SMART Policing Initiative

April 2014

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SMART POLICING INITIATIVE

INTRODUCTION

In October 2010, the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) received funding from the United States Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) to conduct an intensive, intelligence-led, multi-faceted project utilizing techniques called for in the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI). This initiative combines the power of intelligence-led policing, predictive analysis, and crime prevention with the oversight of community brokers and correctional monitors. The SDPD set out to sever the link between criminal organizations and their prospective members (i.e., convicted offenders and at-risk adolescents) and address the violent crime in one of the more vulnerable sections of the City of San Diego. The goals of these efforts were to address the emerging Somali gang population and to disrupt the East San Diego (ESD) gang, one of the more established gangs in the City of San Diego. As part of this project, SDPD contracted with an experienced crime analyst to increase the intelligence capacity within the agency by focusing specifically on data and information needed to implement the place-based, intelligence-led policing. The SDPD also contracted with the Criminal Justice Research Division of the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) to evaluate the project's implementation and outcomes.

The project design followed a logic-based model that flowed from intelligence and enforcement for violence suppression, to community action and correctional oversight. Specifically, data derived from the SPI crime analyst informed many of the SPI activities, including the targeted patrols and sweeps, the Probation compliance checks and operations, and the identification of ESD members for community intervention. This report provides a summary of this project, including the process, modifications, and outcomes.

SMART POLICING INITIATIVE REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

: Implemented a multi-faceted, intelligence-led policing initiative, including targeted intelligence, correctional supervision, and community intervention

: Conducted 49 data-driven law enforcement operations resulting in 411 field interviews and 75 arrests

: Conducted two HUMINT trainings

: Increased the quality and quantity of intelligence data on ESD and Somali gang activity and members

: Removed 22 leaders in ESD

: Provided intensive wraparound intervention to 13 ESD gang involved youth

PROJECT BACKGROUND

Target Problem Area

San Diego is culturally diverse and the eighth largest city in the nation and second largest in California. Encompassing 342 square miles, the city is surrounded by 50 square miles of bay and is less than 15 miles from the San Ysidro Port of Entry to Mexico, which is the busiest land port of entry in the Western Hemisphere. The City of San Diego is home to more than 1.3 million people, 44 percent of whom are White, 29 percent Hispanic, 16 percent Asian/Pacific Islander, 6 percent Black, and 4 percent all Other race/ethnicities. The Mid-City area is comprised of many neighborhoods and encompasses approximately 16 square miles in the heart of San Diego. This central area is also noted as one of the most ethnically diverse and densely populated areas of the city. With approximately 80,000 residents, it has become home for many immigrants from around the world and more than 70 languages are spoken among its ethnically diverse residents. Mid-City also has a larger proportion of Hispanic (43%) and Black (11%) residents than the region as a whole. Mid-City embodies both the richness provided by new immigrants and refugees,

as well as the vulnerabilities that accompany these newcomers. Specifically, Mid-City residents have a lower median income ($43,493) compared to residents of the City of San Diego overall ($66,652) (Census, 2010). Additionally, the area is plagued by a disproportionate amount of crime. With only 13 percent of the city's population, Mid-City accounts for approximately 25 percent of serious violent assaults.

In addition, approximately 25 percent of the citywide gang assaults take place in this area (SDPD, 2013). Many serious violent assaults are committed by gang members paying "taxes" to the Mexican Mafia. The Mexican Mafia has a structured hierarchy with "made members," or "carnales," who have vast control inside California's prisons. The Mexican Mafia relies heavily on the comrades (cousins) to control drug trafficking on the streets and pay tribute or taxes to the Mafia members and their families. This gang controls extortion, robbery, drug trafficking, kidnappings, and violent assaults in East San Diego, in which Mid-City is located. They have at their disposal an army of more than 700 documented gang members from multiple gangs operating in East San Diego who commit crimes at their behest. Exacerbating the situation are the Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (MDTOs), which operate with impunity in Mexico and are now attempting to establish a "plaza," an open drug market where drug dealings would become the norm in the Mid-City area. MDTO figures regularly recruit local gang members under the supervision of the Mexican Mafia to commit acts of violence such as murder, kidnapping, high level drug trafficking, alien smuggling, extortion, and robbery (SDPD, 2013). The Mexican Mafia is a primary driver in fostering the relationship between the MDTOs and San Diego gang members and is one of three target populations for this project.

FIGURE 1
San Diego SPI Target Populations

SOURCE: SDPD 2013

East San Diego (ESD) is the local gang that serves as a primary source for recruitment by the Mexican Mafia. ESD is one of the oldest and more established gangs in the City of San Diego and was a second target population for the project.

SOURCE: http://619gangs.blogspot.com/2013

Recognized as a gang since 1977, ESD had 251 documented members at the beginning of this project, with 9 out of 10 being Hispanic and male (94% each) and the average age of members being 24 years old (SDPD, 2012). It is because of this connection as a recruitment source that ESD was also a target for both the suppression and intervention strategies.

The third target population was the emerging Somali gangs, and especially Mission Clic, which have been suspected of having links to Al Shabaab, a terrorist organization designated by the United States Department of State. At the beginning of the grant period, minimal quantitative data were available on Somali gangs and anecdotally, it was believed that young Somali men from the United States had flown to Somalia under the leadership of Al Shabaab to fight for Islamic jihad movements. Some of the fighters have been recruited from the ranks of the

Somali immigrants here in San Diego. This possible connection with terrorist organizations, along with the dearth of intelligence on Mission Clic, made this group a natural target for SPI.

SPI STRATEGIES/PROGRAM DESIGN

What key SPI strategies were employed?

The SPI used a multi-faceted approach to combat the growing street gang issue in the Mid-City area of San Diego. The main focus entailed targeted intelligence to inform violence suppression, correctional oversight to hold accountable ESD members on Probation and/or Parole, and taking community action by providing intervention services to high-risk youth. All efforts were driven by Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and interagency and community collaboration.

SOURCE: San Diego County Probation Compliance Check Operation, 2012.

Targeted Intelligence

Prior to any action, the SPI grant set out to gather as much information on the primary target gangs: ESD and Mission Clic. While the Mexican Mafia was also one of the targets, SDPD chose instead to concentrate on the two local street gangs to gather information on the infamous prison gang.

The goal of the target intelligence prong of the project was to utilize ILP to obtain the following outcomes:

- Increase the quantity and quality of the intelligence on Somali gangs

- Debrief five Somali and five ESD sources

- Reduce violent crime by ESD members in the target area

- Arrest and convict key leaders in ESD and Somali gangs

The specific ILP strategies to obtain these outcomes included analyses of data to identify the most criminally active ESD members, spatial analysis of residency and crime incidents, and intelligence gathered from informants. This information was then used to drive Probation and Parole searches, inform surgical enforcement operations, and conduct saturated patrols.

These data analyses were supported by two intelligence capacity building efforts: the enhancement of the Police Department Database Intelligence System (PDIS) and the provision of two Human Intelligence Trainings (HUMINT) for officers to improve the quality and quantity of intelligence gathered from informants.

Correctional Supervision

A secondary approach of SPI was the partnership with San Diego County Probation and State Parole to increase the supervision and oversight of ESD members and also identify ESD youth for Call-Ins (detailed in community section) in order to offer support to leave the gang. The outcomes for this facet of the grant were:

- Arrest of ESD members who were in violation of Probation or Parole

- ILP operations targeting ESD members

- Referral of ESD members seeking to leave the gang to community-based services

Probation was the lead in implementing the strategy to accomplish these outcomes and created operation plans for targeted enforcement. This effort was accomplished by analyzing both the arrest and conviction data for the prior three years (2008, 2009, and 2010) of all known ESD members, which was provided by the SPI crime analyst.

Community Support: Call-In Intervention Program

Rounding out the multi-pronged approach to gang violence reduction was the community outreach and collaboration. The purpose of this component was to engage gang members, who showed a desire to leave the gang life, and give them the opportunity to do so by offering community support. Research has shown that most gang members eventually leave the gang and the crucial period of intervention is when they have grown tired of the lifestyle.[1] The desired outcomes of the community effort were:

- Utilize ILP to identify ESD and Somali youth[2] gang members (10 each) and invite them to two Call-In meetings

- Reduce the involved youth's criminal activity and gang involvement

The specific strategy to accomplish these outcomes was based on the success of the Boston Ceasefire model, which enlists the help of the community to hold gang members accountable and offer them support in their neighborhood. For SPI, the community intervention was centered in a church located in the neighborhood (New Harvest Church). The Pastor of the church was an ex-gang member and was passionate about helping the neighborhood youth avoid or leave the local gangs. With the church as the lead, a four-phase wraparound program targeting youth involved in the ESD gang was implemented (Figure 2). From engagement to transition, the program worked with 13 gang-involved youth for over seven months to aid them in transitioning out of the gang lifestyle. The process began when selected participants were notified by

their Probation Officer to report to a "Call-In" as part of their conditions of probation. Call-Ins were held at the SDPD's Mid-City Division community room and included all partners (SDPD, Probation, the District Attorney, Price Charities, and the Pastor and mentors from New Harvest Church). The unified message sent during the Call-In was that the youth were cared about, were part of a community that had supports to offer, and that their gang lifestyle would not be tolerated.

At the Call-In, mentors, who were ex-gang members themselves, were recruited and met with the participant and his family to discuss goals and create a transition plan to leave the gang. From this initial meeting, the mentor met almost weekly with the participant to support the youth in achieving his goals. Upon completion of the seven-month program, a graduation ceremony was held to celebrate the successful participants. Although the formal program ended, the participants continued to have access to both the pastor and the mentor for ongoing support.

FIGURE 2
### Call-In Intervention Program Timeline

Engagement
- Establish program model
- Recruit mentors
- Meet with Probation

Planning
- Call-in meeting
- Family, youth, and mentor create goal plan

Implementation
- Bi-weekly meetings with particpant and mentor
- Weekly spirtual meetings (optional)
- Enrichment activities

Transition
- Obtained educational or employment goals
- Graduation
- Continued contact with participant as needed

SOURCE: Fred Finch Youth Center.

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[1] Pyrooz, C. & Decker, S. (2011). Motives and Methods for Leaving the Gang: Understanding the Process of Gang Desistance. *Journal of Criminal Justice 39,* 417-425.

[2] There was no community group prepared to provide the mentoring and call-in services for Somali youth associated with or documented as gang members. No organization had the capacity, experience, or funding to support a Call-In gang intervention program of this nature. The few social service organizations able to provide services to the East African community focus primarily on health, education, wellness, and language.

DATA AND INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND IMPACT OUTCOMES

How was data intelligence improved and developed as a result of SPI?

As noted earlier, SPI employed two ILP strategies to achieve its goals. One approach was to build the intelligence gathering capacity to obtain more and better information from human subjects through trainings and also improve the data management of this information. To increase the quality and quantity of intelligence within local law enforcement, the SDPD (using SPI grant funds) sponsored two HUMINT trainings, which were held in October and November 2011. The classes were taught by a former CIA agent and covered concepts of intelligence collection, management, analysis, and distribution. A total of 32 SDPD sworn officers attended the two trainings, and of these, just over half (17) completed an on-line follow-up survey regarding their perceptions of the training and how they implemented what they learned. The results of the survey show that of these 17 officers, the majority (82%) felt the training was useful to their work, with about half (53%) instituting some level of change in how they handled their informants after completing the training. When asked how much more effective they felt they were in gathering more and better quality intelligence from informants, as well as surveillance detection post-training, the majority (65% to 77%) noted an increase in their effectiveness (Figure 3).

FIGURE 3
Trainees Reported a Higher Level of Effectiveness in Intelligence Gathering Following HUMINT


SOURCE: SANDAG, HUMINT CLASS SURVEY 2013.

"HUMINT has made me more effective in recognizing agents, better prepared to broaden the intel gathering process, and less likely to overlook smaller details."
– HUMINT Participant

The second approach to building intelligence gathering capacity was to enhance the PDIS, which is the SDPD'S criminal intelligence database, developed under a different BJA grant, for quality control and to track intelligence gathering information. PDIS is an interactive database available to SDPD officers to both enter and access sensitive intelligence. The information is not limited to gangs and can be used to gather information on other types of criminal activity and complaints. A key component of the SPI model was the gathering of information on the target populations by recruiting ten new confidential informants. The goal was to identify five key leaders, or influencers, from the Somali community and five from the Mexican Mafia and/or ESD, and debrief them for information. The information gathered during these debriefings was entered into PDIS and then reviewed and "approved" or "rejected" based on credibility. SPI funds were used to upgrade the system by contracting with a computer programmer to make the system more efficient and effective. In addition, the grant provided the resources to expand the capacity of PDIS to all SDPD officers.

In 2010, the year prior to SPI, there were 583 new entries into PDIS and 17 modifications (i.e., updating existing entries with new information), of which almost all were approved (593). In 2011, during the first year of SPI implementation and intelligence gathering, there was an increase in entries to 715 and 41 modifications, with all but 28 being approved. In 2012, these numbers decreased to below pre-SPI levels (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4
Intelligence Gathering Increased During First Year of SPI

Prior to SPI   During SPI

800
700
600 583
500 593
400
300
200 278
100 17   41   95   7
  0
      Prior (2010)   2011   2012

715
94

——— New   - - - Modified   -·-·- Approved

SOURCE: SDPD PDIS Database (2013)

Anecdotal feedback from supervising police officers after the HUMINT trainings and PDIS enhancements indicated that the length of intelligence reports increased by more than 50 percent and the security level of the entries also increased, with a rise of most being restricted/open source to sensitive/secret. The actual outcomes of this intelligence gathering are discussed later in this report.

How were these data gathering and intelligence improvements integrated into the department?

The improved intelligence gathering during the grant period was instrumental in informing both the crime analyst's work and in developing data-driven law enforcement operations plans. More specifically, the intelligence was combined with spatial analysis conducted by the SPI crime analyst, information gathered through relationships created with the Somali community, as well as the information received from Probation's Gang Suppression Unit (GSU) to inform a variety of suppression operations. A total of 23 operations were conducted from May 2011 to October 2013 and involved saturation of hot spot areas, parolee and probationer sweeps, buy and walks, and fourth waiver searches of ESD members.

Many of the enforcement operations targeted corridors and main thoroughfares that were known to be the main avenues of transportation used by gang members to circulate throughout the neighborhoods of Mid-City. Informational sources, observations, training, and information provided by experienced officers lead to traffic and pedestrian stops of known ESD and Mission Clique gang members. Officers would make contact with these individuals that would lead to Consensual Encounters, Field Interviews, Compliance Checks, Detentions, or Arrests. From the period of October 1, 2013, to December 3, 2013, SDPD conducted over 60 of these saturated patrol missions.

An example of one of these enforcement stops involved an attempted traffic stop that turned into a vehicle pursuit. A passenger was arrested for a parole violation for possessing a concealed weapon. The suspect went to trial, was convicted, and sentenced to 44 months in prison. In addition, a passenger in the vehicle along with a cell phone that was seized at the same time provided information that resulted in the subsequent seizure of narcotics, a handgun, and arrest of an ESD gang member who was on probation.

In addition to the stops, saturation patrol was a policing tactic used to show a strong force of police presence in a targeted area. During this project, officers frequently identified hot spots using their own intelligence and analysis from SDPD's crime analysis as a prevention and intervention method to stop gang activity before it occurred. This approach was used on a number of occasions and reduced the number of violent gang activity during that time period. For example, in February 2014 a planned operation targeting a hot spot for gang activity at a local restaurant yielded 33 field interviews and an arrest for possession of Grabba. The operation occurred during a specific day and time period revealed from analyzing crime data. As a result of these patrols, the gang unit learned from sources that many gang members were "lyinglow' because of enhanced police presence.

An example of the impact of one of these saturated patrols was officers flooding an area known for ESD gang activity, when an ESD gang member, who was currently on parole, was sighted. The officers attempted to contact the individual but he fled the scene. During the foot pursuit, the individual dropped

a .22 caliber handgun. The suspect was caught and charged for possession of a handgun and a parole violation. The handgun was processed for fingerprints and determined to have been used in many past crimes. The Crime Laboratory revealed the handgun was used in a shooting and the fingerprints found on the handgun belonged to the individual arrested who was the suspect in an attempted murder of another ESD gang member. As a result of this action the individual was also charged with attempted murder.

SPI also funded Probation operations that focused on ESD members under the Gang Suppression Unit supervision. From the period of August 2012 through August 2013, Probation conducted 26 such operations. The quantifiable results of all these operations were 411 field contacts, 75 arrests of ESD and Somali gang members or associates, and 6 firearm seizures (Figure 5).

SPI STRATEGIES EMPLOYED TO REDUCE ESD AND SOMALI GANG ACTIVITIES

➤ *Specialized training on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) data gathering;*

➤ *Identification and targeting of the most criminally active ESD members;*

➤ *Saturation and targeted patrol sweeps in ESD hot spots;*

➤ *Debriefing of ESD and Somali gang members;*

➤ *Deployment of proactive enforcement of three criminally active businesses in Somali community;*

➤ *Education of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) strategies to deter crime in Somali hot spot areas; and*

➤ *Active police presence in Somali community to gain trust, gather information, and support gang reduction activities.*

FIGURE 5
Outcomes of ESD Suppression Operations

SOURCE: SDPD Operation Logs, 2013

The arrests of Mission Clic associates was especially damaging to the Somali gangs, as those not arrested fled the San Diego County. Between the arrests and the departure of gang member to other states, the known associates of Mission Clic declined from 107 to 30 over the course of the grant.

While arrests are easy to measure, the long-term implications of these operations can be hard to quantify. An equally important outcome of the operations was the collection of valuable intelligence on gang members, potential criminal activity, and information on open crime cases. This type of information is necessary to build cases against those gang members higher up in the organization and/or discover intelligence on more serious crimes. The following are examples of the types of intelligence that were gathered either during the operations or during debriefings with informants but did not result in an immediate arrest (and were available for public release).[3]

➤ **Removal Of ESD Gang Members From The Streets:** During the grant period, 22 ESD "shot callers" and leaders were arrested, which disrupted the organization of the gang.

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[3] It was challenging to measure the entire breadth and impact of the ILP because of the sensitive nature of some of the intelligence, which was limited to individuals with a certain level of security clearance and need to know access and therefore not available for the evaluation.

- **Disrupted the organization of ESD:** There were 251 documented ESD gang members at the start of the project, which was reduced to 233 by the end. The analytical information gathered by officers was used to target the key leaders and shot callers. Once these individuals were arrested, the leadership structure was fractured and dismantled. This disruption in the organization resulted in a disconnect and/or a delay in communication between the ESD "street soldiers" and ESD leadership that were incarcerated.

- **Dismantled Link between Mexican Mafia and Street Gang:** New information on mail contraband linked an ESD member to a prisoner affiliated with the Mexican Mafia at Pelican Bay State Prison, thereby exposing a communication channel between the prison gang and the local street gang.

- **Increased Intelligence on Shot Callers Inside Prison:** Intelligence was gathered demonstrating that the Mexican Mafia is exerting influence from prison by sending orders to local gangs, including Diego Aztecs and ESD.

- **New Information to Open Crime Cases:** Information was gathered on an ESD member who was in possession of a revolver that had been used in a homicide.

- **Disruption of Narcotics Transportation**: A suspect was apprehended while trying to smuggle two bundles of heroin into a County jail. The suspect was arrested and 12 other individuals were detained who were with the suspect.

- **New Information About Narcotics Smuggling:** Between October 2011 and June 2013, confidential information was gathered on Khat[4] being smuggled in and human trafficking by East African men. Police garnered information about the establishment of a Khat drug network which smuggles Khat into the United States and disseminates the drug to the Somali communities. The shipments of drugs were flown to San Diego from overseas. In May 2012, 27 Somalis were arrested for the possession, sales, and transportation of a controlled substance (i.e., Khat). These arrests and drug seizures drove the cost of the drug up from $40 to $90 a bundle.

- **Dismantled a Narcotics and Prostitution Ring Run in an Apartment Complex in the Somali Community:** As a result of multiple surveillance and intelligence gathering operations, Mission Clic gang members were found to be using a gang member's mother's apartment to sell narcotics and engage in prostitution. The operations led to the eviction of the family and also the identification of a gang member suspected of a kidnapping in another case. During the four-month period after the SPI operations, SDPD experienced a decrease in radio calls (23 to 6) and out of service hours[5] (185 to 277) to the apartments compared to the four-month period prior to the arrests and eviction.

- **Intelligence on Local Links to Terrorist Organizations:** Photo documentation was obtained during a search that demonstrates a link between terrorist organizations and a local street gang.

- **Discovery of Narcotics Transportation through the United States Postal System:** Working in cooperation with the San Diego Narcotics Task Force, SDPD exposed and dismantled an international drug ring that was shipping Khat and Grabba through the mail to New York, Los Angeles, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.

While ESD has established roots in San Diego, the Somali gangs are still relatively new to the area, and therefore, SPI activities focused more on intelligence gathering than conducting operations. In fact, prior to SPI, there were no documented Mission Clic gang members (the largest Somali gang in San Diego), no confidential informants, and weak relationships between police and the Somali community. During

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[4] Khat is a plant native to East Africa and has been deemed a controlled substance in the United States. Khat permeates Somali communities across the nation and gang members are smuggling and transporting the drug in the United States.

[5] Out of service time is the amount of time officers spend on an incident or radio call. A strategy to address hot spots is to research the amount of out of service time officers spend at a problematic location

the period of October 2011 to June 2013, there were over 40 targeted intelligence gathering and Somali focused activities that successfully built a database of information and contacts. These activities resulted in the following outcomes:

➢ Six new Somali sources identified and used to obtain information on narcotics, gang jargon, current trends, pimping/prostitution, and other criminal activity

➢ Twenty-one new Somali gang members documented in CalGang® and over 100 associates identified

➢ Nineteen arrests of Somali gang members, including three on kidnapping charges, three for robbery, and thress for a double homicide

➢ Two operations in hot spot areas to monitor illegal activity

➢ The seizure of over 60 shipments of Khat and Grabba, totaling 2,586 kilograms

➢ Twenty-seven subjects residing in San Diego from the Somali community were prosecuted for illegal sales and transportation of drugs

Other tactics included greater involvement by SDPD in the Somali community to establish relationships with Somali business owners and residents, monitoring new Somali gang associates, debriefing with the FBI on Somali gang-related narcotics trafficking, and conducting Somali cultural and gang training to squad officers in the target areas. These efforts were a direct outcome of the detectives working closely with the SDPD's Multi-Cultural Storefront and Community Relations Officers to understand the make-up of the Somali community, identify community problems, and take the time to meet with leaders. These steps helped reduce the community's defenses towards law enforcement by building trusting and working relationships. Detectives regularly met with community members, formally and informally, to discuss crime issues that were directly impacting the families in the community. The trust between the detectives and the community led to the flow of intelligence.

All told, these efforts led to the identification of three hookah lounges where Somali gang members

congregated and illegal activity occurred (e.g., felony assaults, drug activity), the discovery of Khat shipments from East Africa to the United States, and the uncovering of a grocery store burglary ring that led to several arrests.

The building of relationships between the police and Somali business and community members was a particular success. Working directly with the individual owners of the hookah lounges, the officer assigned to SPI met frequently with each owner to educate them on ways to deter crime using common environmental steps (e.g., lighting, landscaping), conducted proactive policing details around the hookah lounges, and identified and paid five informants to obtain information on Mission Clic gang activity. One example of the success of these efforts was the overall decrease in calls for service to SDPD around the two lounges (i.e., "hotspot1" and "hotspot2"), which decreased from 83 and 100 prior to the grant to 57 each by the end of the grant (September 1, 2012, to August 31, 2013) (Figure 6).

FIGURE 6
Calls for Service Decreased Surrounding Hotspots During SPI Interventions

SOURCE: SDPD GANG UNIT, 2013

Additional information gathered through intelligence increased law enforcements knowledge about how the East African gangs operate. For example, two particular street corners were identified as the Somali gang's primary territory where they hang out and also do business. Besides the activities in the hookah lounges, Somali gang members were found to emulate their American counterparts by engaging in both drug sales and prostitution. However unlike the other local gangs, law enforcement believe that the profits from these illegal activities are being sent overseas to fund terrorism, specifically Al Shabaab.

Increased intelligence also revealed three East African gang sets living and operating in the Mid-City area. Mission Clic, as noted earlier was the dominant gang with the most members, followed by African Mafia Crips (8), and Holy Blood (4). Along with the significant disruption of the Mission Clic, the African Mafia Crips was completely dismantled and there was only one remaining Holy Blood member left at the end of the project.

How did officers working on SPI think the project impacted intelligence gathering and violence in the target area?

In an effort to hear directly from those officers who implemented SPI regarding any successes and challenges of the grant, SANDAG distributed a survey to all involved throughout the grant. A sample of convenience was utilized, with 14 of 18 returning the survey that was distributed in March 2013. The survey inquired about changes in the quantity and quality of intelligence gathered on both ESD and Somali gangs, the usefulness of the SPI crime analyst, and the relationship between SDPD and the community.

In regard to intelligence gathering, the respondents echoed what was evident in the analyses of the operation data. That is, the majority of respondents did note some level of improvement for both gangs as a result of SPI. All respondents reported improvement in the quantity (14% "significant" and 86% "somewhat") and quality (36% "significant" and 64% "somewhat") of ESD related information, which was slightly different than the Somali intelligence. Specifically, a larger proportion reported significant improvement on the quantity (36% and 50%) but also reported no change at all (14% each) (Figure 7).

Total = 14

SOURCE: SANDAG; SMART PROJECT END SURVEY, 2013

Respondents were also asked about any changes in information sharing between SDPD and other law enforcement partners with respondents varying in their opinion about the level of improvement. Over three-quarters reported improvement, either "significantly" (36%) or "somewhat" (43%), and one in five (21%) did not think there was any improvement (Figure 8).

FIGURE 8
Officers Reported Improvement in Information Sharing Among Law Enforcement Partners

Total = 14

SOURCE: SANDAG; SMART PROJECT END SURVEY, 2013

For those who noted improvement (n=11), when asked to elaborate on the type of improvement, most reported better collaboration (8), followed by more frequent interactions with other officers and departments (5) and increased sharing of vital information (4). Examples of some of the noted improvements are listed below:

➢ *"All agencies are holding monthly intelligence meetings to share ESD and Somali information and plan to work together to effectively combat the gang sets."*

➢ *"SDPD consistently meets with outside agencies to educate and share current trends with Somali gangs. One thing that has helped is outside agencies know who to call for info and currently take advantage of that."*

All of the respondents also reported improved information sharing within the different units of SDPD (50% "significant" and 50% "somewhat") (not shown). Specifically, half (50%) reported better collaboration between units, followed by better intelligence sharing (28%), more frequent sharing (21%), and better quality of information (14%).

➢ *"Through the grant process the gang unit has conducted line up training, worked to inform terrorism liaison officers, and [taught] training on how SDPD works to members of the Somali community. This has led to more open communication and info sharing in our department."*

➢ *"The quality of information has allowed patrol to focus more on the specific locations and managers to adjust to hot spots."*

A key component to improving the quantity and quality of intelligence was to learn more about the community and improve law enforcement relations in

the target community. As outlined in this report, these efforts included the partnering with the New Harvest Church to provide the intervention to gang affected youth and also reaching out to the community to educate them about the gang activity and how they could protect their businesses. Overall, respondents reported improved relations in the target community as a result of SPI, with half (50%) noting "significant" improvement and around one-third (36%) noticing "some" improvement. When asked how relations have improved, the responses could be grouped into two categories: community members showing increased level of comfort, and increased collaboration and communication between law enforcement and the community. The following respondent comments reflect these two themes.

➢ *"Community meetings have increased and attendees for these meetings have gone up. The presence of increased officers in target areas has allowed citizens to feel more comfortable in calling in gang activity."*

➢ *"The members' families were more trusting of law enforcement, the advocacy groups were positive about relations with law enforcement."*

➢ *"The agencies involved have built a working relationship with the CBOs and will continue working after the grant is over."*

When asked overall how SPI efforts addressed both ESD and Somali gang-related crime, the responses varied between the two target groups. Specifically, respondents reported a greater degree of improvement in addressing ESD gang-related crime activity than Somali gang activity. This was expected given the lengthy history of ESD in the area and the pre-existing intelligence on the gang. To address the Somali gang-related crime, SDPD had to first improve the intelligence gathering on the gangs and this is reflected in the comments of survey respondents. When asked how intelligence was improved, the most common answer for ESD was having an increased focus, which included better documentation; whereas obtaining better intelligence and improving community relations were the primary answers for the Somali target.

FIGURE 9
Top Reasons How SPI Improved Efforts to Address ESD and Somali Gang Crime

ESD (n=11)
- 60% - Increased focus on ESD gang activity
- 29%- Better information sharing
- 29% - Call-In Support

Somali (n=10)
- 60% - Better intelligence
- 50% - Improved community relations
- 30% - Increased focus on Somali gangs

NOTE: Percentages are based on multiple responses.
SOURCE: SANDAG; SMART PROJECT END SURVEY, 2013

Given the pivotal role the crime analyst was designed to have in the SPI project, officers were asked how they felt the crime analyst was used and to what degree she informed and guided the interventions. The responses indicated that the analyst role could have been better utilized. The majority of respondents reported that the analyst only "somewhat" informed (71%) and/or was used (64%) to the greatest degree (Figure 10). Specific respondent comments suggest that having a better understanding of the analyst role and increased integration into the project could have increased the effectiveness of the analyst.

FIGURE 10
Respondents Felt the SPI Crime Analyst was Underutilized

■ Informed SPI Interventions ■ Utilized to greatest degree

Total = 14

SOURCE: SANDAG; SMART PROJECT END SURVEY, 2013

> *The Analyst provided new ideas to improve efficiency but met resistance.*

> *A better understanding of what the analyst can do and reach out for more information. I felt we were not proactive enough in using her skills. She provided what she thought we needed, but we failed to ask for what we wanted.*

Ultimately, SPI experienced both successes and challenges. The successes noted by respondents were in alignment with the outcomes of the project. The majority of respondents reported the greatest success to be the use of intelligence to better target gangs, to be proactive, and to make arrests of key leaders (64%), followed by identifying and offering interventions to ESD youth who wanted help (43%), and increasing the collaboration in the community and within the agency (29% each). They also mentioned the increased staff and the ability to recruit informants (21%) (Table 1).

TABLE 1
Successful Outcomes of SPI

Greatest Successes	
Use of intelligence to guide law enforcement	64%
Intervention for ESD youth	43%
Improved community collaboration	29%
Improved interagency collaboration	29%
Recruitment of confidential informants	21%
Increased staffing of the gang unit	21%
TOTAL	**14**

SOURCE: SANDAG; SMART PROJECT END SURVEY, 2013

Respondents also mentioned challenges encountered when implementing the grant. The top challenge had nothing to do with the design but was administrative in nature (42%). Dealing with bureaucratic systems to get contracts in place, the additional paperwork, and just managing the grant was frustrating and significantly delayed the startup of the project. Other challenges were convincing ESD youth to choose different options, staff turnover, and meeting what some saw as unrealistic goals (17% each). Overcoming the cultural barrier with the Somali

community was also noted as a challenge by one respondent (not shown).

COMMUNITY OUTREACH AND COLLABORATION

How many community members participated in the Call-Ins, and who were these participants?

The third component of SPI was the collaboration with the community to intervene with vulnerable youth in an effort to assist them in leaving the gang lifestyle. To accomplish this goal, SDPD partnered with a local faith-based, non-profit (New Harvest Christian Church) to lead the Call-Ins and provide the wrap-around services based on the Boston Ceasefire model. Located in the heart of the ESD territory, the church's pastor was well aware of the damage gangs inflicted on the neighborhood. More importantly, the pastor knew the families of these youth, the challenges they faced, and like them, had once been a gang member in the neighborhood. The pastor's connection to the community and the gang lifestyle was fundamental in his ability to establish trust and legitimacy with gang members attending the Call-Ins. To this end, all the volunteer mentors were ex-gang members from the neighborhood.

With the assistance of SANDAG staff, Probation's GSU identified ten ESD gang-involved youth and required them to attend the initial Call-In meeting on February 2, 2012. The youth were all Hispanic males and ranged in age from 15 to 18 years. Each youth had a criminal history, with an average of three arrests (avg. = 3.08, SD = 2.1), two bookings (avg. = 1.85, SD = 1.82) and 98 days incarcerated (SD = 139). At the Call-In, a gang questionnaire was given to each attendee to assess their level of gang involvement. Although all youth were under GSU supervision, only half reported current (4) or past (1) gang membership, and the other half either hung out with gangs currently (4) or in the past (1). In addition, eight youth noted that they were documented by law enforcement as a gang member but only half reported that they were supervised by GSU (not shown). This contrast between law enforcement's understanding and treatment of the youth (e.g., placing them in GSU) and the youth's

own perception of their gang involvement is a disconnect that is worth exploring when working with youth who are perceived to be gang involved, as it could be valuable in establishing trust with them, as well as understanding the youth's needs.

On average, these youth first started associating with the gang at age 11, had hung out with the gang for 3.5 years before joining, and had been a part of the gang for over three years at the time of the survey (avg. 40.3 months). Almost all youth (9) cited protection from other gangs, coercion, status, or peers as reasons for becoming involved in the gang. However, the majority (7) did not feel that it was important to be involved or hang out with a gang and also noted that they would eventually stop their involvement with the gang (7). Furthermore, all but one thought their parents were very much against them being involved in gangs (not shown). This information supports the notion that most gang-involved individuals will come to a point in their life when they are ready to seek out a different lifestyle. It is at this juncture that interventions are most likely to be received by an individual.

It was at this initial Call-In meeting that the youth was teamed with one of the ten mentors who met him and his family and created a goal plan to transition out of the gang lifestyle. Of these original 10 youth, 9 continued in the program and 4 others were later referred to the program by other participants, for a total of 13.

What were the outcomes of the Call-In intervention program?

During the seven-month program between February 1, and August 31, 2012, youth had frequent contact with their mentors and also attended a variety of enrichment activities. Participants were invited to attend bi-weekly group meetings, weekly spiritual meetings, and events such as baseball games, tattoo removal, camp-outs, and other recreational activities. Table 2 summarizes the type and frequency of these contacts, with youth having on average 15 face-to-face contacts and 11 phone call contacts over the course of the seven-month period.

TABLE 2
Participants Had Frequent Contact with Mentors

Activity	Average Number of Contacts
Phone calls	11 (range 5 to 16)
Face-to-face	15 (range 4 to 29)
Total Contacts	26 (range 13 to 45)
TOTAL PARTICIPANTS	**13**

SOURCE: Program Mentors, 2013.

Success was measured by whether youth completed their court orders, with seven of the ten successfully graduating from the program (not shown). Another measure of success was documenting any change in the participant's involvement in the justice system by comparing the 18-months prior to involvement in the program to activity during the program, and 6- and 12-months post program participation. In an effort to place the outcomes in the context of other criminally gang-involved youth, a comparison group was selected for inclusion in the analysis. Research staff met with the Probation GSU Supervisor to select other youth on GSU who had similar characteristics but were not ESD members or associates. In addition to all members of this group being Hispanic males, they were matched on age, with both groups being, on average, 16 years old and in 11th grade. Efforts were made to identify comparison youth with similar criminal involvement, however, the small numbers

greatly reduced the possibility of an exact match. Of a sampling pool of 32, 19 youth were selected with the most similar type of criminal justice involvement as the Call-In group (Table 3).

TABLE 3
Characteristics of Comparison and Call-In Participants

Demographics	Comparison	Participant
Average	16.75 (14-18)	16.40 (15-18)
Grade	11.33 (9-12)	11.20 (10-12)
Criminal History (Past 18 months)		
#Arrests	17	12
True Finding	11	8
Felony	8	4
Misdemeanor	2	4
Violent	4	4
Property	4	2
Other Felony	0	1
Other Misdemeanor	2	1
TOTAL	**19**	**13**

SOURCE: SANDAG, Probation Case Management System, 2013

The analysis is limited not only by the small sample size but also by the lack of a more rigorous sample selection design. Given these limitations when viewing the data, although a similar proportion of both groups were arrested during the program period, fewer treatment youth were convicted of a new crime compared to the comparison group (15% versus 32%). However, more treatment youth were arrested in the 12 months following program participation compared to comparison youth (69% versus 47%) with a similar proportion convicted 6- and 12-months following the program (23% versus 21%) (Figure 11).

FIGURE 11

Criminal History of Gang-Involved Youth

SOURCE: SANDAG, Probation Case Management System, 2013

Finally, in an effort to garner feedback from participants about their experience, a satisfaction questionnaire was given to the youth upon program exit. Of the 13 youth who signed up for the program, 10 completed the questionnaire. Because six of these respondents had completed the program, the responses are possibly biased toward those successfully finishing the program. All of the respondents said they would recommend the program to a friend in a similar situation, thought the program showed them other things to do instead of gang activities, and felt that they were less involved with gangs since being involved in the program. For the most part, respondents reported having a supportive relationship with their mentor and making improvements in school as a result of being in the program. Five of the six youth also thought the Call-Ins and meetings with their mentors helped them create goals (not shown).

However, responses indicated room for improvement in the program, most notably in providing more help to youth to navigate away from gang or criminal activity and offering greater assistance in mending family relationships (Tables 4 and 5).

TABLE 4
Participants Felt Supported By Their Mentors

My mentor…	# of Respondents
Cared About my Progress	6
Helped Increase my Self-confidence	5
Had a Good Connection with Me	5
Understood Me	4
Helped Me Resist Gang/Criminal Activity	4
Was Someone I Could Talk with When Tempted to Participate in Gang/Criminal Acts	3
TOTAL	**5 – 6**

NOTE: Cases with missing information are not included.
SOURCE: SANDAG Call-In Satisfaction Survey, 2013

TABLE 5
Participants Reported Improved School Behavior

Since participating in the program my…	# of Respondents
School Attendance Improved	4
School Grades Improved	4
Relationship with My Family Improved	1
TOTAL	**6**

NOTE: Cases with missing information not included.
SOURCE: SANDAG Call-In Satisfaction Survey, 2013

Seven youth responded to the question asking what they liked best about the program, and their answers clearly reflected the importance of relationships and having a positive place to go.

➢ *The mentors understand and help us a lot through good and bad times… I will keep on coming even after I graduate from it (program) and become a mentor myself.*

➢ *That we get together to do positive stuff and productive things. And also because we hang out together or go fishing or go out to eat somewhere instead of gangbanging.*

➢ *That it helps us out by getting our life on the right path.*

When asked if there was anything they would change about the program, two youth cited the need to fund the program (not shown).

SPI Graduation 2013

SOURCE: SANDAG 2013.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

What was the role of the evaluation partner and how was the evaluation undertaken?

As noted earlier in this report, the roles of crime analyst and evaluator were kept distinct for the purposes of this project. A well-known and trusted analyst, with knowledge of San Diego crime trends, was contracted by SDPD to provide the analysis to drive the intelligence-led policing. In addition to mapping the ESD crime hot spots, which were used for saturated and target patrols, the analyst provided demographic and residential mapping information on known ESD members and affiliates, provided crime data in the target areas, analyzed the most criminally active ESD members, and identified ESD parolee and probationers for the fourth waiver searches. The majority of this information was used to inform the surgical enforcement; however, the analyst also monitored any changes in crime over time.

To assist in documenting accomplishments and challenges over the course of the project, SDPD contracted with the SANDAG Criminal Justice Research Division. SANDAG conducted a process and impact evaluation to determine how intelligence information was used to identify and target efforts, document what efforts were conducted, and

measure the outcomes possibly associated with these efforts. To accomplish this evaluation plan, SANDAG employed multiple data collection methods, which are outlined below.

Data Collection

Meeting Minutes: Research staff attended meetings with SPI partners (i.e., SDPD, crime analyst, Probation, and New Harvest Church) to document the progress and challenges of implementing the grant. Because of the sensitive nature of the data, research staff was excluded from many of the details and planning of the top security operations.

HUMINT Survey: To capture participants' perceptions of the training, its usefulness, and how the information was utilized, SANDAG created an electronic survey that was sent via email to all participants four to five months following the training (i.e., March 2012). This measure was not part of the original evaluation plan, but added in an effort to garner more information about the project.

Operations Data: SANDAG staff gathered outcomes of all operations conducted by both Probation and SDPD to summarize the breadth and impact of SPI targeted intelligence.

Intelligence Data: Because of the sensitive nature of the data, SANDAG was not given access to the actual PDIS entries; however, the total number of entries was shared allowing SANDAG to compare to prior years and document any changes over time. SDPD also provided updates on quality of entries during project meetings.

After Action Reports: Available after action reports were reviewed by SANDAG staff to document the number of arrests, field contacts, types of intelligence gathered, and the number of informants debriefed.

Crime Data: The number of ESD crime suspects and victims were documented one year prior (2010) to and during SPI to measure any changes. In addition, violent crime in the target area was compared to violent crime in San Diego City as a whole during this same time period to measure any change in the proportion of crime attributed to ESD.

Practices and Policy Changes: A new policy was developed on the procedures for inputting information into the PDIS system. These changes were made to increase the efficiency of the system.

Call-In Participants: The number and characteristics of Call-In participants were documented by program staff using an intake form designed by SANDAG. Data included basic demographics and gang involvement.

Criminal History of Call-In Participants: To measure change over time and compare criminal activity to similar gang-involved youth, arrests, true findings/convictions, and days incarcerated were gathered for the 18 months prior to the Call-Ins and 6- and 12- months following participation. These data were also gathered for a matched comparison group of youth.

Call-In Intervention Data: To document the interventions received, research staff created an Excel treatment tracking log that was completed by mentors and delivered to SANDAG for analysis.

Throughout the course of the grant, SANDAG met frequently with both the crime analyst and the SPI officers in charge of the grant. Maintaining frequent communication allowed SANDAG to obtain a more qualitative understanding of SPI progress and witness the changes and reasons driving those changes. Unfortunately, because of the high level of security clearance needed for much of the intelligence data, SANDAG was not able to either learn about or document that component of the project.

In addition to monitoring the target intelligence activities and subsequent SPI actions, SANDAG was instrumental in designing and implementing the community collaborative portion of the evaluation. To accomplish these evaluation tasks, SANDAG was part of the program design and implementation process from the beginning. Research staff met with Probation and SDPD to design a sampling plan. While a random sample was initially employed, due to the small number of eligible ESD members (because of recent incarceration or AWOL status), any ESD member actively on GSU was included on the Call-In list. For the comparison group, a sample of convenience was employed, with every effort made to include youth in the sampling pool with similar characteristics. This effort yielded 32 youth, 19 of whom had similar characteristics and were included in the analysis.

Following the sample selection, research staff attended the Call-Ins and distributed the initial intake forms. Staff maintained weekly contact with the program to monitor data collection, and attended all meetings between the program and law enforcement, as well as attending the graduation.

What was the impact of SPI on violent crime in the target areas?

The ultimate goals of SPI were to reduce gang-related crime, disrupt links with terrorist organizations, and intervene on behalf of vulnerable youth who had the potential for greater criminal activity. Given the relatively short duration of the SPI program, the long-term effects of the project are beyond the scope of this report or evaluation. This is especially true for the Somali gangs, as this was the first concentrated effort to gather intelligence on the gang characteristics, their activities, and document members.

Despite these limitations, it was still possible to examine changes in crime that occurred over the course of the grant. One method used to document change in crime in the area was to examine UCR violent crime both in Mid-City and among the gang members themselves. Data were used to address the question of how crime changed in the target area (Mid-City) by comparing violent crime prior to and during SPI in the Mid-City area to overall violent crime changes during the same period for all of the City of San Diego (excluding the Mid-City area). The second approach was to document violent crime committed by ESD members over the course of time, as well as victimization of members.[6]

As Figure 12 illustrates, prior to SPI activities, the Mid-City area accounted for about one in five violent crimes (21%) in the City of San Diego, which decreased slightly during the two years of the grant period (19% each).

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[6] Given that minimal documentation of Somali gang activity exists prior to the SPI grant, it was not possible to extract Somali-only gang crime for comparison.

FIGURE 12
Minimal Change Occurred In Violent Crime in Mid-City Compared to City Overall

SOURCE: SPI Crime Analyst, 2013

While the proportion of the violent crime in Mid-City changed only slightly during the SPI grant period, the actual number of violent crimes decreased to a greater extent in Mid-City (19% and 11%) than in the City overall (9% and 2%, respectively) (Table 6).

TABLE 6
**Mid-City Area Experienced a Greater Decrease in Violent Crime During SPI Than the City Overall**

	2010 (Pre)	2011	2012	1-year	2-year
SD	5,616	5,104	5,528	-9%	-2%
Mid-City	1,179	960	1,055	-19%	-11%

SOURCE: SDPD 2013.

As part of the crime analyst's ongoing analysis, individual level crime incidents attributed to ESD-involved members were monitored during the course of the grant period. Prior to the grant in 2010, there were 26 ESD suspects and 7 victims of violent crime. There was little change in victims in the two subsequent years but a 23 percent and 35 percent drop in suspects during the years of SPI (Figure 13).[7]

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[7] Data on Somali gang activity was not available because of how ethnicity is coded at time of arrest. Despite efforts by the SPI and SDPD to change the coding system, to date there is still no code for Somalian.

FIGURE 13
ESD Involvement in Crime Decreased During SPI Grant Period

SOURCE: SPI Crime Analyst, 2013.

These data indicate movement in the right direction of violence and gang-related crime in the target area. It is important to acknowledge that the data do not allow for direct correlations to be drawn between SPI activities and decreases in crime, especially given the complexity of the criminal organizations in the area. However, when viewed as a piece of the ongoing strategy to address existing and emerging criminal enterprises in the area, SPI did provide a model that research has shown to be effective in addressing these problems.

INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABILITY

What changes in practices and policies occurred as a result of SPI?

SPI provided an opportunity for SDPD to hone their intelligence gathering practices as they pertain to PDIS and how officers approach gathering intelligence. Specifically, the information learned through the HUMINT training allowed detectives to increase the quality and quantity of intelligence. This change resulted in additional arrests and seizures outside the target areas for this grant. These activities included 55 suspects being charged with federal and state crimes, 56 guns purchased, along with 7.5 pounds of methamphetamine and just over a pound of cocaine being seized. In addition, detectives were able to direct sources to provide more precise and accurate intelligence that led to preventing crimes from occurring.

In addition, substantial knowledge was gained on how Somali gangs operate in San Diego. Information was gathered about how these gangs have assimilated into the gang culture in San Diego, where they conduct their illegal activity, and how to best communicate with the community to garner trust and thereby receive valuable information on Somali gang activity. In fact, detectives became subject matter experts on the East African and the Somali community, especially gang activity. This led to other law enforcement agencies soliciting the assistance of gang detectives to share their knowledge and experience with other major cities experiencing Somali gang problems. For example, during the grant period, the Seattle Police Department requested a gang detective from San Diego to provide training for their gang unit that was experiencing Somali gang activity.

The project also supported the mutual sharing of information gained about Somali gangs with other jurisdictions throughout the nation. As part of the project, SDPD coordinated a conference call with law enforcement from other communities dealing with a growing Somali gang problem in order to share intelligence and information. The results of law enforcement sharing information about this crime group led to the apprehension of wanted suspects, the identification of gang members, preventing and deterring crime issues, and the sharing of resources. The group consisted of the following law enforcement agencies: Nashville, Tennessee; Columbus, Ohio; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Seattle, Washington.

During the conference call, law enforcement discussed open cases involving suspects and victims from the Somali community, trends and activity within jurisdictions, and shared intelligence. Peer to peer learning occurred during this conference call. For example, the conference call revealed Khat and Grabba are in heavy demand in Somali communities throughout the United States; therefore, the need for the drug creates a lucrative business for Somali gangs. Khat and Grabba are considered culturally acceptable in the East African community but it is considered a Schedule I controlled substance and illegal to possess in the United States.

SUMMARY

In October 2010, SDPD was successful in their application to BJA to fund a SPI using an intelligence-led policing model to address gang violence in the Mid-City area of San Diego. The goal of the SPI project was to address the emerging Somali gang population and disrupt one of the more established gangs in San Diego County - ESD. SDPD, in collaboration with San Diego County Probation and the community, designed and implemented a three-pronged approach to achieving their goals: targeted intelligence gathering, correctional supervision, and community interventions. With the assistance of an expert crime analyst who provided the analyses of the intelligence data to inform law enforcement operations, and SANDAG who documented the process and implementation, SDPD oversaw the implementation of the SPI grant from the period of 2011 to 2013, with most of the activity occurring in 2012.

The SPI program allowed SDPD to build its intelligence gathering capacity through officer trainings and increased utilization of the police department's database. Intelligence gained from these endeavors was used to drive more than 20 police operations, including sweeps, proactive patrols, fourth waiver searches, and stings. These activities were combined with the community supervision portion of the project which was led by Probation and resulted in 26 additional operations targeting ESD members supervised under Probation's GSU.

Complementing the enforcement and suppression angle of the project was the community intervention services provided to at-risk youth participating in the SPI project. Partnering with a church located in the target gang area, SDPD and Probation reached out to the church pastor to provide intervention services for neighborhood youth under GSU supervision for their involvement with the ESD gang. Using Boston Ceasefire as a model, the pastor, Probation, and SDPD organized Call-Ins that teamed mentors (who were ex-gang members) with youth and their families. Offering an intensive seven-month program to a total of 13 youth, the program was successful in graduating 6 of the youth.

The SPI project met the majority of its anticipated outcomes by greatly increasing the intelligence on Somali gangs, building relations with members of the Somali community, reducing calls for service at a hot spot known to be a hangout for Mission Clic members, gaining additional information on ESD members and their link to the Mexican Mafia, and intervening in the lives of several gang entrenched youth.

Limitations and Lessons Learned

The project was not without its limitation and lessons learned. These included the following:

- During the grant period the City outsourced the operation of its information system including the maintenance and support of the PDIS. This change in responsibilities greatly decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. Specifically, there was a significant delay in obtaining security clearance of the outsourced company which resulted in delays in repairs, changes, and input to the PDIS system. The current crime and arrest reports do on have an ethnic code for Somali (e.g.,"S") and therefore it is difficult to identify the scope of the problem and also measure any changes in the problem. Despite meetings and discussions to change these reports, there was resistance from the controlling agency because of contract obligations. At the end of the grant period there was still no way to extract this information through automated methods.

- The natural high rate of staff turnover that often occurs in law enforcement made for challenges in continuity in carrying out the goals of the SPI project. During the course of the grant there were three different leadership changes of the gang unit and numerous changes in gang detectives. There was also personnel change among partners, with three different probation officers assigned to the project. Each change required intensive training to bring the new member up to a competent level of operation. The changes also disrupted the flow of information and intelligence sharing which directly impact law enforcement actions. For example, when the detective who was the point

person for the Somali community was promoted, a relationship and communication gap occurred between SDPD and the community because he was viewed as caring, reliable, and was known in the community. This placed an additional burden on his replacement who had to work harder to regain the trust of the community. Recognizing the value in establishing these relationships, it would have been beneficial to have agreement to having a consistent core team throughout the project would have been beneficial.

- Lack of funding to support the Call-Ins. Despite the praise for the Call-Ins, there was no funding to support the in-kind work by the community and the Church that stepped up to provide the support services for the Call-Ins. This funding was not anticipated in the original grant agreement but in hindsight it would have been a valuable use of resources and been beneficial to the overall success of the project.

- Insufficient evidence to document a link between the East African community in San Diego and terrorist activity. While recent arrests and initial intelligence led law enforcement to suspect a growing support of terrorist activities among the East African community, no major activities were documented during the grant period. However, a substantial amount of intelligence was obtained through the means elaborated on in this report and was shared with the appropriate federal agencies.

- The contracted crime analyst was not used as effectively as could have been. The analyst provided statistical information to identify crime hot spots, mapping, and informational support, but there was a lack of communication that created intelligence gaps during the enforcement phase. Specifically, because of the rotation in gang detectives, the assigned detective did not consistently relay information regarding arrests and gang intelligence to the analyst, which prohibited her from providing comprehensive information to support the operations. At times, this caused enforcement actions to not be so location driven but more aligned towards apprehending the suspect. This focus on the individual suspect rather than the larger strategy

of reducing gang involvement and activity is a challenge when attempting to eradicate the root of the problem (i.e., gang involvement) rather than a symptom (i.e., individual arrest). Having one detective assigned to the project until completion would have resolved the miscommunication issue and supported the broader strategy of reducing the gangs influence in the neighborhood. Another possible solution is to maintain crime analysis duties within the agency to provide more cohesive and collaborative communication.

- While an increased priority on the implementation of a rigorous evaluation would have provided a more robust documentation of the impact of SPI, the original funding and proposal placed a greater emphasize on contracting outside the department with an analyst to inform the project. As such, based on the resources initially available a design was created that included a process and impact evaluation involving comparison groups for the intervention and the geographic areas. However, as the project unfolded, project realities limited the ability to implement some of these aspects when problem scopes and areas were smaller or different than originally envisioned. These factors limited the feasibility to identify a matched comparison area. The process evaluation was also limited by several factors including the gathering of sensitive intelligence that could not be shared with the evaluators and because often times the SPI strategies were carried out in tangent with other existing operations or divisions in the department and it was not possible to disentangle the outcomes. Future SPI projects would benefit from clearer requirements about the expected resources and rigor of the evaluation among all parties.