

# **SPI Final Report**

**Rochester Police Department  
Rochester Institute of Technology**

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## Executive Summary

The goal of the Rochester Police Department's (RPD) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) was to reduce violent crime by developing strategies to help police better identify, assess, and intervene in violent-retaliatory disputes. A violent retaliatory dispute is an interaction involving conflict, over a period of time, between two or more individuals and/or people associated with them and marked by two or more events involving confrontation or intimidation, in which at least some of those events involve violent acts or credible threats of violence. The project involved analysis of dispute-related violence in Rochester and the development of a violence risk assessment tool that would guide law enforcement interventions that target violent-retaliatory disputes. A database of shooting incidents was created that includes information about all shootings in Rochester between 2010 and 2012, with data about the victim, the suspect, and the situational characteristics associated with the shootings. Analysis of the shooting database was augmented by focus groups consisting of RPD investigators and officers, as well as incident reviews of important violent disputes that occurred between 2010 and 2012.

Analysis of the data on dispute-related violence served as the basis for the creation of the risk assessment tool, which examines whether certain individual and situational characteristics are present during a suspected dispute. The tool asks whether an incident consisted of violence or the threat of violence; whether it was linked to a previous violent event; whether the previous event involved weapons; whether the victim or suspect has a history of weapon-carrying or weapons violence; and whether the participants had a reputation for violence, belonged to a gang, or were involved with the drug trade. Disputes are scored as high or low risk based on the presence of the factors listed above.

RPD used investigative, place based, and offender based intervention strategies to address high risk violent-retaliatory disputes. The results from the analysis suggest that the dispute assessment tool was an effective predictor of identifying the likelihood that a dispute will be retaliatory in nature. The interventions utilized, however, were not found to reduce overall rates of violence. This suggests that

future efforts that attempt to utilize police strategies to reduce dispute-related violence must more effectively link dispute strategies with high-risk disputes. The ability to adequately link effective dispute reduction strategies was impacted by:

1. Evolution of the planning process to include new program elements
2. Program disruption associated with external factors (Promotion of program leaders, departmental reorganization)
3. Problem of changes in key personnel
4. Limited deviation from intervention strategies involving investigation and arrest
5. Limited ability to track data and assess effects and outcomes

### **Statement of the Problem**

The City of Rochester, N.Y. continues to struggle with high levels of firearm violence. The US Census shows that between 2000 and 2010, Rochester lost 4.2 % of its population, declining to 210,565, from a high of 330,000 in 1950. Like many Northeastern and rust belt cities with a decaying urban core, persistently high levels of firearm violence hinder economic development, promote fear, and limit opportunities for change. In the last five years in New York, Rochester, on average, had the highest homicide rate in the State, the second highest firearm assault rate, the second-highest firearm homicide rate, and the second-highest overall shooting victim rate, basically neck and neck with Buffalo in all categories.

Despite these challenges, the Rochester law enforcement community remains a collaborative progressive team that has successfully sought and implemented significant improvements in the area of violent crime. Successful past and present partnerships among agencies include Ceasefire, Project EXILE, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), and Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiatives (SACSI). Through these efforts, local agencies have developed strong partnerships, learned to collaborate with researchers, and gained insight into the nature of violence in the community, particularly in the areas of firearm violence, gang violence, and the nature of homicide in particular.

These efforts have led Rochester to identify a strategic direction that has been underserved by past and present violence reduction initiatives, and for which there is limited academic research guidance. This project sought to expand the pool of “best practice” knowledge from which to draw on for local intervention efforts by addressing violent retaliatory disputes.

#### Addressing the problem of Disputes through Retaliatory Dispute Intervention

Nationwide, arguments are well-known as the most frequent cause of homicide (Fox & Sawitz, 2010; Wolfgang, 1958). Research into homicide in Rochester has confirmed this finding, showing that as many as 75% of homicides in any given year are the direct result of a violent dispute (Klofas et al, 2001).

Given that disputes are a major factor in a large proportion of fatal violence, a great deal of research has observed that many acts of fatal violence stem from a minor dispute (Felson and Tedeschi, 1993; Griffiths, Yule, & Gartner, 2011). A dominant theme has been the idea of a “code of the street”, a set of subcultural social norms that encourage use of violence as a mechanism for maintenance of social position and conflict resolution (Anderson, 1999). A key component of this idea is that “the code” requires that “disrespects” be responded to with exaggerated levels of violence for demonstrative purposes. According to those norms, the level of retaliation is often disproportionate to the seriousness of the precipitating event. For example, recent dispute-related murders in Rochester have stemmed from such minor arguments as: the victim stealing a grapefruit from the suspect; whether the victim or suspect was more “Puerto Rican”; whether evolution was real; and whether a toy dinosaur (from the movie “Toy Story”) was better than a toy Nemo (from the movie “Finding Nemo”).

Not only do these disputes turn violent over seemingly minor issues, but they can accelerate rapidly to violence. The escalation of a dispute into violence occurs in stages (Athens 2005), however, those stages are just as likely to play out over months as seconds (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Levi, 1980). Police require time to learn of the dispute, conceive, and execute intervention tactics, so disputes that immediately turn fatal offer few opportunities for intervention. Violent disputes that play out over time, involving multiple events and acts of retaliation, offer police the timelines necessary to identify a dispute and then execute an appropriate response. Indeed, this type of dispute accounted for nearly 20% of all 2010 homicides in Rochester, NY. In 2010, the motive in 21 of 41 Rochester homicides (51%) was an argument of some type. Of those 21 murders, 8 (6 involving a firearm), involved a violent retaliatory act preceded by a dispute at least two hours prior.

In order to fully understand the nature of retaliatory disputes, this project followed a data-driven problem analysis approach, including the use of “crime incident reviews” (Klofas & Hipple, 2006) so that specific typologies of retaliatory violence and associated opportunities for intervention could be

identified. One Rochester homicide case from 2010 provides an example of how incident reviews can be utilized to highlight the characteristics of retaliatory and associated opportunities for police intervention:

On May 26, 2010, Ted Francis was murdered by Calvin Johnson at 24 Henion St. Earlier in the night, Calvin Johnson and friends were having a party at the location for Calvin's girlfriend. Calvin's cousins left this party and drove to the west side of the city to taunt a group of people they had an ongoing dispute with (including Ted Francis) who were hanging out on the bleachers of a football field. In response to the taunting, Francis' crew pulled out several firearms and began shooting at Calvin's cousins' car, hitting it once. The car pulled away and returned to the party at 24 Henion St. Later in the evening, Ted Francis' crew showed up at the party and began to fight with the people at the party. During the fight, Calvin Johnson pulled out a handgun and shot Ted Francis while Francis was trying to fight one of Calvin Johnson's cousins.

This case illustrates several unique qualities of retaliatory violence that have implications for intervention including:

1. The existence of a long-standing and escalating dispute between two groups of people.
2. Some of the disputants had known criminal records and existing connections to the criminal justice system in the form of Probation, Parole, or active warrants.
3. A precipitating event (involving shots fired) that may involve a police response.
4. Time to intervene (between the shots fired incident and the homicide) where intelligence was generated.
5. Focal places for retaliation, including a house party and a known hang-out.

If police had known about the dispute and identified it as a likely candidate for retaliation, they could have had time to intervene and place-based as well as offender-based interventions to consider, even though the specific nature of the dispute was unknown.



### Police are well-suited for interventions in Violent Retaliatory Disputes

Intervention in retaliatory disputes is not a new concept in and of itself- police conduct dispute mediation as a regular course of business. What is new is the idea that police can, and should, develop systematic approaches for identifying, assessing, and intervening in potentially violent retaliatory disputes. Recently, a number of models, including Ceasefire Chicago (Skogan et al, 2009), Pittsburgh One Vision, One Life (Wilson et al, 2010), and Baltimore Safe Streets (Webster et al, 2009) have addressed dispute-related issues using “Violence Interrupters”- street outreach workers who attempt to reach out to victims of shooting violence and their families to prevent them from retaliating against their attackers (Skogan et al, 2009). In the Chicago model, “Violence Interrupters” collected intelligence on possible retaliations from personal contacts, hospitals, police, and other sources. They also conducted informal risk assessments of a conflict, seeking to ascertain the likeliness of further violence. These street workers were not employees of the Chicago Police Department, and relied entirely on non-criminal justice related mediation and intervention tactics.

The street outreach model of retaliation intervention has significant appeal, most notably, improved cooperation by disputants who may be unwilling to cooperate with police, or who may be involved in a dispute of an illegal nature. In such cases, the street outreach workers must rely on their own conflict resolution skills and personal savvy to defuse the situation, as they have no other tools with which to compel the disputants to put aside their dispute. Police, in contrast, can engage in a variety of criminal justice “lever-pulling” tactics (Braga, 2010) to generate a deterrent effect among disputants. Should deterrence fail, police can use enforcement tactics to prevent the retaliation by incapacitating one or more of the disputants. Police can also employ “place-based” tactics (Weisburd, 2008) to control and deter at likely places of retaliation. So in addition to conflict resolution skills, law enforcement offers a diverse array of intervention tools on which to draw. Police also have an advantage when it comes to intelligence-gathering: law enforcement has a significant intelligence network from which to draw

including field stops, investigations, school resource officers, confidential informants, jail phone call monitoring, and intelligence obtained from partners in Probation and Parole.

#### An Innovative Police-Based Violent Retaliatory Dispute Intervention Strategy

Police have the capacity to conduct violent retaliatory dispute interventions similar to “violence interrupters”. Indeed, police are ideal for such efforts due to organizational strengths in intelligence-gathering, the organizational command structure necessary to implement a formal dispute risk assessment methodology, and the ability to rapidly deploy effective intervention and prevention tactics. This project involved the implementation of an innovative police-based violent retaliatory dispute intervention strategy that built upon lessons learned from similar non-police approaches and incorporated effective “evidence-based” police tactics. The project expanded “best practice” knowledge about formal processes for violent retaliatory dispute interventions and provided a useful framework for jurisdictions facing the same problems. The strategy employed in this project focused on three issues:

1. Improving local and national understanding on the scope and nature of violent retaliatory disputes by defining a standard typology for retaliatory violent events
2. Formalizing a method for dispute risk assessment that can be used by police to identify and prioritize disputes at high-risk for retaliation
3. Creating, testing, evaluating, documenting, and communicating a violent retaliatory dispute intervention strategy which can be extensible to other departments. The strategy had three main components:
  - a. A formal process to collect, organize, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on potentially violent retaliatory disputes.
  - b. “On-scene” dispute assessments for retaliation risk using the dispute risk assessment tool.
  - c. Intervention tactics drawn from existing “evidence-based” practices that are applied in a novel and coordinated way to the problem of violent retaliatory disputes.

### **Community Outreach and Collaboration**

This project involved the Rochester Police Department and multiple partnerships among criminal justice and city agencies and a university based research partner. The Rochester Police Department is a law enforcement agency with approximately 750 sworn personnel. It has a long history of innovation and commitment to evidence based practice. In recent years it has worked extensively with focused policing strategies and lever pulling strategies including offender call-ins. The department also made significant contribution to incident review methods which have become widespread (Klofas et. al, 2006). It also has engaged in significant partnership building within and beyond criminal justice agencies. These partnerships include strong existing relationships with probation and parole, other local and county and state police departments, the city's street outreach organization, and many other criminal justice and community agencies. These partnerships have grown through projects including Project Exile, Strategic Approaches to Community Initiatives (SACSI), Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) and the State level collaboration known as Operation Impact.

One partnership which was critical in this program was with the Monroe Crime Analysis Center (MCAC) which is housed within and partially funded by the RPD. The center provides analysis of crime patterns and assisted in important analysis of dispute related violence. The partnership with Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) was also critical to this project. RIT is a comprehensive university with 18,600 students. Through the University, Dr. John Klofas serves as Director of the Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI) and works with Dr. Irshad Altheimer. This was a joint project of RIT, the City of Rochester, and RPD. For this project, CPSI worked with MCAC and RPD to provide the following:

1. Analysis, tool building and evaluation services. Specifically, the research partners managed review of past violent events and the ongoing incident review process that occurred throughout the project.

2. Development of the risk assessment methodology and application of the risk assessment tool to identified disputes.
3. Conducting an evaluation of the project.

This project was managed through the Chief's office of the Rochester Police Department. Additionally, Nick Pettiti, Director of Business Intelligence who also works out of the Chief's office directly oversaw the analysis components of the project and the partnership with CPSI. The implementation of the project was also overseen by a Steering Committee consisting of RPD leadership, the research partner, and other key participants. This Steering Committee met monthly to discuss any emergent issues and offer advice on project implementation and related issues. The project fell under the general advisory role of the ongoing Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative (GIVE) partnership. This group is composed of representatives of partner criminal justice agencies and the City of Rochester. This group met weekly to discuss high-risk disputes and craft interventions. These interventions were carried out by different organizational units of RPD, as well as other law enforcement partners.

### Strategies Employed

Numerous strategies were utilized in this project in attempt to intervene in ongoing disputes to and prevent further retaliatory violence. These strategies primarily consisted of traditional law enforcement responses to crime. Attempts to leverage more innovative strategies proved unsuccessful.<sup>1</sup> The strategies were utilized to target disputes rather than individual incidents. This required RPD command and officers to view disputes—as opposed to individual incidents—as the unit of analysis. This also necessitated RPD to address two issues when crafting interventions in response to ongoing retaliatory violence. First, efforts had to be made to determine the extent that individual incidents were linked to an ongoing retaliatory dispute. Second, interventions utilized by RPD had to address both incident specific and dispute-level processes. RPD attempts to address these issues were assisted by crime analysts at MCAC who performed risk assessments of violent incidents and made efforts to identify potential links between incidents. Fortunately, MCAC has a history of developing dispute-level products that guide law enforcement strategies. For several years MCAC analysts have been creating dispute bulletins to track ongoing retaliatory disputes. This fact made it possible for this project to enhance existing mechanisms to respond to retaliatory violence while also leveraging existing organizational knowledge and capabilities.

We utilized a dispute risk-assessment tool to identify violent disputes that had a high likelihood of retaliation. A four step process was followed to develop this risk-assessment tool:

1. We examined the criminological literature to ascertain the state of knowledge on dispute-related violence and the best practices associated with creating risk assessments of violence.

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A for a list of innovative strategies that may have more effectively influenced levels of dispute-related violence.

2. We performed focus groups with officers. These focus groups gave officers an opportunity to discuss the nature of retaliatory violence in Rochester, the best law enforcement practices to use when addressing retaliatory violence, and the challenges associated with addressing retaliatory violence.
3. We worked with local law enforcement partners to perform incident reviews of previously identified disputes. These incident reviews were instrumental for determining dispute types, the different stages of disputes, and how law enforcement tactics could be best utilized to intervene in violent disputes.
4. We performed analysis of the Rochester Shooting Database to understand the risk factors associated with violence.

The dispute risk-assessment tool took into account the nature of violence involved in the incident, whether the incident was connected to a past event, whether the incident involved weapons, and whether the participants had a history of violence, gang involvement, or weapon violence. Analysts scored the dispute risk-assessment tool based on the presence of relevant risk factors. For example, if the victim of a particular dispute-related incident was a gang member, the analyst would mark yes in that category and 1 point would be added to the total risk assessment score. Risk-assessments ranged from a low of zero to a high of twenty-six. Priority for intervention was given to disputes that scored high on the risk assessment.

Dispute assessments could be generated in two ways: by officers and by analysts. At the beginning of the project officers were issued a special form called the field assessment. The field assessment was a page in length and asked officers to document any incident that they believed was either retaliation for a previous event or had the potential to induce further retaliation. After receiving the field assessment crime analysts at MCAC would perform the full secondary assessment of the dispute. In addition to the officer generated field assessments, analyst driven secondary assessments

were created in response to every assault shooting that occurred in the City of Rochester or in response to intelligence generated suggesting that retaliatory violence was imminent. Requiring analyst generated secondary assessments under certain circumstances increased the likelihood that dispute-related violence would be detected by RPD command. Upon completion of the secondary risk assessment analysts forwarded all relevant documentation to RPD command.

RPD command convened a weekly dispute meeting to monitor active disputes and strategize about potential interventions. This meeting was attended by the RPD Commander of Special Operations, RPD Commander of Patrol, Captains for each RPD patrol section, the Captain from the RPD tactical division, the supervisory investigator from the homicide division, and representatives from the Monroe County Jail, Probation, and Parole, respectively. During this meeting the Commander assessed interventions for ongoing disputes and the partners shared relevant intelligence that would either lead to arrest of principle actors or prevent further retaliatory violence.

Between January 1, 2015 and November 6, 2015, 209 Secondary risk assessments were generated. RPD targeted 105 (50%) of those disputes for intervention. The decision to target disputes for intervention was taken in consideration of the Secondary risk assessment score, the commanding officer's personal assessment of the dispute, and the availability of organizational resources. A total of 433 interventions were utilized in response to the disputes identified in this project. This amounts to an average of 4 interventions for every dispute. The average dispute assessment score—as indicated by the total number relevant risk factors present—was 9.68.

RPD commanders worked closely with law enforcement partners to implement dispute interventions. In general, interventions fell into three categories:

1. Investigative. These interventions focused on generating more information to increase the likelihood that the investigation will result in an arrest. Examples of investigative interventions included the RPD follow-up, an info/ document search, interview, knock

and talk, MCAC contact, MCAC Intelligence Sheet, MCAC Bulletin, and property search.

Taken together, investigative interventions accounted for 52.66% of all interventions utilized in this project.

2. Place based. These strategies involved targeting locations where the dispute-related incidents occurred or where active dispute participants were often found. The objective of these interventions was to deter dispute participants from engaging in further violence. Examples of place based approaches included the area canvass, camera check, detail, directed patrol, and neighborhood check. Taken together, these interventions represented 31.18% percent of all interventions utilized in this project.
3. Offender based. These interventions were utilized in attempt to prevent dispute participants from engaging in further retaliatory violence. Examples included internal resources<sup>2</sup>, offender arrests, special attention, targeted offender details, wanted package arrests, and warrant pick-ups. Taken together, these interventions combined to make-up 16.17 percent of all interventions used in this project.

Table 1 provides a frequency distribution of the interventions used in the SPI project. This table reveals that officers utilized numerous strategies to intervene in retaliatory violence. As noted above, the most common interventions utilized were investigative in nature. For instance, interviews of the victim and other relevant parties represented 19.2% of all interventions used in this program. These interviews facilitated the securing of information relevant to the dispute and assisted in the development of further dispute-intervention strategies. The second most common intervention was an MCAC contact (18.7%). The MCAC contact involved contacting MCAC to request more information about the dispute. This contact often led to important products that guided the investigation. Two examples of

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<sup>2</sup> Internal resources involved utilizing the RPD special investigative services unit to facilitate the arrest of key dispute participants.



such products are the MCAC Bulletin and the MCAC Intel Sheet. These products enhanced the development of other products that informed violence-reduction strategies. The next most common intervention was the neighborhood check. This place-based approach served to deter potential disputants and also facilitated the collection of important intelligence. Importantly, most of the targeted disputes were targeted with numerous interventions. As such, these interventions may have operated cumulatively to influence dispute-related violence.

**Table 1: Frequency of Interventions Utilized**

<b>Intervention</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<i>Investigation Interventions</i>		
Follow-Up	18	4.16%
Info/Doc Search	1	.23%
Interview	83	19.17%
Knock and Talk	3	.69%
MCAC Contact	81	18.71%
MCAC Intel Sheet	4	.92%
MCAC Bulletin	21	4.85%
Search	17	3.93%
<i>Total Investigation Interventions</i>		52.66%
<i>Place Based Interventions</i>		
Canvass	17	3.93%
Camera Check	43	9.93%
Detail	7	1.62%
Directed Patrol	17	3.93%
Neighborhood Check	51	11.78%
<i>Total Offender Based Interventions</i>		31.18%
<i>Offender Based Interventions</i>		
Arrest	2	.46%
Internal Resources	43	9.93%
Special Attention	4	.92%
Targeted Offender Detail	5	1.15%
Wanted Pack Arrest	7	1.62%
Warrant Pickup	9	2.08%
<i>Total Place Based Interventions</i>		16.17%
<b>Total Interventions</b>	<b>433</b>	<b>100%</b>

## **Data and Intelligence**

The Rochester Police Department identified fatal and non-fatal shootings as the cornerstone of the local violence problem and disputes in particular as a major contributor. Although this assessment was quickly ascertained, without a truly informed knowledge base it was grounded exclusively in frequency of events, perceived severity, and anecdotal opinions. To begin to understand the complexity surrounding retaliatory violent disputes the research partner and the MCAC analysts conducted a typology analysis focused on disputes with shooting involvements. This occurred in two phases: data analysis and qualitative assessment. In all, data and intelligence information were utilized to develop the Rochester Shooting Database, perform focus-groups with RPD officers, and perform incident reviews of previously identified violent retaliatory disputes. The goal was to begin viewing disputes as a new unit of analysis that helps inform the occurrence and nature of individual incidents of crime rather than continuing to dilute response efforts at the case level.

The initial analysis was conducted on all fatal and non-fatal shooting incidents in the City of Rochester from January 1, 2012 to June 14, 2013. This time period accounted for well over 500 shooting incidents. A Shooting Database was developed to warehouse the data into six categories:

1. Incident
2. Victim/s
3. Suspect/s
4. Weapon
5. Circumstance
6. Investigation

The database contained over 200 variables for each incident and utilized data from a wide variety of available sources including, but not limited to; local crime reports, investigation action reports, field interview forms, local and state level arrest booking data, city property information,

county and state level permits, local gang intelligence and pawn and scrap records. This represented the most complete set of data available for the analysis of shooting incidents at the Rochester Police Department. To ensure validity and reliability of the data collection process, RIT researchers met with MCAC analysts and student coders on a weekly basis. Inter-rater reliability checks of the data were performed regularly and showed promise: percent agreement between coders generally ranged from 80% to 90% and kappa coefficients ranged from .65 to .90. The codebook for the RSD can be found in Appendix B.

Extensive analyses were performed upon completion of data collection for the Rochester Shooting Database.<sup>3</sup> Analyses were performed on the descriptive characteristics of assault shootings, the factors that distinguished dispute-related shootings from predatory shootings, and the factors that account for variation in lethality across shootings. These analyses helped identify the key risk factors that drive dispute-related violence in Rochester and served as the basis for the development of our dispute-risk assessment tool.

To compliment this robust data analysis effort, a series of focus groups and dispute incident reviews were conducted. The focus groups were held with agents from the local Bureau of New York State Parole and the Monroe County Probation Department, officers in the RPD West Division, the RPD East Division, the Major Crimes Division, and the Special Investigative Section (Narcotics), respectively. Focus groups were employed to help understand the processes through which officers address violent retaliatory disputes. Three research questions were of particular interest:

1. How do RPD officers identify and categorize violent retaliatory disputes?
2. What strategies do RPD officers utilize when responding to violent retaliatory disputes?
3. How would officers utilize a retaliatory violence risk-assessment tool?

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix C and D for a descriptive analysis of the Rochester Shooting Database and an analysis of the predictors of dispute-related shootings.

The focus groups were facilitated by Professor John Klofas and were organized around twenty-two questions on the topic of dispute-related violence.<sup>4</sup> Attempts were made to establish group consensus on the topics of interest, while also recognizing minority opinions when disagreements emerged. The focus groups proved helpful in guiding understanding of how law enforcement practitioners identify and respond to dispute-related violence.

Capturing intelligence data on disputes most commonly occurs as law enforcement investigates a shooting incident. In these events the source of the intelligence is the citizenry and the scope is generally tied to the case at hand. Often in larger investigations there will be some informal sharing between investigators but it still tied to the specifics of the case. These collaborations provided a window into the complex nature of a dispute, the kinds of investigative nuances that don't always make it into official police documents and that are generally only experienced by the individual case investigators. Very rarely does this insight transfer from investigator to investigator or analyst in a consistent manner. The focus groups allowed us to structure a conversation on an aggregate level about commonalities in the origination and perpetuation of violent retaliatory disputes. Key data variables commonly present in violent retaliatory disputes were identified through the unique perspectives and experiences of the attendees. In all, the findings from the focus groups revealed that although officers were able to identify the existence of retaliatory violence, they did not clearly understand the stages of disputes, nor did they adequately organize their responses to dispute-related violence around the concept of disputes.<sup>5</sup>

The development of the violence-risk assessment tool was further enhanced by the Incident Reviews. Incident reviews involve a comprehensive analysis of cases to guide understanding of retaliatory violence. The incident reviews were designed to gain deeper insight into the issue of

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<sup>4</sup> For a complete list of the questions used in the focus groups see Appendix E.

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix F for a summary of the results from the focus group.

retaliatory shootings by engaging those who have directly been involved with particular shooting cases or have specific information on the dispute or about the dispute participants. To obtain this information, a number of subject matter experts with relevant knowledge were identified—including officers, investigators, probation officers, parole officers, and analysts—to ensure that we acquired a complete understanding of the context behind each case.

Several steps were taken to increase the likelihood that participants were prepared to discuss the topic. First, MCAC analysts selected 30 previously identified retaliatory disputes that would be discussed during the incident review process. To ensure that the incident review process was robust and comprehensive, disputes discussed at the incident review varied across dispute type (gang dispute, neighbor dispute, romantic dispute, etc.) seriousness of violence, total amount of violence, and duration of dispute. Second, MCAC analysts provided subject matter experts comprehensive notes for each dispute. These notes included a list of cases that were reviewed, including addresses, persons and/or gangs associated with the shooting, as well as notes regarding the context of the retaliatory dispute. Subject matter experts were requested to review the notes that were provided, as well as any documents and/or databases that may contain information on the dispute or disputants, and be prepared to share any information that they had. Third, the discussion for each dispute was led by one of the subject matter experts. This helped facilitate discussion during the incident review process. For each dispute, the following questions were addressed:

1. How did you come to know about this dispute?
2. Who do you consider the main players in this dispute?
3. What previous information did you have about dispute participants?
4. Was the victim an active offender or part of a group of active offenders?
5. Was the suspect an active offender or part of a group of active offenders?
6. What do you know about the relationship between victim and suspect(s)/offenders?

7. What do you know about the location of the event?
8. What was the cause of the dispute?
9. Were any steps taken by law enforcement to prevent retaliation between disputants?

The incident review was helpful in guiding our development of the violence risk assessment tool and illuminated the challenges and promise associated with crafting a law-enforcement driven dispute intervention model.

The results of the data analysis and intelligence sharing efforts were twofold, the police department had tangible data to support the notion that violent retaliatory disputes were in fact a driver of local violence levels, and the project group had both quantitative and qualitative data identifying focal areas to continue to develop a response plan. The biggest revelation from the focus groups and incident reviews was that multiple officers and investigators had cases in the disputes but did not know they were linked in a single dispute and therefore work was not organized around the connections across cases. One major project milestone occurred at this stage as the RPD recognized the need to continue the analytical support to the project and reorganized the MCAC to dedicate a crime analyst to focus solely on disputes. The analyst's duties included support for the project, intelligence gathering, and data analysis and product dissemination. The attention of the project team shifted from analyzing the problem toward the development of tools and processes that could lead to earlier identification of violent retaliatory disputes.

Using the data variables uncovered in the earlier stages of the project, the team created a two-level risk assessment tool designed to facilitate in-progress field-level valuation and later a more vigorous secondary assessment. The field-level tool was intended to provide a quick and immediate assessment of a violent event to make a rough estimate of the potential for retaliatory violence and, if the potential is substantial to develop an immediate response strategy. It briefly walks the respondent through a series of questions intended to prompt a base level of dispute-related analysis through

intelligence gathering. Upon completion the form is sent to the dispute analyst for additional analysis. In this sense, it also serves as a type of early warning system to alert stakeholders that there may be something larger than the single incident. The unique nature of police work depends on this type of situational awareness and discretionary decision making. A primary benefit of this project is the formalization and documentation of the factors that directly impact these personal assessments. An example of the field assessment tool is shown in Table 2.

The completion of a field-level assessment automatically generates a secondary assessment conducted by the dispute analyst. A separate risk assessment tool was developed for analyst completion to provide further guidance on the potential risks associated with an identified dispute. The analyst is equipped with tools and access to data not available at the field-level. The secondary assessment tool is designed to analyze the key variables identified in the original shooting database analysis, focus groups, and incident reviews. Focal areas include, but are not limited to; categories identifying potentially linked cases, access to weapons, disputant reputation and previous involvement with violence, associative networks, and geographic proximity. Each variable is individually scored and then aggregated to provide an overall dispute risk score. This secondary evaluation happens within 24 hours of an initial completion of a field-level assessment. The completed package is forwarded through the chain of command to the initial supervisor, section-level Captain, Patrol Commander, and the Deputy Chief of Operations for operational response design. An example of the secondary assessment is shown on Table 2.

Prior to the SPI project, elements of this new risk-assessment process existed informally and were unevenly adopted across the department. Each of the violent events were generally handled as a singular incident and investigated accordingly. Associated data, if documented, would languish in case folders. Through this project, formalization of record keeping on dispute-related discretionary assessments and improved data quality standards for analysis has directly impacted RPD's ability to more effectively identify potential violent retaliatory disputes.

**Table 2: Sample Field Assessment Tool****Dispute Violence Risk Assessment****Level 1 Review**

**Complete this form when you identify a potentially violent dispute.** For additional information on the individuals/location below please call the **Monroe Crime Analysis Center** at 428-3644.

Incident Location:

Date of incident:

CR#(s):

**Retaliatory Dispute Definition**

A violent retaliatory dispute is an interaction involving conflict, over a period of time, between two or more individuals and/or people associated with them and marked by two or more events involving confrontation or intimidation, in which at least some of those events involve violent acts or credible threats of violence.

1. Provide the names of 2 or more individuals/groups believed to be involved in this dispute.
2. Do you believe the risk of violence is (check all that apply)  
 Immediate \_\_\_\_\_ Ongoing \_\_\_\_\_ Long Term \_\_\_\_\_
3. Why do you think this will result in further violence?
4. Briefly describe the way you found out about this dispute. What event or information is relevant?
5. What do you believe is the cause of this dispute?
6. What specific actions did you take to address this dispute?

Name of person completing this report: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Supervisor Review: Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Supervisor comments:



Table 3: Sample Secondary Risk Assessment Tool

<b>Dispute Violence Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Level 2: Intermediate Review and Intervention</b>

The goal of this form is to help you assess the level of risk of violence in a dispute that you have identified.

**Retaliatory Dispute Definition**

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<b>Name of person completing this report:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
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<b>Incident Location:</b>		<b>Date of incident:</b>	
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<b>CR#(s):</b>		<b>Level 1 Completed:</b>	
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<b>1. Dispute Summary</b>
<b>2. Provide the names of 2 or more individuals or groups that you believe are involved in this dispute.</b>
<b>3. Briefly describe the way you found out about this dispute.</b>
<b>4. What do you believe is the cause of this dispute?</b>

Total Number Checked			
	Yes	No	Unknown

<b>Name of person reviewing this report:</b>		<b>Date:</b>	
--	--	--------------	--

<b>Reviewer's comments:</b>

Action taken by reviewer:				
<b>Dispute Violence Risk Assessment</b>				
	<b>Check If</b>			
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Unknown</b>	<i>Check all that apply. Add comments when needed.</i>
<b>1</b>	<b>Current Event (the event that brought the issue to the officer's attention)</b>			
				Event involved confirmed violence
				Event involved confirmed threat of violence
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Past Events Linked to Current Event</b>			
				There is one or more linked past event which involved violence
				There is one or more linked past event which involved threats of violence
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Involvement with Weapons in this Dispute</b>			
				Current or prior events in this dispute involved weapons
				Recent Reckless Endangerments (RE) involved participants or their property
				Recent Prohibited Use of a Weapon (PUW) involved participants and/or associates
				Participants or associates recently stopped for Criminal Possession of a Weapon (CPW)
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Participants Prior Violence</b>			
				Someone on one side has a prior record involving violence
				Someone on both sides has a prior record involving violence
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Participants Reputation</b>			
				Someone on one or both sides has a reputation for being "out of control"
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Participants: Other Characteristics</b>			
				One or more participants is a known gang member
				One or more participants is a known drug dealer

				One or more participants is believed to carry a gun
				One or more participants was recently released from incarceration
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Associated Individuals</b>			
				Friends of either or both parties have been recruited into the conflict
				Either or both parties are members of known problem families
				<b>Comments:</b>
	<b>Check If</b>			
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Unknown</b>	<i>Check all that apply. Add comments when needed.</i>
<b>8</b>	<b>Associates: Other Characteristics</b>			
				One or more associates of either or both parties is a known gang member
				One or more associates of either or both parties is a known drug dealer
				One or more associates of either or both parties is believed to carry a gun
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Proximity of Parties to One Another</b>			
				Residences of those involved are close to each other
				Parties currently attend the same school
				Parties shared a connection to an illegal business
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>Other Aggravating or Mitigating Factors</b>			
				There are <b>no</b> responsible third parties to intervene to <b>reduce</b> violence
				There are third parties who intervene to <b>support</b> violence
				There are other known factors that <b>increase</b> the likelihood of violence (describe)
				<b>Comments:</b>
<b>Total</b>				
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Unknown</b>	

Early identification of violent disputes is key to tailoring a specific response to the unique nature of the dispute. The assessment tool has become central to raising the awareness of a potential dispute-related issue. In order to facilitate review of these retaliatory violent disputes and disputants, the RPD established a weekly Dispute Meeting. The meeting is chaired by the RPD Commander of Special Operations and representatives from all local law enforcement agencies, MCAC, community stakeholders, and the research partner are in attendance. It's designed as a review of new high-risk disputes, actions taken on existing disputes, and a brainstorming session on potential response tactics. The Dispute Analyst plays a critical role through the presentation of case summaries, disputant backgrounds, vulnerability identification, and evaluation of place and offender based tactics.

Each case is thoroughly reviewed and a group assessment is made on appropriate intervention and prevention strategies. A new database was created to track the progress on disputes deemed worthy of a response. This new tool builds on the framework established in the Shooting Database by organizing the data with the disputes as the focal point of analysis. The dataset captures both the field and secondary assessments, related cases, and intervention strategies employed. This database serves as a new collection point for dispute intelligence sharing and intervention assignments. Prior to this project, dispute-related responses were documented at the case level, if at all which created an uneven adoption of techniques and lacked any significant organizational skill development. The new formalized meeting structure and data collection allows us to evaluate strategies across a broad spectrum of disputes and identify successful methods.

The collaborative approach to addressing violent retaliatory disputes aligns well with the overall RPD focus on violent crime prevention and response. As significant portion of the RPD resources are directly allocated to combatting violence, more specifically firearm violence. A major example of this commitment is the RPD's involvement in the GIVE partnership. The GIVE partnership employs a coordinated process, using crime analysis and field intelligence components to drive operational

decision-making, leveraging a diverse and complementary set of enforcement tactics, coordinating with prosecutorial strategies, and collaborating with local re-entry efforts to reduce shootings and homicides. A cohesive implementation of our primary component strategies 1) the Worst of the Worst (WOW) targeted offender program, 2) the Problem Oriented Policing (POP) teams, and 3) Violence Call-ins, emphasizes a focus on hotspot policing, focused deterrence, and top offenders.

The problem of chronic firearm violence offenders—those individuals who repeatedly engage in firearm violence without specific reference to an individual case—is central to the WOW program. These chronic firearm offenders comprise a large portion of violent retaliatory dispute participants. Continual focus on identifying and impacting these chronic offenders while maintaining the ability to provide case specific support when necessary creates a more comprehensive strategy for dealing with firearm violence offenders and violent disputes alike. In fact, retaliatory dispute involvement is a critical component to the weighted model that was created to identify those in our community at highest risk to be involved in firearm violence. Along with levels of past dispute involvement; arrest history, gang membership, police contacts, and shooting victimization data are weighed and analyzed to create the WOW chronic offender list. The Dispute and Shooting Victim databases are utilized to contribute to the data used in this analysis.

Crime in Rochester, firearm-violent crime in particular, is very heavily concentrated in small geographic pockets. Working with the MCAC, RPD was able to identify seven micro hotspots, POP areas, in our most densely clustered car beats. Individual POP teams were established that are managed by an RPD Lieutenant, consisting of 3-4 RPD Patrol Officers, a dedicated Assistant District Attorney, a Probation officer, and an MCAC analyst. This core team followed the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) model of problem solving to first identify the problems specific to each POP area, then analyze the root causes to develop a response plan specifically tailored to address them. Violent dispute intervention continues to be a key alignment focus for the POP hotspots. The current

POP areas were chosen in part due the large number of known active disputants that frequent these areas. We know from our analysis as part of the SPI project that violent disputes that play out over time, involving multiple events and acts of retaliation, offer police the timelines necessary to identify a dispute and then execute an appropriate response. The SPI grant requires the same collaborative approach to violence as GIVE, so many of the same partner agencies are represented in this effort.

Many of the individuals involved in these violent retaliatory disputes often are subjected to our hotspot based targeted offender strategies. Our gang-based Focused Deterrence call-ins have exclusively featured known street gang members involved in active violent disputes within the POP areas. The call-ins utilize two complementary components, enforcement and deterrence, to reduce and prevent shootings and homicides. Individuals involved in violent retaliatory disputes are directly confronted and informed that continued participation in firearm violence will not be tolerated. The partners explain how the entire criminal justice system will respond to continued criminal behavior; mainly that all potential sanctions, or levers, will be applied. Then the offenders are provided positive incentives, such as access to social services and job opportunities through our community partners. The deterrence-based message is reinforced through crackdowns on the entire group, if the dispute persists despite the warning.

To complement the focused deterrence dispute intervention strategies, RPD and its partners utilize customized notification letters delivered to violent disputants. The letters outline the program agenda, describe the access to service providers and most importantly, address the offender's personal circumstances, criminal history, dispute involvement and legal exposure. These letters are signed by executives from all of the partner agencies and hand delivered to the offender, providing the opportunity for a dialog. Personal notifications are made at places like school, home, and place of employment, on the corner or in jail. Careful consideration is given to individual context when choosing

location of delivery. Data acquired through the risk assessment tools and the dispute meeting contributes to the message.

The SPI project has made a significant contribution to RPD knowledge base, improving the local understanding on the scope and nature of violent retaliatory disputes. A formal process to collect, organize, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on potentially violent retaliatory disputes resulted in a number of new intelligence-based data sources and tools to assist in early dispute identification and intervention. An investment in additional analytical personnel ensures that analysis will remain central to development and evaluation of tactics and strategies. The collaborative approach of this project dovetails nicely with RPD's existing focus on violent crime prevention and has become part of the permanent operational command-level planning.

## **Analysis and Evaluation**

### Role of the Research Partner

The research partner played an important role in virtually every phase of the project. First, the research partner participated in the initial Steering Committee meetings to ensure that implementation of the project reflected fidelity to the proposed research model. Second, throughout the project the research partner met with RPD command and MCAC analysts to guide data collection and analysis efforts. Third, the research partner met frequently with RPD command and MCAC analysts to discuss process related issues that hampered implementation of the project. Fourth, the research partner participated in weekly dispute meetings to review new high-risk disputes, actions taken on existing disputes, and brainstorm on potential response tactics.

The work between RPD and the research partner proved to be very beneficial. The work performed on this project strengthened the existing relationship between RPD and the RIT Center for Public Safety Initiatives. RPD and RIT have a long history of working together on innovative research projects. The scope and duration of this project required close collaboration between RPD and the research partner and demonstrated RPD's commitment to the research partner model. RPD's commitment to the research partner model is further reflected by the efforts to work with the research partner to secure funding to implement and evaluate innovative police practice. Since receiving the SPI award, RPD and CPSI have collaborated to secure 2 federal grants and 1 state grant. Additionally, work on this project has provided important training opportunities for the MCAC analysts and student workers.

### Analysis and Evaluation

The analysis for this project focused on three areas:

1. Identifying high-risk dispute related violence.



2. Assessing the ability of the violence intervention tool to predict subsequent violence.
3. Examining the effect of dispute interventions on levels of violence.

To address these issues, we examined descriptive statistics, correlation coefficients, and logistic regression models of the variables of interest. The results from the analysis are presented below.

Table 4 presents the average numbers of yeses, nos, and unknowns across disputes, as indicated by the secondary dispute assessment. From January 1, 2015 to November 6, 2015 a total of 209 secondary dispute assessments were generated. 105 of the 209 disputes were targeted for SPI interventions by RPD. The average total number of yeses for disputes in the dataset was 9.68. The average number of yeses was interpreted as the total risk assessment score for the dispute. The average number of nos for all disputes was 6.67. The average number of unknowns for all disputes was 9.63. The average number of unknowns proved challenging for RPD, as it reflected both the inability to capture important information about the dispute and the degree of witness and victim cooperation.

	All Disputes	With Intervention	Without Intervention
Average Number of Yeses	9.68	9.28	10.21
Average Number of Nos	6.67	7.25	5.93
Average Number of Unknown	9.63	9.46	9.85

Table 4 also reveals the average number of yeses, nos, and unknowns for disputes with RPD interventions and disputes without RPD interventions. One interesting point to note is that disputes that did not receive any RPD intervention had a higher average risk assessment than disputes that did receive an intervention. This is due to the difficulty associated with effectively tailoring appropriate interventions to certain high risk disputes. Many of the disputes were not targeted for interventions because the victim was uncooperative. RPD command chose to prioritize resources for disputes where

both the suspect and the victim were known. One result of this decision was that many disputes that scored high on the overall risk assessment were not targeted by an intervention.

The next step in the analysis was to assess the link between the risk assessment score, the levels of the violence in the dispute, and the number of interventions used by RPD. Towards that end, two research questions were examined.

1. To what extent does the risk assessment score account for levels of violence in a dispute?
2. To what extent did interventions reduce levels of violence in the dispute?

These research questions were addressed by examining correlation coefficients of the variables of interest and logistic regression models. Most of the key variables in the analysis were not normally distributed. As such, transformed variables were utilized in this analysis. Table 5 provides descriptions of the variables used in the analysis. Risk assessment was examined using two variables: Risk Assessment Score and High Risk Assessment. The number of incidents in the dispute was examined using three variables: Number of Incidents, High Incidents, Above Mean Incidents. The number of interventions was examined using three different variables: Total Interventions, High Interventions, Above Mean Interventions. Transforming the variables of interest in this manner addressed concerns about the non-normal distribution of the variables, while also testing the extent that the results presented were not overly sensitive to the operationalization of key variables.

Table 5 also present mean levels for every variable in the table. The mean for Risk Assessment Score was 9.67. This shows that between 9 and 10 risk factors were present for the average secondary assessment. The distribution of the Risk Assessment Score was close to normal. As such, there was little difference between the mean and the median (9). The mean for High Risk Assessment is .15. It is important to note that this variable is dichotomous. Thus, the mean suggests that 15% of all secondary assessments were 1 standard deviation above the mean level of the risk assessment score.

<b>Table 5: Description of Variables Analyzed</b>		
Variable	Description	Mean
Risk Assessment Score	The total number of yeses on the dispute risk assessment.	9.67
High Risk Assessment	Whether cases were 1 standard deviation above the mean level of the risk assessment score. (Yes = 1, No = 0)	.15
Number of Incidents	Total number of violent incidents known to be related to the dispute.	1.47
High Incidence	Whether cases were 1 standard deviation above the mean level of the known number of incidents. (Yes = 1, No = 0)	.02
Above Mean Incidence	Whether cases were above the mean level of the known number of incidents. (Yes = 1, No = 0)	.10
Total Interventions	The total number of interventions used to intervene in the dispute.	2.17
High Interventions	Whether the number of interventions used was more than 1 standard deviation above the mean level of the total number of interventions. (Yes = 1, No = 0)	.26
Above Mean Interventions	Whether the number of interventions used was above the mean level of the total number of interventions. (Yes = 1, No = 0)	.43

As noted above, the number of violent incidents in the dispute was examined using three variables: Number of Incidents, High Incidents, Above Mean Incidents. The mean for Number of Incidents was 1.4. Of the 209 risk assessments examined here, 186 (89%) only had one incident. This indicates that linking individual incidents to disputes was particularly challenging in this project. The mean for High Incidents was .02, which indicates that only 2% of the secondary assessments generated were 1 standard deviation above the mean levels of the known number of incidents. The mean for Above Mean Incidents was .10, which indicates that 10% of the secondary assessments generated involved disputes that had above mean levels of the known number of incidents.

The number of interventions was examined using three different variables: Total Interventions, High Interventions, Above Mean Interventions. When all cases are considered, the mean for total interventions was 2.17. This number, however, is somewhat suppressed by the fact that half of the cases had no interventions. When we look narrow our analysis to the 105 cases for which there was an

intervention, the mean number of interventions was 4.22 and the standard deviation was 1.75. The mean for high intervention was .26, which suggests that 26% of all secondary risk assessments generated involved disputes that were targeted with a number of interventions that was 1 standard deviation above mean levels of the total number of interventions. The mean for Above Mean Interventions was .43, which suggests that 43% of all secondary risk assessments generated involved disputes that were targeted with a number of interventions that was above mean levels of the total number of interventions.

The correlations between the key variables of interest are displayed in Table 6. This table reveals some interesting relationships between the variables of interest.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Risk Assessment Score	--							
2. High Risk Assessment	.73	--						
3. Number of Incidents	.05	.00	--					
4. High Incidents	.02	-.05	.98	--				
5. Above Mean Incidents	.17	.26	.53	.39	--			
6. Total Interventions	-.07	-.11	.25	.21	.29	--		
7. High Interventions	-.06	-.08	.25	.21	.26	.83	--	
8. Above Mean Interventions	-.04	-.10	.18	.14	.23	.93	.68	--

For the most part, Risk Assessment Score is not strongly correlated with any of the variables in the matrix. High Risk Assessment is, however, moderately correlated with Above Mean Incidence of Violence. This may suggest that the risk assessment tool does not predict subsequent violence. Alternatively, it may point to the inability of RPD officers and analysts to link high risk disputes to subsequent levels of violence. Analysis of these variables with logistic regression will provide further insight into this issue. Additionally, the two risk assessment indicators are not strongly correlated with any of the indicators of interventions. This shows that interventions strategies were not driven by the risk assessment score. This is not surprising, when considering that disputes that did not receive any RPD intervention had an average higher risk assessment than disputes that did receive an intervention.

Importantly, this relationship held even when only considering the cases that were targeted for intervention. Finally, the indicators of total incidence of violence were moderately associated with the number of interventions utilized. This suggests that cases with higher amounts of detected violence received higher levels of intervention.


<b>Table 7. Logistic Regression of Above Mean Incidence of Violence on Total Interventions and Risk Assessment Score</b>	
	Odds Ratio
Total Interventions	1.51*
Risk Assessment Score	1.19*
Constant	.004*
Pseudo $r^2$	.175
Number of Observations	204

\* $p < .01$

To further investigate the nature of the relationship between variables of interest, logistic regression models were examined. The objective of these models was to determine the combined effect of the risk assessment score and the number of interventions on the incidence of known violence across disputes. In Table 5 the results from a logistic regression of high incidence on Total Risk Assessment and Total Interventions are reported. Both coefficients are significant. Total Interventions have a positive effect on the number of incidents in the dispute. We do not interpret this coefficient to indicate that a higher number of violence increased overall odds of the incidence of crime. Rather, we report these models to show that (1) the interventions utilized did not reduce the amount of known violence associated with the dispute, and (2) the analysis requires a test for reciprocal effects that was not possible because of data limitations. The model also reveals a positive relationship between the Risk Assessment Score and the odds that a dispute will have above average incidence of violence. For every one unit increase in the risk assessment score, the odds of violence in the dispute will increase by 29%.

This suggests that the dispute risk assessment tool was able to reasonably predict levels of known violence that occurred in a dispute. We also ran these models with the alternative indicators of intervention levels and risk assessment. The effects of these alternatives on the mean incidence of violence were the same as those reported in Table 5.<sup>6</sup>

**Figure 1. The Effects of the Dispute Intervention on Rochester Violence**



The final step in the analysis was to determine the extent that the dispute intervention project reduced overall levels of violent crime in the City of Rochester. This was done by examining crime rates for murder and aggravated assault in the City of Rochester before and after the SPI project was implemented. Figure 1 displays total amounts of murder and aggravated assault from July of 2012 to April of 2015. The dispute project was officially implemented in July of 2014. The findings reported in Figure 1 show that the implementation of the SPI dispute project did not reduce overall levels of violence in the City of Rochester. There are several plausible reasons why the dispute project did not reduce overall rates of crime in the City of Rochester. First, many high risk disputes were not targeted because both sides of the dispute were not known. Second, the most high risk disputes were less likely

<sup>6</sup> Additionally, in models not reported here we found that the neither intervention levels nor risk assessment scores could account for variation in violence for disputes that were 1 standard deviation above mean levels of violence. This may be due to the fact that only 2% of all cases were 1 standard deviation above mean levels of violence.

to receive an intervention than less high risk disputes. 38% (12 out of 31) of disputes that scored 1 standard deviation above mean levels of the risk assessment were targeted for an intervention, while 52% (93 out of 178) of cases that did not score 1 standard deviation above mean levels of the risk assessment were targeted for an intervention. Third, the dispute intervention strategies utilized were not adequate to reduce levels of violence in the dispute.

### **Integration and Sustainability**

The work put forth under the direction of this grant has led RPD to establish a strategic route to draw on the knowledge gained to better align intervention efforts for violent retaliatory disputes. The specific attention to violent retaliatory disputes had been underserved locally by past and present violence reduction initiatives. This project has expanded the capacity of the RPD to address violent disputes through the development of new data sources, the creation of new risk assessment tools, changes in the existing operational planning structure, and an investment in dedicated personnel. These additions have been integrated into daily operations and will remain beyond the terms of the grant.

The formalization of an intelligence gathering process for cultivating and analyzing intelligence on violent disputes has renewed RPD's commitment to addressing high-risk areas and offenders. The SPI project goals, objectives, and expectations were presented at quarterly supervisory meetings and field intelligence efforts were directed to line-level patrol officers. A multi-agency intelligence working group was implemented. This group shares and coordinates intelligence on current and potentially violent retaliatory disputes and involving representatives from: MCAC Analysts, RPD Field Intelligence Officers, RPD School Resource Officers, RPD Investigators, New York State Parole, Monroe County Probation, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, "Pathways to Peace" (City of Rochester Street Outreach Agency), RIT research partners, and representatives from local dispute mediation agency Center for Dispute Settlement (CDS). The group continues to meet on a weekly basis to review identified disputes, active response strategies, and new intelligence.

Personnel investments in the project, specifically the creation of the Dispute Analyst position and the managerial responsibility of the violent dispute based efforts, have remained supported by the RPD. Both of these roles have morphed over the courses of this project. The Dispute Analyst was originally supported through existing crime analysis personnel at MCAC and over the course of the project multiple analysts held this role. These temporary assignments were due to a number of factors



including promotions, realignment of responsibility, project focus, and “fit”. This semi-frequent change negatively impacted the project at various stages. Recognizing the importance of role to the success to the strategies, RPD permanently assigned a Special Investigations Section (SIS) Investigator to the MCAC as the Dispute Analyst. This new assignment combined with the MCAC’s existing real-time analytical support provided consistency to the role.

Similarly, the project management structure saw significant changes throughout the lifecycle of the grant. Originally proposed and accepted under the previous command administration, the project began under the supervisor of the Deputy Chief of Operations. In the transition to the current command administration the project was placed under the leadership of a then West Division Commander. In April 2015, the RPD underwent a department wide patrol reorganization, which eliminated the West Division Commander position. Ultimately, project accountability was stabilized through its current assignment under the Commander of Special Operations Division (SOD). Under the direction of the SOD Commander the program moved from the planning and pilot phases into citywide implementation. Additionally, the meeting structure was solidified and a majority of the operational action has been phased into the daily procedures since this change in leadership.

The typology analysis that led to the creation and maintenance of the Shooting Database provided contextual insight into the common precursors of violent disputes and the key variables to measure. The data and subsequent analysis have been used many times outside of the scope of this project to align with additional police-based responses to violence and to assist in maintaining strategic focus as RPD continually evaluates personnel and organizational structure. The RPD is in the initial stages of designing a workload assessment for field investigations. Violent dispute caseload prioritization will be a major influence on the eventual structure and expectations of the realigned investigative division. The data collected as part of this project will contribute to a data-driven examination of best practices, policy development, and continual assessment.

Central to the continual data collection and sharing efforts related to violent disputes are the risk assessment tools and the dispute database. The RPD has the capacity to conduct violent retaliatory dispute interventions similar to “violence interrupters”. Indeed, the current structure is ideal for such efforts due to the improved organizational strengths in intelligence-gathering, the organizational command structure necessary to implement our formal dispute risk assessment methodology, and the ability to rapidly deploy effective intervention and prevention tactics. RPD is committed to continue this approach to identify and intervene in violent disputes. The violent dispute risk assessment and intervention protocol occurs in four stages, all of which are captured and maintained in the dispute database.

- Stage 1: Field Level Assessment and Response

The goal of this stage is to provide a quick and immediate assessment of an event to make a rough estimate of the potential for retaliatory violence and, if the potential is substantial to develop an immediate response strategy. The Field-Level risk assessment should be initiated on scene, completed by officers and supervisors and reviewed and completed by the Department Duty Officer and forwarded to the Commander of SOD. If it is found that there is an immediate threat of retaliation the Duty Officer will assure that initial preventive strategies are implemented.

- Stage 2: Secondary Level Assessment and Intervention

This is a next-day follow-up to the Field-Level assessment and response. It should be completed whenever a Field-Level review determines there is reasonable potential for retaliatory violence. It should be completed by the Dispute Analyst in conjunction with the MCAC. It should then be forwarded up the chain of command to the initial supervisor, appropriate Captain and the Commander of SOD. If it is found that there is a substantial threat of retaliatory violence preventive strategies should be implemented and documented.

- Stage 3: Follow-up

This should occur at the weekly Dispute Meeting (within one week) of the Analyst-Level review and intervention and may reoccur as needed. This will involve the Command led review of the current status of the matter and the status and appropriateness of any strategies. The Dispute Analyst will provide a case synopsis and will be consulted regarding any additional events or other relevant information which may be useful.

- Stage 4: Assessment

When Command staff determine that additional follow-up processes are no longer needed, the Dispute Analyst will complete an assessment of the status of the situation, the impact of any strategies that were implemented and any additional information that came forward in the response to the events. All intervention strategies, responsibilities, and outcomes will be entered into the Dispute Database.

The results from the analysis of this project indicate that the knowledge base of the RPD has improved in regards to violent retaliatory disputes. The dispute assessment tools have been an effective predictor of identifying the likelihood that a dispute will be retaliatory in nature. A structure is now in place that facilitates review of these retaliatory violent disputes and disputants. Appropriate resources have been dedicated to ensure that the model is continued after the life of this grant. The RPD recognizes that it needs to improve on advancing the suite of existing police strategies utilized to reduce dispute-related violence beyond traditional enforcement based tactics and is committed to doing so.

## Conclusion

This project implemented an innovative, data driven approach to reducing levels of retaliatory violence in the City of Rochester. Based on in-depth quantitative and qualitative analyses of dispute-related violence in the City of Rochester, a violence risk-assessment tool was developed to guide RPD dispute-intervention strategies. To ensure that the violence risk-assessment tool was properly utilized, RPD assigned a dispute analyst to perform risk assessments of disputes and collect relevant data and intelligence. Weekly meetings were held to discuss dispute intervention strategies and review previously targeted disputes.

The implementation of the SPI project resulted in numerous changes in the manner that RPD responds to dispute-related violence. The dedication of the dispute analyst has increased support for data collection and analysis of dispute-related processes. Additionally, establishment of weekly dispute meetings has ensured that violence reduction strategies will be implemented at both the incident and dispute levels.

Thus far, the implementation of the project has not been found to reduce levels of violence. This may be due to the limited deviation from intervention strategies involving investigation and arrest, and the limited ability to track data and assess effects and outcomes. We are continuing to address these issues in hopes for more effective implementation of the project going forward.

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## **Appendix A: Examples of Potential Dispute Intervention Strategies**

### **Investigative Interventions** (focused on investigating dispute incidents to lead to arrest)

1. Prioritize Investigation at Section level by directing resources.
2. Refer to Special Investigations Section (SIS)
3. Work with Major Crimes
4. Jail Debrief of dispute participants and knowledgeable others
5. Monitor Jail calls
6. Monitor dispute participants' social media
7. Neighborhood or area canvass
8. Refer to School resource Officer (SRO) for additional information
9. Investigate Mental Health issues

### **Crossover Interventions** (enforcement action focused beyond the current dispute incidents)

10. Targeted enforcement on key individuals
11. Saturation patrol in dispute area
12. Probation or parole search
13. Consent search of parent's home
14. Warrant, DMV, checks
15. Support GPS for probationers, parolees
16. Property code residential or business enforcement
17. Social service check and related enforcement
18. SRO Knock and Talk
19. Dispute letter from Chief of Police
20. Mental Health arrest

### **Direct Prevention Interventions** (direct preventive action other than arrest related)

21. Police Knock and Talk
22. Refer to Pathways (street outreach)
23. Refer to Center for Dispute Settlement (CDS)
24. Engage significant others (family etc)
25. Active police mediation
26. Assist to relocate
27. Assist to negotiate or settle debts
28. Link to social services
29. Link to Rec Center or Boys Club
30. Focused Deterrence Call-in
31. Focused Deterrence Custom Notification

## Appendix A: Examples of Potential Dispute Intervention Strategies (cont.)

### RPD Leverage Sheet

Completed by \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**The goal of this sheet is to provide information which may be useful to officers in dealing identified individuals.**

Explain why this sheet was completed (example, subject is on major violator list, Call-in participant, involved in dispute, suspected in crime)

Name of Person \_\_\_\_\_ DOB \_\_\_\_\_ Number \_\_\_\_\_

Photo:

#### Criminal Justice Status

1. On Probation, Y N UNK. If yes... details, probation officer \_\_\_\_\_ search conditions
2. On Parole, Y N UNK . If yes... details, Parole Officer \_\_\_\_\_
3. Warrants, Y N UNK. If yes... details,
4. Wants, Y N UNK. If yes... details,
5. Gang/group affiliations Y N UNK, If yes... details,
6. Significant past or present codefendants Y N UNK. If yes... details,

#### Other influential people in the subject life

1. Any other known important associations, ex. family members and friends UNK If yes list details (ex friends parents, girlfriend, spouse, children)

#### Housing Status (note if no steady home)

1. Address UNK or list details,
2. Lives with others ... UNK. If yes list details,
3. own/rent- name of landlord Y N UNK.
4. Any other common addresses Y N UNK If yes list details.
5. Is Housing subsidized? Y N UNK If yes list details RHA Section 8

#### School Status

1. Currently Enrolled in School? Y N UNK (name of School),
2. Currently suspended? Y N UNK If yes list details

#### Current Employment status

1. Employed, Y N UNK Full time Part time Not Employed
2. job and location if employed UNK List details
3. Receiving Social Services? Y N UNK If yes list details

#### Driving record

1. Current License Y N UNK – number
2. Outstanding MV violations? Y N UNK – list
3. Vehicles owned or operated by subject Y N UNK If yes list details
4. Vehicles he/she is known to travel in Y N UNK If yes list details

**Additional Information.** Please provide any additional information you believe is relevant.



## Appendix B: Codebook of Rochester Shooting Database

# Rochester Shooting Victims Database

## Coding Manual

version: 3.7

updated: 8/7/13



### General Instructions:

---

This codebook is designed to describe the content, structure, and layout of the Monroe Crime Analysis Center's Shooting Database. Each of the five major tabs are broken down by section and variable. All variables are presented with a description, entry type, path (for automated features) and selection options. Efforts have been taken to standardize the selection options for each variable. Those options will be represented in list fashion where necessary. Free form text responses are indicated with [text] and date/number responses with [#] in the option portion. For all selection options that utilize a checkbox, a check indicates an affirmative response, a blank indicates a negative response and a grayed-out box indicates that no data was available. At the end of the codebook is a glossary of abbreviations utilized within. A short definition section is also included for terms that are not self-explanatory.

Any requests for changes should be submitted to both the MCAC Managing Analyst and the Technology Analyst.

## Incident Tab:

---

### A. Incident Information

#### A-1: Street Address

Description: Number and street name of where the shooting occurred  
Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source:

e:

RMS

Options: [text]

#### A-2: City

Description: City or town in which the shooting occurred  
Entry Type:

Path:

Source:

e:

RMS

Options: [text]

#### A-3: State

Description: State in which the shooting occurred  
Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source:

e:

RMS

Options: [text]

#### A-4: Zip Code

Description: Zip Code of shooting address

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

#### A-5: PSA

Description: RPD Police Service Area of the shooting address

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

#### A-6: Division

Description: RPD Patrol Division of the shooting address

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### A-7: Quadrant

Description: RPD Patrol Quadrant of the shooting address

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### A-8: Site

Description: Where the shooting initially occurred on the property (INDOOR= inside building); where the victim was when shot

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 INDOOR
- 2 OUTDOOR
- 3 UNDETERMINED

#### A-9: Location Type

Description: Type of location where the shooting occurred

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 SINGLE FAMILY HOME
- 2 MULTIPLE DWELING

- 3 RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
- 4 OTHER RESIDENTIAL
- 5 GARAGE OR SHED
- 6 TRANSIT FACILITY
- 7 GOVERNMENT OFFICE
- 8 SCHOOL
- 9 COLLEGE
- 10 CHURCH, TEMPLE, MOSQUE
- 11 HOSPITAL OR CLINIC
- 12 JAIL OR PRISON
- 13 PARKING GARAGE OR FACILITY
- 14 OTHER PUBLIC ACCESS BUILDING
- 15 AUTO SHOP OR REPAIR
- 16 FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
- 17 BARBER OR BEAUTY SHOP
- 18 HOTEL OR MOTEL
- 19 DRY CLEANER OR LAUNDRY
- 20 PROFESSIONAL OFFICE
- 21 DOCTORS OFFICE
- 22 OTHER BUSINESS OFFICE
- 23 AMUSEMENT CENTER
- 24 RENTAL STORAGE FACILITY
- 25 OTHER COMMERCIAL SERVICE LOCATION
- 26 BAR
- 27 BUY OR SELL OR TRADE SHOP
- 28 RESTAURANT
- 29 GAS STATION
- 30 AUTO SALES LOT
- 31 JEWELRY STORE
- 32 CLOTHING STORE
- 33 DRUG STORE
- 34 LIQUOR STORE
- 35 SHOPPING MALL
- 36 SPORTING GOODS
- 37 GROCERY OR SUPERMARKET
- 38 VARIETY OR CONVENIENCE STORE
- 39 DEPARTMENT OR DISCOUNT STORE
- 40 OTHER RETAIL STORE
- 41 FACTORY OR MILL OR PLANT
- 42 OTHER BUILDING
- 43 YARD
- 44 CONSTRUCTION SITE
- 45 LAKE OR WATERWAY
- 46 FIELD OR WOODS
- 47 STREET
- 48 PARKING LOT
- 49 PARK OR PLAYGROUND

- 50 CEMETERY
- 51 PUBLIC TRANSIT VEHICLE
- 52 OTHER OUTSIDE LOCATION
- 53 BIKE PATH

A- 10: Location Type Category

Description: Category of location where shooting occurred

Entry Type:

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 RESIDENTIAL
- 2 COMMERCIAL
- 3 OTHER

A- 11: Business Type

Description: Type of commercial establishment where the shooting occurred

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 FOOD
- 2 PAWN
- 3 BAR
- 4 LIQUOR
- 5 CONVENIENCE
- 6 GAS STATION
- 7 RETAIL
- 8 OFFICE
- 9 OTHER
- 10 UNKNOWN
- 11 N/A

A- 12: Business Name

Description: Name of commercial establishment where the shooting occurred

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

**B. Time Information**

B-1: Occur Date

Description: Date of shooting

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#/#/#/#/#]

B-2: Occur DOW

Description: Numerical day of week that the shooting occurred on

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

B-3: Occur Month

Description: Numerical month that the shooting occurred in

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

B-4: Occur Year

Description: Numerical year that the shooting occurred in

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [####]

B-5: Occur Time

Description: Time that the shooting occurred (military time); "time from" in CR

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [##:##]

B-6: 4 Hr. Block

Description: Segment of time that the shooting occurred in

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

01 03:00-06:59

02 07:00-10:59

03 11:00-14:59

04 15:00-18:59

05 19:00-22:59

06 23:00-02:59

B-7: Platoon

Description: RPD Platoon that the shooting occurred on

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

01 1

02 2

03 3

### C. Charge Information

#### C-1: Top Charge

Description: UCR Category of highest NYS PL charge based on UCR hierarchy

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### C-2: Charge Type

Description: Typology of the top charge

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

1 FELONY

2 MISDEMEANOR

#### C-3: Charge Class

Description: NYS PL Class of the top charge

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

1 A

2 B

3 C

4 D

5 E

6 F

#### C-4: Penal Code

Description: NYS PL Code of the top charge

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

#### C-5: Jurisdiction

Description: LE department that completed the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 RPD
- 2 MCSO
- 3 NYS
- 4 PAROLE
- 5 PROBATION
- 6 OTHER

#### C-6: Case Status

Description: RPD internal case tracking

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 CLOSED BY INVESTIGATION/OFFICED
- 2 CLEARED
- 3 UNFOUNDED
- 4 WARRANT ADVISED
- 5 FIELD FOR INVESTIGATION

#### C-7: Clearance Type

Description: Method of Clearance

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 ARREST- ADULT
- 2 ARREST- JUVENILE
- 3 PROSECUTION DECLINED
- 4 DEATH OF OFFENDER
- 5 VICTIM UNCOOPERATIVE
- 6 JUVENILE DIVERSION / NO COURT REFERRAL (JUVENILE)
- 7 EXTRADITION DENIED
- 8 UNFOUNDED
- 9 WARRANT ADVISED
- 10 CLOSED
- 11 UNKNOWN
- 12 NOT REPORTED
- 13 MP CLOSED
- 14 INVESTIGATION PENDING

#### C-8: DA Case Disposition

Description: DA internal Case status



Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: DA RMS

Options:

01 List from DA

#### **D. Additional Location Information**

##### D-1: Census Group

Description: Group level based on the US Census Group

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

##### D-2: Census Block

Description: Block level based on the US Census Group

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

##### D-3: Census Tract

Description: Tract level based on the US Census Group

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

##### D- 4: Zoning

Description: Property designation based on COR zoning regulations

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS, [geo.cityofrochester.gov](http://geo.cityofrochester.gov)

Options:

1	RESIDENTIAL
2	COMMERCIAL
3	INDUSTRIAL
4	OTHER
5	UNKNOWN

##### D- 5: MC Landlord (to be completed only if Zoning is RESIDENTIAL)

Description: Whether the property owner is a Monroe County resident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: COR Property Information Website

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

D- 6: Rochester Landlord (to be completed only if Zoning is RESIDENTIAL) Description: Whether the property owner is a COR resident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: COR Property Information Website

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

D- 7: Property Status

Description: Whether the property was inhabited at time of shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 VACANT
- 2 OCCUPIED
- 3 UNKNOWN

D- 8: Occupancy Type (to be completed only if Property Status is OCCUPIED) Description: Status of current resident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: COR Property Information Website, RMS

## Options:

- 1 OWNER
- 2 RENTER
- 3 UNKNOWN

## E. Miscellaneous

E- 1: # Persons Involved

Description: Sum of the number of shooting victims (fatal and non-fatal) and offenders listed on the original crime reports (CR & IAR's). (Additional LE personnel are included if they fired weapons)

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

## E-2: # Fatal

Description: Count of Fatal shooting victims

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

## E-3: # NonFatal

Description: Count of Non-Fatal shooting victims

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

## E-4: Suspect Shot

Description: Whether the suspect was also shot during incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

## E-5: Suspect Shot By (Only to be completed if Suspect Shot is YES)

Description: By whom was the offender shot

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| 1 | LAW ENFORCEMENT      |
| 2 | VICTIM               |
| 3 | ASSOCIATE OF VICTIM  |
| 4 | ASSOCIATE OF SUSPECT |
| 5 | UNRELATED BYSTANDER  |
| 6 | OTHER                |
| 7 | UNKNOWN              |
| 8 | N/A                  |

## E-6: Situation

Description: Adversarial relationship breakdown of victim/s and offender/s

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |                                  |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 1 | SINGLE VICTIM/SINGLE OFFENDER    |
| 2 | SINGLE VICTIM/MULTIPLE OFFENDERS |

- 3 SINGLE VICTIM/UNKNOWN NUM OF OFFENDERS
- 4 MULTIPLE VICTIMS/SINGLE OFFENDER
- 5 MULTIPLE VICTIMS/MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
- 6 MULTIPLE VICTIMS/UNKNOWN NUM OF OFFENDERS

E-7: # Offenders

Description: Count of Suspects listed on the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

E-8: # Witnesses

Description: Count of Witnesses listed on the original crime report, or identified as being present at scene at the time of the shooting (does not include shooting victims or suspects)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

E-9: # Firearms

Description: Count of all firearms present at the shooting according to the original crime report (LE-possessed counted only if discharged)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

E-10: # Other Weapons

Description: Count of all Weapons (as defined in NYS PL) present at the shooting according to the original crime report excluding firearms.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

E-11: # Juveniles

Description: Count of Juvenile (under 16 yrs. old as defined in NYS PL) victims (fatal and non-fatal) and offenders listed on the original crime report.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

## E-12: # Shots (Total)

Description: Count of total number of shots fired during incident, including LE. (lowest commonly reported number). If # of casings recovered is **higher** than # otherwise reported, use the number of casings recovered

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

## E- 3: Gang Territory

Description: Whether the shooting occurred in a known gang location

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gang Database, ARCgis, RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

## E- 4: Drug Location

Description: Whether the address of the shooting has had 2 or more drug related contacts (CR, IAR, FIF's) in the 12 months prior to the incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: ARCgis, RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

## E- 5: Contacts 6 Months

Description: Whether the address is an offense location on official RPD documents (CRs, IARs & FIFs) within six months prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

## E- 6: CFS 6 Months

Description: Whether a documented CFS originated from the address within six months prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: CFS (Search by Date between, House # equal to, and Street Name begins with)

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

E- 7: CFS for Incident

Description: Whether a CFS (other than SPOTA) was documented for the shooting. Whether a 911 call was made to report the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: CFS (Search by Date equal to, Time between, and PSA equal to)

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

E- 8: Shotspotter

Description: Whether Shotspotter registered the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Shotspotter

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

E- 9: How Found

Description: How the shooting incident first became known to LE

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 911 CALL
- 2 ON PATROL
- 3 OFFICER NOTIFIED BY BYSTANDER
- 4 SHOTSPOTTER ACTIVATION
- 5 HOSPITAL
- 6 OTHER

E- 0: First Responder

Description: First agency to respond to the shooting scene (Scene= location or victim)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 RPD
- 2 MCSO
- 3 NYSP
- 4 EMS
- 5 FIRE DEPARTMENT
- 6 HOSPITAL
- 7 OTHER

## E- 1: Near City Camera

Description: Whether shooting occurred in the vicinity of an overt RPD camera

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: ArcGIS

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## E- 2: Reporter

Description: By whom the initial notification was made to authorities

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 VICTIM
- 2 OFFENDER
- 3 NON-RELATED, UNINVOLVED WITNESS
- 4 FRIEND OF VICTIM
- 5 FAMILY OF VICTIM
- 6 FAMILY OF OFFENDER
- 7 FRIEND OF OFFENDER
- 8 OFFICER ON DUTY
- 9 OFFICER OFF DUTY
- 10 OTHER
- 11 UNKNOWN

## E- 3: Suspect Info

Description: Whether any descriptive information about the suspect was given in the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**E- 4: EMS Present**

Description: Whether EMS responded to the shooting scene (Scene= location or victim, before arrival at initial hospital)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**E-25: Shot at Residence**

Description: Whether the shooting address is the victim's home address; whether the shooting occurred at the residence of a victim in the incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 4 YES
- 5 NO
- 6 UNKNOWN

**E- 6: Shot at Work**

Description: Whether the shooting address is the victim's work address and/or the victim was shot while working their legitimate job

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**E-27: Notes**

Description: Place to document any additional information

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: All

Options: [text]

**E-28: Coder**

Description: Unique name or given ID of the individual entering the incident into the database

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: All

Options: [Custom]



## Reports Tab:

---

### F-1: CR

Description: Crime report number

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

### F-2: Primary CR

Description: Lead CR for the Incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

### F-3: Date

Description: Date the shooting was reported

Entry Type: Automatic

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

### F-4: Time

Description: Time the shooting was reported

Entry Type: Automatic

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

### F-5: Link

Description: Hyperlink to CR

Entry Type: Automatic

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

## Persons Tab:

---

**\*Number of Victim and Suspect entries should equal numbers entered for E-2, E-3 and E-7**

### G. Primary Information

#### G-1: Person Type

Description: Individual relationship to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | VICTIM  |
| 2 | SUSPECT |

#### G-2: CR

Description: CR the individual is linked to

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

#### G-3: Last Name

Description: Last name of the individual

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### G-4: First Name

Description: First name of the individual

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### G-5: Middle Initial

Description: Middle initial of the individual

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### G-6: Alias

Description: Nickname or other identified name of individual. Separate by a comma for multiple

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS, County Jail Booking, Gang Database, Social Media

Options: [text]

G-7: MoRIS

Description: Monroe County Jail booking ID

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking

Options: [#]

G-8: DOB

Description: Date of Birth

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

G-9: Lefty

Description: Whether the individual was left-hand dominant as indicated by the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

G-10: Age

Description: Age of individual at time of shooting. If no Suspect DOB given, write midpoint of age range

Entry Type: Automatic

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#] or [##-##]

G- 11:

Race

Description: Race of the individual as it appears on the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |                        |
|---|------------------------|
| 1 | ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER |
| 2 | BLACK                  |

- 3 AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKAN NATIVE
- 4 OTHER
- 5 WHITE
- 6 UNKNOWN

#### G- 12: Sex

Description: Gender of the individual

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 MALE
- 2 FEMALE
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### G- 3: Ethnicity

Description: Ethnicity of the individual as it appears on the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 NON-HISPANIC
- 2 HISPANIC
- 3 UNKNOWN

### H. Miscellaneous

#### H-1: Street Address

Description: Reported house number and street name of where the individual was residing around the time of the incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#][*street name*][*street type*]

Street type format: *Ave. Blvd. Cir. Dr. Ln. Pk. Pl. Rd. St. Ter.*

#### H-2: City

Description: Reported city or town of where the individual was residing at the time of the incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### H-3: State

Description: Reported state of where the individual was residing at the time of the incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text]

#### H-4: Residence Type

Description: Type of location of reported residence

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: COR Property Information Website, RMS

Options:

- 1 SINGLE FAMILY HOME
- 2 MULTIPLE DWELLING (multiplex, apartment building)
- 3 RESIDENTIAL FACILITY (public housing, group home, halfway house)
- 4 OTHER RESIDENTIAL

#### H-5: Rochester Resident

Description: Whether the individual's home address is within the boundaries of the City of Rochester  
(May be different than address used in H-1 through H-3)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: COR Property Information Website, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-6: MC Resident

Description: Whether the individual's home address is within Monroe County (May be different than  
address used in H-1 through H-3)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC County Clerk, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-7: NYS Resident

Description: Whether the individual's home address is within New York State (May be different than  
address used in H-1 through H-3)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES

- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-8: Homeless

Description: Whether the individual is reported to be homeless

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-9: Birthplace

Description: As indicated by self-reported fields on official LE documents

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: If in the US; [*City, 2-letter State abbrev.*]  
If outside US; [*City, Country*]

#### H-10: Martial Status

Description: As indicated by self-reported fields on original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 SINGLE
- 2 MARRIED
- 3 DIVORCED
- 4 WIDOWED

#### H-11: Pregnant

Description: As indicated by self-reported fields on original crime report. For males, leave blank. For females, mark "NO" if no indication of pregnancy is reported

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-12: Gang Affiliation

Description: Known to LE as a Gang Member/Associate prior to shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gang Database, NYSPIN

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-13: Gang Name

Description: Gang the individual is known to associate with

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gang Database

Options: [dropdown linked to gang database]

#### H-14: # FIFs in prior 6 mo.

Description: Count of FIFs in 6 months prior to shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

#### H-15: # Arrests in prior 6 mo.

Description: Count of Arrests in 6 months prior to shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [#]

#### H-16: CPS

Description: Whether the individual has an active case with CPS

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: CPS, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-17: Strangers

Description: Whether the victim and suspect were strangers prior to the shooting. If there is any LE-documented indication that the individuals knew each other personally, had any prior interaction, or knew *of* the other person, code "NO." If there is no indication of any of the above, code "YES." Only code "UNKNOWN" if the victim did not see the shooter and no suspect was identified. (Can be coded differently for each victim or suspect)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## H-18: Family

Description: Whether the victim and suspect are related

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## H-19: Family Type

Description: Nature of familial relationship of the individual

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:

- 1 N/A
- 2 PARENT
- 3 CHILD
- 4 SIBLING
- 5 GRANDCHILD
- 6 GRANDPARENT
- 7 IN-LAW
- 8 STEPPARENT
- 9 STEPCHILD
- 10 CHILD OF S'S BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND
- 11 INTIMATE PARTNER OF S'S PARENT
- 12 FOSTER CHILD
- 13 FOSTER PARENT
- 14 OTHER FAMILY MEMBER
- 15 UNKNOWN
- 16 MISSING
- 17 COUSIN

## H-20: Romantic Relationship

Description: Whether the victim and suspect are or ever were involved in a romantic relationship, as indicated by LE documentation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

## Options:



- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-21: Romantic Type

Description: Type of romantic relationship the victim and suspect are involved in as indicated by LE documentation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 UNKNOWN
- 2 OTHER
- 3 EX-GIRLFRIEND/EX-BOYFRIEND
- 4 GIRLFRIEND/BOYFRIEND
- 5 EX-SPOUSE
- 6 SPOUSE

#### H-22: Other Relationship

Description: Whether the victim and suspect are personally acquainted but not by family or romance

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-23: Past Co-Victimization

Description: Whether the victim and suspect have any LE documentation as victims in the same incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-24: Past Co-Offending

Description: Whether the victim and suspect have any documentation as offenders in the same incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

H-25: Repeat Victim of Suspect (Only coded if the Person Type is VICTIM)

Description: Whether the shooting victim has any LE documentation as a victim of the same suspect

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

H-26: Past Victim of Victim (Only coded if the Person Type is SUSPECT)

Description: Whether the shooting suspect has any LE documentation as a victim of the victim of this incident

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

H-27: Incident to Residence Distance

Description: Distance (in feet) from the individual's reported home address on the original crime report and the incident location. This will be measured using ARCGIS in the straightest possible line regardless of impediments

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: ARCGis

Options: [#]

H-28: Conflict History

Description: Any LE documentation prior to the shooting that there was a conflict between the victim and suspect. If S is not known, code NO.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES

2 NO

H-29: Taken to Hospital

Description: Whether the individual was taken to the hospital

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

H-30: Hospital Name (only coded if Taken to Hospital is YES)

Description: Name of the first hospital the individual was taken to

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 STRONG MEMORIAL
- 2 HIGHLAND
- 3 ROCHESTER GENERAL
- 4 UNITY ST. MARYS
- 5 OTHER
- 6 UNKNOWN

H-31: Mode to Hospital (only coded if Taken to Hospital is YES)

Description: Method of transportation to hospital. If R/O only mentions "transported to...", assume EMS.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 EMS
- 2 POLICE
- 3 FRIEND
- 4 FAMILY
- 5 WITNESS (uninvolved& unrelated)
- 6 SELF
- 7 OTHER

H-32: Critical Condition

Description: Whether the hospital admits the individual in critical condition as indicated on the original crime report.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### H-33: Death Date

Description: Date the individual was pronounced dead

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [##/##/####]

#### H-34: Death Place

Description: Location where the individual was pronounced dead

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 HOSPITAL INPATIENT (after 24 hours; ICU, etc.)
- 2 ED/OUTPATIENT (less than 24 hours)
- 3 DEAD ON ARRIVAL (of first responder)
- 4 AMBULANCE
- 5 OTHER
- 6 UNDETERMINED

### I. Shot Information

**\*Only mark entry point of each projectile**

#### I-1: Face

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the face  
Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source:

RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-2: Head/Neck

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the head or neck (excluding the face)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source:

RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-3: Upper Ext

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the upper extremities (shoulders, arms, hands, fingers)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-4: Thorax

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the chest/torso/thorax

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-5: Abdomen

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the abdomen

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-6: Spine/Back

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the spine/back

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-7: Pelvis

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the pelvis/hip/buttocks

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-8: Lower Ext

Description: Whether the individual was shot in the lower extremities (legs, knees, ankles, feet, toes)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-9: Fatality

Description: Whether the individual was fatally injured as a result of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-10: Self-Inflicted

Description: Whether the shooting was determined to be self-inflicted as indicated by LE documentation. If the assault charge is **not** unfounded and the injury is speculated to be self-inflicted but V does not admit, leave "UNKNOWN"

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-11: Suicide

Description: Whether the shooting was fatal and determined to be self-inflicted as indicated by LE documentation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### I-12: # Strikes

Description: Count of unique entry wounds (i.e. # of shots fired that connected with victim's flesh)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [#]

### J. Background

#### J-1: Criminal History

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for a misdemeanor or felony level crime prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### J-2: Parole

Description: Whether the individual was an active NYS Parolee at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS Parole, NYS DOC

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### J-3: Parole Prior

Description: Whether the individual had ever been on NYS Parole prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS Parole, NYS DOC

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### J-4: Probation

Description: Whether the individual was an active Probationer in NYS at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC Probation

Options: [checkbox]

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### J-5: Probation Prior

Description: Whether the individual had ever been on Probation in NYS prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC Probation

Options: [checkbox]

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### J-6: Active Warrant

Description: Whether the individual had an active Warrant in Monroe County at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking

Options: [checkbox]

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### J-7: MHA

Description: Whether the individual had ever had a Mental Hygiene Arrest prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### J-8: Alcohol Arrest

Description: Whether the individual had any previous alcohol-related arrests prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]



- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-9: Substance Possession**

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for Controlled Substance Possession (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-10: Substance Sale**

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for Controlled Substance Sales (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-11: Marijuana Possession**

Description: Whether the individual had ever been cited for Marijuana Possession (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-12: Marijuana Sale**

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for Marijuana Sales (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO

## 3 UNKNOWN

## J-13: Handicap

Description: Whether the individual had a physical or mental handicap as indicated by LE documentation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-14: Domestic Abuse

Description: Whether the individual had ever been listed as a victim or suspect on a NYS DIR prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS, DIR

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-15: Previous Shooting Vic.

Description: Whether the individual had previously ever been the victim of a shooting injury

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-16: Violent Victimization

Description: Whether the individual had ever been the victim of a violent crime (as defined by the NYS PL; defined in appendix) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-17: Violent Arrest

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested or received a juvenile diversion for a violent crime (as defined by the NYS PL; defined in appendix) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-18: Prior CPW

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for Criminal Possession of a Weapon (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-19: Prostitution

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested for Prostitution related offense (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## J-20: Property Victimization

Description: Whether the individual had ever been the victim of a property crime (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-21: Property Arrest**

Description: Whether the individual had ever been arrested or received a juvenile diversion for a property crime (as defined by the NYS PL) prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: NYS DOC, County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

**J-22: Pawn History**

Description: Whether the individual had ever conducted a documented local pawn or 2<sup>nd</sup> hand transaction prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: LEADS

Options: [checkbox]

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

## Weapon Tab:

---

**\*For multiple listed firearms, make note of injuring firearm using format in “Coding Guidelines”**

### K-1: Type

Description: Type of firearm (as defined in NYS PL) **discharged** in shooting. If only identified as “long gun” choose RIFLE and make note of “long gun” in Notes section

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| 1 | RIFLE                          |
| 2 | SHOTGUN                        |
| 3 | PISTOL (includes all handguns) |
| 4 | UNKNOWN                        |

### K-2: Make/Model

Description: The firearm manufacturer’s make and model name

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options: [text text]

### K-3: Caliber

Description: The approximate internal diameter of the barrel of the firearm

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |    |         |
|----|---------|
| 01 | UNKNOWN |
| 02 | BB      |
| 03 | 10      |
| 04 | 12      |
| 05 | 16      |
| 06 | 17      |
| 07 | 20      |
| 07 | 22      |
| 08 | 222     |
| 09 | 223     |
| 10 | 25      |
| 11 | 25-06   |
| 12 | 270     |
| 13 | 28      |
| 14 | 30      |
| 15 | 30-06   |
| 16 | 30-30   |

17	300
18	303
19	308
20	32
21	35
22	357
23	38
24	380
25	40
26	41
27	410
28	44
29	45
30	45-70
31	5.56
32	50
33	7
34	7.62X39
35	7.63X54
36	7.65
37	9
38	OTHER

#### K-4: Gun Recovered - Scene

Description: Whether the firearm was located at shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### K-5: Gun Recovered - Investigation

Description: Whether the firearm was located during the course of the investigation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### K-6: Live Ammunition Recovered

Description: Whether any live ammunition was located at the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-7: Casing or Bullet Recovered

Description: Whether any spent ammunition was found from the shooting (parts or whole). Includes any bullets, fragments, pellets, etc. physically recovered from the victim.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-8: Gun Trace

Description: Whether a gun trace was conducted on the recovered firearm

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gun Tracking Database

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-9: Ballistic Match

Description: Whether the firearm was matched to any other incidents by the Monroe County Crime Lab

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC Crime Lab

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-10: Legally Possessed

Description: Whether the firearm was legally possessed (as defined by NYS PL) at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC County Clerk, NYSP Pistol Permits Office

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-11: Permit

Description: Whether the firearm was documented on a NYS Pistol Permit at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC County Clerk, NYSP Pistol Permits Office

Options:

- 1 UNKNOWN
- 2 NO
- 3 YES
- 4 NA

#### K-12: Stolen

Description: Whether the firearm was documented as Stolen on an official crime report prior to the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gun Tracking Database, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-13: Crime Gun

Description: Whether the firearm was categorized as a Crime Gun by RPD upon recovery

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gun Tracking Database, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### K-14: Owner is

Description: Who was the legal owner of the firearm used in the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: MC County Clerk, NYSP Pistol Permits Office, RMS

Options:

- 1 VICTIM



- 2 VICTIM'S FRIEND
- 3 VICTIM'S FAMILY
- 4 OFFENDER
- 5 OFFENDER'S FRIEND
- 6 OFFENDER FAMILY
- 7 STRANGER
- 8 LAW ENFORCEMENT
- 9 OTHER
- 10 UNKNOWN

K-15: Notes (weapons only)

Description: Place to document any additional information

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: All

Options: [text]

## Circumstance Tab:

---

### L-1: During Another Crime

Description: Whether the shooting occurred during the commission of another crime. If crime is listed in charges, mark "YES." If not listed in CR, use discretion

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

### L-2: Crime Precipitated

Description: Whether the shooting occurred immediately after the commission of another crime (immediately= within 1 hour)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

### L-3: Nature of Other Crime (only to be completed if During Another Crime or Crime Precipitated are YES)

Description: Crime category of the other crime committed. If L-1 and L-2 are both YES and are different crime types, mark the crime category using the crime of L-1.

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 DRUG TRADE
- 2 ROBBERY
- 3 BURGLARY
- 4 LARCENY
- 5 MVT
- 6 ARSON
- 7 RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT
- 8 GAMBLING
- 9 PROSTITUTION, COMMERCIALIZED VICE
- 10 ASSAULT, HOMICIDE
- 11 WITNESS INTIMIDATION/ELIMINATION
- 12 OTHER
- 13 UNKNOWN
- 14 N/A

#### L-4: Victim Aggressor

Description: Whether the victim was the initial aggressor in the incident (threats, aggression, or physical attacks), and gets shot as a result

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-5: Dispute Related

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of a dispute- regardless of dispute type or duration. If there is no documented indication of a dispute, or the possibility of relating to a dispute has been discredited, mark "NO"

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-6: Dispute \$/Prop/Drugs

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of a dispute over money, property or drugs

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-7: Romantic Dispute

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of a romantic dispute

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1 | YES |
| 2 | NO  |

### 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-8: Domestic

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of a dispute between members of the same household, family, or between co-habiting intimate partners

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-9: Intimate Partner Violence

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of a dispute between intimate partners

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-10: Other Conflict

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of conflict not defined in L6-L8

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-11: Drug Trade

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that any circumstances of the shooting are related to the illegal drug trade

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1 | YES |
|---|-----|

- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

L-12: Victim Alcohol Intoxication

Description: Whether the victim was intoxicated by alcohol during the shooting as indicated in the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

L-13: Victim Drug Intoxication

Description: Whether the victim was intoxicated by drugs during the shooting as indicated in the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

L-14: Victim Drug Type (to be completed only if Victim Drug Intoxication is YES)

Description: Type of drug the victim was intoxicated by

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- NONE
- 2 MARIJUANA
- 3 SYNTHETIC MARIJUANA
- 4 COCAINE
- 5 HEROIN
- 6 METHAMPHETAMINE
- 7 BATH SALTS
- 8 PRESCRIPTION DRUG
- 9 LSD/MUSHROOMS
- 10 ECSTASY
- 11 OTHER
- 12 UNKNOWN

#### L-15: Offender Alcohol Intoxication

Description: Whether the offender was intoxicated by alcohol during the shooting as indicated in the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-16: Offender Drug Intoxication

Description: Whether the offender was intoxicated by drugs during the shooting as indicated in the original crime report

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-17: Offender Drug Type (to be completed only if Offender Drug Intoxication is YES)

Description: Type of drug the offender was intoxicated by

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 NONE
- 2 MARIJUANA
- 3 SYNTHETIC MARIJUANA
- 4 COCAINE
- 5 HEROIN
- 6 METHAMPHETAMINE
- 7 BATH SALTS
- 8 PRESCRIPTION DRUG
- 9 LSD/MUSHROOMS
- 10 ECSTASY
- 11 OTHER
- 12 UNKNOWN

#### L-18: Gang Involvement

Description: Whether the victim or suspect was known to Law Enforcement as a gang member/associate prior to the shooting, or if the intended target or suspects are identified as being involved in a specific gang

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: Gang Database

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-19: Hate Crime

Description: Whether the circumstances of the shooting determine it is a Hate Crime in accordance with NYS PL

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-20: Mutual Physical Fight

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the victim and suspect were engaged in a mutual physical fight immediately preceding the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-21: Brawl

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that more than two individuals were involved in a physical fight immediately preceding the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-22: Intimidation

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that the shooting occurred as a result of an intimidation attempt of a witness to a previous crime or police cooperator

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-23: Victim Bystander

Description: If any LE-documented indication exists that any victim of the shooting was not the intended target of the shooting and not involved in the dispute

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-24: Victim had Weapon

Description: Any LE-documented indication that the victim was in possession of a weapon (as defined in the NYS PL) at the time of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-25: Drive By

Description: Any LE-documented indication that a firearm was discharged from a moving motor vehicle (includes running vehicles at stoplight or stopped temporarily)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

#### L-26: Sex Assault

Description: Any LE-documented indication that the shooting occurred as a result of a previous sexual assault or rape (as defined by NYS PL)



Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-27: Self-Defense

Description: Any LE-documented indication that the shooting occurred as a result of the S responding to an immediate physical attack from the V

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

#### L-28: Contract

Description: Whether the shooting occurred as a result of an illegal agreement

Entry Type:

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |          |
|---|----------|
| 1 | YES      |
| 2 | NO       |
| 3 | UNKNOWN  |
| 4 | POSSIBLE |

#### L-29: Rental Car

Description: Whether a rental car was involved in the shooting. (Involved= used by V or S during incident events, used in transporting involved persons, struck by gunfire, or seen fleeing from scene)

Entry Type:

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- |   |         |
|---|---------|
| 1 | YES     |
| 2 | NO      |
| 3 | UNKNOWN |

## Investigation Tab:

---

**\*For multiple S's, use information from whomever went the furthest in the judicial process**

### M-1: Suspect Identified

Description: Whether an individual was identified as an offender in the shooting investigation

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

### M-2: Suspect Arrested

Description: Whether an individual was arrested for the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

### M-3: Arrest Date (to be completed only if Suspect Arrested is YES)

Description: Initial date a suspect was apprehended in relation to the case

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, RMS

Options: [#]

### M-4: Suspect Convicted (to be completed only if Suspect Arrested is YES)

Description: Whether a suspect was convicted of the shooting

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

### M-5: Convicted Charge (to be completed only if Suspect Convicted is YES)

Description: Top Charge the suspect was convicted of (as defined by NYS PL)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

M-6: Conviction Date (to be completed only if Suspect Convicted is YES)

Description: Top Charge the suspect was convicted of (as defined by NYS PL)

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

M-7: Plea Bargain (to be completed only if Suspect Convicted is YES)

Description: Whether the suspect was allowed to plea to a lesser charge in exchange for an admission of guilt

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options:

- 1 YES
- 2 NO
- 3 UNKNOWN

M-8: Sentence (to be completed only if Suspect Convicted is YES)

Description: The offender's penalty for conviction. Copied directly as written in MoRIS or Intellibooks

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [text]

M-9: Sentence Date (to be completed only if Suspect Convicted is YES)

Description: Date the suspect was sentenced

Entry Type: Manual

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

M-10: Time Incident to Arrest

Description: Count of days between event date and arrest date

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

M-11: Time Incident to Conviction

Description: Count of days between event date and conviction date

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

M- 12: Time Incident to Sentence

Description: Count of days between event date and sentence date

Entry Type: Automated

Path:

Source: County Jail Booking, DA RMS

Options: [#]

## Coding Guidelines:

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- **Shooting Incidents/Victims** include all fatal and nonfatal (self-inflicted and other) GSW injuries. BB gun injuries and suspected fragment injuries are included only if the charge is Assault 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup>
- **Incident, Circumstance, and Investigation** tabs should have only one (1) entry for each incident
- **Victims, Suspects, and Weapon** tabs may have more than one entry per incident if applicable
- **Code “UNKNOWN” only when necessary-** When insufficient information is given to answer what is being asked
- If GSW victims **shot at each other** and no clear offending side can be determined, enter each victim/shooter in both the Victim and Suspect Tabs
- **For unfounded and/or admitted self-inflicted cases, skip:** E-4 to E-7, E-23, H-17 to H-26, H-28, all of Suspect Tab, L-15 to L-17, and all of Investigation Tab
- **For Previous Shooting Vic. and previous suspects of shootings:** Make note in Incident Tab in the format: “[V. or S.] [name] previous [victim of, suspect in, arrested for ] shooting on [date] (CR# [CR#])”
  - Include **R.E. and PUW** in notes for involvement within 5 years of incident
- **Arrest History** includes arrests made at time of incident for previous warrants. Also includes conviction charges
- **For multiple weapons in Weapon Tab:** Make note in Weapons Tab under the firearm responsible for injury in the format of: “Injuring firearm of V. [name]”
  - For **two or more** firearms injuring the same victim, use format: “One of the injuring firearms of V. [name]”
  - If the injuring firearm is **not determined**, write under all potential injuring firearms: “Injuring firearm of V. [name] not determined”

## Abbreviations:

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A – Arrestee

CFS – Call for Service

COR – City of Rochester

CPS – Child Protective Services

CPW – Criminal Possession of Weapon

CR – Crime Report

DA – District Attorney

DIR – Domestic Incident Report

EMS – Emergency Medical Service  
 FIF – Field Information Form  
 GSW – Gunshot Wound  
 IAR – Investigative Action Report  
 LE – Law Enforcement  
 MHA – Mental Hygiene Arrest  
 MoRIS – Monroe Rochester Identification System  
 NYS – New York State  
 PK – Person with knowledge  
 PL – Penal Law  
 PSA – Police Service Area  
 PUW – Prohibited Use of a Weapon  
 RE– Reckless Endangerment  
 RMS – Records Management System  
 R/O – Reporting Officer  
 RPD – Rochester Police Department  
 S – Suspect  
 UCR – Uniform Crime Report  
 V – Victim

## **Definitions:**

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Cameras – Closed Circuit overt cameras operated by the Rochester Police Department

Critical Condition – Includes life-threatening injuries. Does not include Guarded Condition.

Dispute – Any grievance between individuals

LE-Documentation – Law Enforcement documents include any CR, IAR, FIF, or bulletin

Leads Online – A third party pawn and 2<sup>nd</sup> hand transaction management system

Legally Possessed – Illegal if handgun used by <21yoa; any firearm used by a convicted felon; any sawed-off gun; any handgun possessed by person w/o permit, among other NYSPL violations

Mental Handicap – Evidence that an individual has an abnormal mental condition. Includes autism, schizophrenia, etc.

MoRIS – The Monroe County Jail booking system

Offender – An individual that has been criminally charged for an offense resulting in a shooting victim

Original Crime Report – Original CR and IAR's written for the incident

Persons Tab – Both Victims and Suspects Tabs

Property Crime – Offenses that fall under the Burglary, Larceny (Grand & Petit), and Motor Vehicle Theft categories of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting system

Scene – The surrounding area where the incident occurred, anywhere a V goes before reaching a hospital, or anywhere a S goes up to 1 hour after the shooting

Shooting Victim – An individual whose flesh has been penetrated or grazed by a projectile discharged from a firearm. BB gunshot wounds are included if Assault 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> charge

Shotspotter – A third party gunshot location system utilized by the Rochester Police Department

Spent Ammunition – Any or all parts of a firearms cartridge that has been discharged from a firearm. Includes bullets, fragments, pellets, BBs, slugs, casings, shotgun wads, etc.

Suspect – An individual believed by law enforcement to have committed a crime that resulted in a shooting victim, who has not been criminally charged

Uniform Crime Reporting – FBI system for categorizing offenses known to law enforcement

Violent Crime – Offenses that fall under Murder, (nonnegligent) Manslaughter, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, and Menacing 2<sup>nd</sup> categories of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting system. Applicable charges fall under categories according to the PL at the time of the incident

Witness – A non-involved individual with pertinent investigative information related to a crime that results in a shooting victim

## **Accuracy Checks:**

1. The number of entries in Victims Tab should equal the sum of “#Fatal” and “#Nonfatal” in the Incident Tab
2. If “Mode to Hospital” in Persons Tab = EMS, then “EMS Present” in Incident Tab must = YES
3. Persons Tab: If “Parole”= YES, then “Parole Prior”= YES
4. Persons Tab: If “Probation”= YES, then “Probation Prior”= YES
5. Incident/Persons Tab: “# Strikes” in the Persons Tab must be less than or equal to “# Shots (Total)” in the Incident Tab
6. Weapon Tab: If both "Gun Recovered - Scene" and "Gun Recovered - Investigation"= NO, then leave "Gun Trace" and "Owner is" blank (unless owner of firearm is identified)
7. Weapon Tab: If "Gun Recovered - Scene" "Gun Recovered - Investigation" "LiveAmmunition Recovered" and "Casing or Bullet Recovered" = NO, then leave "Ballistic Match" blank
8. Circumstance Tab: Every field within the table should be coded either YES, NO, or NONE. Only “Gang Involvement” may be left blank if S is not identified, and “Offender Alcohol Intoxication”, “Offender Drug Intoxication”, and “Offender Drug Type” may be left blank if S is not seen.
9. Circumstance Tab: If “Dispute Related” = YES and “Dispute \$/Prop/Drugs”, “RomanticDispute”, “Domestic”, and “Intimate Partner Violence” = NO, then “Other Conflict” = YES. (“Other Conflict” may still be YES if other dispute types are also YES)
10. Investigation Tab: If “Suspect Identified”= NO, leave the rest of the fields in the table blank
11. Investigation Tab: If "Suspect Arrested"= NO, leave subsequent fields blank
12. Investigation Tab: If "Suspect Convicted"= NO, leave subsequent fields in the table blank except for "Time Incident to Arrest"



## Preliminary Descriptive Analysis of the Rochester Shooting Database



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## **Introduction**

The objective of this paper is to provide a description of the assault shootings and firearm homicides that occurred in Rochester, NY from January 1<sup>st</sup> 2010 to June 14<sup>th</sup> 2013. This objective will be attained by describing the results of the initial analysis of the Rochester Shooting Database (RSD). This initial description of the data focuses on 6 issues: the number, time, and place of shootings; situation and circumstance of shootings; weapon type; suspect characteristics, victim characteristics; and criminal justice outcomes. These variables were selected based on their relevance to the goals of the Smart Policing project and data availability. If there are any aspects of the data that are of interests to members of the steering committee, but not discussed here, please email us and we will be glad to provide a description of those indicators. The general take away from this discussion is that the majority of shooting incidents that occur in the city are dispute related and involve criminally involved young minority males as both victims and offenders. The next steps of this research are discussed in the concluding paragraph.

## **Number, Time, and Place of Shootings**

From January 1<sup>st</sup> 2010 to June 14, 2013 there were 539 shooting incidents in the city of Rochester. Because several shooting incidents had multiple victims, there were a total of 594 shooting victims during that period; 76 of whom were killed as a result of the incident. The total number of shooting incidents has fluctuated from year to year. There were 151, 129, and 193 shooting incidents in Rochester in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. By mid-year 2013, 66 shooting incidents had occurred in the city. Although shooting incidents tend to peak during summer months, there is substantial shooting activity throughout the year. For instance, 7% of all shootings that occurred during the study period took place in the month of December. Additionally, a disproportionate number of shootings occurred during weekends: close to half (48%) of all shooting incidents occurred on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Although the weekends are characterized by an uptick in violence, there is also substantial

shooting activity during the weekdays. When shootings do occur, they are most likely to take place at night. 63% of all shootings occurred between 7 pm and 3 am.


City shootings are concentrated by place. Five of the fourteen city zip codes—14605, 14608, 14609, 14611, and 14621—accounted for 74% of all shooting incidents. Relatedly, the 14621 zip code accounted for nearly 1/3 of all shootings (29.6%). 44.4% of all shootings occurred in the Northeast quadrant of the city, followed by Southwest quadrant (24.6%), the Northwest quadrant (22%), and the Southeast quadrant (8.1%). PSAs 24, 25, and 28 together accounted for just under a third (31.3%) of the shootings. 84% of these shootings took place in an outdoor setting; on the street, in a parking lot, yard, or some other outside location.

Rochester Shootings		
	2010-2012	
Zip Code	Number of Shootings	Percent of all Shootings
14604	7	1.3%
14605	57	10.6
14606	39	7.2
14607	8	1.5
14608	54	10
14609	59	11
14610	1	0.2
14611	73	13.6
14613	38	7.1
14615	10	1.9
14617	2	0.4
14619	29	5.4
14620	2	0.4
14621	159	29.6
Total	538	100%

#### Situation and Circumstances


Most of the shooting incidents in the dataset had only 2 or 3 participants. 50.2% of incidents had one victim with one offender and 29.4% had a single victim with multiple offenders. Conversely, only 3.3% of shooting incidents involved both multiple victims and multiple offenders. A total of 61.9% of shootings were carried out by one offender acting alone, and the next highest percentage of 25.4 involved 2 suspects, dropping down to 10% of shootings with 3-4 offenders. Nearly 63% of the shooting incidents had at least one witness present, and a single witness was present in a total of one-third of the incidents. Additionally, information on a suspect description was provided in 76% of all cases.

In regard to the underlying causes of shootings themselves, over half (58.1%) resulted from some type of dispute. Of these, 43% involved issues over money, property, and/or drugs, 6.4% were domestic-related, and around 15% were romantic-related. Overall, 24.1% of shooting incidents exhibited characteristics relating to the illegal drug trade, and just 2% of the shootings were between intimate partners. 49.1% of all incidents were identified as being gang-involved, while 21.9% of shootings were identified as **not** being gang-involved.




28% of shootings occurred in furtherance of another crime, with robbery being the most common at 17% overall, followed by activities relating to the drug trade at 3.5%, and burglary and gambling each at

2.2%. For the immediate circumstances of the incidents, 14.4% involved brawls or mutual physical fights, and 12% were carried out as a drive-by. Along the lines of victim behavior, 4.4% of the shootings were initiated by a victim aggressor, 6.7% involved victims in possession of a weapon at the time of the incident, and 17% of cases involved a victim who was an uninvolved bystander. Almost 9% of the time, victims were determined to be under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs when they were shot. A total of 1.3% of cases were determined to result from the application of self-defense.



### Weapon Use

As expected, handguns accounted for a disproportionately large proportion of shooting incidents. Among cases for which firearm data were available, 85.42% of shooting incidents involved handguns, while 8.85% involved shotguns, and 5.73% involved rifles. However, almost 30% of all weapons discharged in the incidents were of an undetermined firearm type. There was usually only one firearm present during each incident (84% of cases), and 2 firearms present around 12% of the time. Occasionally there were 3 firearms in an incident (2.2%), but more than that was a rarity, occurring only .97% of the time. In most cases, firearms were the only weapons found to be present in the incident. 74% of incidents documented between 1 and 4 shots fired. The most common number of shots fired during an incident was 1 (29% of cases), and the overall highest number of shots documented was 18.




Firearms were recovered in about 11.8% of cases. Of these cases, around 55% were recovered at the scene and 45% recovered during investigation. Spent ammunition was found at the scene of 58.5% of shootings and live ammunition was recovered in 7% of the shooting incidents. The most common calibers of weapons used were .22 and 9mm, accounting for over 21% of the identified firearms.

### **Suspect**


Suspect information was provided for 76% of all incidents. This suspect information is provided to RPD by witnesses and, as a result of this fact, is relatively vague. For those incidents in which suspect information was presented, black males were suspects in more than 90% of the shooting incidents. Because suspect information is limited, a detailed discussion of suspect characteristics is not possible at this time.

### **Victims**

The majority of shooting victims in the city of Rochester are young black males who have criminal records and reside in impoverished neighborhoods in the city. African Americans made up 85% of all shooting victims in Rochester during the study period. Combined, African Americans and Hispanics made up 96% of all shooting victims.



93% of the shooting victims were male. The average age of shooting victims was 25, and the overwhelming majority of shooting victims were above the age of 16. 87.5% of all shooting victims had a previous criminal history at the time of the shooting incident. 40% of victims had been cited for possession of an illicit substance. 37% of shooting victims had been arrested for a violent crime, and 46% had been arrested for a property crime. Although most of the victims were not gang affiliated, gang affiliates did make up a considerable percentage of shooting victims (37%). Importantly, 1/3 of all shooting victims previously had been victims of violent crime and 29% had been known victims of property crime.



#### Criminal Justice Investigation/ Outcomes

911 calls are the primary method that police are notified about shootings. In 55% of the incidents, police officials were informed about the shootings by an unknown informant or an uninvolved witness. Of the 331 cases for which there are data, 75 (23%) of shooting incidents occurred near a city camera. Shotspotter data were available for 147 (27%) of the shootings that occurred in the city. 226 (42%) of shooting victims had been mentioned in an FIF sometime during the six months prior to the shooting incident. To date, 246 of the shooting incidents have been cleared and another 167 have been closed by investigation. 188 shooting suspects have been identified; 112 of which have been arrested. Of those arrested, the average investigation time before arrest was 35 days. A significant proportion of these arrests were made within 48 hours of the incident. This suggests that, for those cases in which investigators are able to gather sufficient information regarding the suspect, arrests are often made shortly after the incident occurs. For most shooting suspects, trial time and sentence are currently unavailable. MCAC analysts are currently attempting to access this data from the District Attorney's office. Results of this data will be analyzed and reported once data become available.



**Next Steps**

The next steps in the analysis will proceed in the following manner. First, means tests of dispute-related shootings and non-dispute related shootings will be performed. These tests will inform us about how dispute-related shootings differ from non-dispute-related shootings in the categories discussed above. Second, regression analyses will be performed to identify those factors that cause dispute-related shootings. Third, factor analysis will be performed to determine if the variables that cause dispute-related shootings coalesce around a single factor.

## Appendix D: Analysis of Dispute-Related Shootings

Analysis of Dispute-Related Shootings



Irshad Altheimer Ph.D.

John Klofas Ph.D.

## Introduction

This paper examines dispute-related shootings in the City of Rochester. Two research questions are examined here. First, how do dispute-related shootings differ from non-dispute related shootings? Second, what factors predict the likelihood that a dispute-related shooting will occur? These questions will be addressed with an analysis of the Rochester Shooting Database (RSD).<sup>7</sup> The analysis will proceed in two steps. First, t-tests will be examined that compare dispute-related shootings and non-dispute related shootings across important predictors of crime. Second, a logistic regression analysis will explore the most important predictors of dispute-related shootings. The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of these findings for policy and practice.

## Comparing Shooting Types

The first step of the analysis is to compare dispute-related shootings and non-dispute related shootings across important predictors of crime. This will be achieved using t-tests. T-tests allow us to examine differences in mean levels of important predictors of violence by shooting type. In this analysis we are interested in determining if mean levels of important victim characteristics, victim outcomes, situational factors, and investigative factors differ between dispute-related shootings and non-dispute related shootings. The results from the t-test analysis are shown in Table 1. The table is organized in the following manner. Column 1 describes the variable(s) examined. Column 2 provides the mean value of that variable for dispute-related shootings. Column 3 describes the mean value of that variable for non-dispute-related shootings. Column 4 indicates whether there is a significant difference in mean levels of dispute-related and non-dispute-related shootings for that particular variable. A plus indicates

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<sup>7</sup> For more information about the development of the RSD see Dipoala et al. (2013), <http://www.rit.edu/cla/criminaljustice/sites/rit.edu.cla.criminaljustice/files/docs/WorkingPapers/2013/2013-03.pdf>

**Table 1. T-test Results for Dispute-Related Shootings**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Dispute Related</b>	<b>Non-Dispute Related</b>	<b>Significant</b>
<i>Victim Outcomes/Characteristics</i>			
Victim fatality	0.149	0.083	+
Number of fatalities	0.166	0.095	+
V1 prior parole	0.222	0.188	-
V1 criminal history	0.885	0.843	-
V1 substance possession	0.413	0.368	-
V1 substance sale	0.121	0.100	-
Violent arrest	0.395	0.360	-
Violent victimization	0.351	0.322	-
Victim Prior CPW	0.310	0.223	+
Property Victimization	0.282	0.277	-
Property Arrest	0.461	0.466	-
Gang Affiliation	0.388	0.332	-
Victim Drug Involvement	0.026	0.050	-
Victim Crime Propensity	0.041	-0.060	+
<i>Situational Factors</i>			
Victim and Suspect Strangers	0.378	0.844	+
Shooting at Known Drug Location	0.209	0.204	-
Crime Precipitated by other Criminal Event	0.095	0.120	-
Brawl	0.086	0.017	+
Self-defense	0.017	0.008	-
During Another Crime	0.158	0.318	+
Victim had Weapon	0.086	0.050	-
Victim Aggressor	0.063	0.018	+
Domestic	0.054	0.004	+
Romantic	0.144	0.004	+
Drug Trade	0.292	0.161	+
Conflict History	0.127	0.009	+
<i>Investigative Factors</i>			
No. FIFs in Last 6 months	1.103	0.975	-
No. Contacts in Last 6 months	0.542	0.529	-
No. Calls for Service in Last 6 months	0.759	0.713	-
Suspect Identified (see note)	0.470	0.197	+
Suspect Arrested	0.594	0.660	-
Investigation Time	55.670	43.968	-

(.05 Significance Level)

Note: Only 207 cases for this variable.

a statistically significant difference in mean levels and a minus indicates that dispute-related and non-dispute-related shootings do not differ significantly for that particular variable.

The first section of the table examines victim outcomes/characteristics across dispute-related and non-dispute-related shootings. The results indicate that dispute-related shootings are more likely to result in a fatality and more likely to have multiple fatalities. Additionally, victims of dispute-related shootings are more likely to have previous arrests for criminal possession of a weapon than victims of non-dispute-related shootings.

The second section of the table examines differences in situational factors across dispute-related and non-dispute related shootings. Dispute-related shootings are more likely to involve a conflict history between the victim and offender, more likely to be romantic or domestic in nature, more likely to be generated as a result of the drug trade, more likely to occur in the context of a brawl between two groups, and more likely to involve a victim that acted as an aggressor during some point in the shooting. Dispute-related shootings are less likely to be carried out during the commission of another crime, or involve participants who are strangers.

The third and final section of the table examines whether important investigative outcomes differ for dispute-related and non-dispute-related shootings. For the most part, there are no significant differences. The one important difference, however, is that suspects are more likely to be identified in dispute-related shootings.

#### Predicting the Odds of Dispute-Related Shootings

Table 2 reports a logistic regression analysis of the predictors of dispute-related gun violence. Regression analysis is a statistical tool that allows us to determine the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable when holding other important predictors constant. For Table 2, the dependent variable is dispute-related shootings. The coefficients reported in Table 2 are odds ratios. An asterisk

next to the odds ratio indicates that the effect of the independent variable on whether or not a shooting is dispute related is statistically significant. The results reveal that odds of a shooting being dispute

<b>Table 2. Logistic Regression of Factors influencing Dispute-Related Shootings</b>	Odds Ratio
Conflict History	19.79 *
Victim previously Victimized for Violent Crime	.82
Victim previously Victimized for Property Crime	1.44
Victim Propensity for Crime	1.29
Shooting a Result of the Drug Trade	3.27 *
Shooting Occurred at Drug Location	1.10
Domestic (Household) conflict	14.84 *
Victim had Weapon	2.05
Gang Involved	1.80 *
Shooting Occurred during a Brawl Between Two Groups	4.26 *
Shooting Occurred During the Commission of Another Crime	.32 *
Constant	.84

\* P < .05

Number of Observations: 451

related are higher when the victim and the offender have a previous conflict history, when the shooting occurred as a result of the drug trade, when there was previous evidence of a domestic dispute between the parties, when the shooting was gang involved, when the shooting occurred during a brawl between two groups. Not surprisingly, the odds of a shooting being dispute related are less likely when a shooting occurring during the commission of another crime.

### Implications

These findings have important implications for criminal justice policy. First, the research points to the risk that dispute-related violence poses to public safety. The t-tests demonstrated that dispute-related shootings are more likely to be fatal and have a larger number of victims. Future research will be needed to determine exactly why this is the case, but the results lend support to the argument that law enforcement should make dealing with dispute-related violence a priority. Second, the t-tests

revealed that victims of dispute-related shootings were more like to have a history of illegal weapon carrying. This suggests that both the aggressor and the victim in such incidents may have access to weapons and attempts to reduce weapon carrying may help reduce dispute-related shootings. Third, police data that are currently being collected can prove useful in predicting which incidents are likely to become dispute-related shootings. For many of the dispute-related shootings there is existing evidence that the disputants are at odds before the shooting occurs. This affords RPD the opportunity to identify potential violent disputes and take pre-emptive measures before they escalate into a shooting. Fourth, any attempt to deal with dispute-related violence must address its proximate causes: gang violence and the drug trade.

## Appendix E: Questions Asked to Focus-Group Participants

### Questions for Focus Groups

1. Is the idea or concept of dispute meaningful in your work? What do you mean by “dispute?”
2. How do you identify disputes?
  - a. What information do you use?
  - b. How to you get the information?
  - c. What are the sources of information?
  - d. How do you make judgments about the strength and accuracy of information?
3. Are there differences across the things you identify as disputes?
4. How do you identify those differences?
  - a. What things matters?
    - i. For Example participants, history, location, time, nature of grievances,  
weapons?
5. Who do you count as participants? Are there others who are relevant?
6. Are friends and family automatically considered as being involved in the dispute and/or targeted? Does this depend on dispute type and time span?
7. Are there types of disputes in your mind or as you talk about them? What are the categories?



8. Looking at our current categories (\$/prop/drugs, romantic, domestic) what other dispute types come up?
9. Is there a most common type of dispute? Does dispute type evolve over time? Is there a most common initial dispute type?
10. Are some disputes more dangerous than others? Why or why not?
11. What is or are the time frames of disputes? What is the average span of time these disputes go on? How long do they exist before you know about them?
12. Is there a pattern of progress in some disputes? What does that pattern look like? Stages?
13. Besides disputes, do you have other terms or ways of describing issues you encounter? What other categories exist?
14. What do you do when you think you have identified a dispute? How does your work progress?
15. Describe dispute mediation. Who is involved? Where does it occur? How do you engage those involved? What is done during the mediation?
16. What if you cannot make any headway in the dispute, what are your next steps?
17. What things indicate that a dispute is no longer ongoing? How can you tell it is reducing or over?
18. Are disputes ever resolved? Ending violently? Ending nonviolently? How?

19. Do you follow-up on disputes? If so, in what cases? How long do you wait to follow-up?

20. What resources in the community do you use in addressing disputes? For example, friends and family of people involved in disputes, not for profits, police or other officials in CJ? Are there specific resources that are more helpful than others?

21. How do you handle the issue of dealing with the police or others in the cj system?

a. What sort of things would you not deal with the police on?

b. When, how do you converse with them?

## **Appendix F: Summary of Conclusions from Focus Groups**

### **Findings from RPD Retaliatory Dispute Focus Groups as of 7/3/13**

Project Staff: Capt. Wayne Harris, John Klofas, Irshad Altheimer, Janelle Duda, Audrey DiPoala, Karyn Bower, Sam DiPoala

This document provides a review of information from the Retaliatory Dispute Focus Groups. It begins with a summary and then provides additional specific information from the meetings.

These focus groups involved approximately 11 participants and were held...

East Side Station, patrol and section investigators 6/25 7:30 PM 1.5 hrs

West Side Station, patrol and section investigators 6/26 7:30 PM- 2 hrs

MCAC Conference Room, SIS and CID Investigators 6/27 10:00 AM 1.5 hrs

A focus group on the subject was also held with Pathways to Peace staff on 4/30/13

### **Overall Summary of Issues**

- a. Everyone saw disputes as associated with violence but officers did not seem to organize their activity around any idea of detecting or managing disputes to prevent violence. That is, there was no general focus on disputes as problems to be managed.
- b. Officers were pretty good at identifying dispute characteristics which seemed to be associated with violence.
- c. They were not as good in describing a process or sequence that moves a dispute further toward violence. The patterns were seen mostly as unpredictable.
- d. They felt the available intelligence information was good but could be better especially as it related to being accessible and pertinent rather than overwhelming.
- e. Consistent with the earlier points they did not describe an extensive set of interventions that are currently used to address disputes.

### **What these issues mean for the project**

1. The incident reviews will be challenging since focus group participants did not seem to describe many details, processes or stages of dispute events.
2. It seems possible to reach agreement on a list of risk factors.
3. The biggest problem we will face may be in encouraging officers to view the dispute issue as a problem to be managed by identifying and intervening early- that is to organize some of their work around disputes.
4. They suggest that a pilot approach with specialization may be appropriate.
5. Engagement of partners will be important. These will include prosecution, probation, parole, pathways, jail staff, some clergy and community organizations and the courts.
6. This will also require intra-agency coordination among existing structures (SROs, FACIT, Tactical Unit, MCU, SIS) if resources and processes are to be redesigned

Below is a review of issues from the focus groups.

**General Points**

1. All participants recognized the importance of the dispute issue and saw disputes as frequent causes of major violence.
2. All saw many disputes as erupting from “minor” insults and perceived disrespect. Others were linked to “more serious” problems such as drug thefts.
3. Although all saw the importance of disputes as causes they did not describe any way that “disputes” organized their work. That is, they did not actively seek information in the field on disputes and did not tend to identify disputes or intervene in disputes before violence occurred.
4. All saw great value in MCAC bulletins- they are a major source of information on disputes and they are highly accurate and very useful. However, if they realized that information was not accurate in the MCAC bulletins, there is no feedback process in place to get that information back to MCAC.
5. They also saw FIFs as a good source but some complained about trouble accessing them and preferred the old paper card forms that were easily filled out and thumbed through in stacks in the roll call room. Some suggested that having to log on to the system to complete FIF’s may decrease the likelihood that FIF’s are completed on busy days. Though the content is now searchable in the new electronic system, it is more difficult to browse through a grouping of FIFs unless searching for something in particular.
6. Some also felt that they could not keep up with the information from MCAC. In their view there were too many bulletins and too much information. This was because they were getting info from all across the city. They had some idea that they could filter but saw that as difficult. Some suggest they should only get notices related to their PSA and perhaps those nearby. Others mention a large number of bulletins on relatively minor-level problems, which can then desensitize officers to the more stringent MCAC products.
7. The SIS group and West side discussed other ways these problems might being addressed including such things as speech to text phone apps etc. In general they were concerned with making both information input and access easier.

**Identification of Disputes**

8. In most cases officers found out about disputes after an incident. MCAC bulletins added information. Residents would tell officers details, prior incidents and other cause related information- generally after dispute related violence occurred.

9. Some proactive work is done to ID disputes- using street intelligence, prostitution details. The focus group participants suggested that officers who had built up rapport with street actors over time had the best ability to collect reliable street intelligence.
10. Social media (Facebook, Youtube) was seen as an important source of information- especially with young people.
11. These were seen as important sources of information- nightly reports, school behavior, FIFs (but underutilized), informants (best when under pressure), jail phone calls/interviews/other intelligence from inside jail
12. Participants noted that most disputes are unknown to them until violence occurs but also that many disputes were known in the community before police learned of them.

### **Risk Factors in Disputes**

13. There was some sentiment that disputes were not very predictable- small transgressions could lead to serious violence.
14. But there was also the view that some factors were more important than others
15. These included:
  - a. Criminal record of participants
  - b. their reputation on the street
  - c. known access to weapons
  - d. gang involvement
  - e. involvement of family members
  - f. Some known and identifiable families
  - g. location in known areas for violence
  - h. shots fired (i.e. into houses)
  - i. Intel that an individual was walking around with a gun
  - j. Involvement of "out of towners"
  - k. Links to home invasion robberies or known drug rip-offs
  - l. The dispute growing public through social media

### **Patterns in Disputes**

16. Participants seem more comfortable with identifying risk factors than patterns.
17. Most felt disputes were generally unpredictable- some fizzed, some exploded.

18. Uncooperative victims and witnesses are often a telltale sign that retaliation will occur
19. They did seem to be able to identify (after the fact) precipitating events such as the initial shooting or robbery.
20. The expansion beyond the early protagonists was seen as problematic and occurring due to improved technology
21. Disputes which expanded to others sometimes took on a life of their own- disassociated with original causes. Cell phones and social media (especially Facebook) often cause these disputes to grow.
22. Locations were important, with concentrated violence a concern and focused knowledge of patrol officers seen as useful.
23. It was not entirely clear whether a dispute was dormant or actually over. Some officers held the opinion that a dispute is never really over, and that small events can reignite a dispute. It is often the "loser" of the last encounter who retaliates back.
24. Disputes may continue or escalate in jail, or jail time might put a temporary pause on outside violence

### **Intervention**

25. A sound but limited number of options for intervention was discussed. Lack of sufficient resources to cover everything, it is often difficult to decide where to devote resources to.
26. There was support for significant, immediate and forceful response to dispute violence when it occurs. This was generally discussed in the form of police sweeps.
27. Mostly police resources were seen as useful but there was also discussion of FACIT, some clergy or civilian intermediaries, and Pathways under limited circumstances.
28. In the case of disputes with a high risk of violence, planned efforts to remove participants to jail was seen as a useful short term intervention. This involved arrests for new charges as well as probation or parole violations. Importantly, if none of the major players in the dispute received long-term prison sentences, it was believed that they were likely to reengage in dispute-related violence once released from jail (after a short sentence) or after police suppression was lifted. It is not entirely clear why some disputes are effectively stopped after the implementation of such strategies while others are not.

29. Officers usually are not notified when disputants are released from jail. This means that important players may reenter the dispute without officers knowing.
30. There was discussion of the increase in buying-off crime victims with a couple thousand dollars in order to not proceed with court intervention. Law abiding neighborhood residents did not seem to be a helpful resource due to concerns of retaliation. Educating the community or "the street will educate them."
31. Involving parents when disputants are young was also seen as useful. The officers also noted that some parents are either uncooperative or don't have control over their children.
32. There was also significant support for a specialized unit to address disputes. Several versions were discussed including a centralized unit or quadrant based units. Activity for this unit was seen as significantly different from the activity of the TAC unit. This was seen as a problem solving unit which gathered intelligence and intervened with a wide range of approaches.
33. Involvement of partner agencies, including the courts and judges was seen as important.