalism 4. 39% re attack 5. 39% re robbery 6. 36% re murder 7. 30% re rape 	<p>Crimes: responding “somewhat” to “very serious” in Baker:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 85% - drug trafficking 2. 82% - drug-dealing 3. 80% - drug abuse 4. 62% - assault 5. 62% - crime (in general) 6. 57% - burglary 7. 47% - human trafficking 8. 45% - robbery 9. 33% - homicide
<p>“Is there a need for more police patrols in your neighborhood?": 81% - said “yes”</p>	<p>What is the most important cause of crime in the neighborhood?": 72% responded gangs</p>
<p>Disorder: responding “somewhat serious” to “very serious”:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 73% - drunks 2. 72% - trash 3. 67% - unsupervised youth 4. 57% - graffiti 5. 57% - disruptive neighbors 	<p>How likely a cause of crime is ___ (1 = least likely, 5 = most likely) – Percent responding 4 or 5:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 79% - drugs 2. 71% - gangs 3. 67% - repeat offenders 4. 65% - lack of supervision of minors 5. 57% - cartels 6. 49% - poverty and unemployment
<p>What would most likely reduce crime (1 = least likely, 5 = most likely) – Percent responding 4 or 5:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 87% - better relations between the police and community 2. 86% - increasing police patrols 3. 85% - more effective drug enforcement 4. 83% - tearing down abandoned buildings 5. 82% - enforced curfew 6. 79% - stronger prosecution 7. 79% - neighborhood watch group 8. 78% - supervised juveniles 9. 78% - cleaning up graffiti 10. 66% - foot or bicycle patrols 	

What seems to be amazing about the victimization responses on the Community Survey are the high percentages of those who reported having been victimized, or had a family member

victimized, within the past year, which would be 2011 through May of 2012. It is likely some telescoping forward of crimes that had occurred in earlier years, or expansion out of whom they considered “family members” may have happened. Over 32% reported having been burglarized, 22% reported being victims of vandalism, and 18.5% of having something stolen from their car. While a higher percentage of respondents said they reported violent crimes, only 39% reported being burglarized and 27% reported vandalism. It is noted that unwillingness to report crime is linked to social disorganization, poverty, ethnicity (non-African-American), fear of crime, and fear of retaliation (see Avdija and Giever 2012; Davis and Henderson, 2003). As this study finds, it is fear of retaliation from criminals that is the important factor.

TABLE 6: Community Pre-Project Survey – questions about victimization and reporting to police	
<p>Percent responding “Yes” to “Were you or a member of your household in Pharr the victim within the past year of”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Homicide – 1.2% • Assault by a non-family member – 4.9% • Assault by a family member – 6.2% • Rape – 2.5% • Burglary (having something stolen from your home) – 32.1% • Having something stolen from your car – 18.5% • Auto theft – 8.6% • Vandalism – 22.2% 	<p>Percent (of those victimized) responding “Yes” to “Did you report ____ to the police?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Murder – 100% • Assault by non-family member – 75% • Assault by a family member – 60% • Rape – 50% • Robbery – 50% • Burglary – 39% • Theft from your car – 42% • Auto Theft – 80% • Vandalism – 27%

Drug Bust from Administering the Community Survey: Even before we started our project, it seems the Community Survey had the effect of creating a consciousness among the residents that they should report crimes, as the survey made them think that the police seemed interested in controlling crime and protecting them. In other words, the survey itself may have presented a “treatment” effect. Several respondents became encouraged and emboldened after receiving the survey and contacted the police station about various problems, one leading to a big cross-border drug ring bust near a public housing project in the Baker sector treatment area.

IV. THE PLACE-BASED PROJECT:

From these above considerations – the police survey, conversations with PD personnel, and limited PD resources and expert personnel – we came up with the idea for the place-based project of not only increasing police presence and visibility (one project we started was use of red and blue cruise lights on squad cars at night, see below) and problem-oriented policing, but also enhancing police-community relations, mainly with the use of SPI-trained patrol officers using all-

terrain vehicles or ATVs and foot patrols, which allow them to interact with community members. ATVs also allow officers to go into narrow and off road areas they would not be able to go into with a squad car. One short-coming we realized later is that they cannot take suspects into custody or respond to APBs as they can in squad cars, because ATVs can only seat one person. However, if they confront crime, suspicious activity, or make an arrest they can easily call for squad back-up or special units.

We sought to address all of the above issues and crime (lack of adequate patrolling, lack of intelligence-led POP policing, lack of police-community relations, and greater social disorganization problems) in whatever small ways these specially SPI-trained police officers could help with a combined COP-POP/SARA strategy for the place-based strategy. We felt that police who could be multi-functional in this way, bringing more analytical and innovative COP-POP/SARA strategies and do pro-active interactive patrolling, including better scanning as well as police-community relations, would be more effective in (1) improving police-community relations, (2) reducing crime by greater police presence, (3) increasing a stronger sense of professional satisfaction and pride (low police morale was a problem we became aware of), (4) enhancing public safety and satisfaction, and (5) perhaps help the community to organize for greater “community efficacy.”¹

A. INTERVENTION:

The main intervention used in the “hotspot” project was through **patrol officers** specially trained in various policing strategies, including interactive patrolling with ATVs and some foot patrolling in the target area. This would both enable better “scanning” and improve police-community relations, which could also help gain information about crimes and disorder problems from residents and commercial establishments – a combination of community interactive & proactive policing and POP and hotspot reactive policing. It would have been difficult in terms of Pharr’s size and police resources available to come up with 15 to 30 areas in Pharr, so this became the single hotspot project. Furthermore, we wanted to create a multi-functional policing strategy appropriate for a small city that could be continued on into the future, after the grant period. We explained these issues to CNA persons in charge of the SPI projects, and we were told we could modify the original proposal.

The Pharr has 56 patrol officers and 10 sergeants; it has few police specialists and inadequate crime analysts/analysis.² We thought patrol officers using a combination of reactive and proactive

¹ We understood community involvement, especially off regular police hours, to be above and beyond police duties, so we did not expect large community organizing efforts, but that the officers only do a few things they could within their abilities and skills and mostly during their shifts. We found out the Lieutenant’s wife worked for the city development office, so we got the idea officers could refer community members to agencies that could help their neighborhoods and businesses. Also, this COP aspect of the treatment would be something that would flow naturally from the more community-involved interactive patrolling in ATVs and on foot. It should be noted that various police, including the Chief, have already been involved in community activities above and beyond their call of duty, so this is not an unusual idea, only that it should be their ideas and done voluntarily.

² During the 3 years of this SPI project, the PD had 4 “crime analysts,” the first two untrained in crime analysis and seeking other employment in their different professional fields. The third analyst was genuinely interested in his job

policing methods might be a better way to control crime in this type of situation, especially property crime, and hopefully violent and drug-related crime as well.

B. TRAINING OF OFFICERS:

As the patrol officers already had training and experience in policing, we felt the training and education for SPI need not be rigorous and involve weeks of training. The six police officers selected for the SPI place-based project went through brief training for 17 hours over a week-long 5 day period, October 1 through the 5th, 2012. The plan was to put these six on the SPI project half time, but some were pulled off due to other PD needs (as explained below). Later other officers that were put on the SPI project received training from those already trained.

The materials developed for this drew on materials from <http://www.popcenter.org/learning/> and <http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/tta/webinars> that related to POP and the SARA model, but were refashioned to include an emphasis on community oriented policing (COP) and officer initiative in developing crime and disorder control strategies (see Appendix A, pages 76-80). The training involved:

1. Pre-test and post-test regarding the training.
2. Various SPI webinars on problem oriented policing, targeting offenders, offender notification, research that matters, collaboration.
3. Developing better police-community relations
4. Engaging in COP using the SARA model of scanning the general characteristics of residents, groups, businesses, and their problems so the police can interact with them, come up with solutions within their purview, and address their concerns and problems.
5. Engaging in POP, employing the SARA model of scanning, problem analysis, responding with innovative strategies, and assessing results; scanning specific problems that deserve the people's and police concern for reducing crime and interpersonal conflict; identifying persons, groups, and stakeholders who contribute to the problem.
6. Theories, including "broken windows," social disorganization, community efficacy, routine activities, and situational crime theories and ways of using these to prevent crime.
7. The importance of going beyond reactive policing and perfunctory squad car patrolling and identifying social problems and physical environmental conditions that have a bearing on crime and disorder – emphasizing "broken windows" theory.
8. Networking with residents, organizations, and businesses.
9. Park crime reduction – to facilitate a shift from parks as places of crime to places for family and public enjoyment and communities gatherings; scanning for obstructions to the use of parks: drugs, crimes, poor lighting, gangs, suspicious activities, deviant behaviors.
10. The importance of crime prevention and helping the community to "harden the target."

and took crime analysis training courses, but left to join the police academy and fill the great need for police officers (there had also been a loss of PD officers in late 2012). The current crime analyst is now learning the necessary skills. This made it difficult for the researchers to get the information they needed.

11. Examples of other SPI programs that used SARA, such as convenience store robberies in Gainesville, FL, apartment complex crime in Santa Barbara, CA, disorderly youth in New York City, and crime control experiments in Glendale, AZ.
12. Hypothetical cases of solving problems using SARA, with officers then creating some their own hypothetical cases.
13. Using a specially devised SARA-based form for the SPI hotspot project on which to practice their hypothetical cases, a form later used by the officers during the project – see Appendix B, pages 81-84.
14. Raising awareness in the community of police presence and willingness to help.
15. Facilitating community organization within the purview of policing, such as facilitating community events, clean-up, etc.
16. Being empowered by telling the SPI officers that the success of the program depends on what they were trained to do and their coming up with innovative strategies to control crime.
17. Being told that they have to be the change they want to see.
18. The newly-trained SPI officers giving PowerPoint presentations about what they had learned, to reinforce their knowledge, enthusiasm, and ownership of the project.

As it turned out, after some months of struggling to understand and appreciate this training, especially the COP approach – they admitted later that they did not really understand or appreciate it until they have been practicing it for several months – they adopted it in ways above and beyond their duties, thoroughly enjoying this and becoming highly inspired professional police officers in the service of the community, rather than daily wage earners (see outcomes and sustainability, pages 37-38, 42 and 62-63, below). According to these SPI-trained officers, the other patrol officers in the PD did not have much respect for the program in the beginning, but as it progressed many of the non-SPI officers came to regard it highly and now seek in various ways to emulate SPI policing to some extent. In the post-study survey of the SPI-trained police officers, they said that this SPI model of training should be included as a regular aspect of police academy training.

The idea of using COP-POP trained patrol officers was to:

1. **Increase more effective police presence and visibility**, which had been lacking in this crime- and gang-ridden part of Pharr, to enhance crime control.
2. **Have patrol officers themselves implement the SARA model** by the training provided, suggestions made, and report form developed; have them scan the crime and problem situations of their area – which in many cases could be better done using ATVs and foot patrol – analyze causes, and respond with innovative solutions based on problem analysis. The SPI patrol officers did get a lot of positive feedback and crime-related information from the community as a result of their efforts. Furthermore, the crime analysts reported that the officers began to rely more and more on the crime data in the PD crime analyst’s office, and that even other non-SPI officers began to use the data more often.
3. **Increase better police-community relations** through more interaction with people in the residential and commercial sectors, such as by talking to the people, by giving crime-prevention talks, and facilitating police-community events (the idea was to suggest that the

people organize these events, but the police themselves did the organizing, and it seems the community is also getting more involved in organizing them). This is to:

- a. Increase trust between the police and the people.
- b. Obtain more tips and information about crime and crime-related problems; and
- c. Facilitate community organization.



Figure 1: CAPE Officer with ATVs and Baker residents

The COP-POP/SARA Style of policing becomes “Community Awareness Police Enforcement” or C.A.P.E.: After the patrol officers’ training the PD came up with a name for the program, “C.A.P.E.” (Community Awareness Police Enforcement), and made them police shirts monogrammed with C.A.P.E. That is the name it is known by today and we will use CAPE hereafter to refer to this Pharr placed-based Smart Policing Initiative project.

Aside from the researchers and PD grant project coordinator (Robert Garcia) meeting with the SPI-trained patrol officers about once a month, these officers **kept reports of their specific Smart Policing activities on the form developed, along with photos and other related materials, in a large 4-inch thick binder.** See form on pp. 81-84 in Appendix B on SPI (Place-Based) Reports for two examples of these special reports. Most of their activities were of a proactive crime prevention nature (which would be expected of patrol officers going about patrolling), some in which community people brought attention to crimes and problems, bringing residents and commercial people into the “scanning” part of the project.

C. MEASUREMENT OF OUTCOME AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES:

In order to measure the project’s success we decided to use UCR crime data collected in the PD. Because we expected there might be a threat to statistical validity due to low numbers, we decided to look at the total index crimes, property crimes combined (mainly theft), and violent crimes combined (mainly aggravated assault, some rape, but no murder as it turned out) rather than more specific crimes. There was also a problem in getting crime data due to frequent turnover of crime

analysts. It was difficult enough just to get the UCR crimes, so we gave up the idea of obtaining Part II and other crimes and disorders.

We also planned to use qualitative and anecdotal information, police and community assessments of project success and their satisfaction with the project as an important supplement to quantitative data, and as it turned out this type of information was at least as valuable, if not more so, in assessing project outcome.

We hoped for success in one or more of the following outcomes:

1. Reduced UCR crimes.
 - a. We also warned the PD that UCR crimes (crimes reported to the police that exclude unreported crimes) could actually increase because if people gained confidence and trust in the police due to the project and started coming forward to report more crimes. We planned also to look for evidence that this might be the case.
 - b. Also since the number of crimes in this rather small area is not very high, even though the crime rate there is higher than most other areas of Pharr, there could be threat to statistical validity.
 - c. Decrease in property crimes, expected from an increase in police presence and visibility in the area.
 - d. Decrease in violent crimes, expected from decrease in social disorganization and increase in collective efficacy. We hoped the Smart Policing CAPE officers might be able to effect this through their community-policing strategies.
 - e. We expected that there would be a learning curve for the CAPE officers and the community, so that the treatment effect would be less in the initial months and increase over time.
2. Increased positive police-community relations, indicated by information from final interviews with the SPI-trained police involved in the project and a community focus group discussion, comparing it with the community survey before the project began. The focus group was planned since the pre-study community survey was costly with poor returns.
3. Improved police morale resulting from more intensive involvement with the community and commitment to the CAPE type of policing we developed – which we hoped to find in the post-study interviews with the police.
4. Improved community support for the police, as the people would hopefully feel that the police care for them and their safety. Results for this would be obtained from the post-study focus group.
5. Sustainability: The Pharr Police Department's plans or actions to continue this form of policing and help train other officers. We could obtain information about this from follow-up interviews with the CAPE police and the Assistant Chief (who at the start of the project was the Lieutenant in charge of selection, training and deployment of patrol officers for the Pharr PD, including those for the CAPE project).

D. SELECTION OF TREATMENT AND COMPARISON AREAS:

The Pharr PD has 7 sectors, covering the 21 square miles of the city, which are similar to “patrol beats,” except for Adam, which spans the west and east sides of Pharr (and is divided by Freeway 281), which has two “beats,” giving a total of 8 patrol beats. These sectors seemed to have been drawn up on a straight grid according to roughly equal population in each grid for the purpose of partitioning up patrol areas. However, these sectors and beats are not homogenous, but a mix of different types of residential areas and commercial establishments. Baker and Charlie, two of the beats we were considering due to their high crime rates, has Freeway 283 running through them with a very different area on the other side. Robert Garcia found a website for people seeking to move to new areas and neighborhoods, Neighborhood Scout (NS, see www.neighborhoodscout.com), that breaks Pharr into more homogenous areas and also includes a wide variety of demographic, social, and cultural characteristics about those areas, including levels of crime (which are based on official census, UCR, and other data). They had two areas with higher crime rates that cut across Baker and Charlie, one to the north and the adjacent one to the south, but excluding parts of the beats that included large shopping malls on the other side of the freeway, etc. Neighborhood Scout’s only higher crime area was “City Center,” the downtown commercial area to the south of and adjacent to Baker and Charlie but in the David and Edward sectors, where traditionally the wealthier people lived.

As noted in Table 1 and from our other data the violent crime rates in these sections of Baker and Charlie for 2010 and 2011 were nearly three times higher than other in areas of Pharr – they were indeed violent hotspots. That many of the violent crimes clustered in 3 to 6 assaults/murders at the same location and same time indicates these were likely gang-related, and it has been noted from other sources that these areas have a high concentration of gangs.

We decided to go with these north and south areas in the Baker and Charlie sectors, then divided them between west of Cage Blvd (in Baker, our treatment area) and east of Cage (in Charlie, our comparison area). Together these areas come to 2 square miles, or about 10% of the Pharr City area. See image below; the dark orange and light blue is Baker, and the dark blue and yellow is Charlie, with the light blue being the treatment area and yellow being the comparison area from within these sectors. The treatment and comparison areas within the Baker and Charlie sectors also have a shared history of being the oldest, poorest, and most neglected areas of Pharr (see Table 1 of area characteristics below). The treatment area we chose is a very rough area with many gang members, 5 little dilapidated bars (about the size of a two-room home) on the edge of the residential area; these have been grandfathered in and the city cannot close them down without some serious cause. The area also has 2 housing projects. Both Baker and Charlie have gangs, but these are mainly neighborhood-based rival gangs. In 2010 some gang members from the Charlie area killed a rival Baker area gang member outside a Baker school. Just recently in 2014, after the SPI project was over, some gang members from San Juan, the city to the east of and adjacent to Pharr, engaged in a drive-by shooting in Baker.




Figure 2: Map of the Baker treatment and Charlie comparison areas

While Charlie is the most similar in demographics and history to Baker, one problem was that these two areas are contiguous, divided by the main 4-lane boulevard (that is a continuation of Freeway 281 to the north). Commercial establishments line this heavy traffic boulevard, further separating the west-side Baker from east-side Charlie neighborhoods, which seemed to us would reduce treatment diffusion problems.

Because of concerns about diffusion we also looked at other areas for comparison to Baker, and strongly considered an area well to the south, Las Milpas or South Pharr (the Frank and George sectors). Although it is not as comparable to Baker on some factors as Charlie is (Charlie being in effect the same neighborhood as Baker, but divided by Cage Blvd.), it is the second closest in comparison in terms of low socio-economic level. South Pharr is separated by over a mile of uninhabited agricultural fields, canals, and a major floodway from the rest of Pharr and five miles south of the Baker treatment area. Together Frank sector, to the west of Cage Blvd, and George, to the east, are known by residents as Las Milpas (“the Cornfields”), which was an unincorporated colonia³ established in the 1960s and annexed by Pharr in 1987. Like Baker, it also has a high level of poverty and crime and has been of high concern to the Pharr PD, which prefers people to refer to the area as South Pharr, since some of the people there tend to consider themselves a separate town.

As the place-based project in Baker was in progress, Charlie received a high level of unplanned “treatment” that made it less desirable as a comparison area (explained below), so we decided to also include Las Milpas as another comparison area, including both Frank, which has a higher proportion of commercial establishments than the Baker treatment area we selected, and George

³ Colonias are unincorporated communities with low income residents, many of whom are or were migrant farm workers, or descendants of farm workers. They often do not have city amenities, such as city water and electricity, and often their homes do not meet city codes.

(which has a higher proportion of residents than the Baker treatment area; however, together they are more similar in residential/business composition to Baker.

TABLE 7: Demographics and Characteristics of the Baker Treatment and Charlie Comparison Areas (most from 2011 data)		
	Baker (treatment)	Charlie (comparison)
Population (residential) 2011	3,045	3,277
Homes/Apartments	814	876
Businesses	61	40
History and characteristics	One of the oldest parts of Pharr, along with the commercial center, adjacent and to the south; pre-1970s ethnic residential segregation; Hispanics to the north of the RR tracks (Baker/Charlie sectors); Anglos to the south (David/Edward sectors); after the riots of 1971 most Anglos were driven from Pharr.	
Per capita income Baker/Charlie**; Pharr, \$12,725*	\$10,199	
Median home values, Baker/Charlie**; Pharr (2012) \$73,800*	\$45,800	
Children living in poverty**	60.5%	
Ethnicity* (Pharr is 93% Hispanic)	97.6% Hispanic nearly all others are "Anglo" White	
Parks	1. Memorial Park – small, centrally located with restrooms & sports areas; large Guadalupe Cemetery adjacent 2. VG Municipal Park, NE, with some buildings, sports areas, basketball courts.	1. Lorenzo Garcia Park – large, centrally located, more sports areas, basketball; with old Boys & Girls Club with a large gym and activities rooms, kitchen; Pharr City renovated this 1/13 – 2/13 and opened to community and Pharr police for PAL and other programs
Schools:	1 elementary school	3 elementary schools
	1 PK-12 Christian School	1 Head Start
		1 middle school
		2 high schools (one a reform school)
Crime**	2 nd highest crime rate in Pharr, after "City Center," the main business district, adjacent to the treatment/comparison area	
<p>Data not indicated with an asterisk has been obtained by the Pharr PD crime analyst *2011 data, from http://www.city-data.com/city/Pharr-Texas.html. **Based on information from Neighborhood Scout (NS) at www.neighborhoodscout.com, which provides such information on smaller level residential areas. NS broke the city of Pharr into 9 such larger "neighborhood areas," based them being internally somewhat homogenous. Our Baker treatment and Charlie comparison areas were based on two of their areas, one just south of Freeway 283 and one adjacent to the south of that. We combined these north and south NS "neighborhoods" (averaging the statistics for both), then broke the combined area into two, Baker to the west of Cage Blvd and Charlie to the east. While NS statistics are based on census and other official data, they may be outdated by about 5 years, but they are the only ready-made statistics for these smaller areas.</p>		




Figure 3: Map of Pharr indicating the Baker, Charlie, and Las Milpas areas

TABLE 8: Demographics and Characteristics of the Las Milpas or South Pharr (Frank & George) Comparison Area			
	Frank (comparison)	George (comparison)	Frank + George
Population (residential) 2010	15,076	9,849	24,925
Homes/Apartments	4,031	2,633	6,664
Businesses	324	145	469
History and characteristics, compared to Baker/Charlie	Unincorporated colonia from the 1960s; annexed by Pharr in 1987; agricultural fields becoming residential areas, rapidly increasing population, many newer homes (57% built after 1999*), more undocumented residents from Mexico, more industries than in Baker or Charlie		
Median household income, Las Milpas (Pharr, \$29,000)*	\$23,200		
Median home values, Las Milpas area*; Pharr, \$73,800*	\$67,800 (the older portions of Las Milpas have homes similar to those in Baker/Charlie)		
Children living in poverty**	51.8%		
Ethnicity* (Pharr is 93% Hispanic)	98.5% Hispanic nearly all others are "Anglo" White		
Crime*	3 rd highest crime rate in Pharr, after Baker/Charlie and the main business district		
Data not indicated with an asterisk has been obtained by the Pharr PD crime analyst or Pharr City Manager *Based on information from Neighborhood Scout (NS) at www.neighborhoodscout.com , which provides such information on smaller level residential areas. NS broke the city of Pharr into 9 such larger "neighborhood areas," based them being internally somewhat homogenous. Our Las Milpas (Frank and George) comparison area was based on two of those areas, north and south of each other. We combined these north and south NS "neighborhoods" (averaging the statistics for both), then broke the combined area into two, Frank to the west of Cage Blvd and George to the east. While NS statistics are based on census and other official data, they may be outdated by about 5 years, but they are the only ready-made statistics for these smaller areas.			

E. TREATMENT IN THE BAKER SECTOR (BEAT):

At first there were 6 SPI-trained officers assigned half-time time to the SPI project, which came to about 120 SPI special patrol/activity hours per week, starting after the training in mid-October 2012. The main activities included ATV patrolling, foot patrols, squad car patrolling with red and blue cruise lights on at night, contacting residents, asking about crime problems, and giving talks and engaging in other activities relating to crime prevention.

Some of the treatment aspects are as follows:

1. The method of police patrolling changed from reactive and perfunctory patrolling (in squad cars with windows mainly rolled up) to proactive and community-engaged patrolling in ATVs, or when in squad cars, then stopping and getting out to engage residents and businesses, seeking out problems and tips. The ATVs greatly helped in this and attracted children and adults alike, who were more forthcoming in discussing problems and issues.
2. Patrolling was done in a way that made police presence more visible – which the ATVs did, as well as driving into more areas in Baker that had perhaps been neglected earlier.
 - a. The researchers suggesting that while in squad cars at night they could drive around with police lights on. The police knew they could not use the flashing

lights that way, but discovered they could use two red and blue cruise lights on either end of the array while driving at night. These were quite visible and distinctive, alerting the community to the police presence. This was done from May 2013 on. During a post-focus group residents claimed to have seen those lights at night, which gave them a sense of security, also helping them to reclaim some authority over their children.

3. Patrolling was done in a way that allowed officers to scan more effectively for problems and crimes, including ATV, foot, and some bicycle patrolling. The ATVs allowed better scanning than the squad cars had.
 - a. They checked abandoned buildings, parks, cemeteries, parking lots, checking whether drug dealing, prostitution, or gang activities were taking place. About 28% of 2012 crimes in Baker occurred in open areas, such as streets, highways, alleys, and parks, compared to only 4% in Charlie (see Table 9 below). Such a high proportion of “open area” crimes is indicative of social disorganization and would be linked to Baker residents’ high fear of crime expressed in the community survey.

Table 9: Crimes According to Location

		Number of Residences in Sector	Number of Businesses in Sector	Residence	Business/School/Bar	Open Areas: Highway/street/alley/park	Percent Crime in open areas
Baker	2012	814	61	44	24	19	28%
	2013			65	22	13	15%
Charlie	2012	876	40	70	24	4	4%
	2013			89	14	2	2%

- b. One officer said he was able to see drug paraphernalia in a car parked at a Baker hotel from his ATV, which he said he would not have been able to see from his squad car; he then called for back-up and it resulted in a large drug bust. The ATVs also allowed them to go into narrow alleys and other areas inaccessible to squad cars, and get much closer to the small local bars, where drug dealing was going on.
4. Police within their purview as police trying to reduce manifestations of social disorders and crime with cooperation of residents, businessmen, and community organizations. They engaged in many creative and innovative activities in this direction and educated the community to about the physical, social, and legal hazards from litter, illegal dumping (e.g., car tires), excessive noise, and unkempt yards.
 - a. They conducted “Operation Clean-Up,” involving residents and businesses in cleaning up their premises and the area.
 - b. One SPI officer, seeing the door hangers for the false alarm project and understanding that part of the SPI project was to reduce social disorder and disorganization (including physical incivilities) created a card to leave on the

door of residences and businesses informing them to clean up their premises (see card below).




Figure 4: “Weedy Yard” Notice, CAPE Officer Segura created

5. The police got to know and maintain contact with residents and businesspersons in Baker, handed out cards and phone numbers, and encouraged them to call regarding problems (which they then would relay to the dispatcher, if necessary).
6. The police networked with agencies, schools, business, and governmental organizations to seek their help in solving community problems and reducing crime.
7. The police held many crime prevention talks with adults and children, both during patrolling and at special meetings they arranged at various businesses and public facilities.
8. They patrolled school areas, read books to children, and spoke to them about bullying and internet bullying.
 - a. They started a drive to raise funds to give books and school supplies to needy children, collecting some of the money from businesses in Baker.
9. The police arranged for and/or hosted many community-building activities, bringing residents and businessmen together, such as:
 - a. “Movie Night in the Park” three times a week during summer, showing cartoons and family movies, with good turn-outs of 50 to over 100 residents. This was in Baker’s centrally located park.
 - b. A huge Cinco de Mayo festival in the park, enlisting financial support and presence of local businesses and various organizations.
 - c. They also hosted ten block parties, most connected to holidays, such as Halloween and Memorial Day.

10. Some SPI officers on their own time started up two athletic programs – basketball and flag football – for children in Baker, especially for those in Baker’s public housing, involving their parents in discussions, as well.
 - a. When they saw that one boy did not have athletic shoes and found out his family could not afford them, the PD started a “Shoes for Kids” drive to collect money to buy athletic shoes for needy children.
11. The police offered assistance to residents, informing them where they could find help for their problems, securing parking for handicapped persons, etc.

These 14 months of the project from November 2012 through December 2013 the hours per week put into the special type of SPI policing devised for this project fluctuated a great deal due to various PD manpower issues that arose unexpectedly, a promotion to detective, and later due to the need to deploy more officers in South Pharr (Las Milpas), which was experiencing a high increase in crime. From 6 officers assigned half-time to the project, it went to 2 full-time, then 3 full-time, and then back to 2 full-time on the SPI project (see Table 10). However, these fluctuations, including the inability of the two SPI officers in September to go on ATV and foot patrol due to unusually heavy rains the entire month, gave a good chance to test “dosage” of treatment in term of SPI hours and crime levels discussed under “outcomes” below.

Table 10: SPI Officer Hours per Week Each Month of the Place-Based Project in the Baker Treatment Area (November 2012 through December 2013)

Month & Year	Number of SPI Officers	SPI Patrol/Activity Hours per week
Nov 2012	6 half-time	120
Dec 2012	6 half-time	120
Jan 2013	2 full-time	80
Feb 2013	2 full-time	80
Mar 2013	2 full-time	80
Apr 2013	2 full-time	80
May 2013	3 full-time	120
Jun 2013	3 full-time	120
Jul 2013	3 full-time	120
Aug 2013	3 full-time	120
Sept 2013	2 full-time (unable to use ATVs much of the month)	20
Oct 2013	2 full-time	80
Nov 2013	2 full-time	80
Dec 2013	2 full-time	80

F. PROBLEMS WITH THE PLACE-BASED PROJECT AND DATA:

While the project went on very well in the treatment area of Baker and the two post-project community focus groups and the SPI police self-report indicate glowing success of the project, several issues arose that impacted official results in various ways:

1. **Project Nearly Halted in September 2013:** It rained nearly the entire month of September 2013, during which time the ATV patrolling was reduced drastically. As it turned out the level of crime did shoot up in Baker during September 2013, creating a sort of natural experiment within the experiment of the type: O X O -X O X O. While the numbers are too low to reach statistical significance, the pattern points to the ATV COP-POP treatment being successful. See chart below and note the crime spike at “11” for September, but even with that spike (and even with overall UCR crime slightly higher in 2013 over 2012) there was a still a downward trend.




Figure 5: Number of Monthly Crimes Reported in Baker during 2013

2. **Crime Statistics Problems:** From the outset we warned the Chief and Robert that the treatment itself may increase the UCR crimes (crimes reported to the police). Increased trust the police may gain from the residents may prompt greater reporting of crime that usually went unreported, either to report being a victim or giving tips regarding crimes involving others, which would be a good thing and a sign of the project’s success, but it might create issues for our research statistics. We figured this increased reporting of crimes that usually go unreported would increase reporting of property crimes more than violent crimes, which are more serious and more likely to be reported regardless of the treatment. And indeed some of the residents reporting crimes told officers they would not have reported it, except for the CAPE project and their reduced fear of retaliation for reporting crimes. It has been found that community policing can play an important role in reducing fear of crime (Renauer 2007). For example, one Baker resident reporting the theft of his lawn bench told the responding CAPE officer he would not have reported it except his neighbor had told him the police were there for them now. After the project was over the focus group participants and the CAPE police all said that during the project there was an increase in reporting of crimes that would not have been reported before without the project’s effect.

Another similar issue arose regarding the UCR data. When the project neared completion the newly hired crime analyst (who had not heard our warning about UCR data) was looking over the detailed descriptions of some crimes and realized some of the property crimes were extremely minor or non-crimes. For example in one report an elderly resident in the treatment area had left his back shed door unlocked; after a few days he went out and saw it was open, flapping in the wind, which he admitted could have been blown open by the wind; he also said he didn't know if anything had been stolen, but the "crime" ended up being classified as "burglary." In another case a resident found that someone had poked a small hole in his screen door but found nothing missing; he called the police and the "crime" was classified as a "burglary." The crime analyst decided to create a revised dataset by taking these types of non-crimes and very minor crimes out of the official dataset for Baker. It was very time-consuming work and he soon left his crime analyst position to become a police officer, so he could only do that for 2013 for Baker, concluding that there had only been 69 UCR-level crimes for Baker in 2013, not the 100 as per official UCR records. We could not use this data since it was not done "blindly" for both Baker and Charlie and for both 2013 and 2012; we can only note it here as indicating a possible threat to validity.

3. **"Natural" Treatment in Charlie, the Control Area Not Planned by the Researchers and PD Project Coordinator:** While there could have been some diffusion of treatment into the Charlie area due to its proximity to Baker, a more serious threat to validity with perhaps much greater impact arose. An athletic program, S.P.A.R.K., for at-risk kids, not part of SPI of CAPE project was started in an old gym and park area in the Baker sector (the SPI treatment area), becoming the Police Athletic League (P.A.L.). It was started a couple of months before implementation of the SPI project, and some police began participating in the program, inspired by the Chief, who as his personal service to the community had for years been involved in basketball for at-risk youth in Pharr. We had little concern about this, since it was additional treatment in the treatment area, along the lines of what we had hoped the COP strategies might involve.

However P.A.L. was moved to Charlie, the comparison area, during the project. The Pharr Boys and Girls Club, located in Charlie, had abandoned their dilapidated facilities and moved to the Edward Sector to the south of Charlie. These abandoned facilities included much larger though run-down indoor sports and activities facilities with a larger adjacent outdoor park and sports areas than in Baker. The City of Pharr bought the facilities and started renovating them during January and February 2013 (several month into our SPI project) and gave these facilities to the PD to have a better place for P.A.L. The two-month renovation involved heavy traffic in the Charlie comparison area of construction workers and supplies, security guards, and police moving around and patrolling. After completion in February, the facility became not only a place for P.A.L. activities, but also a favorite work-out place for the police and community, thereby increasing police presence and police-community interactions in the comparison area. The park and club area, which is open well into the evening, continues to receive extra patrolling since the Charlie sector is nearly as rough and crime-ridden as the Baker sector is.

4. **Other Interventions Not Planned by the Researchers and PD Project Coordinator:** The PD administrators, unbeknownst to the researchers, started other interventions which they applied to the entire city, many around March 2012. At that time the researchers and PD grant project coordinator were still in the “scanning” phase of the SPI, and had not settled on treatment and comparison areas or the exact treatments. The PD wanted to continue and go ahead with new interventions they thought would help reduce crime – an important function of the police. In the final analysis the researcher feel these projects did not have as much impact as the CAPE COP-POP project conducted in Baker and were not a significant threat to validity. These projects included:
 - a. Operation Phoenix started ostensibly as part of the SPI program, but implemented city-wide in March 2012, a few months after the planning stage of SPI had begun in January 2012 and soon after the first SPI conference our team attended in February 2012. The goal was to “resurrect the community’s confidence in law enforcement through pro-active patrol,” including some foot patrolling. The police would conduct extra patrol each shift to some business or residence of their choice and notify the resident or business owner that extra patrol was provided.
 - b. Operation Blindside and Operation C.P.R. started in March 2012 but no longer in operation.
 - c. C.A.R.E. (Contact a Resident Everyday): Started in 2002.

It is suggested that these other strategies, except the heavy unplanned “treatment” in the Charlie control area, may not have helped reduce crime enough to have been a threat to validity of the CAPE project.

5. **Increased Treatment/Intervention about mid-way through:** As the project proceeded for a few months we noticed that the property crime did not reduce much in the treatment area while it did in the comparison area (which may have been a result of the unplanned P.A.L. “treatment” in the comparison area) and suggested that the police could come up with further strategies to interact with the community more. Having already become somewhat involved with the community and receiving positive feedback from the people over the first 5 months of the project, they were eager to become more involved. They came up with several events – a police-sponsored Cinco de Mayo festival in the treatment area park in May and Movie Night in the Park during the summer. Furthermore more officers were SPI trained and brought into the project, causing the “dosage” of treatment to vary.

G. OUTCOMES OF THE PLACE-BASED PROJECT:

1. **QUANTITATIVE OUTCOMES:** One of the important findings from the UCR Index Crime data (police reports on serious crimes sent to the FBI) was that **violent crimes** decreased in Baker, the treatment area. Though this decreased of 33% did not reach statistical significance due to the low numbers, aggravated assault did decrease significantly by 47%. While aggravated assault also decreased in Charlie, but only half as much and not significantly, it increased significantly by 56% in Las Milpas. Property crime in Baker increased, though not significantly, going in the opposite direction we had expected (see tables below). However, as

qualitative and other information discussed later suggests Baker's property crime was underreported to the police in 2012 before the project, partly from fear of retaliation, and reported more accurately in 2013 due to the CAPE project, indicating actual property crime (including that not reported to the police) may have decreased or may not have increased.

TABLE 11: Crime Data and Change for Areas of Study, 2012-2013, obtained from the Pharr Police Department

Area/Year	Index	Property	Violent	Theft	Burglary	Auto Theft	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Rape	Index adjusted ¹	Property adjusted ¹
BAKER											
2012	87	66	21	34	32	0	3	15	3	90	66
2013	100	86	14	41	45	0	3	8	3	94	80
%Change	14.9%	30.3%	-33.3%	20.6%	40.6%	0.0%	0.0%	-46.7%	0.0%	4.4%	21.2%
CHARLIE											
2012	98	83	15	42	39	2	2	13	0		
2013	105	89	16	46	41	2	1	10	5		
%Change	7.1%	7.2%	6.7%	9.5%	5.1%	0.0%	-50.0%	-23.1%	500.0%		
LAS MILPAS²											
2012	279	239	40	159	68	12	5	27	8		
2013	485	422	64	297	98	27	16	42	5		
%Change	73.8%	76.6%	60.0%	86.8%	44.1%	125.0%	220.0%	55.6%	-37.5%		
PHARR											
2012	2594	2324	270	1628	552	144	43	212	15		
2013	2737	2509	228	1810	579	120	37	171	20		
%Change	5.5%	8.0%	-15.6%	11.2%	4.9%	-16.7%	-14.0%	-19.3%	33.3%		

¹Because the CAPE project in Baker was greatly curtailed in September 2013, property crimes for that month are calculated based on the mean of July, Aug, Oct, Nov, & Dec 2013 property crime, rounded up to nearest whole number, 5.

²Crime data for Las Milpas may underreported, as a high portion of residents there are undocumented and fearful of the justice system; furthermore the PD's New World data system (which was used only for Las Milpas) underreports crimes.

Since there are not enough data points to conduct an interrupted time series analysis, a one-means test was conducted to find significant changes in crimes for Baker, Charlie, Las Milpas, and Pharr City between 2012 and 2013 (see Table12).

Table 12: One-Mean T-Test for Crime Change 2012 (test value) to 2013, (note: no murders in Pharr 2012 or 2013)

Area	Index Crimes	Property Crimes	Violent Crimes	Theft	Burglary	Vehicle Theft	Aggravated Assault	Robbery	Rape
Baker	1.12	1.96	-1.81	.73	3.88**	.00	-2.60*	.00	.00
Baker – adjusted	.60	1.47							
Charlie	.81	.63	.269	.47	.58	.00	-1.9	-1.04	
Las Milpas	6.50**	6.16**	2.50*	4.35**	3.36**	2.26*	1.90	2.95*	-1.31
Pharr	1.81	2.91*	-1.91	3.33**	.71	-2.13	-2.23*	-1.06	.894

* significant at p < .05

**significant at p < .01

To find significant differences in these changes between Baker and the other areas a cross-products Yule's Q (Gamma) test was conducted (see Tables 13 and 14).

When comparing the Baker treatment area with the contiguous Charlie comparison area, both areas experienced an increase in Index crime (the bulk of which is property crimes) between 2012 and 2013, Baker experiencing an overall Index crime increase of 5.9%, which was not significantly greater than Charlie's increase of 1.2% and even Pharr's increase of 5.5% (see Tables 13 and 14 below). However, Baker's increase was a lot lower and significantly so than that of Las Milpas, which had a 74.2% increase.

Table 13: Baker Treatment Results v. Comparison Results using yearly data, 2012 & 2013 (Negative sign for Gamma indicates Baker treatment area lowered its crime more or did not increase it as much)		
	Chi-Sq	Yule's Q (Gamma)
Baker Index Crimes compared with:		
Charlie	0.120	0.035
Pharr	0.330	0.040
Las Milpas	6.418**	-0.205*
Baker Property Crimes compared with:		
Charlie	0.367	0.073
Pharr	0.677	0.072
Las Milpas	3.804	-0.182
Baker Violent Crimes compared with:		
Charlie	0.894	-0.231
Pharr	0.441	-0.118
Las Milpas	4.933*	-0.412*
*Significant at $p < .05$, ** Significant at $p < .01$		

The researchers also ran statistics using September-adjusted data for Baker. The SPI project was nearly halted in September 2013 due to unusually heavy rains almost the entire month, so an average for crime data from July through December without September was plugged into September to indicate what we may have expected had the project continued full force. With this adjusted data Baker UCR crime may have increased less than in Pharr and Charlie for 2013 had the project continued during September 2013, if it indeed did increase when taking into account the qualitative information. However, this smaller increase using September-adjusted data is still not significantly different from the increases in Charlie and Pharr.

Property crime in Baker, Charlie, and Pharr increased, though not significantly (except for the significant increase in burglary for Baker, which will be discussed below). However, no significant differences in increase were found among these areas. Property crime in Las Milpas did increase significantly, but the difference in property crime increase between Baker

and Las Milpas is only significant when the September-adjusted data for Baker is used, with Las Milpas’s increase significantly higher than Baker’s at the .05 level of significance.

Violent crime decreased in Pharr by 15.6%, which is less than half Baker’s 33.3% decrease. It increased very slightly and in Charlie, and by a great deal in Las Milpas. However, the decrease in Baker’s violent crime is not significant when compared to the lesser decrease in Pharr and the slight increase in Charlie. It is, however, significantly different from the increase in Las Milpas.

Table 14: Baker Treatment Results v. Comparison Results using yearly data, 2012 & 2013, and September-adjusted data for Baker (Negative sign for Gamma indicates Baker treatment area lowered its crime more or did not increase it as much)		
	Chi-Sq	Yule’s Q (Gamma)
Baker Index Crimes – adjusted:		
Charlie	0.002	-0.004
Pharr	0.025	0.12
Las Milpas	8.297**	-0.234**
Baker Property Crimes – adjusted:		
Charlie	0.295	0.061
Pharr	0.471	0.058
Las Milpas	4.637*	-0.196*
*Significant at p < .05, ** Significant at p < .01		


Loess Curve of Crime Trends in Baker:

In lieu of an interrupted time-series analysis, the researchers ran some crime trend charts with loess curves to give a sense of trends (see Figure 6 below). Loess curves use calculations among smaller subsets of data from the dataset to give the best-fitting curve.

Though this may not be significant, Baker’s loess curve for 2012-2013 crime data reveals an increasing trend in crime for the first 16 months – the 12 months of 2012 prior to the project and 4 months into the project, up through April of 2013 – then a sharp decline during the last 8 months of the project, despite September’s high up-tick in crime (when the project was virtually halted). The September-adjusted curve to the right is about the same, showing a slightly sharper decline and by month 15 (March 2013)

Violent crime shows a slight increasing then decreasing trend in 2012, and then flattens out until around the 16th month (April 2013), when it takes a sharp decreasing trend.

FIGURE 6: Loess Curves of Crime Trends in Baker over 24 months, 2012-2013



Changing Treatment Dosage and Fluctuations in Crime: One expectation was that increased police presence itself, even without COP or POP strategies, would decrease crime as has been found in other studies. Unplanned happenings in “dosage” of treatment occurred during the project. The CAPE or Smart Policing project started out in mid-October 2012 with six COP-POP-trained patrol officers patrolling half time in Baker employing strategies they had learned. Then by the first of January 2013 Pharr experienced a large loss of patrol officers and were only able to put two officers full-time on the project for several months until more officers went through the police academy and could be put on the CAPE project. Later due to

the large spike of crime in Las Milpas and the need to deploy more police there, the CAPE police in Baker went back down to two.

The following is a chart of the shifting “dosage” in terms of police and police man-power hours per week over the 14 months of the project (November 2012 through December 2013).

Month	Number of SPI Police	Hours per Week
Nov 2012	6 half-time	120
Dec 2012	6 half-time	120
Jan 2013	2 full-time	80
Feb 2013	2 full-time	80
Mar 2013	2 full-time	80
Apr 2013	2 full-time	80
May 2013	3 full-time	120
Jun 2013	4 full-time	160
Jul 2013	3 full-time	120
Aug 2013	3 full-time	120
Sep 2013	projected mostly halted because of heavy rains	20
Oct 2013	2 full-time	80
Nov 2013	2 full-time	80
Dec 2013	2 full-time	80

Crime also fluctuated during this period as indicated in the graph on page 27. These fluctuations work as a natural experiment of the $O_1 \ X \ O_2 \ -X \ O_3 \ X \ O_4$ type: Observation or crime data 1 before the project (2012), observation 2 during the first part of the project (X) from January 2013 (or November 2012), halting of the project in September (-X) and observation 3 during that month, and observation 4 after the project (X) resumes in October through December. The data are too meager and the natural monthly fluctuations in crime too large for the small area of Baker to reach statistical significance on the decrease before September, then the increase during September, then decrease for the remainder of the project. However, the pattern is suggestive that the project was successful.

While significance was not found at the .05 level perhaps due to the very low number of cases, there was a moderate negative (non-significant) correlation of -0.369 between SPI man-hours and property crime. When man-hours were adjusted to reflect learning curves of both the CAPE officers and Baker residents (by reducing December 2012 man-hours by 20%, in descending reductions to 5% in May 2013) the negative correlation between greater man-hours and lower property crime strengthened a little to -.393, but still remained non-significant – see Table 16. Only a suggestion can be made that the direction of the correlation (higher man-hours associating non-significantly with lower crime) is what we would expect. If the number of months of the project had been increased to 18 or 24 there may have been a significant correction.

Table 16: Correlations between SPI Man-Hours and Crime					
		UCR	Property	Property with Man-hours Adjusted	Violent
# SPI man-hours	corr:	-0.155	-0.369	-.393	0.210
	signif.	0.173	0.214	.183	0.490
	N	13	13	13	13

It is interesting that SPI man-hours and violent crime showed even a weaker correlation and much less significance, but that it was violent crime, especially aggravated assault, that decreased greatly and significantly in Baker during the project. It can perhaps be suggested that this decrease in violent crime without correlation to SPI man-hours is perhaps because the project in general (in a more diffused time span) prompted or triggered a lessened fear of crime and retaliation, a greater sense of law and order, and a greater sense of community efficacy, leading to more self-control and less violence. The qualitative outcomes below suggest that.

Increased Reporting of Property Crimes and the Location of Crimes: As suggested above Baker’s increase in property crime may have been an artifact of increased reporting of crime in 2013 versus underreporting in 2012, especially property crime. As noted in Table 17 below the entire increase in Baker property crimes from 2012 to 2013 was in residential crimes, with property crimes decreasing in businesses and open places and with violent crimes decreasing in all locations. This in conjunction with the qualitative information below lends support to the idea of an increase in reporting of property crimes in 2013 due to the CAPE project.

We find a difference in patterns of crime location between Baker and Charlie. Most notable is that for Baker residential property crimes increased by 76%. While residential property crimes also increased in Charlie they did so only by 21.3%, less than a third as much as in Baker.

An important point here is that businesses would be much more likely to report property crimes for tax and insurance purposes regardless of any intervention project, so a decrease or increase according to the UCR in those areas are likely to reflect more accurately a real decrease or increase in crime. However, residents may be less likely to report property crimes, especially if they perceive it is not worth the effort, the police will not be able to solve the crime, the police are not there for them, or they may face retaliation from the criminals for reporting the crime. The CAPE style of policing, however, helped residents overcome these doubts and fears (see the section on Qualitative Outcomes below).

Table 17: 2012-2013 Crimes by Location in Baker and Charlie

	Residences				Businesses & Schools				Open Areas (streets, parks)			
BAKER	2012	2013	Change	% Change	2012	2013	Change	% Change	2012	2013	Change	% Change
Total Violent	11	8	-3	-27.3%	4	3	-1	-25.0%	6	3	-3	-50.0%
Robbery	0	2	2	200.0%	1	0	-1	-100.0%	2	1	-1	-50.0%
Assault	8	4	-4	-50.0%	3	3	0	0.0%	4	1	-3	-75.0%
Rape	3	2	-1	-33.3%	0	0	0	0.0%	0	1	1	100.0%
Total Property	33	57	24	72.7%	20	19	-1	-5.0%	13	10	-3	-23.1%
Theft	13	24	11	84.6%	13	12	-1	-7.7%	8	4	-4	-50.0%
Burglary	20	32	12	60.0%	7	7	0	0.0%	5	6	1	20.0%
MV Theft	0	1	1	100.0%	0	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0.0%
CHARLIE												
Total Violent	9	14	5	55.6%	4	1	-3	-75.0%	2	1	-1	-50.0%
Robbery	1	1	0	0.0%	1	0	-1	-100.0%	0	0	0	0.0%
Assault	8	8	0	0.0%	3	1	-2	-66.7%	2	1	-1	-50.0%
Rape	0	5	5	500.0%	0	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0.0%
Total Property	61	75	14	23.0%	20	13	-7	-35.0%	2	1	-1	-50.0%
Theft	30	38	8	26.7%	11	9	-2	-18.2%	1	0	-1	-100.0%
Burglary	29	36	7	24.1%	9	4	-5	-55.6%	1	1	0	0.0%
MV Theft	2	1	-1	-50.0%	0	0	0	0.0%	0	0	0	0.0%

What is striking about violent crimes by location is that they decreased in Baker in all locations fairly substantially, while in Charlie they increased substantially in residences, while decreasing in non-residential locations – which might be expected, along with decreases in non-residential property crimes, from the heavy “natural” treatment of police, security guard, and construction worker presence in regard to the P.A.L facilities being renovated and put into heavy use by the police. In other words, police presence and visibility could help explain decrease in property and violent crimes in nonresidential areas. However, what explains the decrease in violent crimes in Baker residences, most likely domestic violence? It is suggested here and in the Discussion section below that the CAPE project may have also helped to instill great self-control.

It should be noted that index crimes in open areas (streets and parks) in Baker decreased by 32% from 2012 to 2013, a 50% reduction for violent crimes and a 23% reduction for property crimes. While the numbers are too low to give significant results, the patterns are suggestive: assaults in open areas of parks and streets decreased from 4 to 1, indicative that increased police presence (and perception of presence through the cruise light measure) may have been having this effect. Assaults at businesses and schools (the lowest among the three types of locations) remained the same.

2. **QUALITATIVE OUTCOMES:** While the quantitative UCR results, despite various threats to validity and reliability, showed some evidence of CAPE program success, especially regarding violent crimes, the qualitative results – including a post-study self-report of the CAPE officers, two Baker community focus groups, informal discussions, anecdotal information – indicated the CAPE program was a great success in terms of:

1. crime reduction
2. police-community relations
3. decreased fear of crime
4. decreased fear of retaliation for reporting crime
5. willingness to report more crime among residents
6. increased community efficacy and sense of taking control their area back from criminals and disorderly persons
7. police professional satisfaction and morale

Self-Report of CAPE Police Officers after the Project: The self-reporting survey of the police officers during March 2014 and various conversations with the officers after the project reveals:

1. The CAPE officers really liked working with the people in the community and made themselves available for help. The people called them and seem to have reported more crimes than before.
2. At first they were unsure of this new method of policing, but once they had experienced it for several months they came to embrace it.
3. The CAPE officers liked community-oriented policing and the relationship they established with the community.
4. Other officers in the PD not in the CAPE program had a somewhat negative view of the project in the beginning, but later most came to respect it and some have been emulating that type of policing to some extent in various ways.
5. A conversation with the last two crime analysts reveals that not only CAPE officers but many other officers started coming and using crime data in their crime control efforts.
6. The people in Baker gave information about crimes taking place, which helped in identifying and solving crimes.
7. The people told them they wanted the ATV patrols and movies in the park to be continued.
8. When asked about what they thought of Baker before the project the CAPE officers referred to the high crime there – thefts, narcotics, gang activities. One mentioned high crime and low officer visibility.
9. When asked if they thought the project had reduced crime in Baker, most said yes, with one saying it at least would have disrupted crime.
10. When asked about barriers they encountered during the project, almost all referred to the manpower shortages in the PD, which were severe near the beginning (from January through April 2013) when a number of officers left the PD for other jobs or

other reasons, and also the last several months when CAPE officers had to be deployed to other hotspots as crimes decreased in Baker and spiked in Las Milpas.

Focus Group 1: The first post-project focus group was held on September 5, 2014 in the meeting room of a housing project in Baker. Initially 12 persons were selected and agreed to come – 6 men and 4 women who resided in Baker and a woman who worked at the elementary school. Some of them brought other people so the total was 17 persons and some children. It was held during the day, from 1 to 3 pm.

The officers started by explaining the CAPE project, how it was grant funded and involved researchers from UTPA. They spoke about how it was expected to increase trust of police in the community so that problems could be fixed, and a part of the project was to patrol in ATVs. If residents wanted an event to take place, the CAPE officers would help arrange it in partnership. A CAPE officer present said if anyone in the room did not have his contact information, he would give it to them. They said that before the beginning of the project the type of policing was reactive, responding to calls, but that with the CAPE project they wanted to make contact with the people one-on-one and find out about their problems. They said that the project was funded by the government, but now the PD, with the support of the chief and assistant chief, was continuing it with their own funding and expanding the program. It started in Baker, but now there are 5 CAPE officers and they are being deployed to places in Pharr where there is high crime problems, and also now doing night shifts. They mentioned about the PD receiving calls from Baker residents praising the program.

Some of the focus group people spoke about the problems before the project, what happened during the project, and what has been happening after the project ended (nine months earlier).

Before and During the Project – the people noted:

1. Before they noticed frequent gang activities, but during the project the streets and neighborhoods were calm. They felt fine, including during the nights.
2. Cars used to speed in the streets, including where children walked to school (as there is not school bus service for that school). The school area was not secure. During the project the police officers were around and the drivers slowed down, and children overall felt more secure in and out of school.
3. During the project children and youth were not wandering around in the alleys or “doing bad things out on the streets.”
4. The ATV and foot patrol helped to increase police presence and visibility. All were aware of it. They mentioned how these helped them speak on site to the police and tell them about problems.
5. One businessman said kids see the ATVs and police, and make positive comments about them. They have less fear of violent crime and when they see a problem they tell the police. When they grow up they will have respect for the police. He said some of those kids were going to be his future customers, so he thought the CAPE policing was very good, both for the kids and his business.

6. One woman said she walks and does exercises in the park, and that the people who used to hang out there are no longer there and she feels safe and has a better quality of life now. She felt the ATV patrol really helped. Another woman made a similar comment, saying they can now take their kids to the park and have fun, that the youth with bad intentions are no longer hanging around there. Another woman added that because the ATVs are also patrolling at night, kids can play and have fun in the park, and leave after dark by 9 p.m., and after that there are no people in the park.
7. A man said he and his wife would see the ATVs in the afternoon, and now that they are patrolling at night as well the people who would hang around the streets and parks, smoking marijuana, running stop lights stopped doing that and the neighborhood had calmed down.
8. When asked whether crime had decreased or increased during the project year a woman said it went down a lot.
9. A custodian in a Baker elementary school told the CAPE officers that a student had brought a knife to school. The officers took care of it, gave a talk at the school, and there was no problem since. She also said the graffiti at the school, which was a big problem, also went down tremendously.
10. When asked to rank which activity helped reduce crime and give a sense of security the most they ranked ATV number one and public relations number two, with patrol cars last.
11. One resident spoke of seeing a bicycle patrol late one night come out of nowhere, which the officer explained was that officer's innovation for that shift and that they had been given instructions to come up with methods of reducing crime. The resident thought it was a good idea because people can hear the squad cars and ATVs coming. The officer mentioned that they had been thinking about getting electric ATVs that would be silent and able to catch offenders on the spot, and the resident thought that was a good idea.

Comments regarding the situation after the project ended when CAPE police were deployed to other high crime areas and regular patrolling resumed in Baker:

1. Focus group attendees complained about the return of loud music, break-ins, stash houses, people walking around smoking marijuana, spray painting stop signs and the gym. They said that crimes, nuisance, and narcotics use all increased after the project and ATV patrols ended and routine reactive patrolling resumed.
2. One woman said such behavior is not common in the apartments or housing authority, but outside in the neighborhoods.
3. Juveniles from 13 to 18 are the ones who often cause problems.
4. One woman suggested there should be a 1 to 3 a.m. patrol, as this is the time a lot of mischief occurs.
5. One man said it took 20 minutes after he called the PD dispatcher for a policeman to arrive regarding some spray-painting activity.
 - a. Another man said that when he called to report a "hit and run," the dispatcher hung up on him.

- b. A CAPE officer present said they want that kind of feedback, that one of their main priorities was to establish trust, so when things like that happen [dispatcher hanging up] they should let the CAPE officers know about it.
- c. The resident responded that he understood the police had priorities, that there could be a severe accident somewhere, when he might be just calling in to report someone smoking marijuana.

The officers ended by talking about how CAPE program was now expanded throughout the city and they have more officers being trained for CAPE, but that they sometimes do not have enough police officers to help. They now have CAPE patrol arranged on a rotation basis, with two officers in the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift and three in the 3 to 11 p.m. shift. They said they do not patrol as intensively as during the project, but they encouraged the people to call the department. They also mentioned they would take the problems and issues the residents mentioned to higher commands.

Focus Group 2: The second post-project focus group was held on December 11, 2014 from 1 to 2 p.m. in the meeting room of a housing project in Baker. Some 12 people attended, one man and 11 women, and 10 answered some brief questions at the beginning. Four of the CAPE officers were present, along with Robert Garcia and the two researchers.

Reporting more crime: According to the brief pre-meeting survey 6 of 9 (67%) who answered first questions responded “yes” to they thought people in their neighbor were reporting more crimes to the police during the CAPE project. Then later during the focus group meeting we again asked the question and even more responded in the affirmative. The discussion then turned to why they were reporting more, with the main answer being that when the CAPE project was going on they did not fear retaliation from criminals and troublemakers as much, followed by they felt more comfortable with the CAPE police to talk about problems and it was easier to do so when they were patrolling around on the ATVs or holding events and talks.

Crime Change during the Project: Most said that crime had decreased with the CAPE project, with one saying it had remained about the same. One man pointed out that before the project he could see kids out in the streets at 1 and 2 a.m., throwing rocks, making noise (causing dogs to bark), and that they did not respect the neighbors, but that during the project this declined a lot.

Crime Change After the Project: While most thought the crime had not increased after the project had ended, one woman said she thought it had increased and pointed out a drive-by shooting that had occurred a few months earlier in her Baker neighborhood, explaining it was a gang from San Juan (city adjacent to the east of Pharr) targeting another gang in Baker. She felt the fear of crime had increased after the CAPE project ended in December 2013. Some others also agreed with her, that the fear of crime had increased after the project. They all agreed that they wanted the CAPE police and ATV patrolling back in Baker.

Table 18: Comparison of the Pre-Study Community Survey and the Two Post-Study Focus Groups	
Community Pre-Project Survey	Community Post-Project Focus Groups
Fear of crime: felt “somewhat unsafe” to “very unsafe”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 59% re burglary • 48% re vandalism • 30% re rape • 39% re attack • 39% re robbery • 36% re murder • 51% re going out at night 	They said their fear of crime and criminals decreased significantly during the project and people were not as afraid of retaliation for reporting crime
81% - said “yes” to “Is there a need for more police patrols in your neighborhood?”	They said they were aware of much great police patrolling and involvement and praised the police for it. They said they wanted the ATV patrols and other police-initiated projects to come back. One suggested bicycle patrols for stealth
Responding “somewhat” to “very serious” in Baker: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85% - drug trafficking • 82% - drug-dealing • 80% - drug abuse • 62% - assault • 62% - crime (in general) • 57% - burglary • 47% - human trafficking • 45% - robbery • 33% - homicide 	They all said crime in Baker went down greatly, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gang activities (because the gangs knew the police were there) • vandalism • disorders such as graffiti & nuisance (because of police presence and police involvement with community improvement work) • drug abuse (because before it was done in the parks and deserted areas, but now the police were patrolling those areas)
Disorder: Reporting “somewhat serious” to “very serious”: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 73% drunks • 72% said trash • 67% unsupervised youth • 57% graffiti • 57% disruptive neighbors 	They also noted that after the project ended gang activities and crime were beginning to increase again
72% stated gangs were the most important cause of crime in the neighborhood	

Squad Car Cruise Lights: The people also talked about seeing the cruise lights at night and being aware of police presence. This was a part of the CAPE project that began in May 2013 and has continued to the present throughout Pharr. They said the lights help make them feel more comfortable and secure. They said it helped them control their children and perhaps reduces

domestic quarrels and violence. One woman told of how she would warn her children about police presence, so they had better behave, which they did. The ATVs and UTVs also keep their lights on constantly, which has the same effect as the squad car cruise lights.

Officers' views: The CAPE officers all expressed enthusiasm for the CAPE program and felt it was very effective in reducing crime. They explained that since the grant-funded project had ended, they had continued the project throughout Pharr in the most crime-ridden areas, and that even though there were more CAPE officers now and more ATVs and UTVs or utility task vehicles (see Sustainability section below on pp. 62-65), since they were covering more areas, they were not able to cover Baker as before, but were hoping to do so in the future. They mentioned that during the project they has received more calls for service, especially for a few months in the beginning when they had a PD cell phone and gave out their card with its number. One also mentioned that they got **more information from Baker residents and businessmen about crimes**, such as giving descriptions of vehicles involved in hit and runs, and that people were now keeping a look out.

In the end the Baker participants were eager to have the CAPE patrolling and police involvement in events and talks back and in their area; one participant from Las Milpas, who worked at a school in Baker, seemed a bit envious of the treatment Baker received and wanted CAPE policing in Las Milpas (they have been doing some CAPE policing there since the grant project ended, but apparently not in her neighborhood).

The researchers suggested to the participants that they could also do something themselves to help reduce crime and the fear of crime, and that was get to know their neighbors, maybe by having block parties, and staying in touch with each other. The participants admitted that they didn't know their neighbors well, especially beyond their contiguous neighbors, and did not get together with them much (and the pre-meeting survey reveals that), but they would like to have block parties if the police could lead in the efforts. The CAPE police present said they would be glad to do that. Before the meeting while speaking to a newly trained and enthusiastic CAPE officer who asked for suggestions, the researchers had also suggested that he could inform residents and businesspersons to arranged pot-luck block parties (*pachangas*) with the police, who could set up barricades on each end of the street for a couple of hours and perhaps give brief talks at the beginning about crime prevention.

Comparison of the pre-study survey conducted in April of 2012 and the post-study focus groups reveals a large change, from fear of crime and responding that various crimes, disorders, and gang problems were serious to the opposite of that (see Table 41 above).

In summary, it seems the CAPE project was successful in reducing crime (if we consider the higher property crimes in the UCR were at least in part an artifact of people reporting more crime because of the CAPE project and not due to a real increase in those crimes). This was due to type of greater police presence that actively engaged the community. It is this which helped reduce people's fear of crime and fear of retaliation for reporting crime, and increased their sense of

community efficacy to take control of their neighborhoods and public facilities back from criminals and disorderly people under the auspices of the CAPE police. The project perhaps also increased adults' and children's self-control to reduce domestic problems.

H. DISCUSSION

Pharr is a small city with a higher property crime rate than that of the U.S., but lower than that of Texas, and a violent crime rate lower than that of Texas and the U.S. (see Appendix A). However, it should be noted that both property and violent crimes are largely committed by younger people and Pharr has a much larger proportion of younger people than the U.S. in general. The percent of the population in Pharr below 25 is 45.6% while in the U.S. it is 33.9% (a nearly 12 percentage point difference) and the population in Pharr below 35 is 60.3%, while in the U.S. it is 47.2% (a 13 percentage point difference). Another factor linked to crime is poverty, with Pharr much poorer than the U.S. in general, having a per capita income of \$12,725 compared to \$27,319 for the U.S. Furthermore, 36.2% of Pharr residents are below the poverty line, compared to about 15% for the U.S. Residents of Baker are even poorer than residents of Pharr in general, with a per capita income of \$10,199. What is surprising is that Pharr has a lower violent crime rate than the U.S. even with these criminogenic factors of a young population and high level of poverty (see Table 1). Its property crime rates even though higher than in the U.S. would probably be lower than in the U.S. without these criminogenic disadvantages (if Pharr mirrored the U.S. on age demographics and per capita income). Amarillo, largely an Anglo city in North Texas, has a higher crime rate than Pharr, despite the fact that it is economically more prosperous than Pharr. It has been found that social and cultural neighborhood characteristics help explain differences in crime rates, beyond these demographic and financial characteristics (Sampson, *et al.* 1997) and that Latinos contribute less to crime with criminogenic factors held constant, which Sampson (2008) refers to as the "Latino Paradox" (also see Stowell, *et al.* 2009). (Sources for the above data include U.S. Census and Neighborhood Scout 2012-2014.)

Within Pharr, Baker, the treatment area had a high crime rate, which is why it was selected for the study. During the study in the process of analyzing data in regard to statistical significance, the lower number of crimes noted in Baker posed some problems, however, even though the data did yield some indication of good results, especially in relation to violent crime reduction and from qualitative information regarding both violent and property crime.

In support of these statistical and qualitative findings, information about the culture and social life of the area and its importance in relation to crime is presented to help explain the patterns of crime in Pharr and Baker and in what way the police intervention helped in Baker to change the patterns. First a comprehensive understanding of the local culture, people, and their living conditions is presented. After this, an explanation of how the police intervention helped to contain crime is considered, as the police themselves contributed to enhancing certain cultural and social structural characteristics that help control crime, that were present in a weak form.

Pharr-Baker, local culture and crime: Pharr is a rapidly urbanizing community adjoining the larger city of McAllen and is a part of the McAllen-Edinburg-Mission Metropolitan Statistical

Area and the McAllen-Reynosa Transnational Metropolitan Area. Pharr is located on the U.S.-Mexican border. The people are bicultural and bilingual. The thinking and behavior of the people, known as Tejanos, reflect the unique configuration of Mexican and American cultures adapted to their life situations in Pharr (Arreola 2002). The culture of the area is founded and organized around the traditional altruistic (that is, socially-oriented) attitudes of the people in Mexico – a valuing of and connecting with people in a friendly and helpful way. Freeberg and Stein (1996) found that Mexican-Americans have a stronger ethos of familism, collectivistic attitudes, helping behavior, and group and interpersonal relationships than found among Anglos. This is further strengthened in Pharr by the South Texas rural way of life, which is now changing under rapid urbanization. There are also other factors that help to sustain this altruism, such as their closeness to Mexico, interactions with people in and around the Mexican side of the border, and immigrants coming from Mexico, who may be connected by kinship or friendship. In addition their attachment to the Spanish language and their ethnicity as Tejanos or Latinos provide close identities. The ethnic identity is stronger, as many of residents faced greater discrimination in the past, and this is still continuing in subtle ways today, even though Mexican-Americans constitute a majority in the area. Travelling away from the Rio Grande Valley to Anglo-dominated areas and experiencing discrimination has also made them conscious of their ethnicity. To avoid this unpleasant experience many return to the Rio Grande Valley. As most have Catholic background, this has further helped to promote a sense of altruism, connectedness, and ethnic identity. As Harrison, *et al.* (1990) point out, under situations of discrimination, immigration, and poverty attachment to the family for Mexican-Americans becomes very important. Family plays a vital role regardless of the weakening of its influences because of acculturation to the American way of life. Family is at the center of people's thinking, while other connections based on cultural background, ethnicity, religion, and social networks support attachment to the family, and they may be useful when problems external to the family have to be dealt with.

Young Mexican-American adults are expected to live with the parents until they are married, unlike Anglos who are expected to move away as soon as they become adult. Even when young Mexican-Americans are away they maintain frequent and long-lasting relationships with family members, and depend on their parents' advice for important aspects of their lives. This leads to experiencing a sense of being together, being supportive of each other, and achieving more collective than individual goals. This familism provides a sense of identity and pride for the person similar to what has been noted among people in India, in contrast to Anglo Americans. Reese, *et al.* (1995) found that Mexican-American parents raise their children with a greater sense of right and wrong: "Especially striking was parents' determination to keep children on the good path or *buen camino*." Fathers and mothers are respected and the children are held in a dependent lower status in the family hierarchy. "Most parents neither expect nor wish to be friends with their children, although they enjoy each other's company. Child-rearing practices reflect this stress on hierarchies. Punishment, shaming, deception, promises and other threats are sometimes used in response to children's behavior," (Falicov 2005); this includes references to supernatural ghosts and bogeymen used by most families in the Rio Grande Valley to make children comply and obey their elders – La Llorona, El Cucuy, and a host of other such frightful figures. On the other hand, in line with the American ethos, younger parents are motivating their children to be better than

themselves and obtain a good education (Cooper 1999:15). In addition, the Catholic background that most Mexican-Americans have helps to support commitment to conventional ways of behaving. Even when Rio Grande Valley residents come across various and different kinds of people and ideas, they would tend to choose to associate with those who can take them in right directions and would not want to jeopardize their advancement. Consequently the supports for doing what is right here in Pharr and the Rio Grande Valley are perhaps stronger than in large American cities where people have a plurality of rationalizations for doing wrong.

The traditional and rigid sense of machismo of the past – providing for the family and protecting it by controlling women and children under strict authority without showing emotion – is declining upon the impact of egalitarian values, and is taking two different forms as people are impacted differently. In one form it becomes “destructive machismo” when it finds expression in criminal directions: violently responding to disrespect shown by wives, children, and others, taking revenge and avenging insults, or achieving personal interests with rough disregard for the law. These criminal expressions are commonly noticed in Mexico and the throughout various areas of U.S. (for comparative American and Mexican violent crime statistics see The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014a, 2014b). It is sometimes observed in the Rio Grande Valley and Pharr as well, but not that commonly. The second form is a constructive type of machismo evolving in the Mexican-American border communities and becoming more prevalent. It has been termed “caballerismo.” It is developing under the impact of equality and freedom emphasized in American culture. However, it has promoted a different type of character of becoming a concerned father who relates well with family members and others and has feelings. According to Martin (2008, also see Arciniega, *et al.* 2008), “Caballerismo is a positive image of a man as the family provider who respects and cares for his family. It depicts Mexican-American men as chivalrous, nurturing and noble. These men rated higher in social connectedness scale, saying they felt value in their family relationships and were in touch with their feelings and the feelings of others. They also displayed more practical ways of solving their problems.” The caballerismo type of machismo could have the influence of reducing violent behavior and crime. In addition violent crimes that result from destructive machismo are lower and seem to be declining in Pharr as law enforcement on the U.S. side of the border is more effective, unlike in Mexico. Caballerismo is also likely being strengthened by more effective law enforcement on the U.S. side of the border than in Mexico. Even the disadvantages and frustrations of living in the border area, which is not as highly industrialized as other areas in America, tend not to lead to violence. Studies have found that such experiences – young working class men lacking good education, steady jobs, and good income to the extent that their female counterparts have – tend to create depression, neuroticism, and lower self-esteem instead (Chavez and Rudolph 2007). This adaptation should be understood in the context of progressive people with an immigrant spirit and self-control (Fay-Ramirez 2014:22), trying to be critical of themselves toward improvement, but not succeeding well. These problems of being less successful in an increasingly economic-success-oriented society tend to manifest inwardly, rather than being expressed in open aggression. Consequently violent crimes are lower in Pharr.

Further the lower violent rates prevailing in this border area are unique, not only different from Mexico, but also different from many other areas of the U.S. Unlike in economically developed European countries, where violent crime rates are lower, in the U.S. they have remained

higher, a kind of anomaly (Shelley 1985), apart from the high property crime rates in the U.S. This uniqueness is often explained in terms of the violent American cultural traditions continuing from the past, which people sometimes use as means in achieving personal goals – economic and other goals, including status by violence. Even though the violent crime rates have been declining in the U.S. for some time, the decline is often explained in terms of the decline in the proportion of the youth and young adults in the population, especially below the age of 35, who often contribute more to these crimes. It should be noted that this RGV area has larger families and a lot of young people, who could contribute to crime greatly as mentioned earlier, and they do contribute to crime in Pharr and Baker, but they have not done so to the extent that may be expected. Furthermore, the trend in violent crime in Pharr has been decreasing and this is could be due to the violent orientation decreasing. Violence had been declining in Pharr, as a new view of life is developing toward self-improvement, which is noted among the younger people. Violent crimes could increase in the future in the context of increasing economic desires, but lack of opportunities to achieve them, extreme economic inequalities, Americanization, and urbanization. At this time the culture of this area is unique; it neither greatly supports the idea of violence as in Mexico nor in American culture. However, here and there a few individuals influenced by destructive machismo may react to crisis situations in violent ways. Violent crimes are lower in Pharr, contrary to the exaggerated view of the RGV as a violent crime land with extensive gang warfare, murders, and cartel violence, which are occasional and sporadic in nature. However, there is some evidence that ultra-violent Mexican cartels are recruiting and training gang members on the American side of the Rio Grande Valley in some communities, though it is believed they have not yet penetrated much into Pharr.

The researchers suggest it may be more difficult to reduce property crimes than violent crimes because property crimes involve achievement of tangible material goods (which violent crimes in general do not, except for robbery), and achievement of such goods is highly encouraged for people to attain status and experience a high life, increasingly so with greater Americanization. Reduction of violent crime, on the other hand, seems to be more easily achievable, as self-control can be achieved without too much effort, and only involves restructuring one's cognitive repertoire to be more self-controlled and non-violent, for which there is plenty of cultural support in the Tejano culture and religions in the area. People also think of serious consequences regarding how committing violent crimes, which helps to deter them. The awareness created by the CAPE policing has perhaps strengthened the dispositions to not commit crime, especially violent crime. For instance, assaults committed within the home in Baker declined by 50% from 8 to 4, and declined from 4 to 1 in open areas, such as parks and streets (see Table 17 on page 36); although the numbers are too low to reach statistical significance, it does reveal a direction expected. From the first and the second post-study focus group meetings the researchers noted that the CAPE community crime prevention patrolling has helped children and adults to develop more self-control and be reminded of living a more peaceful and less violent life without engaging in arguments, street fights, and domestic violence. Strong family ties, socialization of children for conventional ways of behaving, Mexican-American or Tejano ethnic identity, and as Almeida, *et al.* (2009) points out, large social networks – which are more than what can be found among Anglo Americans or non-Mexican-American Hispanics – help to develop respect and feelings for others, promote self-control, and inhibit commission of crimes.

Americanization and urbanization has also a significant impact on property crimes. This impact is fast occurring in the general area with increasing property crime rates. This will perhaps continue to happen as Pharr and the RGV become culturally, socially, and economically more integrated with the rest of America (Egerton 1974). UCR crime rates indicate property crimes have significantly increased in the South. Property crimes will increase along with the development of economic and individualistic orientations, weakening altruistic and collectivistic orientations. When economic orientations dominate over other considerations – concern for others, sense of what is right, and religion – and opportunities to achieve economic goals are not adequately present property crimes will increase. Overall, comparing Pharr with some other American cities of similar size, property crime rates in Pharr and especially in Baker are less, in spite of the fact that the people in Pharr and especially in Baker are very poor (see Table7). They have for the time seemed to have learned to reduce their desires in the context of what they know they can achieve, as people with humble beginnings usually do. In a way they can be considered contented poor, at least for now, but property crimes will likely increase with their increasing desires. Smart policing strategies adopted here may help to reduce property crime, but it should also be done along with general improvements of socio-economic conditions and opportunities, which are often outside the purview of police work, and yet deserve consideration for long-term success in reduction of crime (see Curtis 1985:216; Sampson, *et al.* 1997:923).

Pharr-Baker Smart Policing Strategies and their Effects: If these structural conditions – Mexican-American cultural influences adapted to American and local conditions, the altruistic orientations, and the evolving individualistic and economic orientations, and unique configuration made of these and adaptation to their conditions of poverty – are held constant and taken as given, what effect has the SPI project had on crime during this short one-year experimental period? Even though it seems according to official statistics there was an increase in property crime in Baker, we believe the property crimes did not increase much and may have even declined, according to information collected from the focus groups and CAPE police (such as people reporting crime more during the project than they would have without the project). Even if we assume that the property crimes increased in Baker, the increase could have been greater without the SPI intervention, as Baker is adjacent to the city center business district and also has more businesses than Charlie. Furthermore it has extreme poverty in the context of unmet economic desires.

The SPI-trained police officers were engaged in a variety of community policing and problem-oriented policing strategies, such as meeting with residents, businessmen, ministers, school officials, children, and city administrators; alerting people to keep their person and property safe and their premises clean and maintained; advising them on how to protect themselves from crime; reinforcing the responsibilities of parents toward their children; engaging the children; bringing people together by organizing block parties, showing movies in the park, and hosting other events; listening to people about the social disorder and crime in the area; receiving crime tips from the people (as the people became more trusting of the police); and analyzing problems and helping solve them. People began to take interest in their area and felt their area was theirs and took control of it. In their view crimes declined during the experimental project period, gang activity declined, drug using and dealing declined, and graffiti declined.

The people were unanimous in saying that they liked this COP type of policing in which the police interacted with the people in a personal manner. The SPI police also said they liked this type of policing. Both the police and the people said the use of ATVs has made possible this close interaction. We felt it almost like foot patrol. The concern of the police for the people increased, which the people perceived and appreciated. In addition the police were a proper fit, as they were themselves from the RGV and all of them Mexican-Americans, Tejanos, sharing the same altruistic orientations (see Weisburd and McElroy 1988). They are altruistic officers in an altruistic community. Consequently the people and the police developed a supportive relationship and mutual trust and respect.

As crimes are generally less in Baker and Pharr in comparison to some other U.S. cities of this size, the police did not have to engage in aggressive and socially disturbing police strategies, instead they engaged in active community policing with a pro-active crime prevention orientation. In fact there were only five incidents of crimes that happened during the year when the SPI police officers were patrolling or engaged in activities in the community, which they did not handle directly, but called other police officers in the PD and assisted them. As the community is largely conformity-oriented there is less need for aggressive or reactive strategies, and therefore relationships between the people and the police is less frictional. Any dislikes and mistrust the people in Baker may have had toward the police would have been minimized by the helpful gestures of the SPI police and the thinking that the police were now “there for them” to help them.

The increase in police presence and visibility during the SPI project with ATV patrolling (similar to foot patrol) would have certainly disrupted crimes that some people may have been intending to commit. This external presence, visibility and interaction of the police with the people, has helped to strengthen the altruistic tendencies and conformity orientations the people in general had already had effects on crime. It helped to revitalize the cultural aspects of altruism and social sentiment, which were declining because of increasing individualism occurring in the process of acculturation to the American culture, urbanization forces and effects, fear of crime and fear of retaliation from reporting crime. Personal controls increased and people were personally and socially motivated to effect changes in their lives.

The SPI police helped to increase the level of community efficacy through bringing people together and making them see that their safety and security depend on the initiatives they take; as mentioned police can play an important role in this (Renauer 2007). The people became empowered and reported crimes more actively by informing the police, whom they now trusted, about crimes taking place and drug dealings going on. This is more a collective efficacy of a type in which residents who feared reprisal from offenders (with somewhat realistic fears of offenders’ gang involvements and an exaggerated fear of offenders connection to the cartels) and kept to themselves without reporting crimes, now felt empowered with the CAPE community policing to contact the police to secure their person and property or report other crimes they knew of. At the same time it seems from the focus groups that residents are less inclined to take control of the matter by themselves or organize the community to do so. However, altruistic tendencies and readiness to cooperate with the police enabled the police to take the leadership during the CAPE project to strengthen the people’s social sentiments for greater social and personal control needed for crime control. As mentioned during the second focus group the residents wanted to organize,

such as by having block parties, but they wanted the police to lead in this effort and the police said they were willing to do so.

The collective efficacy referred to here is therefore not one that developed out of strong social bonds and social cohesion that activate social expectation that they have to voluntarily direct control measures to solve the problem they saw in the community. It is rather a weak collective efficacy founded on an emphasis on family and kinship ties, surrounded by less influential, yet important ethnic identity, social networks, cultural origin, and religion in the background. However, the Baker residents had greater altruistic orientations than many communities, which provided the capacity to come together under the auspices of police leadership to address community disorders and control crime (see Bursik and Grasmik 1993; Uchida, *et al.* 2013).

This level of collective efficacy that the police were able to create in a short period perhaps also helped to promote personal efficacy by creating a consciousness that community people should exercise control over their neighborhood environment and keep it orderly and clean, as well as over their personal character, which could help explain why violent crime decreased so dramatically in Baker during the research period. These findings support the conclusions of Sampson, *et al.* (1997; also see Maxwell, *et al.* 2011) that crimes, especially violent crimes, can be reduced by increasing collective efficacy, irrespective of social and economic disadvantages that people may experience. It is a further testimony that under certain circumstances as those found in Baker, such as the high levels of poverty and physical and social incivilities, the police can help revitalize and create community efficacy and help reduce especially violent crime, particularly if the police take the leadership. It should also be noted that altruistic connections among people may not by themselves lead to reduction in crime or violence – gangs also exhibit sociality – but it should be founded on conventional norms. The police through their leadership were able to activate the people's social sentiments, their support for the law, and their respect for authority that the people already had, toward the control of crime.

II. OFFENDER-BASED INTERVENTION, MAN-ON-WOMAN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

A. MOWV PROJECT RATIONALE, HYPOTHESIS, AND DESIGN:

Rationale for the Project: The researchers and Project Coordinator considered various type of offenders for the project and decided on domestic violence offenders, focusing on man-on-woman violence (hereafter referred to as MOWV). Responding to domestic violence, especially MOWV, is an area of policing that is usually disliked as it involves entering into the private problems of residents in the privacy of their homes, and it also dangerous to the officers. In the Pharr Police Survey, as noted earlier, the police ranked domestic violence highest (along with burglary at the same level) as the crime of “more concern” (selected either as the first, second, or third crime of top concern), with 67.9% of police officers so responding. If an SPI project could reduce domestic violence, particularly man-on-woman violence, this would divert police resources for other crime control activities. Reducing this social problem could also help families and perhaps help end the cycle of abuse and violence, though these would not be measurable within this study.

Objectives of the Study: The main objective of the study was to reduce MOWV offender recidivism by creating an awareness in him that man-on-woman domestic violence is a criminal act and it has many negative consequences for the offender, such as spending time in jail or going to prison, losing his freedom, perhaps losing his job, losing his dignity, and losing respect in his family and neighborhood. The program would also be directed toward enabling the offender to find various ways of controlling his anger (such as walking out of the home or taking a “time-out” away from the home) and refraining from anger-facilitating factors, such as drug and alcohol use and addiction. Positively it is oriented toward helping the offender treat the spouse or partner with reasonableness, equality, decency, dignity, and respect. Further, the purpose of the program would be to help especially first time offenders (those who come to the attention of the police for the first time) control their anger by building appropriate reasoning and informal controls that help develop conformity to the law. Apart from this consciousness-raising intent to enable the offender to become remorseful and change behavior, referral services were to be made to appropriate agencies that would help the offenders, such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation and mental health programs. The PD already has a Domestic Violence Coordinator who has been helping victims with advice and services, and this was to be continued as usual.

Project for Domestic Violence Offenders: The researchers and Project Coordinator decided to focus solely on MOWV offenders to make the project and comparisons consistent. They had initially thought up a strategy in which arresting police officers would randomly select these offenders to receive treatment from a “peace committee.” However, we discovered this would not be feasible for many reasons, legal and logistic. So patrol officers were not directly involved in the domestic violence project, except to do their duty and charge offenders as usual. It was the PD Domestic Violence Coordinator who did the selecting at the police station. It took us time, several mis-starts, and meetings with the Chief, the judge, and others to iron out the legalities and logistics of this project. While the responding patrol officers were not directly involved in this project other PD and court personnel were involved (note that the municipal court and the police station

are in the same building). The PD Domestic Violence Coordinator, the bailiff, the judge, the PD Chaplain (a woman), and the PD Project Coordinator (Robert Garcia) were to form a “Peace Committee” to deal with the treatment offenders.

Selection Method: We did not want to include very serious MOWV offenders, such as Class A or B offenders, as their crimes were serious and there were legal issues involved. We wanted to target minor MOWV offenders who had been reported to the police but were not charged with a crime. However, when they were asked to come to the police station to participate in the “Peace-Making” Program even those who agreed to come did not show up. The judge then advised us to select Class C misdemeanor offenders, whose crime is not too serious, yet they have been arrested and held in jail.

We used a systematic random sampling method by dividing Pharr between the west and east, excluding the areas used for the place-based project. All Class C misdemeanor domestic violence offenders are brought to the police station and held in jail, and it was from these that the treatment and control group offenders were selected. After booking they are told that they can pay a \$315 fine and go free. Meanwhile each day the DV Coordinator would check the police reports and charge sheets to if any offenders were eligible to be selected for treatment based on our specifications: they should be from the west side (but not from Baker), it should be MOWV, and Class C misdemeanor offense. The offender was told about the “Peace-Making” Program and asked whether he would like to participate. Those who agreed were selected for the treatment group. As for the control group, they were selected from the east side of Pharr (but not from Charlie) using the same specifications. They were not contacted by the DV Coordinator, but were “followed” in terms of checking police records to see whether or not they reoffended. There were many other types of DV cases that came in, and many other levels of seriousness beyond Class C misdemeanor, so the specifications limited us to whom we could select, which is why it took so long to fill up the treatment group.

The judge initially said he could within his discretion reduce their \$315 fines for those agreeing to participate in the project, but this did not happen because the City needed the fine money and the expected proceeds were already budgeted.

B. MOWV OFFENDER INTERVENTION AND FOLLOW-UPS

Intervention/treatment: The initial phase of the intervention was a Peace Committee session in the police station near the holding cells and municipal court in which 3 to 5 PD and court officials – the DV Coordinator, the judge, the bailiff, the PD chaplain (a female), and Robert Garcia – met with the offender and talked to him about the seriousness of his offense for legal repercussions as well as the effect on his family and future. The Peace Committee helped the offender become aware that man-on-woman violence is an illegal act, and helped open up his cognitive resources to the reality that men and women have equal rights, and that men should not dominate women by violence. The committee also provided him with information about community help, such as alcohol and drug treatment programs. In actuality, because the judge and chaplain were often tied

up with other work, most of these sessions included only the DV Coordinator, the bailiff, and the Project Coordinator. Later the Booking Supervisor took over the role of the Bailiff, who was not able to participate regularly after some time. Each offender in the treatment group appeared before the Peace Committee individually within 4 to 24 hours of arrest. It should be noted that several of those who received treatment were touched that the PD and court had shown some concern for them and their family and had wanted to help straighten out their problems.

The Roles of the Peace Committee were:

1. Explaining to the offender in various ways and styles:
 - a. the legal reasons for his arrest and presence before the committee
 - b. what could happen if he were to repeat the offense, especially if it is more than two times or more severe, such as:
 - i. going to jail for six months or more
 - ii. restrictions on his freedom due to being in jail or prison
 - iii. the shame he would face
 - iv. disrespect from the wife, children, and neighbors
 - v. his wife obtaining a protective order that would prevent him from being with his family
 - vi. losing his job
 - vii. suspension of his professional license (if any)
 - viii. being expelled from the housing project (if that is where he lived)
 - ix. losing other government-sponsored benefits (if any)
 - c. the help and programs available in the city for him to change (mentioned above)
2. The three members of the committee had overlapping roles, but approached the problems in different styles
 - a. The style of the DV Coordinator, Allan Cantu: He is a civilian employee in the PD with mild manners with concerns for the offender and his improvement. He had a lot of information about the services available for DV and MOWV offenders, and made appropriate referrals in relation to each offender's problems and needs. He also was the one who maintained frequent contact with the offenders and their victims to help monitor whether the agreements made with the Peace Committee were being followed.
 - b. The style of the Project Coordinator, Robert Garcia: He is also a civilian employee in the PD with a Bachelor's degree in Criminal Justice and an M.A. in Education. He has had a lot of experience working with drug addicts, child abusers, abused children, and family violence offenders. With his personality trait of being firm, friendly, and forceful, he made the offender feel guilty and remorseful, at the same time talking in general terms about horrible things that people do and the horrible repercussions to themselves and their victims. By opening up their consciousness, he provided guidance where to get help and the types of programs that are available for the offender's rehabilitation.
 - c. The style of the Booking Supervisor (the Jailer): He replaced the Bailiff on the Peace Committee. They both have a similar disposition and style. The Booking Supervisor is a veteran uniformed police officer with a law enforcement focus. He spoke with the

authority of the law and reminded the offender of the degradation he went through and warned of possible more serious actions that could be taken against him if he repeated the offense. He made the offender understand the devastating consequences that reoffending would bring for him, his image, his family, and the neighborhood.

Follow-up calls were made over the 6 month period of the experiment, at first more frequently and later less often; the offenders were also given the DV Coordinator's card so they could call him if they wished. **The victim** was treated according to the usual practice of the PD, with attempted contacts, referrals for community counselling and help programs, including those of Mujeres Unidas (a Latina feminist organization that provides help and shelters for women), the option for a restraining order, etc.

Special Form: In addition to the police reports on each of the subjects, we developed an additional SPI report for the DV Coordinator to fill out (see p. 85 for Appendix X on the Domestic Violence Form).

Final call/exit interview: The DV Coordinator made a final call at the end of the project to each of the 40 MOWV offenders (to the comparison group members for the first time) to find out how they and their families are doing, with one of the questions being whether they are in the same relationship, or they have divorced or separated.

Victim Survey: The DV Coordinator also gave an exit phone survey to the MOWV victims from both treatment and comparison groups after the project had ended to find out how they and their spouses were doing, including questions about whether the offenders had beaten them again and how many times, whether they were still living with the offenders, and whether the offenders had improved.

C. MOWV PROJECT OUTCOME:

Official Records: None of the 20 treatment group members reoffended, while two in the comparison group have been officially charged again with domestic violence, one of them three times, and the last time he was sent to prison. This indicates the program may have had some positive effect on reducing recidivism. However, the number of offenders are so small and time period so short that these have created a threat to statistical validity. On a comparison of means test on whether the subject recidivated (=1) or not (=0) on DV charges only, the .10 difference in means was not significant: $t = -1.45$, $p = .16$ (see Table 19). On comparing the means of how many times the offenders recidivated the -.20 difference was even less significant at $t = -1.29$, $p = .21$ (see Table 20).

Table 19: Official Domestic Violence Re-offending Record, Comparison of Means T-Test on Whether Offender Reoffended (0=no re-offense, 1=reoffended at least once)		
	N	Mean
Comparison Group	20	.10
Treatment Group	20	.00
Mean Difference	T	Significance
.10	1.45	.16

Table 20: Official Domestic Violence Re-offending Record, Comparison of Means T-Test on Times Offender Reoffended		
	N	Mean
Comparison Group	20	.20
Treatment Group	20	.00
Mean Difference	T	Significance
.20	1.29	.21

Victim Survey: The threat to validity of official arrest records, such as those used above, is that many domestic violence victims may not report their victimization to the police. Therefore a questionnaire was administered to the victims after the program had ended to find out, among other things, if their partner had beaten them again after the first offense (that brought the offender into the project), how many times, and whether they felt the offender had improved. While 3 victims with their spouses in the treatment group reported that they had beaten them after they first reported abuse, 8 victims with spouses in the comparison group reported he had beaten them again. These results are somewhat better than the official results, with $t = 1.80$ ($p=.08$), so we can say there is a significant difference at the .10 level of significance (see Table 21 below).

Table 21: Victim Survey on Domestic Violence Re-offending, Comparison of Means T-Test on Whether Offender Reoffended (40 responded; 0=no re-offense, 1=reoffended at least once)		
Had he beaten again?	No	Yes
Comparison Group	12 (60%)	8 (40%)
Treatment Group	17 (80%)	3 (20%)
	N	Mean
Comparison Group	20	.40
Treatment Group	20	.15
Mean Difference	T	Significance
.25	1.80	.08

However, the number of times offender reoffended, as above, does not yield a significant result, even though difference between treatment and control offenders is reported to be even more greatly different. For one thing, three victims of the comparison group offenders did not answer this question, so the number of cases is even smaller (see Table 22 below).

Table 22: Victim Survey on Violence Re-offending, Comparison of Means T-Test on Times Offender Reoffended		
	N	Mean
Comparison Group	17	.47
Treatment Group	20	.20
Mean Difference	T	Significance
.20	1.12	.27

We obtained somewhat better results, though still not significant, when we replaced “1” for missing data on the question “How many times did he beat you?” for the three victims who did not answer that question, but did respond “yes” to “Since the first abuse you reported to us on (date of initial case), did the man beat you again?” In other words, we can conservatively assume it was at least once. The results are .55 for mean difference, $t = 1.6$, $p = .12$ (see Table 23).

Table 23: Victim Survey on Violence Re-offending, Comparison of Means T-Test on Times Offender Reoffended (adjusted)		
	N	Mean
Comparison Group	20	.55
Treatment Group	20	.20
Mean Difference	T	Significance
.20	1.6	.12

The best results were on the question of had the offender had improved; the question was “Do you feel he has improved,” with possible answers of “yes” or “no.” Both Chi-Square and Gamma were found to be significant at the .05 significance level. The Gamma of .70 shows a strong positive association between the offender getting the treatment and the victim saying he had improved.

Table 24: Victim Survey on Offender Improvement, Chi-Square and Gama Tests (35 of the 40 responded)			
	No	Yes	total
Comparison Group	15 (83%)	3 (17%)	18
Treatment Group	8 (47%)	9 (53%)	17
		total	35
Statistics:			
Chi-Square	5.11	.028	
Gamma	.70	.015	

Domestic Violence Coordinator’s Assessment: Aside from quantitative evidence that suggests (either strongly or weakly) that the Peace Committee domestic violence offender treatment was successful in reducing MOWV, qualitative information also indicated success. The DV Coordinator said he noticed a marked difference in tenor during the final exit calls between the treatment group members (who went through the “Peace Committee” treatment and received periodic calls to see how they and their families were doing) and comparison group members (who were only contacted that one time): the treatment group members were respectful, appreciative,

and more open about how life and family relations were going for them, while the comparison group members tended to be more gruff and unresponsive. He also pointed out that though the treatment was effective for all the men, it seemed to work better on middle class professional men, than working class and unemployed men. The middle class men were more shameful and repentant; they were more thankful for and receptive to the Peace Committee treatment.

Two opposing threats to validity: In addition to threats to statistical validity due to the numbers being too low, two construct threats to validity may be impacting the results. The arrest and jailing of MOWV offenders can itself be considered a “treatment” that might impact both the treatment and comparison group offenders, contributing to their reform (there is some evidence this was the case), with the Peace Committee intervention constituting an “add-on” to this process making reform more likely, but this “treatment” of arrest and jailing would then dampen the differences between the treatment and comparison groups. On the other hand, the treatment group offenders volunteered for the Peace-Making Program (with those who were eligible but did not volunteer being excluded from the study); this might create a bias for success, if volunteers are different in ways that make them more likely to succeed (which we might assume is the case). Furthermore, there is no way of knowing how many in the comparison group would have volunteered for the program if the opportunity had been offered them. This would then skew the results for greater difference between the treatment and comparison group offenders. See the following “Discussion” for a more on this. It might be the case that these two opposing threats to validity might cancel each other out and in combination have no impact on results.

In summary, the main point is that according to official records none of the offenders who went through the Peace-Making treatment committed domestic violence again, while several of those in the comparison group did, even though the numbers were too low to find statistical significance in this difference. The victim survey also gave good results, with 3 treatment group offenders reoffending compared to 8 in the comparison group. Furthermore, better statistical significance regarding differences and the success of the program was achieved on the victim survey results.

D. MOWV PROJECT DISCUSSION:

Both the members of the Peace Committee and the offenders who went through it realized the importance of the Peace Committee in helping the offenders think and work toward a positive change in their behavior. According to the Peace Committee members all the offenders in the treatment group felt shameful, guilty, and remorseful for what they had done, and they were happy that they had an opportunity to participate in the peace-making program. A couple of the offenders suggested that such programs should be made available to all in the community so that they could benefit by it, as it is doing good for them. Even a few offenders in the comparison group felt bad for what they did, and a couple of them mentioned that the simple contact they had with the police helped them change. In addition a significant number of victims in the treatment group (9) and a small number in the comparison group (3) reported that they clearly noticed improvement in their men’s behavior. Because domestic violence is fairly common, and happens

in the privacy of home against intimate persons often without premeditation, people tend not give much thought to it as a crime. However, the arrest and contact with the Peace Committee seemed to have prompted the offenders' learned, but dormant, sense of what is right and what is wrong behavior to surface in their conscious minds, fostering an identity with what is right. This generated a sense of guilt, shame, and lower self-esteem, and a willingness to correct themselves. In this regard, the requirements of conformity to the law and the repertoire of reasoning the offenders already have in support of the law, helped to change their behavior. This conformity and corrective orientations of the offenders need greater exploration. Three interrelated explanations are provided here:

1. People in Pharr are closely connected with family and kin. There is also a strong ethnic identity and a larger social network of relationships maintained, as mentioned earlier. Their general similar social experiences have led to the development of certain shared views and similarities in thinking and behavior.
2. In addition to these altruistic interconnections there is a strong commitment to social, religious, and legal norms, because of which there is clarity toward the right behavior and the importance of following the right path. This strengthens the social expectation of right behavior in one's personal life. Additionally, parents tend to make sure children learn religious, social, moral, and legal norms and requirements. The authority of the parents, especially the father, is important. Children fear engaging in wrong behavior, as they could be seriously disciplined. Rebellious response to disciplinary actions, are not ordinarily noted. Children accept the expectations of the parents and try to fulfill them. The learned submission to authority to the father is transferred to submission to the authority of the police, as the police are often thought of as benevolent persons who mean well and are interested in their improvement. Further, as all the police officers are Mexican-American and in a predominantly Mexican-American community, the expectations of the people, including offenders, that the police act paternalistically are often met with helpful and supportive police responses, with the recognition at the same time that the law needs to be enforced.
3. As those who become offenders were also brought up under similar social contexts they feel they committed the crime against their loved one, which they should not have committed. This feeling prompts a sense of shame and guilt; shame in relation to not doing what is socially and legally expected, and guilt in relation to internalized and personalized moral and legal norms. Mead (1934:254-255) and Black (1998:71) point out that as people tend to measure their importance in relation to what others say, social condemnation often leads to self-criticism, and they feed on each other, as social condemnation and self-criticism are made of the same substance. This is experienced more by younger generations who are struggling to better themselves, than by older generations in this area.

The resulting self-criticism and the lower self-esteem the offender experiences, lacking in much social support to take a dissident adaptation, results in blaming oneself and changing to align oneself to social and legal expectations. This is what is happening in general to many offenders at this time, who are like others in the community, and are inclined to introduce improvements in

their lives, with the spirit of immigrants striving to fulfill the American dream; Fay-Ramirez (2014) found a similar situation for Latinos in Seattle. The more the self-criticism to improve is experienced the greater will be the benefits to make strides in all aspects of life, including offenders giving up their crimes. However, some individuals on their road to progress make mistakes or commit crimes, but when alerted by warning, citation, arrest, or brief jail time they gather personal cognitive resources and try to change their behavior. The Peace Committee intervention then can be understood as a more powerful tool for this process of improvement, and would help more greatly. The fact that the offenders in the treatment group voluntarily participated in the Peace-Making program, instead of just paying their fine and going free, is a sign of an improvement orientation to find help and reform.

III. FALSE ALARM PROJECT:

A. RATIONALE, TREATMENT PLANNING, RESEARCH DESIGN, TRAINING

In response to the Pharr Police Survey question of what was the most time-consuming work of policing, “responding to alarms” ranked highest as the mode, at 30.9%. The PD and Robert Garcia did a calculation of the high costs involved in responding to false alarms in terms of money and police time spent, \$31.31 per call or about \$146,000 for the most recent 12 month period for which we had data at that time (see below). In addition a patrol car was involved in an accident in 2012 when responding to a false alarm. We figured if we could reduce false alarms even a

Table 25: Cost Analysis of False Alarms in Pharr

Steps	Notes	Calculations
1. Define the Unit Response Service:	Alarm Service	
2. Determine the number of alarm calls response (unit) provided in the defined time period:	5,631 Total # of Alarms Call Response (Units) from July 1,201 to July 30, 2012	
3. Calculate the direct cost:		
Police Officer 2 Cost:	Salary and benefits of \$50,082 per year ÷ 52 work weeks per year ÷ 40 work hours per week ÷ 60 minutes per hour = \$0.4012 per x 25 minutes required	\$20.06
Radio Communication Supervisor 1 Cost:	Salary and benefits of \$41,901.50 per year ÷ 52 work weeks per year ÷ 40 work hours per week ÷ 60 minutes per hour = \$0.3357 per x 15 minutes required	\$4.22
Radio Communication Operator 1 Cost:	Salary and benefits of \$35,112.37 per year ÷ 52 work weeks per year ÷ 40 work hours per week ÷ 60 minutes per hour = \$0.2813 per x 25 minutes required	\$7.03
TOTAL Direct Costs Per Call (Unit):		\$31.31
Total Alarm Calls cost per call:	\$31.31 per responds call x 5,631 for both activate and false alarms	\$176,306.61
4: Direct Over Time Costs		
Overtime Pay Cost:	Two people were pay OT for collecting fine fees	\$12,015.66
5.		
Annual Collection of Alarm Fees:	Average Collection Fees last 3 years	\$58,256.66
6. Calculate the PD Annual Overall Cost		
Total from step 3 & 4:		\$188,322.27
Subtract Total from step 5:		\$58,256.66
Grand Total Cost:	Total costs for responding for both active and false alarm, OT minus the collection in fees.	\$130,065.61
A. False Alarm Cost	\$31.31 per responds call x 4,667 (83.1 %) were for false alarms only	\$146,123.77


Figure 7: False Alarm Door-Hanger

small percent, this would help in making overall policing in Pharr more effective and efficient.

While such a project is not directly a type of SARA smart policing, it indirectly (if successful) would support smart policing and the other projects by helping the PD save money and police hours, which could be better spent on crime control activities. Furthermore, it would alert the police to their responsibility to take a more proactive step in helping people prevent false alarms, rather than simply responding perfunctorily and filling out a report. Pharr is a poor city in one of the poorest counties in the country and every dollar counts. Therefore this project could be considered part of a total Smart Policing “package” in that, if effective, it would help free up the limited police officer hours to pursue smart policing practices found to be successful and contribute to sustainability.

Treatment Planning: While planning we realized that people whose alarm goes off are not often at home, so we developed a door-hanger, which could be handed to the resident or business, or left on the door. It explains the costs of false alarms and that police would be taken away from fighting real crime; it then lists many tips to avoid false alarms, the first one suggesting that the person call their alarm company for help. The opposite side had the same information in Spanish.

Research Design: To make this easy for the PD we decided that only patrol officers on the sectors on one side of Pharr would get the door-hangers and apply the treatment, handing them out or leaving them on doors when responding to false alarms. That was our easy and logistically feasible method of systematic randomization. The other side would be used as a comparison, so we could see whether false alarms decreased significantly on the treatment side, and significantly more than on the comparison side. We chose the west side of Pharr as the treatment area, since that would be a tougher area to reduce false alarms because it had much higher number of businesses.



In our discussion with PD officers and personnel we came to understand that businesses were less likely to reduce their false alarms and did not seem to care about the fines (Pharr imposes a \$25 fine for every false alarm after the first three). Some police officers could even identify some businesses and a particular school on the west side that had their alarms going off very frequently.

Training: The Police Patrol Lieutenant took charge of training the police involved in the false alarm project, which were his instructions for the police to talk to people whose alarm had gone off accidentally and hand them the door hanger, and if not home, then leave the door hanger on the door. He clearly stressed the treatment was only to be done on the west side of Pharr.

B. OUTCOME:

Both the west side treatment area and the eastside comparison area experienced a decline in false alarms from 2012 (before the experiment) to 2013 during the experiment (see Table 26). However, the greater decline was on the eastside comparison area, a 26.8% decline compared to a 15.8% decline on the west side. It should also be noted that there was an overall decrease of 16.9% of all alarms, despite an increase in property crimes between 2012 and 2013.

Table 26: False Alarms in Pharr, 2012-2013					
	2012	2013	change	% change	Savings
Westside of Pharr (treatment)	3006	2531	-475	-15.8%	\$14,872
Eastside of Pharr (comparison)	2225	1629	-596	-26.8%	\$18,661

There are several possible explanations for this difference. The decline may have been due to a general decline not attributable to the false alarm door-hanger treatment. There may have been diffusion or compensatory treatment, with patrol officers passing out the door-hangers on both sides of Pharr, or there may have been diffusion among the residents. Being a small city and many residents knowing people from different areas of Pharr, there could have been a diffusion of treatment in that way. The fact that businesses are more immune to reducing their false alarms and the west side could also account for lesser decrease in the west side treatment area.

It would have been ideal to obtain information on whether the false alarm was from a resident or business, but since the crime analyst put a tremendous amount of work into separating the false alarms from the real alarms, and then left to become a police officer, it was not possible to obtain this information.

Whatever the cause or causes for the decline in false alarms and the greater decline on the east side, Pharr saved \$33,533 and 446 police officer hours by this reduction of 1071 false alarms. That is well enough cause to continue this door-hanger treatment.

VII. SUSTAINABILITY:

A. CAPE PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY:

The Pharr PD knows the SPI CAPE project has been a success reducing crime through COP, POP, and SARA strategies and methods. The closer interactions that developed between the people and the police helped to develop appreciation for police work, which increased police morale and pride in what they did. It also helped in receiving crime tips and gathering intelligence from the community that resulted in uncovering and solving crimes. Because of these successes the PD has continued CAPE policing after the SPI grant ended, and extended it to other hotspot areas.

Before the SPI CAPE project:

1. There were two patrol officers assigned to each of the 8 beats for each of the three shifts, plus two at large who were deployed to areas during that shift experiencing more disorder and crime problems.
2. Most officers were mainly engaged in reactive policing, answering calls for service.
3. The PD did not have a tracking device to know where the squad cars were, and there was some talk about them perhaps skirting around the periphery of neighborhoods, such as in Baker, rather than going into them, or perhaps they were not going into them very much.
 - a. The pre-study community survey and two post-study focus groups, as well as some officers, alluded to much less police visibility in Baker before the project.
 - b. The CAPE patrol officers also said that before the project they would patrol around in the squad cars with windows up and would mainly pass by people without interacting with them, at most giving brief waves.

Changes made since the SPI project:

1. CAPE Training: The PD is continuing to train officers into the CAPE style of policing, using the veterans from the SPI-funded CAPE project to train others. It now has 5 CAPE officers.



Figure 8: CAPE Officers at a Red Ribbon Event at an Elementary School. CAPE officer on the right went through the original SPI training in 2012, while the one on the left was trained into CAPE policing after the grant-funded project ended.

2. CAPE officers report that their morale has increased greatly due to the project, and this has caught on with the new CAPE officers. At the beginning both CAPE and regular officers were skeptical about CAPE, but now many have become convinced it can reduce crime. CAPE has become part and parcel of their thinking, and even some officers not trained in CAPE emulate it to some extent.
3. The Assistant Chief has rearranged the patrol assignments to be more flexible in order to focus more keenly on crime problems and problem areas as they arise, incorporating a mix of CAPE officers and enforcement officers, according to need.
 - a. The PD administration and officers are making better use of crime data to plan their operations and schedules.
 - b. The new PD patrol assignments include the 5 CAPE officers, two the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. day shift and three in an afternoon/night shift from 5 p.m. to 1 a.m. (Community members had suggested more CAPE patrolling in the afternoon and night, when more crimes and disorderly behavior were happening.)
 - c. One traditional enforcement officer (instead of two) is now assigned to each of the eight beats during each shift, and the PD is using crime analysis information and intelligence-led policing to deploy the remaining larger pool of enforcement officers to the high crime areas, during high crime shifts and days-of-the-week.
4. The five CAPE officers who are being deployed to crime hotspots around the city, as needed, continuing their pro-active form of policing.
 - a. Combined COP and POP strategies using the SARA model, identifying criminogenic conditions in areas to which they are assigned and uncovering crime, both through their own scanning and through “community-intelligence-led policing” made possible by their closer interactions with the community.
 - b. They are continuing to come up with innovative strategies to reduce crime and disorder.
 - c. The CAPE program has been extended to the Las Milpas area where crime is rapidly increasing.
5. The PD is perhaps short of regular and CAPE-trained officers to cover all the crime hotspots with the CAPE form of intensive, interactive policing. CAPE officers have not been back in Baker.
 - a. As a part of sustainability, it is necessary to return to areas that received CAPE treatment at least on an occasional basis to sustain community confidence in the police and keep their fear of crime and retaliation for reporting it from resurging.
 - b. Since the CAPE project has proven that police can help increase collective efficacy, this effort should be sustained, as crime control and collective efficacy are mutually reinforcing. This needs to be maintained in Baker. Continuation of CAPE officers’ presence there is needed for long term and lasting effects.
6. Although the ATVs have allowed greater interaction with the people, even when patrolling in squad cars, the CAPE police now make it a point to stop and interact with the people.
7. Regular patrol officers not CAPE-trained are now patrolling into the neighborhoods more, since the PD has purchased equipment to track where the squad cars are.

8. The PD needed a well-trained crime analyst, and now there is a Crime Analysis Unit with Robert Garcia as its head and the new crime analyst is going through crime analysis training.
 - a. According to the Crime Analyst, some regular patrol officers in addition to the CAPE officers are making better use of crime data and analysis.
 - b. Officers have a regularly scheduled meeting with the Crime Analyst on Mondays.
 - c. They use crime analysis data during their briefings for all shifts.
9. ATVs and UTVs: During the SPI project the CAPE police used the two ATVs. Seeing the tremendous impact these vehicles had in enhancing police-community relations and gaining tips and information about crimes, the PD purchased more vehicles, but decided on utility task vehicles (UTVs), which are larger than ATVs but smaller than cars and can go into the narrow places that ATVs can go. They have a roof and a structure that makes them safer so officers do not have to wear helmets. They have two seats and a dump bed in back where they keep an ice chest with water to hand out to the public as well as public information materials. UTVs are open on all sides, allowing same contact with the community. The police can also offer rides to people who look like they need a lift. As with the ATVs children and adults are fascinated by them. It should be noted that these types of vehicles are not allowed on city streets, but the PD is in process of seeking a city ordinance that will only allow them for police use.



Figure 9: CAPE officers with the new UTV talking with elementary students.



Figure 10: CAPE officers with the new UTV talking with high school students.

10. The City of Pharr has also become involved in projects started by the CAPE police; for instance the Park and Recreations Department has taken over hosting Movie Night in the Park, which was a big hit with the residents. They partnered with some businesses in the area to purchase an inflatable screen that would be safer than the original one.
11. Cruise Lights: The PD is now having all its patrol officers use their red and blue cruise lights on during the night, both on the squad cars and UTVs, and now having officers keep their lights on when writing reports. Robert Garcia mentioned how when driving through various cities in the Rio Grande Valley he hardly noticed any police cars at night, except in Pharr, where he could see them because of their distinctive red and blue cruise lights. As mentioned, the focus group participants said those lights, which would slightly beam into their homes at night, gave them a sense of security and safety, helping also to keep their children under better control and reduce family quarrels and violence.
12. In order to facilitate innovative ideas and find creative solutions to problems, a PD Advisory Council was created in which the two university researchers have been made members.
13. The PD initiated new requirements as part of the training of officers for promotion to sergeant and lieutenant. They are to read books and articles on COP, POP, intelligence-led policing and the SARA model:
 - a. For promotion to sergeant, in addition to regular training, they are to study (for their exam) *Problem Oriented Policing* by Herman Goldstein, and *Intelligence-led Policing* by Jerry Ratcliffe.
 - b. For promotion to lieutenant, in addition to regular training, they are to study (for their exam) *Intelligence-led Policing* by Jerry Ratcliffe and *Police Administration: Structure, Processes, and Behavior*, by Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo, and Robert W. Taylor.

14. Aside from the Chief and a few others, we did not see much of an “improvement” orientation among police officers before the SPI project, but now such an orientation has caught on. It should be further developed, which can make the Pharr Police Department a model PD in South Texas.
15. Baker community, which received CAPE treatment, has expressed its desire (through the focus groups and people calling the PD) to have the CAPE program return. Likewise, residents of other areas aware of the program want it to come to their areas as well. This is a good sign, which will help contribute to the sustainability of the program.
16. The PD is also continuing their other programs beyond the CAPE program it started such as CARE (contact a resident every day), Operation Phoenix, P.A.L. (the Police Athletic League), sports teams for underprivileged children, and a new one, Operation Talon to track down fugitives with outstanding warrants.

B. MOWV DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

The DV Coordinator, the Project Coordinator, the judge, and bailiff all felt the Peace-Making MOWV offender project was a success and expressed a willingness and eagerness to continue this program.

The Peace-Making Program is now an ongoing program. The DV Coordinator, Project Coordinator, and Booking Supervisor currently compose the committee.

A three-year grant from the State of Texas is currently helping to fund this program.

They are planning to provide a room for the Peace Committee session across from the holding cells and next to the court area in the police station, as was originally proposed so as to have maximum impact on the offenders by reminding them of the consequences of their offenses. Currently they are meeting in a room upstairs from that area.

C. FALSE ALARM PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY:

Since this project is not too costly in term of police time and printing of the door-hangers, the Project Coordinator said this program would likely be continued.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CAPE PROGRAM:

1. The CAPE (COP-POP/SARA) strategies have shown all around success and should be continued throughout Pharr, especially in areas where crime is higher. It is good to note that it is being continued.
 - a. The ideal situation would be to have a permanent CAPE program with two or more full time CAPE-trained officers in each of Pharr's crime hotspots. That should be the goal.
 - b. Meanwhile, when the CAPE program goes into a new high crime area, two or more CAPE police should be assigned to it full-time for 3 or more months, giving it enough time for all the community members to know that the police are "there for them."
 - i. Second Phase: After that initial intensive period, the same CAPE police (or at least one of them) should continue CAPE patrolling and activities in that area at least twice a week for another 3 or more months.
 - ii. Third Phase: After the second phase the CAPE police should come back to that area once a week (at least twice a month) indefinitely to remind people that they are there for them.

The idea is that once the CAPE program has been carried out in an area such as Baker for some time and community trust has been gained, it is important that the area not be neglected and the people not again become fearful of crime and of reporting crime. Furthermore one year is not enough time for the full effect of CAPE policing, that would hopefully facilitate greater grass-roots organizing within the community.

- c. It would be good to continue to evaluate the effects of CAPE policing in Baker (and other areas) on a longer term basis.
 - d. As the CAPE program expands into other areas of Pharr, this need to return to the old areas at least twice a month means that more CAPE officers will need to be trained. Eventually the PD will reach the optimum mix of CAPE and regular enforcement officers. Of course CAPE officers are also trained in traditional enforcement, so they can always be reassigned to enforcement when the need for more enforcement officers arises.
 - e. The City of Pharr should provide for the hiring of more police officers, with a certain portion of them going into the CAPE program, with the understanding that the reduction in crime and staving off of more serious problems, such as cartel infiltration, is well worth it.
2. Mexican cartel operations are expanding in U.S. cities along border in the Rio Grande Valley. They are recruiting and training local gang members. While they do not seem to have much of a presence in Pharr at this point compared to their connections and presence in some other border cities, there is a real and imminent possibility of greater infiltration into Pharr. In order to keep this situation at bay, the CAPE style of policing is even more important than during the project period. CAPE police are able to tap into vital intelligence from the community, engage at-risk children and youth, and facilitate community organization in a way that helps control

- crime, reducing people's fear of crime and fear of retaliation for reporting crime. These are the activities that would most help to keep dangerous criminal elements from infiltrating Pharr.
3. The new CAPE officers entering into the program should be given adequate training, along the lines of the training given at the beginning of the project in October 2012.
 - a. It might be a good idea to have experienced CAPE officers conduct the training.
 - b. It would be good to have the CAPE officers get together once or twice a month to talk about their experiences and find solutions to issues they face. Also they can be in informal communication with each other on a more frequent basis.
 - c. It may be good for CAPE officers to have a brief refresher course or half-day "retreat" at least once a year to discuss more thoroughly issues connected with the program, perhaps a program they themselves could devise.
 4. Apart from separate and more intensive CAPE training, the Police Academy should incorporate some of the principles and strategies of the CAPE program that would be helpful even to regular enforcement officers.
 5. The ATVs and now the UTVs have been very successful in allowing CAPE officers to engage the community more, receive crime tips; give advice, guidance, and helpful information; and gain community trust and participation in crime control.
 - a. More of these vehicles should be purchased.
 - b. The City of Pharr should pass an ordinance that allows only the police to drive these vehicles on city streets and roads.
 6. The cruise light program for all patrol vehicles should be continued, since this has positive effects on the community beyond what was expected.
 7. It is good to find ways within the purview of police activities to help people organize themselves for reducing physical and social disorders, and controlling crime. In other words, the police should not be doing the organizing beyond a certain minimal point, but suggesting that the community get organized at least at the neighborhood or block level, and facilitating their efforts.
 - a. As individuals are somewhat fearful of criminal retaliation, if the whole neighborhood is involved, that would help; if police presence during some of their meetings helps to reduce their fears, then a police officer could be present at least for a few minutes.
 - b. This could be along the lines of a neighborhood clean-up (or beautification) and crime watch group.
 - c. In some communities elders in the neighborhood – there are usually some who know more people there – could constitute a committee to address and help solve disorder and crime.
 - d. If some such groups take root and become successful, their members could be called on to help other neighborhoods organize.
 8. Baker residents made some complaints to the CAPE police during the focus group that the PD dispatchers were not receptive to the calls they make. This problem should be explained to the dispatchers and rectified. This may especially be the case when someone is hesitant to speak clearly about a crime problem due to fear of retaliation; the dispatcher would need to be patient and draw the information out.

9. The New World Program the Crime Analyst uses seems to have some problems and underreports or wrongly reports crime. This was discovered when comparing the official crime records with those generated by the New World Program. The problem needs to be looked into and addressed.
10. The police are engaged in various youth and delinquency control programs to help increase youth support for the police and instill law-abiding behavior. The Pharr police have programs aside from CAPE policing such as P.A.L. and school programs about delinquency and drug abuse prevention. These are good and should be continued and enhanced.
11. There has been a good amount of turnover in the Pharr Police Department, which may be due to greater opportunities available to police officers in county, state, federal agencies. Even though some turnover cannot be avoided it could be controlled through better salaries and fringe benefits.
12. The Pharr Police Department should also try to hire and train more college graduates. In the RGV area there are many Criminal Justice graduates who can be targeted. The new UTRGV (UT-Pan American and UT, Brownsville are now merging) and South Texas Community College have over 2500 majors in Criminal Justice and a large number graduating every year.
13. Adequate pay and training for the Crime Analyst and crime analysis staff should be given.
14. There should be even better incorporation of crime analysis information in police planning and strategizing. This would improve Smart Policing and intelligence-lead policing efforts, increasing the PD's effectiveness and efficiency. These measures may also increase incentive and morale for the Crime Analyst and reduce the turn-over that has beset that position.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOWV DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAM:

1. Since this program showed signs of success and since MOWV is such a serious problem with repercussions for family members, it is suggested that this program be continued.
2. The Peace Committee with (1) the Domestic Violence Coordinator, (2) the PD Project Coordinator, and (3) the Booking Supervisor (the Jailor) is a good combination. If more well-qualified persons can be added as they are available for this extra work that would also be good.
 - a. For instance an older retired police officer interested in such a program could participate and bring his experiences to guide the offenders.
 - b. Adequate compensation should be provided to members of the Peace Committee who do this work beyond their regular hours. Since this is an important program that could help reduce the problem of MOWV, the savings in police time and financial resources from this projects could help justify this expense.
3. The program should be strengthened by interfacing with private and public agencies so that referral services, counselling, and other assistance can be provided.
4. Once the state grant runs out, the City of Pharr should continue funding this program, which ultimately could be a savings in many ways by reducing recidivism, helping keep families intact, and reducing the cycle of abuse.

5. There should be continued evaluation of how well the program is working by tracking offenders to see if they reoffend (compared to those not in the program who reoffend), which could help improve the program.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ALARM PROGRAM:

1. If the Police Department and City of Pharr deem this a cost-effective measure that also diverts police to focus more on crime control, then more of these door-hangers can be printed and distributed as police respond to false alarms.
 - a. It might be a good idea in addition to handing out door-hangers to have the police officers explain to the people whose alarms have gone off accidentally (if they are at home) about the importance of their stopping this from happening in the future.
2. A webpage can be created on the Pharr PD website giving the same information on the door-hangers or more. This was planned at the beginning of the project but with the other projects consuming most of our time we did not follow through in seeing that it was done. The door-hangers do have the Pharr PD webpage at the bottom, so if there is a link on the main PD page to a page about reducing false alarms, this would be enough.
3. If there are some cases in which false alarms go off repeatedly, some stricter action has to be taken, either a higher fine or a very strong suggestion that the person or business investigate with the cooperation of the alarm company into the cause and find a solution.
4. The City of Pharr could consider raising the fee for repeat false alarms. Those who have alarms are perhaps wealthy enough to pay higher fees.
5. The City of Pharr could consider charging businesses a higher fee for repeat false alarms than the residential fee.

IX. SUMMARY

The Smart Policing research collaboration of the Pharr PD and the University of Texas – Pan American researchers was an overall success, despite the short time of about a year devoted to the field research. However, there were some hindrances to the study as mentioned in previous sections.

The place-based CAPE project was successful because the CAPE officers were also trained in and expected to follow SPI principles, incorporating the SARA model and evidence-based approaches into intensive community-oriented policing, having the officers themselves come up with innovations to crime control, with guidance and suggestions from the university researchers, the PD Project Coordinator, and the PD administration. This not only led to strategies and innovations that worked, but enhanced the officers' professional pride and morale. The offender-based man-on-woman domestic violence offender project also ran into some problems and had to restarted several times before it ran smoothly, as mentioned earlier, but the final result indicated it was a success. The false alarm door-hanger project went according to plan and false alarms were reduced in the treatment area. The regular patrol officers were trained on what to do, and we were told they complied, though there is some thought that the comparison area may have also gotten the door-hangers, or that there was diffusion from the treatment to the comparison area via community interactions, since false alarms reduced more in the comparison (more highly residential) area. All these programs are being continued.

Generalizability to Other Places: The COP-POP project, having the patrol officers themselves implement the SARA model while being involved in community-oriented policing, might be applicable to and helpful for small city police departments across the nation (70,000 to 125,000 population) that are not heavily urbanized. The police in these types of small cities can become more involved with the people they serve in the hotspots, scan for problems, and come up with innovative responses to address physical and social disorders (at some level possible with the purview of policing) and control crime. Such communities should also be based on receptive orientations between the people and the police to cooperate and work together. As ATV and UTV patrolling is like foot patrolling, these vehicles have been useful in facilitating interactions between the people and the police for collaborative efforts in this regard. Our study using a non-aggressive form of policing and the Philadelphia foot patrol experiment using a more aggressive form of policing (Ratcliff, *et al.* 2011) have both proven that foot and ATV patrolling can reduce especially violent crime.

As for the man-on-woman domestic violence offender-based Peace-Making project, it would not be difficult for other PDs to develop such a Peace Committee and start a similar program. One consideration is that Pharr's population and the research subjects are Mexican-American Tejanos, and it is thought that their cultural characteristics may make them more amenable to rehabilitation. However, it would be well worth it for other communities to conduct the program on an experimental basis to assess whether it helps reduce recidivism, since it can draw on existing police personnel, such as domestic violence coordinators and booking supervisors, and may not

entail much expense. The false alarm reduction door-hanger project could also be applied elsewhere.

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XI. ADDENDICES:

APPENDIX A: SPI COP-POP/SARA Training



Draft Proposed Training Schedule for the Pharr Smart Policing Initiative

Session I (2-2.5 hours): (Proposed Date Here)

- Introduction by Chief Ruben Villescascas (10 minutes)
- Pre-test (20 minutes)
- Introduction to SPI: Robert Garcia, Project Coordinator, UT-Pan American Research Team and SPI Webinar (20 minutes)
 - 1) SPI Grant Goals and Objective (Handouts)
 - 2) Testing three (3) Policing Strategies
 - 3) Crime Data and Analysis
 - 4) Police Survey Results
- Assign Personnel, Thoughts and Reflections on SPI Initiative: Lt. Joel Robles, Sgt 1 (20 minutes)

Session II (2.5 Hours): (Proposed Date Here)

- Pre-test Evaluations Results
- SPI Problem-Oriented Policing Webinar (60 minutes)
 - Introduction Power point on POP and SARA (Robert and Joel POP/SARA) (30-45 minutes)
 - Case Studies: Control and Treatment Areas Thoughts and Reflections and Assignments (30 minutes)

Session III (2.5 hours): 2 (Proposed Date Here)

- SPI Targeting Offenders Webinar (60 minutes)
 - Power point on Theories (45 minutes)
 - 1) Broken Windows/Problem analysis Triangle (UT- Pam American Research Team, Joel and Robert)

- 2) Other Theories – Crime Pattern, (UT- Pam American Research Team, Lt. Joel and Robert]
- 3) Alan Cantu – Domestic Violence Liaison

-Discussion of Objectives for SPI (offenders Domestic Violence, Organized Retail or Residential Theft- 20 minutes; UT- Pam American Research Team)

-Problem places identified first

-Problem people identified at each problem place

-Break into Groups and Hand out Assignment #1: Scanning to identify places

Session IV (2.5 hours): (Proposed Date Here)

-SPI Offender Notification Webinar (60 minutes)

-Presentation on Social Network Analysis (UT- Pam American Research Team, Lt. Joel and Robert); 30 minutes)

-Group Presentations and Discussion of Assignment #1(Scanning to Identify Problem Places; 60 minutes

-Hand out Assignment #2: Analysis of underlying conditions (Place and Problem People)

Session V (2.5 hours): (Proposed Date Here)

-SPI Research that Matters Webinar (60 minutes)

-Summary of Daily or Weekly Treatment results (20 minutes or less; UT- Pam American Research Team, Lt. Joel & Robert)

-Group Presentations and Discussion of Assignment #2 (60 minutes)

-Hand out Assignment 3: Proposed Response Plan

Session VI (2.5 hours): (Proposed Date Here)

-Collaboration Webinar (60 minutes)

-Power point on Evaluation and Assessment (30 minutes; Research Team)

-Group Presentations and Discussion of Assignment #3 (60 minutes)

-Hand out Assignment #4: Proposed Assessment Plan

Session VII (2 hours): (Proposed Date Here)

-Group Presentations and Discussion of Assignment #4 (60 minutes)

-Final Thoughts and Next Steps (15 minutes)

-Post-test and Evaluations Results (20 minutes)

Pharr Police Department Smart Policing Initiative

Problem-Oriented Policing Knowledge Assessment

October 1, 2012

1. Which of the following is a justification for the use of studies using control subjects?
 - a. To determine specific problems among offenders
 - b. To compare troublesome people, places, events, and times with non-troublesome people, places, events, and times
 - c. To compare data from one timeframe to determine change
 - d. To determine the effectiveness of different response techniques

2. CPTED is Crime Prevention Through _____ Design.
 - a. Educational
 - b. Environmental
 - c. Enforceable
 - d. Effective

3. Which of the following represents the primary stages of the SARA model?
 - a. Scanning, analysis, response, and accuracy
 - b. Scoping, analysis, response, and assessment
 - c. Scoping, analysis, reflect, and assessment
 - d. Scanning, analysis, response, and assessment

4. The basic Problem Analysis Triangle consists of all of the following *except*:
 - a. Features of the location
 - b. The lack of capable guardians
 - c. Characteristics of the victim
 - d. Features of the offender


5. Problem-oriented policing and community policing are styles of policing that currently are being regarded as _____:
 - a. Mutually exclusive
 - b. Overlapping in philosophy and practice but still somewhat distinct
 - c. Aggressive policing
 - d. Essentially two versions of the same style of policing

6. For purposes of POP, an issue may be defined as a *problem* when it occurs:
 - a. One time
 - b. Two times
 - c. Occasionally
 - d. Often enough that is considered harmful to citizens as well as police

First pages of several PowerPoint Training Modules used by the Pharr Police Department:

Smart Policing Curriculum

Module 3: Introduction to POP



Lt. Joel Robles, Pharr PD
Robert Garcia, SPI Coordinator

Model Academic Curriculum

Module 4

The SARA Process
Scanning, Analysis,
Response, & Assessment

1



Center for Problem-Oriented Policing

MODEL ACADEMIC CURRICULUM

MODULES 5-6

Crime Theories

Situational Crime Prevention

1



Center for Problem-Oriented Policing

MODEL ACADEMIC CURRICULUM

MODULE 13

Assessing and Evaluating Responses

1

APPENDIX B: Place-Based COP-POP Reports, 2 examples of the 2-page reports

Narcotics issue pg 1:



Smart Policing Initiative
Problem Oriented Policing Model (POP)
Analysis Report

Name of Officers: 1. DAVID TREVINO 2. CHARIS HERNANDEZ

- Lone Patrol
- Squad Car
- Team Patrol
- ATV Patrol
- Foot Patrol
- Bicycle

Shift: A Date: 2-20-2013

Name the incident/situation: POSSIBLE NARCOTICS Location: PARKER Time: 10 PM TO 6 PM
Examples: Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Robbery, Burglary, Larceny-Theft, Auto Theft, Domestic Violence, False Alarm, Disorderly Conduct, Physical Disorder (Graffiti, Utter, Etc.)

Persons involved: Male Female Juvenile Male Juvenile Female Others

Description of the Incident:
 * POSSIBLE NARCOTICS BY 311 WEST AUDREY APARTMENT HOA
 * POSSIBLE NARCOTICS BY 230 WEST CLARK AVENUE ALLEY EVERY FROM 8PM TO 3AM
 THURSDAY, FRIDAY, SATURDAY, SUNDAY.
 * BOARD UP VACANT HOME BY 306 WEST CLARK AVENUE (DOORS, WINDOWS OPEN).
 * EXTRA PATROL BEING NIGHT HOURS FROM 300 TO 400 BLOCK WEST CLARK AVENUE.

Time taken to deal with the incident: 8 ^{hrs} _{minutes}

Strategy followed:

- Advised and closed
- Issued Warning
- Made Arrest
- Asked the person to come to the P.D.
- Involved people in crime prevention groups (watch groups)
- Advised people to avoid false alarms
- Advised people on how to avoid victimization
- Observation booth
- Other surveillance
- Suggested to start neighborhood group to keep the area clean and under control
- Used POP (thought of a situation to stop the incident from reoccurring and applied the idea)

If POP was used, follow the directions below:

1. State the Problem (Scanning):
NARCOTICS VACANT HOME (DOORS, WINDOWS OPEN).



2. Analyze possible causes of the problem (Analysis):

POSSIBLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY BY JOB WIS? LARD DUE TO VACANT HOUSE NOT
PROPERLY SECURE.


3. Figure out and help implement some solutions and strategies for solving the problem (Response):

ADVISES NARCOTICS FOR PUNISHMENT AT 17 21 WEST 4000Y. AND INQUIRY ACTIVITY
ADVISES CODE ENFORCEMENT TO COME UP VACANT HOUSE. AND
EXTRA PATROL DURING NIGHT HOURS.

4. Follow-up (Assessment):

CONTINUE TO CHECK PLACES TO AVOID FROM HAPPENING AGAIN.


General Comments/Suggestions:

1.		7-20-2013
	Signature	Date
2.	_____	_____
	Signature	Date

Keep one copy for yourself for follow-up
Submit the other copy to your supervisor

Crime prevention event and citizen input about problems, pg. 1:

11

Pharr Police Department 

Smart Policing Initiative
Problem Oriented Policing Model (POP)
Analysis Report

Name of Officers: 1. C. Hernandez #8853 2. D. Trevino #9147 Lone Patrol Squad Car
 Team Patrol ATV Patrol
 Foot Patrol
 Bicycle

Shift: A Date: 3/5/13

Name the Incident/Situation: Prevention Location: Baker Time: 12p - 2p
Examples: Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Robbery, Burglary, Larceny-Theft, Auto Theft, Domestic Violence, False Alarm, Disorderly Conduct, Physical Disorder (Graffiti, Litter, Etc.)

Persons Involved: Male Female Juvenile Male Juvenile Female Others

Description of the Incident:
Power Point Presentation was made.
Power Point Presentation was done at Middle view heights in
reference to burglary.
Power Point Presentation was done at Sunset Terrace in reference
to Air Soft guns complaints.
Went to remove Air Soft guns from Green Point.
Called the Fire Marshall to help with presentation on Fire Safety.

Time taken to deal with the incident: 8 hrs.
minutes

Strategy followed:

<input type="checkbox"/> Advised and closed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Advised people on how to avoid victimization
<input type="checkbox"/> Issued Warning	<input type="checkbox"/> Observation booth
<input type="checkbox"/> Made Arrest	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other surveillance
<input type="checkbox"/> Asked the person to come to the P.D.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Suggested to start neighborhood group to keep the area clean and under control
<input type="checkbox"/> Involved people in crime prevention groups (watch groups)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Used POP (thought of a situation to stop the incident from reoccurring and applied the idea)
<input type="checkbox"/> Advised people to avoid false alarms	

If POP was used, follow the directions below:

1. State the Problem (Scanning):
Citizens were complaining about children shooting property either
there's or the housing department and/or shooting and stalking other
persons with the Air soft guns.
Citizens stating they needed more information on burglary prevention.

PPD-14
 Approved 09/2012



2. Analyze possible causes of the problem (Analysis):

Parent's lack of educating their children on the safety of using Air Soft guns, and their probability of injuries.


3. Figure out and help implement some solutions and strategies for solving the problem (Response):


I went door to door to invite parents to our power point presentation.

4. Follow-up (Assessment):

Will go back the following week to speak with parents on Air Soft Usage.

General Comments/Suggestions:

1.  Signature 3/5/13 Date

2.  Signature 3-5-2013 Date

Keep one copy for yourself for follow-up
Submit the other copy to your supervisor

APPENDIX C: Domestic Violence Form for SPI:



Pharr Police Department – Smart Policing Initiative
“Additional Report Information”
 Male on Female Domestic Violence- Unofficial Offenders

Call from: West Side East Side Date: _____
 Adam West Adam East
 David Edward
 Frank George
 Other

I. Name of perpetrator: _____ Age: _____

Relationship to Victim:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Living with spouse | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Living with partner |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Separated from spouse | 5. <input type="checkbox"/> Separated from partner |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced from spouse | 6. <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

Number of children: _____ Hers only: _____ His only: _____

Employment: employed unemployed

Occupation: _____

Yearly Household Income:

- under \$10,000
- from \$10,000 to \$19,000
- from \$20,000 to \$39,000
- from \$40,000 to \$69,000
- from \$70,000 to \$99,000
- from \$100,000 to \$149,000
- \$150,000 or above

Residence: own home rent

Current Address & Phone: _____
Address City Phone

Type of Assault: _____ Date: _____ Time: _____

Cause of the conflict: _____

Presence of substance: alcohol Drugs none

Weapon involved during offense: no yes unknown

Number of prior domestic violent incidents against females: _____

II. Name of Victim: _____ Age: _____

Was Victim referred for: Medical Treatment Counseling

Responding Police Officer: _____

Pharr Police Department
 - Confidential Information -