Evaluation of the Savannah Smart Policing Initiative

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EVALUATION OF THE SAVANNAH SMART POLICING INITIATIVE

Executive Summary

In 2008, the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department was alarmed that a total of 12,535 Part I crimes occurred; 1,285 were violent crimes. The SCMPD were particularly concerned about the amount of crime that was committed by repeat offenders. Between the years 2007-2010, almost three thousand (2,874) inmates were released into Chatham County. Based on the individuals returning from the prisons, they estimated that 81% were repeat offenders. Extrapolating from that percentage, they estimated that repeat offenders were responsible for 1,040 of the total 1,285 violent crimes committed in 2008 and 913 of the 1,128 violent crimes in 2009.

To address this problem, the SCMPD focused on two primary strategies: (1) to identify "hot spots" through data collection and analyses and create holistic solutions in partnership with other state and local agencies to address those specific problems; and (2) to identify repeat violent offenders and decrease their recidivism by providing intensive monitoring, including electronic monitoring in some cases, and services. The SCMPD implemented this initiative through the police-funded Savannah Impact Program (SIP). SIP is an innovative multi-agency program which provides intensive monitoring and services to high-risk offenders who are on parole, probation, and under no supervision.

The focus of the evaluation centered on: (1) evaluating the overall impact of the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) by examining crime trends pre- and post-SPI implementation; (2) assessing whether individuals in the Top 100 who received services at the Savannah Impact Program committed fewer crimes, particularly violent crimes, than individuals who did not

receive SIP services; and (3) interviewing SIP personnel, including employees of the SCMPD, parole, probation, DJJ, Juvenile Court, and service provides, in both January and November 2013 to provide insight into what did and did not work with Smart Policing in Savannah in the context of the Savannah Impact Program. Due to the innovative nature of several aspects of the SMART Policing Program in Savannah, this research will benefit other agencies throughout the country by providing information on best practices in providing similar types of services.

Percentage change in raw count analyses between Savannah, Columbus, cities with populations of 100,000 to 249,000, and nationally did not support that SPI had an impact on violent crime, robberies, and aggravated assault in Savannah. Percentage change in raw count analyses comparing the Central District, an area that received more Smart Policing focus than other areas, with that of the Downtown and Southside Precincts indicated that SPI impacted both the overall amount of violent crime as well as robbery.

Both univariate and multivariate analyses did not find strong evidence to support that Top 100 clients who received SIP services were less likely to offend in the future. Univariate analyses, including tests of difference between proportions, cross-tabulations, and correlations, did not indicate that the treatment and service groups committed fewer crimes than the control and comparison groups. Exploratory analyses, however, indicated that probationers and parolees who received services committed fewer crimes and had fewer probation and parole violations than probation and parole clients who did not receive services. The multivariate analyses found that providing services reduced the odds of committing future crime at certain time stages, but only when weakening the tests of significance.

SIP personnel answered questions in January and November 2013 regarding: (1) the progress of SPI and SIP; (2) impact of SPI and SIP; (3) whether running reentry programs through a police-oriented program affected how clients viewed the services and the police; (4) perceptions of the police about SIP; (5) perceptions of other agencies about SIP; (6) whether SIP has improved relationships between different agencies; (7) satisfaction of non-policing agencies' roles in SIP; (8) how information was shared among the agencies; (9) the balance between treatment and enforcement at SIP; (10) concerns about Smart Policing in Savannah; (11) concerns about SIP; and (12) the sustainability of Smart Policing in Savannah. The general consensus among all personnel was that SIP was an effective program that succeeds because it consists of multiple agencies, balances treatment with enforcement, and was successfully able to provide services to high-risk offenders. SIP personnel provided possible issues for police administration to examine regarding both SIP and Smart Policing. Finally, personnel considered the Smart Policing components of crime mapping and the Top 100 program to be sustainable because they have shown themselves to be effective, have become integral parts of SIP, and have influenced the police department as a whole.

SIP is an innovative program that brings multiple agencies together to better the community by monitoring and providing services to Savannah's highest risk offenders. It is an example of how police departments can experiment with new ideas on how to provide better services to its community members before implementing them more fully at the departmental level. Other cities would benefit by examining whether some of the successes achieved by SIP would benefit their communities and departments as well.

EVALUATION OF THE SAVANNAH SMART POLICING INITIATIVE

Targeted Problem

The Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department (SCMPD) was alarmed with the increase of violent crime in the late 2000s and perceived the problem to be caused by violent repeat offenders. In 2008, the SCMPD documented that 12,535 Part I offenses occurred in the Savannah-Chatham County area; 1,285 were violent crimes. They viewed this amount and increase in violent crime as being consistent with the national trend. The SCMPD's larger concern, however, was the amount of violent crime committed by repeat offenders. It was estimated that 2,874 inmates were released into the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan area between 2007-2010. Eighty-one (81) percent of these releasees were repeat offenders. Extrapolating this 81% ratio to all violent offenses committed in their jurisdiction, they estimated that repeat offenders were responsible for approximately 1,040 of the total 1,285 violent crimes in 2008 and 913 of the 1,128 violent crimes in 2009. Considering that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior, they were concerned that the same group of individuals was going to continue to be responsible for committing high numbers of violent crime in the Savannah-Chatham County area.

In addition, earlier reports conducted by the SCMPD indicated an escalation in violent offenses for individuals arrested for misdemeanor gun crimes. For example, they found that most homicide arrestees had a history of arrests for misdemeanor gun possessions. In addition, a 2000 SCMPD report found that aggravated assault incidents were normally preceded by both simple assault and gun possession charges. They viewed this as a concerning progression in which misdemeanor violent crimes and gun offenses occur prior to more serious violent felonies.

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To complicate this issue, they believed that a significant number of offenses were committed by arrestees who had been released into the community on bond and had committed additional offenses before their first cases were adjudicated.

In addition to the problem of violent crime being committed by a group of repeat offenders, SCMPD knew that violent crime was concentrated in specific areas of the city. Their weekly hot spot analyses indicated that violent crime was concentrated primarily in their Downtown and Central Precincts. Additional hot spots were identified in the Islands and Southside Precincts. In 2008, 443 violent crimes, or 34.5% of the total violent crime, were committed in these hot spots. The total area, however, of the identified hot spots only totaled 2.4 square miles, or 1.8% of their jurisdiction's area. Thus, one-third of violent crime in the Savannah-Chatham County area occurred in less than two percent of their jurisdiction.

Smart Policing Initiative - Savannah

The SCMPD wanted to address the high amount of violent crime in the late 2000s, particularly violent crime committed by repeat offenders, by focusing on both geographic areas and repeat offenders. The Savannah SPI had three central and complementary components to address the stated problem: (1) utilizing data and maps to identify "hot spots" in order to strategically plan solutions to identified problems; (2) using grant-funded electronic monitors as extra accountability measures for violent offenders who either bonded out or were placed on probation; and (3) identifying the highest risk offenders (i.e. Top 100) and decreasing their recidivism levels through intensive monitoring and services by the Savannah Impact Program (SIP), a police-funded, collaborative, comprehensive community reentry program. (See Appendix I for a description of SIP and its services). The Smart Policing Initiative was

originally housed in the Savannah Area Regional Intelligence Center (SARIC), but was moved to SIP in the summer of 2010 because the police chief determined that the resources at SIP were more suited to the goals of the grant's goals - to monitor and provide services to high-risk offenders.

Crime Analyses and Mapping

A central component of Smart Policing in Savannah was the use of crime analyses and crime mapping to strategically address crime. The SIP crime analyst was requested to conduct data analyses and create maps for SIP strategic planning, commanders in the precincts who requested them, and for special operations, among other reasons. Some of these maps were provided to the evaluator. A select few are provided as appendices (see Appendices 2 – 4) as examples of the different types of analyses and maps that were created to help support Smart Policing in Savannah, particularly in the early stages of Smart Policing.

In the first grouping of maps (Appendix II), both total violent offenses and specific violent crime types were mapped. A chart was then created to identify three beats within the Central Precinct that contained the highest volume of violent crime. In this same appendix, further maps showed that the location of offenders living within Chatham County formed clusters.

The second grouping (Appendix III) contains maps of all five precincts and shows the overlay of adult probationers and adult parolees with the locations of suspected and confirmed rooming houses. Each map has a caption providing specific information for each precinct. These maps indicated that the Central Precinct had the highest number of each. These maps were part of a public safety concerns resolution that was brought before the Savannah City Council in Fall

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2011. One of the items the resolution addressed was the correlation between crime and illegal

rooming houses. In addition to the resolution, a list of the rooming houses within the Central

Precinct was provided to the precinct's commander. While this did not lead to a direct operation,

it enabled the precinct to be better aware of where the individual rooming houses were located

within the precinct. This, in turn, enhanced their decision making. Other city bureaus had been

continuously addressing issues surrounding housing as well. Although it was not believed that

these crime maps led to the same impact as the other entities, these maps increased awareness

within SCMPD that the neighborhoods with crime problems also had other quality of life issues.

Finally, when SIP's leadership changed, it led to an increase in periodic special

operations. In Appendix IV, maps and charts of the beats and neighborhood which were

originally analyzed are provided. While the number of Part 1 Crimes went down, the bulk of

SCMPD's Part 1 Crimes still occurred within these beats and neighborhoods. Based on these

data, decisions were made to perform compliance checks in these same beats and neighborhoods.

The last two maps were created for special operations.

In the end, the SIP crime analyst was utilized heavily for multiple purposes, including

strategic planning to address chronic problems and to plan special operations. Analyses and

maps created indicated that there were multiple problems in the same neighborhoods and that

different agencies within Savannah needed to collaborate to address those problems in a holistic

fashion. The maps overlaying probationers, parolees, and high-risk offenders were viewed as

being effective in helping with both strategic planning and implementing tactical operations.

Electronic Monitors for Repeat Violent Offenders

The SCMPD's Savannah Impact Program (SIP) and the Chatham County District Attorney's Office partnered together to provide federally funded electronic monitors to qualifying violent offenders who were released on bond or probation. In March 2011, the Smart Policing team met with Assistant District Attorneys to explain the Smart Policing grant and the electronic monitoring tool. In April 2011, the Smart Policing team met with the Recorder's Court, State Court, and Superior Court judges to provide brochures and to discuss the program. In April 2011, the Assistant District Attorney assigned to the Smart Policing program started making referrals for individuals to be placed on GPS ankle monitoring. In May 2012, the Smart Policing ADA no longer informed the other ADAs of qualifying offenders in their caseloads in anticipation of the end of the grant-funded GPS ankle monitors. Due to this, no monitors were requested or ordered in or after May 2012. After October 2012, electronic monitoring was still available through SIP, but the defendant needed to pay for his or her own monitoring and it would no longer be free for qualifying defendants.

To know whether a defendant was eligible for the grant-funded GPS monitors, ADAs were originally instructed to complete a Smart Policing Grant Referral form, which they did in the early months. The Smart Policing team created two referral forms, one for offenders on bond and one for probation, consisting of basic offender information and conviction history. By the end of 2011, however, the standard way to request a referral was for an ADA to send a brief e-mail to the ADA assigned to the Smart Policing program (Smart Policing ADA) to request him/her to examine an offender's case for qualifying current charges or prior convictions that fell under the Smart Policing grant, basically serious violent offenses. In addition, the Smart Policing ADA would screen the first appearance/waiver forms and grand jury dockets for the

following offenses: aggravated assault; aggravated battery; homicide; rape; robbery; brandishing weapon; concealed weapon; firing weapon; weapon possession; altering ID of weapon; kidnapping; explosives/arson; terroristic threat/act; simple assault; and battery. Prior to December 2011, the Smart Policing ADA only notified an ADA if an offender in his/her caseload had a charge of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, homicide, robbery, or weapons firing. Beginning in December 2011, the Smart Policing ADA began notifying ADAs when an offender in his/her caseload was charged with any of the above listed violent crimes. The Smart Policing ADA also started screening for the same violent offenses in the State Court Hearing Calendars.

For the District Attorney's Office, the greatest factor affecting whether they requested an electronic monitor for a defendant in bond cases was when the judge's decision to grant bond was against the State's wishes. In order to qualify for these electronic monitors, the defendant in question would have had to have been charged or previously convicted of some type of violent crime. The State typically opposed bond in these cases. Therefore, the ADA in these bond hearings generally requested electronic monitoring only after the judge indicated that he/she would impose bond against the ADA's argument for incarceration. Thus, the use of electronic monitoring was only mentioned as an extra accountability measure after the judge set bond for a defendant. In probation cases, the ADAs typically knew in advance whether they intended to include an electronic monitoring condition as part of the negotiations with defense counsel. As the ADA explained, "Therefore, the contributing factors with the grant-funded GPS monitors with probation cases involved negotiations of guilty pleas and sentencing deals with the defense, as well as whether or not the particular defendant's crime warranted the type of intensive supervision GPS tracking provides."

In September 2012, near the end of the funding of grant-supported electronic monitors, an Assistant District Attorney provided a summary of the Smart Policing grant statistics for electronic monitoring. There were a total of fifty-one (51) total requests by the ADA for electronic monitoring since the program began in April 2011. Thirty-one (31), or 60.8%, were ordered by a judge. Twenty-three (23) were funded by the Smart Policing grant and the other eight (8) were offender-paid at a cost of $150 per month. Between April 2011 and 2012, the electronically monitored offenders met with SIP staff 399 times and had thirty-five drug tests taken. As of September 28, 2012, the statuses of these thirty-one electronic monitors were:

- Sixteen (16) were removed due to either the expiration or modification of their bond or probation orders;
- Five (5) were arrested for new charges while on SIP ankle monitors;
- Four (4) were arrested for new crimes after release from their monitors;
- Four (4) were never monitored (two remained serving time in prison, one never posted bond, and one failed to report to SIP after release on bond and was arrested);
- One (1) was acquitted by a jury of all charges;
- One (1) remained on the grant-funded SIP monitor.

In total, ten (10) individuals who had been ordered on electronic monitors had committed crimes before they could be placed on the monitor (n = 1), while on the monitor (n = 5), or after its removal (n = 4). When one excludes the three individuals who were never released from prison or jail to be placed on electronic monitoring, ten (10) out of twenty-eight (28), or 35.7%, of the electronic monitor offenders re-offended.

The Assistant District Attorney, however, provided reasons why the recidivism level might actually be higher than 35.7% for these offenders. First, the twenty-eight offenders had been released from a prison throughout a full year period, with the first monitor being ordered in April 2011 and the last monitor ordered in May 2012. Subsequently, offenders who had been

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placed on a monitor in early 2011 had a much longer time frame in which to recidivate. If offenders who had been placed on a monitor in mid-2012 were followed longer, they would have more time to recidivate and the 35.7% failure rate would increase. Second, they found out that two offenders who had been ordered on house arrest had actually left their homes in violation of their bond order and ankle monitor conditions. Neither were arrested for these violations. Discretion by judges, prosecutors, and SIP personnel were used throughout the program to determine whether curfew or other violations were appropriate of arrests. The 35.7% failure rate therefore only includes individuals in which a decision was made to arrest someone. It is unclear how many individuals committed crimes without detection by law enforcement or who had committed offenses but were provided second chances by someone. Third, two of the offenders were juveniles and their subsequent criminal histories were unavailable. Thus, it is more appropriate to conclude that 10 out of 26 (38.5%) re-offended.

Finally, it should be noted that these offenders were not placed on electronic monitoring in lieu of incarceration. Thus, one could consider "success" in two different ways. The first would focus on individuals who did not re-offend while under electronic monitoring and the monitors helped ensure that. The second is that violent individuals who were being monitored who committed crimes were caught, arrested, and taken off the streets. In addition, the district attorney's office considered the strengthened relationship and communication between SIP and the District Attorney's Office as a benefit regardless of complications.

The Assistant District Attorneys who had used the grant-funded electronic monitors were provided in May 2012 an optional survey regarding their opinions on the Smart Policing's electronic monitoring program. Only six ADAs answered this survey. Below are the results.

- (1) Of the four ADAs who provided information on the division to which they belonged:
  - SVU (2);
  - Superior Court (1);
  - Early Intervention Program (1).
- (2) "How you do rate the overall Savannah Impact electronic monitoring program?"
  - Very satisfied (1);
  - Satisfied (3);
  - Neutral (1);
  - Very dissatisfied (1).
  - Comments:
    - "Great tool, but the focus on violent offenders greatly limited its use."
- (3) "In your case(s), how easy was the process of arranging for a defendant to be ordered onto a Savannah Impact electronic monitor?"
  - Extremely easy and straightforward (1);
  - Moderately easy and straightforward (3);
  - Not at all easy or straightforward (1).
  - Comments:
    - "It wasn't easy; it was cumbersome; it required a lot of work."
    - "[SMART Policing ADA] was extremely helpful with this process!
    - "Asking a judge to use a particular order and/or include many particular conditions isn't easy. When a judge considered a monitor in course and signs his/her own order, it is not always possible to go back and ask the judge to add conditions to the order. More flexibility on the part of SIP would have been helpful."
- (4) "In your case(s), did the Savannah Impact electronic monitoring program provide effective supervision and accountability for the offender released into the community on an electronic monitor? (i.e. drug testing, curfew, GPS-tracking, exclusion zones, etc.)"
  - Yes (4)
  - No (1)
  - Comments:
    - "As far as I know."
    - "Some cases better than others; hard to get responses from officers sometimes."
    - "Don't know – did the SIP officer notice any positive changes in the offender?"
- (5) "In your case(s), did the Savannah Impact electronic monitoring program provide effective rehabilitative measures to the offender in your caseload released on an

electronic monitor? (i.e. alcohol/drug/domestic violence classes; vocational training, etc.)"
- o Yes (1)
- o No (1)
- o Comments:
  - ▪ "Unknown"
  - ▪ "Don't really know"
  - ▪ "Don't know – did the SIP officer notice any positive changes in the offender?"
- (6) "In your case(s), did the Savannah Impact Program's electronic monitoring program provide effective oversight of the offender by the SCMPD?"
  - o Yes (2)
  - o No (1)
  - o Comments:
    - ▪ "Unknown"
- (7) Additional comments:
  - o "It was a useful tool; however, the process very much needs streamlining both to set up and for immediately securing warrants for violators."
  - o "I think it was a good program."

Finally, every component of a program has larger and smaller complications. One of the first challenges in implementing this component of the program was that the ADAs were hesitant about the use of electronic monitoring because of a misunderstanding. They believed that the primary use of electronic monitoring in the Smart Policing grant was as an alternative to incarceration. Presentations by SIP and continual dialogue demonstrated to the ADAs that electronic monitoring was going to serve as an additional tool of accountability for offenders who were not going to be incarcerated regardless of the program.

An additional challenge, especially for the District Attorney's Office, were residency requirements. Individuals needed to reside in Chatham County to be eligible for the grant-funded GPS ankle monitors. During just the time period of January to July 2012, two qualified offenders lived outside of Chatham County and were therefore unable to be placed on grant-

funded monitors. Others had plans to frequently travel outside of the county; arrangements had to be quickly made to ensure that they left the county only under compelling circumstances. Another offender was homeless and was therefore ineligible. The judges and prosecutors expressed frustration in all these cases because they had wanted for the offenders to be monitored by the Savannah Impact Program. A warning was sent by the Smart Policing ADA to all ADAs to ensure that the defendant resided and planned to remain in Chatham County prior to requesting a judge place an offender on a grant-funded monitor.

The Top 100 Program

An essential component of the Smart Policing Initiative in Savannah was to identify a group of violent high-risk offenders who lived in the city limits of Savannah and to provide intensive monitoring and services to them in order to decrease their odds of recidivism. The SPI was originally housed in Savannah's intelligence unit (SARIC) and focused on younger offenders. When the program was moved from SARIC to SIP in the summer of 2010 because the police chief concluded that the monitoring and service component of the SPI better matched the mission of SIP, the TOP 100 had a reboot. SIP wanted the focus to be based on prior conviction and seriousness rather than simply arrest record, leading to an older clientele and more of a reentry program.

SIP created a Top 100 list by first examining a list of 2,872 offenders who were released from a state prison in Georgia over a three year period (2008-2010) and who were believed by the Department of Corrections to be returning to Chatham County after release. They excluded all individuals from the list who had an address falling outside of Savannah's city limits. This is an important distinction since the SCMPD's jurisdiction covers all of Chatham County. They

then used a point system based on the United States Sentencing Commission's 2008 Federal

Sentencing Guideline Manual to identify the highest risk offenders being released from state

prison into Savannah. The sentencing guideline ranged from a maximum of 43 points for

homicide/manslaughter to a minimum of 4 points for simple assault and other offenses not listed.

The original evaluation team simplified the method for assigning points by modifying the scale

from a maximum of 11 points to a minimum of 1. The revised point scale was: homicide and

manslaughter (11 pts.); kidnapping (10 pts.); rape, including statutory rape (9 pts.); bank and/or

armed robbery (8 pts.); robbery (7 pts.); aggravated assault with firearm or any assault or

obstruction of a police officer (6 pts.); arson (5 pts.); aggravated assault with other weapon (4

pts.); sexual assault to include child molestation and sexual offenses (3 pts.); weapons offenses

(2 pts.); and simple assault and other offenses not listed (1 pt.). When the offenders' prior

histories were being examined, two (2) additional points for every felony committed and one (1)

point for every misdemeanor committed were added.

One hundred eight (108) individuals were originally identified or added to the Top 100

program. A Smart Policing intel folder electronically available to all law enforcement officers

was created for each person in the Top 100. Four of the Top 100 were dead when identified or

died at some point afterwards. Table 1 presents descriptives of these 108 Top 100 offenders.

Eventually, 43 (39.8%) of the Top 100 would be in the treatment group while 40 (37%) would be

in the control group. The evaluation section of the report discusses these two groups more. A

little under 25% were excluded for various reasons (e.g., never leaving prison, dying soon after

the program began; not residing in the city limits of Savannah, etc.). Twenty-six individuals, or

24.1% of the Top 100, received services at some point during the evaluation. The majority of the

Top 100 were black males (81.5%), followed by white males (13%). The ages of the Top 100

ranged from 19 to 67 with the average age being 36.8 years old (as of 2010). Slightly more than

half (51.9%) were released on parole while another 42.6% were released from prison after

serving their sentences. Thirty-two percent (32.4%) of the Top 100 served probation after

release. Seventy-one percent (71.3%) had been convicted of a violent offense for their last

incarceration; 8.3% had been convicted of a sex offense; 10.2% had been convicted of an "other"

(most likely a possession of a firearm offense) crime. Finally, the risk score for the Top 100

ranged from 1 (e.g., simple assault) to 11 (i.e. homicide), with the average being 6.52 [i.e. a risk

score between aggravated assault with firearm (6) and robbery (7)].

Table 1. Descriptives of Top 100 Identified (n = 108)

		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	n
Group	Treatment	0.398		0	1	43
	Control	0.370		0	1	40
	Excluded	0.232		0	1	25
Services	Yes	.241		0	1	26
Race/Sex	Black Male	.815		0	1	88
	White Male	.130		0	1	14
	Other Male	.019		0	1	2
	Black Female	.028		0	1	3
	White Female	.009		0	1	1
Age		36.80	11.75	19	67	108
Actual Release type	Sentence Expired	.426		0	1	46
	Parole	.519		0	1	56
	Commuted by PB	.009		0	1	1
	Supervised Reprieve	.009		0	1	1
	Conditional Transfer	.019		0	1	2
	Missing	.019		0	1	2
Probation to Follow	Yes	.324		0	1	35
Crime Type	Viol/Person	.713		0	1	77
	Sex Offender	.083		0	1	9
	Property	.083		0	1	9
	Drug Possession	.019		0	1	2
	Other	.102		0	1	11
Points		6.52	3.38	1	11	108

The Top 100 offenders were originally assigned to multiple SIP officers in late 2010 for them to make contact and inform the identified high-risk offenders about the program. When they attempted to make contact, they had an interview checklist that contained information on: the offender (e.g., name, address, phone number, etc.); the type of visit attempted (e.g., field interview, phone call, office, etc.); date and time of attempted contact; whether offender was contacted; whether offender was on supervision; any contact with law enforcement reported; services offender was currently receiving; services offender needs; and comments. If they were not able to make contact with the offender, they left a specialized door hanger, containing information on the date, telephone number of the officer, and comments, at the suspected address of the Top 100 individual which asked the individual to call SIP.

According to interviews of the SIP police officers, all officers who were assigned TOP 100 offenders searched for them in late 2010 and early 2011, but most of them did not enter any notes into the Smart Policing intel folder. Thus, it is unclear why some of them were added to the control group at later stages. In early 2011 (March/April), the decision was made to create a Top 100 caseload and assign it to a designated SIP officer. The individual chosen was an individual that had accepted the importance of this program from the beginning, made every effort to contact the individuals on his/her smaller caseload, and was one of the very few officers who were entering contact information into the SARIC Smart Policing files. In March and April, he/she attempted to contact all individuals in the Top 100, not just the ones assigned to the treatment group, to provide services. After those months, his/her primary focus was contacting and attempting to get the treatment group interested in the program. In the summer of 2012, he/she made another earnest effort to contact all individuals in the Top 100 regardless of whether they were categorized as treatment or control. A few offenders who originally were assigned to

the control group actually showed interest in the program in the summer of 2012 and were moved to the treatment group by the evaluator. It was the belief of the Top 100 officer, and of SIP administration, that it was unethical to hold essential services from high-risk offenders who needed services as this was deemed detrimental to both the offender's chances of success and community safety. Thus, the original separation between the treatment and control group was not strongly followed through the program.

When I went on a ride-along with the Top 100 officer, he/she described what was his/her normal routine. He/she usually went out 2-3 times per month to track down the offenders. A part of the officer's duties were to find them, make contact with them, inquire how they were doing, and ask if they were interested in coming to SIP for a variety of services. It was quite typical to provide them specifics regarding dates and times for the next possible service, such as the new job readiness class starting that week. He/she wanted to make contact with them once per month in person if possible, but generally it was not. If he/she had not seen an individual in person for a month, he/she made that person his/her higher priorities to track down. Often, the individuals actually called him/her and checked in even though the program was not required and completely voluntary. In addition, the Top 100 officer spent a significant amount of time each month checking records and databases to see whether the Top 100 individuals had been arrested, or if they had been arrested, if and when they were going to be released from a jail or prison.

To provide an example of the amount of work that it took to track down offenders and attempt to have monthly contacts with them, the Top 100 officer recorded that he/she had 1,046 total interviews with sixty of the Top 100 offenders in 2012. The breakdown for the one thousand interviews is as follows: 415 field visits; 548 phone interviews; 28 jail visit; and 55 office visits.

Individuals who voluntarily agreed to participate in the program were eligible to receive a wide variety of services at SIP, including, but not limited to: job readiness training; job leads; housing assistance; references to Savannah Tech for GED; anger management; cognitive behavioral development, and referrals to other community resource providers. This was true, however, as long as they could pass a drug test. The individual needed to be able to pass a drug test so SIP could vouch that the individual was employable.

EVALUATION

The goal of the evaluation was to assess the impact of the Smart Policing Project in Savannah by reviewing the implementation of the program and evaluating the impact of its programs. Based on data feasibility and consultation with CNA, the evaluation focused on the overall impact of the SPI in Savannah by examining crime rate trends pre- and post-SPI implementation. In addition, the evaluation focused on assessing whether individuals who received treatment in the Top 100 program were arrested for fewer crimes, particularly violent crimes. Finally, the evaluation consisted of interviewing SIP personnel, including employees of the SCMPD, parole, probation, Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), Juvenile Court, and service providers, in both January and November 2013 to provide insight into what did and did not work with Smart Policing in Savannah in the context of the Savannah Impact Program.

Crime Impact Analysis

As one part of the evaluation to assess whether the implemented Smart Policing strategies as a whole impacted crime in Savannah, the change in crime (%) that followed the implementation of the major components of the Smart Policing Initiative were compared with a comparison site, cities with populations between 100,000 to 249,999 (labeled Group II in the

UCR), and the nation. The comparison site chosen was Columbus, Georgia. Other cities in the region, such as Charleston, South Carolina, North Charleston, South Carolina, and Jacksonville, Florida were initially examined as comparison sites but were excluded because their populations and/or crime rates were incongruent with Savannah. Columbus, Georgia, however, was a suitable comparison site in that it is within Georgia, has a population of 184,576 (2010 Census) (Savannah's 2010 population = 136,322), had a similar amount of violent crime (Columbus = 1,187 violent crimes in 2006; Savannah = 1,054 violent crimes in 2006), and has an economy similar to that of Savannah in that is heavily influenced by tourism and a local military base. Although differences exist, Columbus was a suitable comparison site, especially when considering that its percentage changes in various forms of crime were similar to similar sized cities across the nation as well as the country as a whole.

Since some of the major components of the Smart Policing Initiative, such as the Top 100 program, use of the crime analyst to provide maps for strategic decisions, and electronic monitoring, did not occur until late 2010 to early 2011, January 2011 was used as the "start date" to assess whether the implementation of the SPI impacted crime in Savannah. Due to the focus of the Savannah's Smart Policing Initiative's focus on reducing violent crime, violent crime, robbery, and aggravated assault raw counts were collected from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report for Columbus, GA, the nation, and cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999 for the years 2006-2012 (See Appendix V). At the time of the writing of this evaluation, 2013 data were not available in the UCR. Since the UCR reports crime data for the entire Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department, and not just the city of Savannah, crime data for the city of Savannah for the years 2006-2012 were provided to the evaluator by the SIP crime analyst.

The primary analyses regarding reductions in crime consist of examining the percentage change in raw counts for violent crime, robbery, and aggravated assaults in the post-implementation years (2011-2012) of the SPI project in Savannah in comparison to the other sites and groups. Because of the additional errors that coincide with population estimates, crime rates were not examined for these analyses. Instead, percentage changes, which take into account differences in raw count totals, were examined.

Violent Crime

Table 2 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2006-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for violent crime for Savannah, Columbus, Group II (cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999), and the nation. As Table 2 illustrates, Savannah experienced a 29.6% decrease in violent crime in the pre-program years (2006-2010). In fact, however, they experienced an increase in violent crime in 2007, but then experienced a 14.4% decrease in violent crime in 2009 and another 25.1% decrease in 2010. Thus, Savannah experienced major gains in violent crime reduction during the years of their writing the proposal and working on implementing this program. As can be seen in the Table, this reduction in violent crime is two to three times the size of violent crime reductions in comparison to the others. It does not come as much surprise then that Savannah experienced a minor form of regression to the mean in the two years following the implementation of the SPI program as they saw a 4.4% increase in violent crime. This does not seem a serious concern considering that: (1) Savannah saw significant reductions in violent crime in the years preceding the program; and (2) the other groups saw small decreases in violent crime (Columbus and nationally) or experienced small increases (Group II) in 2011-2012. Thus, the evidence does not support that the implementation of this program directly led to decreases in the total number of violent crime in

Savannah, but it does illustrate that Savannah experienced much larger reductions in violent

crime in the years preceding the program in comparison to the other groups.

Table 2: Violent Crime

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post- program
Savannah	1,054	1,163	1,157	990	742	768	775	-29.6%	4.4%
Columbus	1,187	1,316	1,274	1,153	1,005	933	994	-15.3%	-1.1%
Group II[a]	1,742	1,757	1,692	1,650	1,567	1,557	1,581	-10.0%	0.9%
Nation[b]	1,435	1,423	1,394	1,326	1,251	1,206	1,214	-12.8%	-2.9%

Notes: [a] = reported in hundreds (e.g., 1,742 in 2006 equals 174,186; [b] = reported in thousands (e.g., 1,435 in 2006 equals 1,435,123). See Appendix V for specific raw counts.


Robbery

Table 3 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2006-2010), and

post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for robbery for Savannah, Columbus, Group II

(cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999), and the nation. Reductions in robberies

in Savannah looked similar to reductions in violent crime as a whole. Between 2006 - 2010,

Savannah experienced a 33.3% reduction in robbery. This reduction, however, all occurred in 2009 and 2010. In 2007 and 2008, Savannah saw a 19.2% increase in robbery. Savannah then had a 44% decrease in 2009-2010. This 33.3% reduction was twice the reduction that of the other three groups. In the post-intervention years, however, there was a 4.3% increase in robbery in Savannah, similar to the increase in violent crime as a whole. This increase is similar in size to that of Group II. Columbus, GA and the nation, however, continued to have decreases. Table 3 thus illustrates that Savannah experienced significant reductions in robbery, but that these decreases occurred before the major components of the Smart Policing Initiative were implemented.

Table 3: Robbery

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post- program
Savannah	625	678	745	582	417	437	435	-33.3%	4.3%
Columbus	582	618	635	574	477	413	423	-18.0%	-11.3%
Group II[a]	624	629	619	563	513	508	544	-17.8%	6.0%
Nation[b]	449	447	443	408	369	355	354	-17.8%	-4.1%

Notes: [a] = reported in hundreds; [b] = reported in thousands. See Appendix V for specific raw counts.

City Comparison: Robbery

Aggravated Assault

Table 4 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2006-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for aggravated assault for Savannah, Columbus, Group II (cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999), and the nation. Table 4 illustrates that Savannah experienced a reduction in aggravated assault in the pre-program years similar to that of Columbus and larger than that of Group II and the nation. Almost of Savannah's reduction (17.3%) in aggravated assault occurred in 2010. The reduction in aggravated assault did not continue in Savannah in the post-program years. Although aggravated assault did decrease in 2011, it increased in 2012, leading to an over 6% increase in aggravated assault. This pattern of a decrease in 2011 and an increase in 2012 existed for all four groups. Savannah's increase in aggravated assault over this two year period is most similar to that of Columbus. Table 4 illustrates that Savannah has experienced reductions in aggravated assault, but that these decreases occurred primarily before the major components of the Smart Policing Initiative were implemented. Although the number of aggravated assaults continued to decrease for one year after the program started, an increase between the last two years offset the previous year's gain.

Table 4: Aggravated Assault

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post- program
Savannah	348	397	354	342	283	276	300	-18.7%	6.0%
Columbus	569	617	537	519	475	465	523	-16.5%	10.1%
Group II[a]	993	1000	953	968	942	931	951	-5.1%	0.9%
Nation[b]	874	866	844	813	782	752	761	-10.5%	-2.7%

Notes: [a] = reported in hundreds; [b] = reported in thousands. See Appendix V for specific raw counts.

City Comparison: Aggravated Assault

A line chart titled "City Comparison: Aggravated Assault" with the y-axis labeled "Aggravated Assault (Raw Count)" ranging from 0 to 1200, and the x-axis showing years 2006 through 2012. A vertical line is drawn at 2010. Four series are plotted: Savannah (blue), Columbus (red), Group II (green), and Nation (purple).

City Comparison Summary

In order to assess whether SPI had an impact on violent crime, robberies, and aggravated assault in Savannah, percentage change in raw counts for these three offenses were compared between Savannah, Columbus, GA, cities with populations of 100,000 – 249,999, and nationally. The above analyses did not support that SPI had an impact on these three categories in Savannah. Although Savannah has experienced significant decreases in violent crime, robbery, and aggravated assault since 2006, these decreases primarily occurred before SPI was implemented in 2011. Thus, the reductions in crime cannot be attributed to the SPI.

Comparison of Precincts

Another option to explore the impact of the Smart Policing Initiative in Savannah was to compare changes in crime (%) between different precincts. Although efforts of the SPI as a whole were not simply limited to one precinct, some of the efforts were more focused on the

Central Precinct than others for various reasons. This was partially due to the location of where some of the Top 100 offenders lived, noted problems in this precinct based on the crime mapping, and early acceptance and interest of the precinct commander in crime mapping. Thus, the Central Precinct could have experienced larger reductions in crime than other precincts because of this extra focus. The below analyses compared the Central Precinct's changes in crime (%) post-intervention (2011-2012) with that of the Downtown and Southside Precincts on violent crime, robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with gun, property crime, and burglary. The Downtown and Southside Precincts are both adjacent with the Central Precinct. The Downtown Precinct, however, is less residential and more entertainment oriented. The crime data at the precinct level were provided by the SIP crime analyst.

Violent Crime

Table 5 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for violent crime for the three precincts being compared. Table 5 illustrates that the Central Precinct only experienced half of the reduction in violent crime in the pre-program years as compared to the other two precincts, thus validating the additional focus on this precinct. In the post-program years, the Central Precinct continued to experience decreases in violent crime (16%) while the other two precincts saw increases of up to 15.8%. Although the decrease in violent crime was already occurring in the Central Precinct before the program started, the fact that violent crime increased in the other two precincts after the program started could mean that the decrease in violent crime in the Central Precinct could be attributed to the Smart Policing efforts.

Table 5: Violent Crime

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-program
Central	323	325	297	256	244	215	-20.7%	-16.0%
Downtown	349	344	290	195	211	220	-44.1%	12.8%
Southside	231	210	182	133	155	154	-42.4%	15.8%

Robbery

Table 6 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for robbery for the three precincts being compared. The findings are similar to that of the violent crime trends. The Central Precinct was already experiencing a reduction in robbery (8.9% between 2007 and 2010) before the program started. This reduction, however, was much smaller than the other two precincts. The other two precincts in fact saw decreases of almost 50% in robbery between 2007 and 2010. After the program was implemented, the Central Precinct saw a decrease of 29.2% in robbery over the

next two years while the other two precincts saw increases of up to 22.9%. Thus, the reduction

in robbery in the Central Precinct after the program was implemented in 2011 could be the result

of the SPI considering that robberies increased in the other two precincts.

Table 6: Robbery

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-program
Central	169	200	169	154	124	109	-8.9%	-29.2%
Downtown	203	234	164	106	135	120	-47.8%	13.2%
Southside	165	145	130	83	102	102	-49.7%	22.9%

Aggravated Assault

Table 7 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010),

and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for aggravated assault for the three precincts

being compared. All three precincts experienced decreases in aggravated assaults in the pre-

program years, with the Central Precinct experiencing a decease (24.6%) in between the other

two precincts (36% and 18.9%). All three precincts experienced similar increases in aggravated

assaults after 2010. The trend, however, is somewhat different. The Central Precinct saw an

increase in the first year of the program and then a decrease the second year. The other two

precincts saw the opposite pattern. Thus, no discernible impact of the SPI on aggravated assault

in the Central Precinct was found.

Table 7: Aggravated Assault

|	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-program
Central	114	103	111	86	102	95	-24.6%	10.5%
Downtown	125	98	108	80	61	87	-36.0%	8.8%
Southside	53	56	45	43	40	47	-18.9%	9.3%

Aggravated Assault with Gun

Table 8 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010),

and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for aggravated assault with a gun for the three

precincts being compared. Similar to the results from Table 7, no discernible impact on

aggravated assaults with guns in the Central Precinct was found. The Central Precinct saw a

reduction of 25.9% in aggravated assaults with guns in the pre-program years, similar to that of

the Southside Precinct, but only half that of Downtown. In the post-program years, there was no

increase in aggravated assaults with guns on the Southside but the Central and Downtown

Precincts saw similar increases.

Table 8: Aggravated Assault w/ Gun

|	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-program
Central	58	51	62	43	53	50	-25.9%	16.3%
Downtown	51	56	49	23	29	27	-54.9%	17.4%
Southside	20	27	26	16	14	16	-20.0%	0%

Property Crime

Table 9 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for property crime for the three precincts being compared. The results do not clearly illustrate that the Central Precinct was benefitted more in regards to a reduction in property crime. In the years prior to the program, the Central Precinct saw a decrease (6.3%) that was half of the other two precincts. In the two years following the program, the Central Precinct saw a 17.7% decrease in property crimes, identical to the downtown area.

Table 9: Property

|	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-Program
Central	2175	2255	2388	2039	2248	1678	-6.3%	-17.7%
Downtown	1869	1884	2099	1657	1582	1364	-11.3%	-17.7%
Southside	2314	2698	2188	1924	2274	2266	-16.9%	17.8%

Burglary

Table 10 contains the raw count data, pre-program percentage change (2007-2010), and post-program percentage change (2010-2012) for burglary for the three precincts being compared. The burglary data for the three precincts paint an interesting picture. At first glance, it appears that the Central Precinct saw a significant increase in burglary (17.9%) from 2007 – 2010. This increase, however, was solely due to the 31.6% increase in burglaries in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the Central Precinct experienced a decrease of 10.4% in burglaries, similar to the reduction of burglaries in the downtown area from 2007-2010. In the years following the program, all three precincts experienced different trends. The Central Precinct experienced a 9.8% increase the first year, followed by a 17.6% decrease, leading an overall reduction of 9.5%. The downtown area had two years straight of significant decreases leading to an overall 40.1% reduction. The Southside, on the other hand, had a 14.9% decrease in the first year with a 23.7% increase in the second, leading to an overall 5.6% increase. Thus, no clear evidence supports an impact of the SPI on burglary when compared to the other two precincts.

Table 10: Burglary

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Pre-program	Post-program
Central	526	692	638	620	681	561	17.9%	-9.5%
Downtown	350	317	409	319	241	191	-8.9%	-40.1%
Southside	483	691	462	456	388	480	-5.6%	5.6%

Burglary: Precincts Comparison

Precinct Comparison Summary:

These exploratory analyses compared crime in the post-program years (2011-2012) in the Central District with that of the Downtown and Southside Precincts. These overall analyses indicate that the additional focus in the Central Precinct had an impact on both the overall amount of violent crime as well as robbery. The evidence did not support that the SPI had more of an impact on aggravated assaults, aggravated assaults with guns, property crime, and burglary in the Central Precinct than it did in the other two comparison precincts.

Top 100 Analysis

To assess the impact of SIP services on recidivism rates of high-risk releases into the community, the SIP team identified a Top 100 of the highest risk offenders that were reported to be released back into the city of Savannah from the Department of Corrections.

Treatment group.

For purposes of this evaluation, the treatment group consisted of the individuals identified as part of the Top 100 that were approached by SIP, offered services, and indicated interest in being a part of the program. Due to the small number of females and non-African American minorities included in the Top 100, females and non-African American minorities were excluded from the following analyses.

Many individuals in the treatment group did not receive services during the time period of the evaluation. This could have been due to several reasons, including being arrested before they were able to come in for services, saying that there were interested in the program but not making any appointments to come in for services, or even making many appointments but never actually ever coming in for these services. Thus, this group consisted of individuals who expressed interest in the program who did and did not receive services. Defining this group as such allows other police departments who are interested in following such an approach a better understanding of what percentage of individuals interested in the program would receive services and the impact of the program as a whole on recidivism levels of an entire group of high-risk offenders in comparison to not tracking and offering services to a similar group.

Services group.

At the same time, it was important to examine the specific individuals who received the services to test whether the services they received decreased their odds of being arrested. The services group consists of the individuals in the treatment group who received services during the period of evaluation. It should be noted, however, that there is a participation bias as these individuals voluntarily agreed to participate in the program and illustrated some form of

investment in their future by showing up for these services. Thus, these individuals are different from the treatment group individuals who did not receive services on this factor.

Table 11 below indicates the percentages of the treatment group who received overall services (*services)* and employment-oriented services (*employ)* within different time frames. As Table 11 below indicates, 26 of the 43 individuals in the treatment group, or 60.5%, received some form of service from SIP during the entire evaluation period. The table indicates that the percentage of individuals who had received services increases as more time elapsed. Within six months, 44.2% has received some form of service. This increased to 55.8% within the first year, 65.8% within the first 18 months, and 63.6% within the first two years. For employment-based services, 41.9% received a service within the first six months. This increased to 55.8% within the first year, but stabilized at 55.3% within the first 18 months, and 51.5% within two years (the percentage can decrease as the size of the sample decreased over the two year period depending on when the person first showed interest in the program).

Table 11 also indicates that individuals usually received services within the first six months of indicating interest, but then generally receive fewer services in later stages. For example, 44.2% of the treatment group received services within the first six months. Only 30.2% received services between six and twelve months, 15.8% received services between one year and 18 months, and 12.1% received services between 18 months and two years.

Table 11 also provides information on the percentage of clients who received services over multiple time periods (*cumulative).* For example, the cumulative measure for within twelve months ranges from 0 (received no services) to 2 (received services within both time periods).

For cumulative services within 18 months, the measure ranges from 0 (received no services) to a

3, indicating that they received services from 0-6, 6-12, and 12-18 months.

Table 11. Services Rendered to Treatment Group

		n	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Overall		43	0.605	0.495	0	1
Within 6 Months	Services	43	0.442	0.502	0	1
	Employ	43	0.419	0.499	0	1
6-12 Months	Services	43	0.302	0.465	0	1
	Employ	43	0.233	0.427	0	1
Within 12 Months	Services	43	0.558	0.502	0	1
	Employ	43	0.488	0.506	0	1
	Cumulative	43	0.744	0.759	0	2
	Cumulative Employ	43	0.651	0.752	0	2
12-18 Months	Services	38	0.158	0.37	0	1
	Employ	38	0.132	0.343	0	1
Within 18 Months	Services	38	0.658	0.481	0	1
	Employ	38	0.553	0.504	0	1
	Cumulative	38	0.974	0.885	0	3
	Cumulative Employ	38	0.842	0.916	0	3
18-24 Months	Services	33	0.121	0.331	0	1
	Employ	33	0.091	0.292	0	1
Within 24 Months	Services	33	0.636	0.489	0	1
	Employ	33	0.515	0.508	0	1
	Cumulative	33	1.06	1.03	0	4
	Cumulative Employ	33	0.909	1.07	0	4

Control group.

The control group consisted of the individuals in the Top 100 that were not included in

the treatment group. All of these individuals had an intel file created within SARIC to indicate

that they were part of the Top 100. Individuals were added into the control group for various

reasons. An examination of the original 28 control group's SARIC folders indicated various

reasons how they were classified as a control group member. The largest category consisted of

11 individuals where no explanation was provided on why they were added to the control group.

For these individuals, there were no notes in their file from when they were first identified in late 2010 to being added into the control group at some point generally in March 2011. The second largest category (8 individuals) consisted of individuals where SIP made contact, but the person declined services because they had a job. Notes on the third group (n = 5) indicated that there was no contact between SIP and the individual, but their address was confirmed, generally through a family member. In three instances, they were not able to locate an individual. Finally, one person was contacted but simply declined the services with no rationale provided in the folder. Other individuals from the Top 100 were added to the control group by the current researcher if they had never been assigned to either group but their arrest records had been monitored by a SIP employee over the time of the program. In the end, one thing was clear. The control group was not chosen randomly and consisted of individuals who were placed into that group for different reasons. Considering that eleven individuals were entered into this group with no explanation, and another eight individuals declined services because they already had employment, the control group did not seem adequate to compare with the treatment group to assess the effectiveness of SIP programming.

Comparison group.

Due to concerns regarding the adequacy of the control group, a comparison group was identified. In choosing the comparison group, the focus was to create a group that matched as well as possible on several key factors with the treatment group. The comparison group was not created to match the services group. The comparison group hopefully provided a baseline of recidivism levels of similar released offenders in the community and what would happen if the police department did not take any efforts in tracking them and offering reintegration services.

To create the comparison group, the current evaluator was provided the list of 2,872 names of individuals that had been released from a state prison in Georgia over a three year period (2008-2010) and who were believed to be returning back to Chatham County after release. This list was primarily what SIP and the original researcher had used in mid-2010 to identify individuals based on location and seriousness of past offenses for their Top 100 list. For purposes of this project, the pertinent information in this list was: Name, race, sex, birth year, age, actual release date, release type (e.g., sentence expired, parole, commutation, etc.); whether probation was to follow (simply yes or no); major offense (e.g., robbery, murder, possession of cocaine, etc.); crime type (e.g., Viol/Persn; Property; Drug Possession; Drug Sales; Sex offender; Other); city (the city in Chatham County that the person plans to return); and points. It should be noted that the list also included information on the specific prison from which the person was returning. Based on the records and conversations, the prison from which the prison was retuning was not a factor in the choosing of the Top 100 list and was therefore not a factor in the creation of the comparison group.

A list of 105 individuals that were chosen based on race, sex, age, and offense type were sent to the SIP crime analyst to check for residence status. Since the list consisted of cities and addresses where the Department of Corrections believed that the person was returning to, it was important to exclude individuals who moved out of the area during the period of evaluation (2011-2013). Various police records can indicate whether they were arrested in different jurisdictions or if out of state tags might be associated with their names. Thus, it was easier to identify and remove individuals from the comparison group list who moved out of the area and was arrested by a different police department. It was not possible to remove individuals who

were not under supervision, moved out of the area, and who do not appear in police records. Thus, the recidivism levels of the comparison group might be higher than what they appeared.

The crime analyst sent the list back and identified individuals (n = 19) that records showed did not live in Savannah anymore, were not released from prison when previously thought (e.g., probably had a hold and were transferred to a different state or federal prison), or had died. After removing these names, the comparison list did not match well with the treatment group on offense type and whether they were going to serve probation after release. Fifty additional names from the larger list were chosen based on offense type and whether they were going to be on probation and were submitted to the crime analyst for him to check residency issues again. Similar to the last submission of names, the crime analyst indicated names of individuals who should not be included in the comparison group (i.e. clearly moved out of the area; still in prison, etc.). These names were deleted from the comparison group list. The current evaluator then ran descriptives on race, age, offense category, points, release type, and whether the person was on probation and compared the comparison group list to the treatment group list. Individuals were then deleted from the comparison list in categories that were overrepresented until the comparison group was similar to that of the treatment group.

Table 12 below provides the descriptives to compare the treatment, services, control, and comparison groups on: race/sex, age, release type, whether on probation, crime type, and points. The treatment group consisted of 95.3% black males, ranged in age from 20-61, and averaged 34 years old. More than half of the treatment group (55.8%) had been released from their previous incarceration on parole, 2.3% had their sentence commuted by the parole board, and 39.5% of them were released after their sentence had expired (i.e. maxed out). Almost 40% of them were on probation after their release. Nearly 80% had served their previous incarceration for a violent

offense or an offense against a person. Finally, their mean risk score was a 6.6 with a median of

7.

Table 12. Descriptives of Treatment, Services, Control, and Comparison Groups

		Treatment (n = 43)	Services (n = 26)	Control (n = 40)	Comparison (n = 64)
Race/sex	BM % (n)	95.3 (41)	92.3 (24)	82.5 (33)	90.6 (58)
	WM % (n)	4.7 (2)	7.7 (2)	17.5 (7)	9.4 (6)
Age	Range	20-61	20-61	19-64	22-61
	Mean (Std.dev.)	34.2 (10.3)	35.1 (10.8)	38.1 (11.7)	33.3 (9.6)
	Median	33	33.5	35	33.5
Release type	Parole % (n)	55.8 (24)	57.7 (15)	52.5 (21)	56.3 (36)
	Comm. PB % (n)	2.3 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	Sentence exp. % (n)	39.5 (17)	38.5 (10)	45.0 (18)	43.8 (28)
	Missing % (n)	2.3 (1)	3.8 (1)	2.5 (1)	0 (0)
Probation	Yes % (n)	39.5 (17)	34.6 (9)	27.5 (11)	39.1 (25)
	Missing % (n)	2.3 (1)	3.8 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Crime Type	Violent/Person % (n)	79.1 (34)	80.8 (21)	82.5 (33)	78.1 (50)
	Other % (n)	20.9 (9)	19.2 (5)	17.5 (7)	21.9 (14)
Points	Range	1-11	1-11	1-11	2-11
	Mean (Std.dev.)	6.6 (3.2)	7.0 (3.0)	6.8 (3.4)	6.13 (3.0)
	Median	7	7.5	8	7

Sixty-percent (26 out of 43) of the treatment group received services during the course of

the evaluation. As Table 12 illustrates, however, the clients in the service group did not differ

from the treatment group on race, age, release type, whether on probation, previous conviction

crime type, or risk score. Thus, predicting why some individuals in the treatment group chose

services could not be done based on these characteristics within this sample.

The control group matched up well on certain characteristics. For example, the control

group had approximately the same percentage as the treatment group regarding: (1) being

released from prison on parole (52.5%); (2) having their previous incarceration conviction be a

violent crime or crime against a person (82.5%); and (3) being considered the same level of

threat (6.8). The control group, however, differed on: (1) race (only 82.5% black male); (2) age (control group was slightly older at 38 rather than 34); and (3) being released on probation (only 27.5% of the control group was released from prison on probation in comparison to 39.5% of the treatment group).

The newer comparison group appeared to match up better with the treatment group. Although the comparison group had slightly a higher percentage of white males (9.4%) than the treatment group (4.7%), the two groups matched well on age, release type, whether on probation after release, crime type, and risk score. The two groups had similar medians for risk score, but the comparison group's mean risk score was slightly lower than that of the treatment group. This is primarily because of a higher number of individuals in the comparison group whose last incarceration was for possession of a firearm by a felon, which only received a score of 2 on the risk score scale and thus pulled down the overall mean. Based on the characteristics utilized to create a comparison group similar to that of the treatment group, the current comparison group should be an adequate group to compare recidivism levels.

Dependent variables

The start date used to create the dependent variables was individualized. For treatment group members, the start date was the date that each person agreed to participate in the program if they were not incarcerated. If they were incarcerated at the time they agreed to participate in the program, the first day out of jail or prison was used. For the services group, the start date was the first date of services. For the control group, it was the date that SIP assigned them to the control group or the date when the individual declined to participate in the program. For the

comparison group, the date January 1, 2011 was used unless the individual was incarcerated. The first day released after 1/1/2011 was then used.

Since each person had an individualized start date, the time periods (6, 12, 18, 24, 30 months) refer to different ranges. For example, the first six month time period for an individual with a start date of 1/1/11 runs from 1/1/11 to 7/1/11. If a person's start date was 3/1/11, the 6 month time period runs from 3/1/11 to 9/1/11.

Arrests.

Arrest data through 9/30/2013 were collected for individuals in the three groups, allowing for an examination of arrest data up to 30 months depending on an individual's start date. The arrest data included all arrests by which a law enforcement agency (e.g., municipal police, sheriff, state law enforcement, etc.) brought someone to the county jail. Arrest data for the individuals, including both dates and offense types, were sent by the crime analyst to the evaluator in a Word Document. Due to the limited variation in the number of crimes committed by the small sample size, it was not possible to create scores of the total number of crimes committed. Instead, the arrest data were coded as dichotomies to examine whether the individual had committed a crime within each total time frame. Thus, the analyses examined whether an arrest occurred within 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 months. The analyses did not examine whether a crime was committed between 6-12, 12-18, 18-24, and 24-30 time periods. It examined whether a crime occurred within those total time periods. Traffic offenses such as DUI and driving without a license were counted if it led an individual's arrest. Contempt of court violations were not counted as there were no explanations for these offenses. In addition to examining whether any arrest occurred during these time frames, the data were also coded in a way to examine

whether the individual was arrested for: (1) a violent crime/crime against a person; or (2) firearm offense. These were examined because of the project's focus on reducing violent, particularly firearm, crimes.

In addition to arrests, the police data bases contained information on whether an individual was listed as "suspect/never arrested" in crimes. These data, including both dates and offense types, were limited to that of the SCMPD and not the entire county unlike the arrest data. Suspect information possibly provided additional information into whether individuals were committing offenses in which not enough evidence existed to make an arrest. In order to have a fuller measure of the offenses the individuals were possibly committing, a measure that combined whether they were arrested or suspected of committing a crime was created as well. Similar to the arrest measures, this "combined" measure was measured at the 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 month marks. This measure should be viewed with caution, however, because of the error involved with adding in suspect data that could be inaccurate.

Table 13 contains the descriptives for arrests overall, violent crime arrests, "combined" overall, and "combined" violent. Table 14 contains the information on firearm offenses. Table 13 illustrates that 20.4% of the dataset (not Top 100) analyzed had been arrested within the first six months. Only 8.2%, however, had been arrested for a violent offense. The prevalence increased to 25.9% and 11.6% for the combined crime and combined violent crime measures respectively. Within the first year, 29.2% of the sample had been arrested; 11.8% had been arrested for a violent crime. When taking into consideration whether they were suspects, 36.8% had been involved with a crime within the first 12 months. One out of every five (19.4%) had been involved with a violent crime when combining arrests and suspects. At the 18th month mark, almost one out of every three (32.6%) had been arrested; 10.9% had been arrested for a

violent offense. When combining arrest and suspect data, 43.5% and 20.3% had been involved

with a crime and violent crime respectively. Within the first two years, 42.8% had been arrested

for any crime and 13% for a violent crime. More than half (52.3%) had been arrested or

suspected of a crime by the police; 26.2% had been arrested or suspected of a violent crime.

Finally, at the 30 month mark, of the 115 individuals in the dataset with information covering

this range, 47% had been arrested; 15.7% had been arrested for a violent crime. Half (52.7%)

had been arrested or suspected of coming a crime; 26.8% had been arrested or suspected by the

police of committing a violent offense within the first 30 months.

Table 13. Descriptives for Dependent Variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	n
6 months					
Arrests	0.204	0.404	0	1	147
Violent crime arrests	0.082	0.275	0	1	147
Combined arrests/suspects	0.259	0.439	0	1	147
Combined violent crime arrests/suspects	0.116	0.321	0	1	147
12 months					
Arrests	0.292	0.456	0	1	144
Violent crime arrests	0.118	0.324	0	1	144
Combined arrests/suspects	0.368	0.484	0	1	144
Combined violent crime arrests/suspects	0.194	0.397	0	1	144
18 months					
Arrests	0.326	0.470	0	1	138
Violent crime arrests	0.109	0.312	0	1	138
Combined arrests/suspects	0.435	0.498	0	1	138
Combined violent crime arrests/suspects	0.203	0.404	0	1	138
24 months					
Arrests	0.428	0.497	0	1	131
Violent crime arrests	0.130	0.337	0	1	131
Combined arrests/suspects	0.523	0.501	0	1	130
Combined violent crime arrests/suspects	0.262	0.441	0	1	130
30 months					
Arrests	0.470	0.501	0	1	115
Violent crime arrests	0.157	0.365	0	1	115
Combined arrests/suspects	0.527	0.502	0	1	112
Combined violent crime arrests/suspects	0.268	0.445	0	1	112

Table 14 indicates that firearm offense arrests were rare for the sample after the implementation of the program. Only 1.4% of the entire sample was arrested for a firearm offense arrest within the first six months; 2.7% were suspected of or arrested of a firearm offense. Within the first year, 3.5% were arrested. Around five percent (5.6%) were suspected of or arrested of a firearm offense within the first twelve months. At 18th months, 2.9% were arrested for a firearm offense. The reason for the percentage decrease from the 12th month time period to the 18th month time period was the six fewer individuals in the sample at the 18th month mark. Within the first two years, 5.3% had been arrested for a firearm offense; 8.5% had been suspected of or arrested of a firearm offense. Finally, 6.1% of the sample had been arrested for a firearm offense within thirty months of their start date. Due to the low prevalence of this offense within this smaller sample, further analyses with firearm offenses were not conducted. Instead, analyses on the impact of SIP services on the Top 100's recidivism levels focused on overall and violent crime, not firearm offenses.

Table 14. Descriptives for Firearm Offenses

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	n
6 months					
Arrests	.014	.116	0	1	147
Combined arrests/suspects	.027	.163	0	1	147
12 months					
Arrests	.035	.184	0	1	144
Combined arrests/suspects	.056	.230	0	1	144
18 months					
Arrests	.029	.168	0	1	138
Combined arrests/suspects	.051	.220	0	1	138
24 months					
Arrests	.053	.226	0	1	131
Combined arrests/suspects	.085	.279	0	1	130
30 months					
Arrests	.061	.240	0	1	115
Combined arrests/suspects	.089	.286	0	1	112

Independent variables

The independent measures included in the analyses can be categorized as: (1) background; and (2) interventions. See Table 15 for descriptives.

Background measures.

Six background measures were created and analyzed. The information for all six measures came from the list of 2,872 names of individuals that had been released from a state prison in Georgia over a three year period (2008-2010) that was used to both select the original Top 100 and the comparison group. The six background measures were: (1) race (1 = White); (2) age (measured continuously); (3) release type (1 = parole); (4) whether the person was placed on probation after incarceration (1 = Yes); (5) crime type (Violent or crime against person = 1); and (6) points (measured continuously).

Table 15. Descriptives for Independent Variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	n
Background					
Race (White = 1)	0.10	0.30	0	1	147
Age	35.76	10.46	19	64	147
Release type (Parole = 1)	0.56	0.50	0	1	145
Probation	0.36	0.48	0	1	146
Crime type (Violent = 1)	0.80	0.40	0	1	147
Points	6.46	3.17	1	11	147
Interventions					
Intel folder	0.56	0.50	0	1	147
Services (0-6 months)	0.13	0.34	0	1	147
Employment services (0-6 months)	0.12	0.33	0	1	147
Services (0-12 months)	0.22	0.53	0	2	144
Di Services (0-12 months)	0.17	0.37	0	1	144
Employment services (0-12 months)	0.19	0.51	0	2	144
Di employ services (0-12 months)	0.15	0.35	0	1	144
Services (0-18 months)	0.27	0.63	0	3	138
Di Services (0-18 months)	0.18	0.39	0	1	138
Employment services (0-18 months)	0.23	0.61	0	3	138
Di employ services (0-18 months)	0.15	0.36	0	1	138
Services (0-24 months)	0.27	0.69	0	4	130
Di Services (0-24 months)	0.16	0.37	0	1	130
Employment services (0-24 months)	0.23	0.67	0	4	130
Di employ services (0-24 months)	0.13	0.34	0	1	130
Services (0-30 months)	0.20	0.64	0	4	112
Di Services (0-30 months)	0.11	0.31	0	1	112
Employment services (0-30 months)	0.15	0.60	0	4	112
Di employ services (0-30 months)	0.07	0.26	0	1	112

Intervention measures.

Two different types of intervention measures were included in the analyses. The first type was whether the police department had created a Smart Policing intel folder on the individual (1 = Yes). All individuals who were originally identified as part of the Top 100, including the treatment and control groups, had a Smart Policing folder created.

The second type was treatment oriented. Treatment data were collected by combining information from two efforts: (1) the evaluator examining SARIC folders to collect treatment data from late 2010 through early 2013 by reading the Smart Policing officer's entries; and (2) SIP providing some treatment data for 2012-2013 from their ETO system. The information provided from ETO did not cover before 2012. The Smart Policing folders generally had no entries after February 2013 when the officer assigned to the Smart Policing caseload was re-assigned to other duties. Thus, the Smart Policing folders contained information, including some treatment information, from November 2010 through the first part of February 2013. In cases in which the data from ETO provided by SIP did not match the data in the SARIC folder, the evaluator used the Smart Policing folder information since this information was entered by the police officer assigned to the Top 100 program who entered data diligently.

Treatment measures were created for the 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 month time periods. At the sixth month mark, two dichotomous measures were created: (1) whether or not (1 = Yes) they had a service provided to them by SIP (*services*); and (2) whether or not (1 = Yes) they had an employment-oriented service (e.g., job readiness, job leads, etc.) provided to them by SIP. At each of the other four stages (12, 18, 24, and 30 months), four measures were created: (1) how many time periods they received services (*services*); (2) whether or not they received any service within that total time period (*di service*); (3) how many time periods they received employment services (*employment service*); and (4) whether or not they received an employment service with that total time period (*di employ service*). For example, at the 18 month mark, four measures were created. *Service* ranges from 0 (received no services) to 3 (meaning that they received services in the 0-6, 6-12, and 12-18 month time periods. *Di service* measures whether (1 = Yes) they received a service at all within the first 18 months. *Employment service* ranges from 0 (no

employment services) to 3 (received employment services in the 0-6, 6-12, and 12-18 month time periods). *Di employ service* measures whether (1 = Yes) they received an employment service at within the first 18 months after their start date.

Analysis Plan

The analysis plan to assess whether the Top 100 program had a significant effect on the recidivism levels of targeted offenders included both univariate and multivariate analyses. The first step was to run tests of difference between proportions to examine whether the four groups (treatment, services, control, and comparison) were statistically significant from each other regarding future arrests. The second step was to examine cross-tabulations between the service and dependent measures. The third step was to run correlations between all independent measures and dependent measures. Finally, the last step was to run a series of logistic regression models to examine whether services provided decreased the odds of future arrests at various time stages (6, 12, 18, 24, 30 months) while controlling for other factors.

Tests of difference between proportions

The first step in analyzing whether the four groups (treatment, services, control, and comparison) had statistically significant different offending levels after the implementation of the Top 100 program was to run tests of difference between proportions between the groups. See Tables 16 and 17. The first set was to conduct tests between the treatment and the service groups to examine whether the services group fared better than the overall treatment group. Although at first glance it appeared that the services group committed fewer offenses than the treatment group, only one statistically significant difference existed between the two groups, primarily because of the small sample sizes. At the 24 month mark, 48.5% of the treatment group had been

arrested for a crime, in comparison to only 17.7% of the services group. The second set of tests conducted was between the control group originally chosen by the SIP team and the comparison group chosen by the evaluator. There were no significant differences found between these two groups, even though some prevalence scores differed by ten percent.

The third and fourth sets of tests were to compare the treatment group with the control and comparison groups respectively. The general pattern appeared that the treatment group recidivated more than the other groups. Due to small sample sizes, few significant differences were found. The treatment group had a statistically significant higher proportion of its group arrested for the following offenses than the control group: (1) overall crime at six months; (2) violent crime at six months; (3) overall crime at 12 months; (4) violent crime at 12 months; and (5) overall crime at 18 months. When comparing the treatment with that of the comparison group, which matched better on key factors with the treatment group, the treatment group only statistically differed in one category regarding arrests – violent crime at the 18 month mark. When considering the proportion of the treatment group arrested or suspected of a crime (combined), the treatment significantly differed from the control group on: (1) overall crime at 6 months; (2) overall crime at 12 months; (3) violent crime at 12 months; and (5) violent crime at 18 months. When examining the comparison group, the treatment group significantly differed on the combined measure on: (1) violent crime at 6 months; (2) violent crime at 12 months; and (3) violent crime at 30 months. No statistically significant differences were found between the treatment group and the control and comparison groups when examining firearm offenses (see Table 17).

The final two sets of tests compared the services group with that of the control and comparison groups respectively. In contrast to the treatment analyses which indicated that the

treatment group fared worse than the control and comparison groups, the services group only

significantly differed from the control and comparison groups on one offense. At the 18 month

mark, 38.1% of the services group was arrested or suspected of committing a violent offense in

comparison to 12.8% of the control group. It did not statistically differ from the comparison

group. No statistically significant differences regarding firearm offenses were found between the

services group and the control and comparison group (See Table 17). Thus, these sets of

analyses did not support that the services provided to these individuals decreased recidivism.

Impact on probation and parole violations

An important part of the Top 100 program was to provide services to individuals released

from prison who would also being serving probation, parole, or both. The SIP crime analyst

provided information on which individuals had probation and parole violations and the dates for

those violations. As Table 15 indicated, a total of 53 individuals in the dataset being analyzed

were currently serving probation. Both the treatment and comparison groups had approximately

39% of its group on probation.

		Treatment	Services	Control	Comparison
Probation	Yes % (n)	39.5 (17)	34.6 (9)	27.5 (11)	39.1 (25)
	Missing % (n)	2.3 (1)	3.8 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)

Regarding parole, 81 individuals in the dataset were released on parole after their latest

incarceration. The treatment and comparison groups had approximately 56% of its group serving

parole.

		Treatment	Services	Control	Comparison
Release type	Parole % (n)	55.8 (24)	57.7 (15)	52.5 (21)	56.3 (36)
	Comm. PB % (n)	2.3 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
	Sentence exp. % (n)	39.5 (17)	38.5 (10)	45.0 (18)	43.8 (28)
	Missing % (n)	2.3 (1)	3.8 (1)	2.5 (1)	0 (0)

In order to explore whether services rendered impacted future probation and parole violations, data on arrest, probation, and parole violations for the first two years were examined. Similar to the above analyses on arrests, the proportion of individuals on probation who were arrested for a new crime or who had a probation violation within 6, 12, 18, and 24 months were calculated for the four groups (see Table 18). For those released on parole, the proportion who had been arrested or who had a parole violation within 6, 12, 18, and 24 months were calculated for the treatment, services, control, and comparison groups (see Table 19). Due to the small sample sizes, tests of difference between proportions were not run. Thus, the analyses presented are exploratory and readers should consider the findings with caution.

Table 18 indicates that individuals on probation in the treatment group did not fare as well as compared to those in other groups, similar to the findings for the entire treatment group. In general, a higher percentage of probationers in the treatment group were more likely to be arrested and have a probation violation than both the control and comparison groups within the first six and twelve months. At the 18th month mark, a similar proportion (31%) of the treatment group when compared to the comparison group was arrested and slightly more of the treatment group had a probation violation. Within two years, however, a lower percentage of the treatment group (37.5%) had been arrested in comparison to the control (50%) and comparison (43.5%) groups, but slightly more (25%) had received a probation violation than the control (20%) and comparison (21.7%) groups.

Although the n is quite small for the number of probationers who received services (n = 9), they fared well. None of them had been arrested within the first 12 months. One had received a probation violation within the first year. Although the sample size decreases to seven

when examining later stages, no individual on probation who had received services was arrested. The two individuals, however, who received probation violations created a proportion similar to the other groups. Thus, this group had no arrests and probation violations early in the program, but probation violations later in the analyses were comparable. Due to the quite small sample size, little confidence was placed in these findings.

Table 19 provides the proportion of parolees who had been arrested or who had a parole violation in the four groups over the 24 months. Although the differences were marginal in some cases, the treatment group had a higher proportion of parolees arrested or receiving a parole violation at every stage. The services group performed better or was comparable to the control group. The services group, however, had a smaller percentage arrested and receiving parole violations than the comparison group at each stage. Similar to the probation analyses, it was difficult to place much confidence in these findings because of the small sample size (n = 15), but the findings are favorable in supporting that parolees who received services were less likely to be arrested or receive violations than parolees who did not receive services.

Table 16. Proportion of groups committing any form of crime and violent crime (%)

	6 months		12 months		18 months		24 months		30 months	
	Total (%)	Violent (%)	Total (%)	Violent (%)	Total (%)	Violent (%)	Total (%)	Violent (%)	Total (%)	Violent (%)
Arrests										
Treatment	32.6[a]	18.6[a,b]	39.5[a]	20.9[a]	42.1[a]	18.4	48.5	18.2	57.1	14.3
Services	15.3	7.7	20.0	12.0	23.8	14.3	17.7	5.9	--	--
Control	7.5	2.5	18.0	5.1	20.5	5.1	39.5	10.5	42.9	20.0
Comparison	20.3	4.7	29.0	9.7	34.4	9.8	41.7	11.7	45.8	13.6
Suspected										
Treatment	7.0	4.7	16.3	16.3	23.7	23.7	30.3	30.3[b]	40.0[b]	40.0[a,b]
Services	3.9	3.9	16.0	12.0	28.6	23.8	35.3	29.4	--	--
Control	7.5	5.0	10.3	7.7	15.4	10.3	21.6	13.5	22.9	14.3
Comparison	7.8	3.1	9.7	6.5	14.8	9.8	16.7	11.7	18.6	11.9
Combined										
Treatment	37.2[a]	20.9[b]	51.2[a]	34.9[a,b]	52.6	31.6[a]	60.6	39.4	63.2	47.4[b]
Services	19.2	11.5	36.0	24.0	52.4	38.1[a]	52.9	35.3	--	--
Control	15.0	7.5	25.6	10.3	33.3	12.8	43.2	21.6	44.1	23.5
Comparison	25.0	7.8	33.9	14.5	44.3	18.0	53.3	21.7	54.2	22.0

Notes: [a] = Significantly different from control group at $p \leq .05$; [b] = Significantly different from comparison group at $p \leq .05$; Ns: Treatment at 6 months (n = 32), 12 months (n = 43), 18 months (n =38); 24 months (n =33), and 30 months (n = 19). Service at 6 months (n = 26), 12 months (n = 25), 18 months (n = 21), 24 months (n = 17), and 30 months (n = 0). Control group at 6 months (n = 40), 12 months (n = 39), 18 months (n = 39), 24 months (n =37), and 30 months (n = 34). Comparison group at 6 months (n = 64), 12 months (n = 62), 18 months (n = 61), 24 months (n = 60), and 30 months (n = 59).

Table 17. Proportion of groups committing firearm offenses (%)

	6 months	12 months	18 months	24 months	30 months
Arrests					
Treatment	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	--
Control	0.0	5.1	5.1	7.9	8.6
Comparison	3.1	3.2	3.3	6.7	6.8
Suspected					
Treatment	2.3	4.7	5.3	9.1	10.0
Services	0.0	4.0	4.8	5.9	--
Control	0.0	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.9
Comparison	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7
Combined					
Treatment	2.3	7.0	5.3	9.1	10.5
Services	0.0	4.0	4.8	5.9	--
Control	0.0	5.1	5.1	8.1	8.8
Comparison	4.7	4.8	4.9	8.3	8.5

Notes: [a] = Significantly different from control group at $p \leq .05$; [b] = Significantly different from comparison group at $p \leq .05$; Ns: Treatment at 6 months (n = 32), 12 months (n = 43), 18 months (n =38); 24 months (n =33), and 30 months (n = 19). Service at 6 months (n = 26), 12 months (n = 25), 18 months (n = 21), 24 months (n = 17), and 30 months (n = 0). Control group at 6 months (n = 40), 12 months (n = 39), 18 months (n = 39), 24 months (n =37), and 30 months (n = 34). Comparison group at 6 months (n = 64), 12 months (n = 62), 18 months (n = 61), 24 months (n = 60), and 30 months (n =59).

Table 18. Arrests and Probation Violations for Probationers

	6 months		12 months		18 months		24 months	
	Arrest	Probation	Arrest	Probation	Arrest	Probation	Arrest	Probation
Treatment	29.4% (5/17)	17.6% (3/17)	35.3% (6/17)	17.6% (3/17)	31.3% (5/16)	25.0% (4/16)	37.5% (6/16)	25.0% (4/16)
Services	0% (0/9)	0% (0/9)	0% (0/9)	11.1% (1/9)	0% (0/7)	28.6% (2/7)	0% (0/7)	28.6% (2/7)
Control	9.1% (1/11)	9.1% (1/11)	20.0% (2/10)	20.0% (2/10)	20.0% (2/10)	20.0% (2/10)	50.0% (5/10)	20.0% (2/10)
Comparison	24.0% (6/25)	12.5% (3/24)	29.2% (7/24)	12.5% (3/24)	34.8% (8/23)	17.4% (4/23)	43.5% (10/23)	21.7% (5/23)

Table 19. Arrests and Parole Violations for Parolees

	6 months		12 months		18 months		24 months	
	Arrest	Parole	Arrest	Parole	Arrest	Parole	Arrest	Parole
Treatment	25.0% (6/24)	12.5% (3/24)	33.3% (8/24)	16.7% (4/24)	38.1% (8/21)	19.0% (4/21)	41.2% (7/17)	23.5% (4/17)
Services	6.7% (1/15)	0% (0/15)	13.3% (2/15)	6.7% (1/15)	15.4% (2/13)	7.7% (1/13)	10.0% (1/10)	10.0% (1/10)
Control	4.8% (1/21)	9.5% (2/21)	15.0% (3/20)	10.0% (2/20)	15.0% (3/20)	10.0% (2/20)	40.0% (8/20)	10.5% (2/19)
Comparison	19.4% (7/36)	11.1% (4/36)	25.7% (9/35)	11.4% (4/35)	29.4% (10/34)	14.7% (5/34)	36.4% (12/33)	15.2% (5/33)

Continued univariate analyses

To further assess the impact of the clients receiving services on recidivism levels, further univariate analyses were conducted. First, cross-tabulations were run between all service measures (see Table 15) and the dependent variables listed in Table 13 (e.g., arrests, arrests/suspects combined, etc.). At the two-tailed $p \leq .05$ statistical level, there were no significant differences, indicating that individuals who received services were not significantly more or less likely to be arrested and suspected of any crime or violent crime over a couple year period.

Second, correlations were run between the independent variables listed in Table 15 with the dependent variables listed in Table 13. The resulting correlation matrices for the six month mark (Table 20), 12 month (Table 21), 18 month, (Table 22), 24 month (Table 23), and 30 month (Table 24) are below.

The correlation matrices indicate that age was not significantly correlated with any offending measure. Being white was significantly correlated with being less likely to be arrested for all crime (Y1) and being arrested/suspected of all crime (Y3) at the 6 and 12 month mark. They were less likely to be arrested of any crime within the first 18 months. There was no significant correlation between race and offending at the 24 and 30 month mark. In addition, there was no significant correlation between race and violent offending within this sample. In the following multivariate models, race was not included because of some of the lack of variation in offending within the white category at the earlier stages which created model misspecification due to high standard errors. For example, no white individuals in the sample were arrested or were suspected of any offense within the first six months. Within the first 12 months, no whites

were arrested for any crime, but 2/15 (13.3%) were suspected of a violent crime. At the 18 month mark, 1/15 of whites were arrested for a crime (6.7%), which was not a violent crime. When taking into consideration being suspects, 3/15 or 20% of them were arrested or suspected of committing a crime; only 2/15 (13.3%) were arrested or suspected of committing a violent crime at this mark. At the 24 month mark, 3/14 (21.4%) were arrested; none of them for violent offenses. 35.7% were arrested or suspected of committing a crime; 2/14 (14.2%) were arrested or suspected for committing a violent crime. At the 30 month mark, 3/11 or 27.23% were arrested; none of them for violent offenses; 4/11 (36.4%) were arrested or suspected of crime; 1/11 (9%) were arrested or suspected of violent crime. Although there is variation in the later stages, the lack of variation in the early stages causes model misspecification. Thus, for consistency purposes, the race measure was not included in any of the multivariate models.

Neither being on probation nor parole were significantly related with future offending. Having one's last incarceration be for a violent offense, however, was significantly negatively correlated with being arrested and arrested/suspected of crime within the first year. At the 18th and 24 month, it was negatively correlated with all four dependent measures. Within the first 30 months, serving one's last sentence for a violent crime was negatively correlated with both combined offending measures. Considering that the risk score was computed partially off the individual's previous incarceration crime, it was not surprising that the risk score was also negatively correlated with the offending measures at different stages as well. Because of the conceptual overlap between these two measures, and the moderately strong correlation between the two ($r = .619$), the risk score was not utilized in further multivariate analyses. The final non-service measure in the matrices was whether the individual had an intel folder on him. This measure was not significantly correlated with any offending measure at any stage.

Of particular interest to this evaluation was whether the service measures were significantly correlated with the offending measures. Tables 20-24 indicate that no service measure, whether examining total services or employment services, or measured cumulatively or dichotomously, were significantly correlated with any offending measure at any stage.

Table 20. Correlation Matrix for 6 Month Analyses

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9
Y1 Arrests	--												
Y2 Violent Crime arrests	.589*	--											
Y3 Combined	.858*	.505*	--										
Y4 Combined violent	.450*	.824*	.612*	--									
X1 Race	-.171*	-.101	-.199*	-.122	--								
X2 Age	-.158	-.027	-.149	-.028	.223*	--							
X3 Parole	-.076	.015	-.021	.065	-.154	-.201*	--						
X4 Probation	.053	-.122	.051	-.096	.026	-.199*	-.117	--					
X5 Crime type	-.079	-.096	-.125	-.134	.115	.131	.007	-.088	--				
X6 Points	-.036	-.067	-.026	-.072	.008	.191*	.030	-.211*	.619*	--			
X7 Intel folder	.002	.111	.017	.103	.024	.035	-.007	-.051	.032	.092	--		
X8 Service	-.044	.033	-.042	-.013	.004	-.065	.124	.020	-.056	-.030	.338*	--	
X9 Employ service	-.035	.040	-.078	-.005	.011	-.045	.108	-.008	-.017	-.001	.328*	.970*	--

Notes: * $p \leq .05$

Table 21. Correlation Matrix for 12 Month Analyses

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11
Y1 Arrests	--														
Y2 Viol. crime arrests	.570*	--													
Y3 Combined	.841*	.479*	--												
Y4 Combined viol.	.418*	.745*	.644*	--											
X1 Race	-.219*	-.125	-.166*	-.053	--										
X2 Age	-.047	.032	-.100	-.043	.223*	--									
X3 Parole	-.088	-.020	-.116	-.021	-.154	-.201*	--								
X4 Probation	.012	-.138	.074	-.036	.026	-.199*	-.117	--							
X5 Crime type	-.173*	-.138	-.227*	-.235*	.115	.131	.007	-.088	--						
X6 Points	-.116	-.144	-.116	-.169*	.008	.191*	.030	-.211*	.619*	--					
X7 Intel folder	.003	.057	.053	.108	.024	.035	-.007	-.051	.032	.092	--				
X8 Service	-.096	.049	-.021	.124	-.057	-.081	.073	-.057	-.051	-.014	.363*	--			
X9 Di service	-.123	.010	-.032	.110	-.030	-.051	.046	-.008	-.008	.032	.389*	.933*	--		
X10 Employ serv.	-.096	.030	-.066	.054	-.041	-.060	.056	-.047	-.012	.003	.336*	.951*	.863*	--	
X11 Di employ	-.092	.032	-.071	.046	-.012	-.045	.036	-.006	.011	.031	.359*	.898*	.924*	.934*	--

Notes: * p ≤ .05

Table 22. Correlation Matrix for 18 Month Analyses

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11
Y1 Arrests	--														
Y2 Viol. crime arrests	.502*	--													
Y3 Combined	.793*	.398*	--												
Y4 Combined viol.	.302*	.692*	.575*	--											
X1 Race	-.193*	-.122	-.165	-.060	--										
X2 Age	.010	.047	-.115	-.071	.223*	--									
X3 Parole	-.103	-.060	-.106	-.016	-.154	-.201*	--								
X4 Probation	-.024	-.115.	.028	-.038	.026	-.199*	-.117	--							
X5 Crime type	-.264*	-.229*	-.284*	-.238*	.115	.131	.007	-.088	--						
X6 Points	-.213*	-.195*	-.222*	-.217*	.008	.191*	.030	-.211*	.619*	--					
X7 Intel folder	-.035	.030	-.014	.050	.024	.035	-.007	-.051	.032	.092	--				
X8 Service	-.075	.110	-.095	.071	-.075	-.078	.074	-.021	-.014	.024	.378*	--			
X9 Di service	-.086	.078	-.071	.090	-.043	-.045	.030	.017	.003	.069	.419*	.902*	--		
X10 Employ serv.	-.088	.059	-.143	-.015	-.057	-.058	.071	-.002	.015	.027	.341*	.955*	.814*	--	
X11 Di employ	-.080	.046	-.127	-.013	-.018	-.037	.041	.037	.013	.048	.377*	.874*	.901*	.904*	--

Notes: * $p \leq .05$

Table 23. Correlation Matrix for 24 Month Analyses

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11
Y1 Arrests	--														
Y2 Viol. crime arrests	.447*	--													
Y3 Combined	.818*	.370*	--												
Y4 Combined viol.	.341*	.652*	.568*	--											
X1 Race	-.149	-.134	-.115	-.094	--										
X2 Age	-.002	.035	-.097	-.130	.223*	--									
X3 Parole	-.090	-.056	-.066	.008	-.154	-.201*	--								
X4 Probation	.009	-.113	.018	-.056	.026	-.199*	-.117	--							
X5 Crime type	-.246*	-.196*	-.223*	-.213*	.115	.131	.007	-.088	--						
X6 Points	-.194*	-.123	-.165	-.155	.008	.191*	.030	-.211*	.619*	--					
X7 Intel folder	.020	.036	-.019	.095	.024	.035	-.007	-.051	.032	.092	--				
X8 Service	-.131	.014	-.096	.072	-.064	-.063	.051	.011	.007	.034	.362*	--			
X9 Di service	-.122	.016	-.041	.119	-.018	-.030	.009	.062	.019	.054	.406*	.891*	--		
X10 Employ serv.	-.134	.003	-.132	.030	-.046	-.061	.070	.034	.007	.014	.322*	.960*	.793*	--	
X11 Di employ	-.147	-.015	-.132	.029	.012	-.018	.018	.093	.030	.029	.359*	.876*	.884*	.898*	--

Notes: * p ≤ .05

Table 24. Correlation Matrix for 30 Month Analyses

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y4	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10	X11
Y1 Arrests	--														
Y2 Viol. crime arrests	.458*	--													
Y3 Combined	.867*	.401*	--												
Y4 Combined viol.	.419*	.699*	.573*	--											
X1 Race	-.128	-.140	-.108	-.132	--										
X2 Age	-.004	-.031	-.075	-.148	.223*	--									
X3 Parole	-.108	-.058	-.136	.027	-.154	-.201*	--								
X4 Probation	.015	-.117	.023	-.051	.026	-.199*	-.117	--							
X5 Crime type	-.180	-.121	-.207*	-.208*	.115	.131	.007	-.088	--						
X6 Points	-.210*	-.220*	-.197*	-.171	.008	.191*	.030	-.211*	.619*	--					
X7 Intel folder	.025	.059	-.033	.113	.024	.035	-.007	-.051	.032	.092	--				
X8 Service	-.113	-.091	-.101	.067	-.102	-.146	.140	-.062	-.003	.045	.325*	--			
X9 Di service	-.085	-.066	-.019	.182	-.114	-.158	.110	-.055	-.022	.056	.365*	.888*	--		
X10 Employ serv.	-.112	-.107	-.148	-.019	-.083	-.153	.175	-.042	-.007	.019	.267*	.946*	.729*	--	
X11 Di employ	-.114	-.117	-.154	-.011	-.092	-.174	.154	-.036	-.018	.019	.293*	.892*	.801*	.911*	--

Notes: * $p \leq .05$

Multivariate analyses

The above univariate analyses did not strongly suggest further multivariate modeling was necessary since few independent measures were significantly correlated with the offending measures. In particular, the cross-tabulations and correlation analyses did not find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the treatment measures and offending. To further examine whether the services rendered significantly impacted offending, however, logistic regression models were run in order to control for all independent variables simultaneously and explore for suppressor effects. Separate logistic regression models were run for the 6 month (Table 25), 12 month (Table 26), 18 month (Table 27), 24 month (Table 28), and 30 month (Table 29) time periods. A separate model was run within each time period for each combination of dependent measure (arrest, violent crime arrest, combined, and combined violent) and service measure (service, dichotomized service, employment service, and dichotomized employment service), leading to a total of 8 models for the 6 month time period (Table 25) and 16 models for the other time periods (Tables 26-29).

Considering that few independent measures were significantly correlated with the offending measures, it was not surprising then that none of the models at the 6 month (Table 25), 12 month (Table 26), and 30 month (Table 29) time periods were more significant than chance in predicting the offending models, as indicated by their non-significant $\chi 2$. At the 18th month mark, the first ten models were significant; the first four models predicting arrests at the 24 month period were significant. Nagelkerke R^2 in the significant models ranged from .108 (Model 1 in Table 27) to .163 (Model 9 in Table 27).

Tables 25-29 indicated that the measures of age, parole, probation, and whether the person had an Intel file did not significantly predict the odds of future offending at any time

frame. Supporting the univariate analyses, the fuller logistic regression models indicated that individuals who had been last incarcerated for a violent offense were less likely to have been arrested and suspected (i.e. combined) of both crime in general and violent crime within the first year. At the 18th month and 24th month time periods, having committed a violent offense for the last incarceration decreased the odds of future offending for almost all offense measures examined. These significant findings, however, were not present at the 30 month mark.

Finally, the models indicated that providing treatment services reduced future offending at certain time periods if using a one-tailed test of significance instead of a two-tailed. Table 25 indicated that providing services within the first six months did not significantly reduce offending at the 6 month mark. If at least one service was provided within the first year (see Table 26), however, it reduced the odds of being arrested. This did not apply to employment services or violent offenses. At the 18th month mark, providing employment services over time (employ18), or simply providing employment services one time over the first 18 months (di employ 18), decreased the odds of being arrested and suspected (combined) of a crime (Table 27). Table 28 indicated that providing services did not decrease the odds of committing violent offenses over the first two years. Services, however, both overall and employment-oriented services, decreased the odds of being arrested in the first 24 months. Finally, providing one employment service within the first 30 months decreased the odds of being arrested and suspected of a crime at the 30 month mark (Table 29). It should be noted that models 3 and 4 examining violent crime arrests (Table 29) could not be run because of high standard errors in these two employment treatment measures. In fact, none of the eight individuals who received employment services who were still in this model offended. All seventeen individuals who offended in this model at this stage did not receive employment services.

Table 25. Logistic regression models predicting offenses at 6 months [Exp(B) presented]

	Arrest		Combined		Violent		Combined Violent	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Age	.954	.955	.966	.966	.986	.986	.993	.994
Parole	.621	.607	.864	.873	.906	.900	1.415	1.392
Probation	1.041	1.024	1.093	1.073	.293	.293	.481	.474
Crime Type	.802	.825	.613	.626	.403	.405	.354	.360
Intel	1.138	1.101	1.264	1.318	2.560	2.516	2.323	2.251
Service6	.427	--	.447	--	.945	--	.569	--
Employ service6	--	.487	--	.295	--	1.022	--	.646
Constant	1.897	1.869	1.655	1.658	.232	.230	.233	.229
$\chi2$ (6)	6.512	6.163	5.732	7.047	6.221	6.218	6.934	6.742
-2LL	138.605	138.954	158.972	157.658	76.561	76.564	97.870	98.061
R^2	.069	.066	.057	.070	.097	.096	.091	.088
n	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145

Notes: R^2 is Nagelkerke. * $p \leq .05$ two-tailed; # $\leq .05$ one-tailed

Table 26. Logistic regression models predicting offenses at 12 months [Exp(B) presented]

	Arrest				Combined				Violent				Combined Violent			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Age	.990	.991	.991	.992	.983	.983	.982	.983	1.006	1.006	1.006	1.006	.996	.996	.995	.995
Parole	.660	.661	.652	.652	.578	.577	.579	.578	.788	.790	.790	.790	.788	.790	.804	.804
Probation	.911	.945	.917	.941	1.181	1.206	1.178	1.209	.328	.323	.325	.326	.763	.736	.743	.739
Crime type	.439	.454	.452	.464	.348*	.355*	.351*	.360*	.331	.328	.328	.328	.253*	.245*	.251*	.249*
Intel	1.248	1.342	1.215	1.232	1.444	1.493	1.521	1.566	1.430	1.504	1.473	1.417	1.704	1.654	1.909	1.886
Service12	.512	--	--	--	.755	--	--	--	1.094	--	--	--	1.419	--	--	--
Di serv12	--	.279#	--	--	--	.605	--	--	--	.954	--	--	--	1.784	--	--
Employ12	--	--	.495	--	--	--	.602	--	--	--	1.024	--	--	--	1.099	--
Di empl12	--	--	--	.365	--	--	--	.445	--	--	--	1.208	--	--	--	1.198
Constant	1.408	1.327	1.347	1.285	2.685	2.588	2.693	2.588	.297	.307	.304	.300	.638	.678	.680	.685
$\chi 2$ (6)	6.964	8.605	6.848	6.913	10.478	10.771	11.503	11.876	6.889	6.857	6.855	6.914	11.075	11.252	10.337	10.371
-2LL	163.72	162.08	163.84	163.78	176.08	175.79	175.06	174.68	97.16	97.19	97.19	97.13	129.92	129.75	130.66	130.63
R^2	.068	.084	.067	.068	.097	.100	.106	.110	.091	.091	.091	.091	.119	.121	.112	.112
n	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142

Notes: R^2 is Nagelkerke.   * $p \leq .05$ two-tailed; # $\leq .05$ one-tailed

Table 27. Logistic regression models predicting offenses at 18 months [Exp(B) presented]

	Arrest				Combined				Violent				Combined Violent			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Age	1.007	1.007	1.007	1.008	.979	.980	.979	.979	1.019	1.017	1.016	1.015	.988	.988	.986	.986
Parole	.641	.636	.641	.639	.582	.572	.588	.582	.620	.642	.626	.633	.801	.807	.818	.815
Probation	.827	.841	.833	.845	.942	.960	.959	.981	.397	.376	.381	.375	.722	.707	.707	.711
Crime type	.269*	.274*	.273*	.275*	.252*	.258*	.255*	.260*	.183*	.178*	.185*	.184*	.270*	.261*	.274*	.274*
Intel	.940	.990	.940	.953	1.131	1.099	1.190	1.195	.960	.964	1.119	1.107	1.210	1.084	1.411	1.391
Service18	.726	--	--	--	.641	--	--	--	1.685	--	--	--	1.242	--	--	--
Di serv18	--	.515	--	--	--	.575	--	--	--	2.264	--	--	--	1.900	--	--
Employ18	--	--	.675	--	--	--	.499#	--	--	--	1.374	--	--	--	.887	--
Di empl18	--	--	--	.521	--	--	--	.353#	--	--	--	1.726	--	--	--	.881
Constant	1.556	1.512	1.511	1.470	7.147*	6.772*	6.977*	6.674*	.292	.316	.328	.334	1.115	1.137	1.179	1.168
χ^2 (6)	10.94#	11.42#	11.19#	11.21#	14.60*	13.88*	16.45*	15.95*	11.57#	11.19#	10.56	10.52	9.00	9.75	8.71	8.65
-2LL	160.29	159.81	160.03	160.02	171.55	172.27	169.70	170.19	82.85	83.23	83.86	83.90	129.30	128.55	129.59	129.65
R^2	.108	.112	.110	.110	.136	.130	.153	.148	.163	.158	.149	.149	.100	.108	.097	.097
n	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136	136

Notes: R^2 is Nagelkerke. * $p \leq .05$ two-tailed; # $\leq .05$ one-tailed

Table 28. Logistic regression models predicting offenses at 24 months [Exp(B) presented]

	Arrest				Combined				Violent				Combined Violent			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Age	1.008	1.009	1.009	1.011	.985	.986	.985	.987	1.006	1.006	1.006	1.006	.970	.970	.969	.970
Parole	.698	.693	.709	.698	.722	.710	.739	.725	.673	.677	.672	.672	.863	.857	.875	.869
Probation	1.096	1.132	1.125	1.174	.989	.994	1.021	1.060	.421	.417	.419	.418	.630	.614	.631	.635
Crime type	.294*	.297*	.294*	.302*	.350*	.345*	.350*	.357*	.260*	.259*	.262*	.262*	.393	.381*	.399	.399
Intel	1.355	1.354	1.309	1.355	1.118	1.011	1.162	1.176	1.271	1.245	1.299	1.335	1.536	1.348	1.636	1.619
Service24	.502$^{\#}$	--	--	--	.672	--	--	--	1.092	--	--	--	1.040	--	--	--
Di serv24	--	.350$^{\#}$	--	--	--	.737	--	--	--	1.248	--	--	--	1.642	--	--
Employ24	--	--	.470$^{\#}$	--	--	--	.556$^{\#}$	--	--	--	1.052	--	--	--	.893	--
Di empl24	--	--	--	.244*	--	--	--	.353$^{\#}$	--	--	--	.962	--	--	--	.856
Constant	1.668	1.569	1.588	1.453	5.533	5.376	5.373	5.003	.435	.438	.440	.444	2.074	2.130	2.081	2.059
$\chi2$ (6)	12.63*	11.94$^{\#}$	12.79*	13.27*	8.72	7.30	10.20	9.92	7.66	7.70	7.63	7.62	7.677	8.34	7.78	7.72
-2LL	161.68	162.37	161.52	161.04	168.44	169.87	166.96	167.25	92.61	92.58	92.65	92.66	138.44	137.77	138.34	138.40
R^2	.126	.120	.128	.132	.088	.074	.102	.099	.107	.107	.107	.106	.086	.093	.087	.086
n	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128	128

Notes: R^2 is Nagelkerke. * $p \leq .05$ two-tailed; # $\leq .05$ one-tailed

Table 29. Logistic regression models predicting offenses at 30 months [Exp(B) presented]

	Arrest				Combined				Violent				Combined Violent			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Age	.998	.998	.998	.997	.986	.988	.983	.982	.969	.970	--	--	.967	.971	.963	.961
Parole	.662	.646	.681	.672	.579	.557	.613	.603	.749	.729	--	--	.989	.942	1.065	1.058
Probation	.958	.963	.970	.959	.918	.934	.922	.908	.383	.390	--	--	.624	.638	.610	.603
Crime type	.423	.418	.422	.425	.392	.381	.392	.396	.417	.419	--	--	.405	.385	.413	.415
Intel	1.173	1.145	1.120	1.143	1.003	.889	1.041	1.070	1.567	1.505	--	--	1.581	1.286	1.762	1.795
Service30	.534	--	--	--	.640	--	--	--	.403	--	--	--	.923	--	--	--
Di serv30	--	.414	--	--	--	.824	--	--	--	.359	--	--	--	2.102	--	--
Employ30	--	--	.481	--	--	--	.398	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.535	--
Di empl30	--	--	--	.194	--	--	--	.133[#]	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.239
Constant	2.308	2.306	2.265	2.356	5.921	5.583	6.207	6.551	1.436	1.386	--	--	2.183	1.984	2.403	2.520
$\chi2$ (6)	7.40	6.48	7.43	7.73	7.99	6.62	10.15	10.66	6.60	5.74	--	--	6.94	7.90	8.52	8.69
-2LL	144.19	145.10	144.16	143.85	144.17	145.55	142.02	141.50	88.12	88.98	--	--	119.96	119.01	118.38	118.22
R^2	.087	.077	.087	.091	.094	.078	.118	.123	.101	.088	--	--	.089	.101	.109	.111
n	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	--	--	110	110	110	110

Notes: R^2 is Nagelkerke. * $p \leq .05$ two-tailed; # $\leq .05$ one-tailed

Summary of the results of the Top 100

This evaluation assessed the impact of the Top 100 program on the recidivism levels of identified high-risk offenders who were provided treatment. Univariate analyses did not find evidence that the treatment group displayed lower recidivism levels than the control and comparison groups. When the treatment group was compared with that of the comparison group, tests of difference between proportions found that the treatment group did not have significantly lower offending rates than the comparison group and in fact were more likely to commit violent crime at the 18th month mark. In addition, tests of difference between proportions indicated that individuals in the treatment group who received services were not statistically different than the comparison group regarding future offending. These findings applied as well to probationers and parolees as well in the treatment group. In general, they did not fare better than other groups. Exploratory analyses, however, indicated that probationers and parolees who received services were less likely to commit future crimes and/or have probation or parole violations in comparison to probationers and parolees in the comparison group who did not receive services. Finally, cross-tabulations and correlation tests did not find significant relationships between receiving services, whether measured as total or employment services, and the offending measures at any stage (6, 12, 18, 24, 30 months).

The multivariate analyses consisting of logistic regression models predicting the odds of future arrests at 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 months provided some evidence of a significant effect of receiving services on offending levels, but only if a one-tailed test of significance was utilized. Although providing services within the first six months was not a significant predictor of whether someone was arrested within the first six months, receiving one service within the first

year reduced the odds of being arrested within that same time period. In addition, providing employment services over the first 18 months also decreased the odds of being arrested of a crime within 18 months. No significant effect of services, however, was found at the 24 month mark. Finally, providing an employment service at least one time over the 30 month period significantly reduced the odds of being arrested for a crime, possibly including violent crime as well.

As with any study or evaluation, there are limitations to note. First, the sample size of individuals who received services was small, decreasing the ability to find significant effects. If the treatment group was larger, or if more individuals had received services, it is possible that a significant treatment effect could have been detected. Second, the service measures were rudimentary because of the small sample size and the data on services provided. More precise measures, particularly ones that measure intensity of services provided, could be linked to a decrease in recidivism levels. Third, it was possible that the comparison group received non-SIP services that counteracted the positive effects of the SIP services. Fourth, the analyses examined whether individuals were arrested or suspected of committing crimes. The evaluation did not examine non-criminal justice outcomes, such as whether the SIP clients were more likely to find employment than non-SIP clients. Fifth, in order to assess whether police-oriented services made an impact in comparison to services offered through other agencies, an evaluation would need to be conducted that compares recidivism levels of individuals who received police services with individuals who received traditional reentry services. Sixth, the diverse group of individuals that were included in the three groups made it challenging to isolate effects. For example, each group had individuals who were on parole, probation, and who maxed out. In addition, the groups had individuals who committed non-violent and violent crime. It is possible

that the services were more beneficial for one group more than another and that this effect was hidden because of the diversity of the groups. For example, the exploratory analyses indicated that the service programs worked well for SIP clients on probation and parole. It is possible that SIP services work in conjunction with extra monitoring by probation and parole but not for individuals who maxed out. Much larger studies with different evaluation designs would need to be created to examine these specifics. These larger studies could consist following two parole groups, one receiving services from SIP with the other not. They could also monitor two probation groups, one receiving services from SIP and the other not.

INTERVIEW ANALYSES

As part of the evaluation, interviews of individuals assigned to SIP within the SCMPD, probation, parole, DJJ, Juvenile Court, and service areas of SIP were conducted. Individuals were interviewed twice, once in January 2013 and once in November 2013. The questions focused on: (1) progress of SPI and SIP; (2) impact of SPI and SIP; (3) whether running reentry programs through a police-oriented program affects how clients view the services and the police; (4) perceptions of the police about SIP; (5) perceptions of other agencies about SIP; (6) whether SIP has improved relationships between different agencies; (7) satisfaction of non-policing agency roles in SIP; (8) how information is shared among the agencies; (9) the balance between treatment and enforcement at SIP; (10) concerns of Smart Policing in Savannah; (11) concerns of SIP; and (12) the sustainability of Smart Policing in Savannah.

During the first set of interviews, a total of 22 SIP personnel were interviewed. This included ten (10) individuals with the SCMPD – 9 officers (including the Director) and the crime analyst. In addition, four (4) parole officers, one (1) probation officer, five (5) individuals

responsible for providing services to clients (e.g., program coordinators, WIA, Work Ventures, etc.), one (1) probation officer from the Juvenile Court, and one (1) employee of the Department of Juvenile Justice were interviewed. For confidentiality purposes, the interviews were not digitally recorded. Instead, the evaluator typed notes during the interviews. Considering the small number of employees involved directly with the SIP program, all findings provided below are presented at the group level (e.g., police) in order to not identify individuals. Interviewing individuals with different agencies assigned to SIP provided different perspectives on the same questions. As the findings below indicated, many individuals in the different agencies had similar views that SIP and the SPI were doing well; in some cases, however, different agencies had different views on what could be changed.

All individuals associated with SIP believed and argued with conviction that SIP was the major backbone of Savannah SPI. In a way then, asking the officers and other agency personnel assigned to SIP to separate their perceptions of SIP and SPI were difficult for some and impossible for others. For employees of other agencies (e.g., probation, parole, Work Ventures, etc.), they did not know much about the particulars of the SPI itself; thus they simply saw the activities of the SPI as a normal part of SIP. The same, however, can be stated about the police officers assigned to SIP to some extent. The police officers were familiar with the strategies of the SPI, such as crime mapping, the Top 100, and the use of electronic monitoring for some offenders. But since they saw these activities on an everyday basis, and these activities were simply part of the cultural fabric of SIP, they did not always separate the two when discussing what was working with SIP and/or SPI and what needed to be improved. In general, the individuals who could best separate the two were individuals who had responsibilities directly tied to the SPI, including the Director(s) of SIP, SIP Program Coordinator(s), the officer directly

assigned to the Top 100, and the crime analyst assigned to SIP. Due to confidentiality of the

interviews, however, their views and perceptions were not assigned to their roles in the analyses

below. Rather, the views of the Director of SIP at that time, the Top 100 officer, and the crime

analyst were blended into the perceptions of the police officers at SIP. The crime analyst at SIP

was not a sworn officer, but because his duties were most in line with the law enforcement role,

his views were included there. The views of the Program Coordinator were combined with other

individuals who provided services at SIP, such as WIA and Work Ventures. Although it is

problematic for evaluative purposes to not be able to separate views on SIP from the SPI in some

cases, this "problem" illustrates how the SPI activities were enmeshed in the SIP culture,

encouraging sustainability. It was not a separate program or activity that could easily be cut. In

one way, the only way all of the activities with the SPI could be cut would be if SIP as a whole

was cut. We return to the issue of sustainability at the end of the interview analyses.

How do you think the overall initiative (both SIP and Smart Policing) has proceeded up to this point?

One of the first questions asked of all individuals in January 2013 associated with the SPI

at SIP was the broad question, "How do you think the overall initiative (both SIP and Smart

Policing) has proceeded up to this point?" The goal of the question was two-fold. The first was

to simply ask them their general perceptions of how things were going to assess whether they

think that SIP/SPI were moving in the right direction. The second reason for the broad question,

however, was to examine what issues they would start discussing. Considering that SIP was

involved in so many activities that range from reentry services (i.e. employment help, drug

counseling, etc.) to aggressive law enforcement operations (e.g., warrant sweeps), the individuals

could have interpreted the question in various ways. In the end, what they discussed was telling

to the importance of both treatment and enforcement at SIP.

Police.

The police officers' comments fell into four general categories: (1) discussion of reentry services; (2) discussion of both reentry services and operations; (3) discussion of services and the role of other agencies; and (4) comments on communication. Three officers discussed only reentry services regarding this question. The general belief of these three police officers was that services were going well. They could not help everyone and it cannot work for individuals who simply don't want the services. But if they want the services, they can provide them at SIP and provide some one-on-one help. Another officer commented that he/she did not expect that the individuals they contacted would be so trusting of the police and open to receiving the services. We return to the services later when discussing the impact of SIP.

Another three officers discussed how well both services and operations were going in their answer on SIP/SPI in general. Considering that three officers only discussed services, and another three discussed both services and operations, it clearly indicated how a service-oriented mentality exists with SIP officers. All three officers indicated that this blend between services and operations existed and was going to continue as the model for SIP. Two of the officers discussed the necessity of both. Targeting the right individuals, and providing them with services, particularly employment services, kept them from reoffending. Monitoring them, however, made them realize that they were being watched and that they should be focusing on what they should be doing – obtaining employment. Another officer observed that SIP was doing well in providing both services and helping the community by removing offenders from the streets. He/she said that SIP has continued its strong focus on services and programs, but that there had been more focus on increasing the operations component of SIP. Not only was SIP

doing more warrant searches and sweeps, they were working more closely with precincts rather than doing these sweeps on their own.

Another two officers commented on the police's relationship with other agencies involved with SIP. The first officer at first discussed how recidivism levels were decreasing in his/her opinion because of the programs that were offered at SIP. It doesn't work for everyone, but for those who really want a job and become part of the community and set goals, it works well. He/she then discussed how more of the agencies were working together and that there was more of a team orientation that had weakened in the past. He/she saw this creation of a cohesive unit as a higher priority. The officer discussed the "choppiness" of merging different agencies together into one unit, but that this was expected. The rest of his/her comments were regarding the problems that SIP had with the District Attorney's office during much of the earlier part of the grant. He/she believed that a much better relationship between the police department and the district attorney's office could have led to more significant results earlier in the program. He/she placed much of the problem with the district attorney's office at that time. He/she felt that their greenest assistant district attorney was assigned to the project and this was problematic considering that the project was supposed to be working on the most violent repeat offenders. Once the assistant district attorney had a better understanding of the project and rapport with SIP, he/she was usually reassigned and the new assistant had to be trained all over again. The quality of the assistant district attorney affected this relationship greatly.

Finally, two officers brought up issues of communication immediately when asked this question. One officer stated that communication had improved within the police department regarding SIP over the last year, but that many officers were still not familiar with SIP. Thus, for this officer, he/she believed that SIP was doing a good job, although he/she did not discuss it in

detail at this point of the interview, but he/she thought that the "good news" was not getting out enough. The other officer's comments focused on a need for improved communication within SIP itself. He/she thought that there needed to be improved communication and that this could be accomplished through daily briefings. As can be seen above, no other officer discussed this issue, particularly regarding this broad question.

Parole and probation.

The parole and probation officers were not as thorough in their answers regarding this and several other questions. A part of the issue was that they were not directly connected with most aspects of the SPI. Many of the components were police-focused. Similar to that, SIP still had a police-oriented focus. The Director was with the SCMPD and reported to the SCMPD. The other agencies were stationed at SIP but still reported back to their own supervisors. Thus, the answers of the parole and probation officers gave a feel that they were a part of SIP, but that their roles and responsibilities were not as directly tied to SIP as the police officers. Of the five parole and probation officers, one officer declined to comment. Another simply stated that it was going "ok" and he/she liked it. The other three commented that SIP was doing well or should be considered effective. One believed that this was because there was a better identification of the higher risk offenders from all agencies. This allowed them to better focus on their higher risk clients rather than individuals who have maxed out of prison. Another officer made the same comment as the officer just described, but also pointed out that more treatment programs and services were necessary to better help their clients. Finally, the third officer stated that the program was very effective because it helped all the agencies work together and share information. In addition, he/she thought the word was getting out to the

community by what parole/probation was doing at SIP because of newspaper articles on operations and community events (e.g., community basketball games).

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court.

Due to the small number of individuals assigned to services, DJJ, and the Juvenile Court at SIP, and because their focus was more on providing services than enforcement, their comments were combined below to protect confidentiality. These five individuals described how SIP was doing as: "well" (3), "on the right track," and "good." Considering their backgrounds, it was not surprising that their comments revolved around services. One stated that SIP was doing well in targeting the right individuals, getting them to voluntarily participate in services, and bringing down recidivism levels. Three pointed out that they were able to help a lot of juveniles with services. One of them interestingly even argued that SIP was the most stable thing in these juveniles' lives.

How is SIP and Smart Policing Making a Difference?

During the January 2013 interviews, all employees associated with SIP who were interviewed were asked two questions regarding how they thought SIP and Smart Policing were making a difference: (1) "What specific impacts do you see SIP or Smart Policing making?"; and (2) "What is the greatest success so far within SIP and Smart Policing?" Both of these questions were analyzed simultaneously since the answers were similar in nature.

Police.

When answering these questions, the police officers answered focused primarily on helping clients succeed in life with getting jobs and the improved collaborations of the agencies

at SIP. The officers were positive that providing services, particularly employment-based services, decreased recidivism for these individuals. "You can crunch the numbers and see it." It was considered important to give them the skills they lacked, assist them in their daily living, refer them to the right agencies, help them get GEDs, be an aid to them (e.g., advice, helping with food stamps or shelter, etc.), and help them get a job. If they did not have a goal, maybe SIP could provide them one. If a client believed that they would stop hustling if they could simply provide for his family, this provided them an opportunity to progress, change their way of thinking, get a job, and feel that they could provide for their family lawfully. A couple mentioned that they thought that these services improved the clients' outlooks on life. One of the officers provided a formula: education + vocational training + employment = reduced recidivism. This equation is insightful in that it shows the importance of vocation, training, and education in their minds to reduce recidivism, but that the equation did not include "arrests," "monitoring," "operations," or any other enforcement related activity. Although they did not ignore the importance of this component of their jobs, their minds focused on the positives of services rather than enforcement when considering how to reduce recidivism. They also discussed the internal rewards of seeing people succeed. It felt good to see individuals get off parole, get hired by the city, work at the park, and have a normal conversation with them as you would any citizen. Another shared that he/she liked going out and helping people get a job who in the past thought all doors were closed to them. Now the individual does not have any excuses because if the person received services through SIP, SIP can vouch for them that they have been drug tested and have received training. The fact that all the agencies were working together to accomplish this made the feeling even better for some of the officers.

Related to the issues above, some of officers during the January and November 2013 interviews specifically referred to the collaboration between the agencies themselves as one of the greatest successes in SIP. This collaboration allowed them to reach more clients and increase the program's effectiveness in their opinions. They questioned how effective it would be without some of the partners. Some of them in their answers specifically referred to the enjoyment of working with other agencies. Similarly, some of the officers mentioned that they liked the collaboration as well because it improved the monitoring of the offenders. Probation, parole, and the police department could all have different information. It was important for it to be shared for better monitoring, particularly of high-risk offenders. Before SIP, the officers stated that they did not know about the Juvenile Court or DJJ. But now they feel comfortable to contact them to find out if there is a warrant for a juvenile that might not be in the system that is visible to the police.

Near the end of the final project, in November 2013, the SIP personnel were once again asked to reflect on the biggest successes of the Smart Policing Project specifically. The answers of the seven police officers can be categorized into three categories: (1) better monitoring; (2) providing services to targeted groups; and (3) better strategic decision making. Several of the officers stated that a major success of SIP was identifying a group of high-risk offenders and be able to monitor them, know where they were, what they were doing, and with whom they were associating in order to try to prevent them from committing crimes. Keeping contact with them once or twice per month was seen as important. The second major success was identifying what their needs were and providing them services, such as employment opportunities, in order to give them the best opportunity to succeed. Many of their clients had never had a resume. This was one of the first times that someone was helping them try to find a job. It was also noted that this

element led to positive interactions between the clients and the police, something that many of the clients had previously lacked. One of the individuals associated with providing services at SIP noted how hard the officer assigned to the Top 100 during the majority of the grant worked to make contact with each and every one on the list to offer them services. In most cases, these individuals never received services because they chose not to physically show up to SIP. But this person argued that the positive contact and interactions that the police officer had with these clients was a success in and of itself. It showed that there were individuals out there, even in the police department, who showed concern for them and wanted to help them succeed. A relationship between the police and some of the clients were formed that was not related to a crime or victimization. In essence, they were able to "trust the badge."

Finally, Smart Policing helped them increase their strategic thinkers in their planning. It allowed them to pool the data available to them from the different agencies, analyze it, and move toward a common goal of creating a safer environment for the community rather than simply focusing on separate agency goals. This strategic planning, which heavily focused on data analyses and crime mapping created by the crime analyst stationed at SIP, started taking hold in the entire department when these successes were shared at COMPSTAT.

Parole and probation.

Probation and parole's answers differed on what they thought was the greatest impact. Probation's answers on the greatest success was that the different agencies were coming together to help make the community safer by identifying high-risk offenders and providing services to them. They also thought the additional monitoring of multiple agencies watching their clients was beneficial. The parole answers primarily focused on what the greatest success of parole was

at SIP or how SIP has benefitted parole. They all believed that SIP helped reduce recidivism of

parolees by identifying the most prolific offenders and providing services. They thought their

clients received more services than non-SIP parolees. They were able to get in house treatment

for services for which the state did not pay.   One of them specifically thought that the cognitive

change programming was beneficial to their clients. One of them stated that working at SIP

allowed him/her to have a smaller caseload, even though it consisted of more prolific offenders,

which allowed him/her to deal with them more intimately and deal with their special needs.

Finally, one said that the collaboration between the agencies helped with intelligence gathering.

The responses for parole were similar when asked in November 2013. (The probation officer

was not interviewed in November 2013).

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court

     As expected, the greatest successes and impacts that individuals associated with the

services component or who work only with juveniles dealt with providing services, particularly

employment, to individuals to help better their lives. This answer stayed consistent between the

January and November 2013 interviews. For juveniles, it was considered important to help them

get their GEDS and help them find employment. For juveniles, it might be their first job. This

experience therefore was meaningful on how they will view work in the future. Because of this,

some of the SIP employees might take on a mentor or father-figure role in teaching them how to

be effective in the workforce. For adults, it still came down to jobs. They have succeeded in

getting some of their clients to learn skills and to better themselves in the real world. It was

giving guys a better chance to get through the programs and land real jobs, like in landscaping.

With all the services provided by SIP, however, it was important for them to note that a lot more

goes on than just providing employment opportunities and other types of more formal services.

They made great impacts by just helping their clients with very important everyday basics, such as getting them clothing, food, and shelter. These were things that would not be possible if it was not for the collaborative efforts that existed at SIP. The general feeling was that there was no other place that had this much interaction and collaboration. They knew their clients and knew where they were, meaning that it was much easier to contact them. Probation and parole ensured that the clients were following conditions while the police were providing assistance and help.

How do you think that running reentry and/or rehabilitative programs through a police agency rather than a correctional agency makes a difference?

One of the most innovative aspects of SIP is that it is a multi-agency operation, with the police department in the center, that offers traditional re-entry and rehabilitative programs, such as employment services, drug and alcohol counseling, anger management, cognitive development, etc. A central question then is whether offering these services through a police-oriented program affected how clients viewed both the services and the police department as a whole. The evaluation, however, did not consist of interviews or surveys of clients or members of the community. Personnel at SIP were asked what were their perceptions of these issues.

Police.

The police officers in general did not think that offering services through a police-oriented program inherently changed the nature of the services offered. They believed that if the individuals wanted the services, they would pursue them regardless of what agency offered them. One individual, however, strongly argued that offering the services via a multi-agency program did make a difference in the success of the services. He/she argued that having all the resources available under one roof made the services more accessible to the clients. They could immediately register into programs and quickly see the results. Considering the clientele with

which SIP is engaged, accessibility and ease was quite important to get them to participate and to stay involved. In addition, offering services at SIP allowed them to approach the individual holistically and monitor their progress on multiple facets.

All interviewed officers believed that offering services through SIP affected how clients viewed police officers. Specifically, they were seen in a more positive light. Instead of the clients viewing them as trying to arrest or "lock them up," they were viewed as individuals who were trying to help or assist them. The individuals saw that the police were working for the betterment of both the individuals and the community and that these two interests were not contradictory. One officer said that he/she thought the client found it actually confusing at first because officers providing these types of services, such as helping them apply for food stamps and finding shelter, did not match their image of a police officer. Eventually, however, they started associating "help" with the police. In addition, having police officers provide services meant that not all interactions that individuals had with the police were negative. Instead, they had positive interactions, including phone calls, with the individuals. Thus, if the police were looking for someone, it did not have to be a bad thing. They also felt that these improved relationships helped spread the message about SIP to others in the community who needed this help who might have historically not trusted the police.

An interesting question is whether these improved images of the police were contained to SIP officers or whether it influenced the clients' views of the police as a whole. Not all officers addressed this issue in their answers. The officers who did specifically address this part of the question, however, seemed split. Three of the officers thought that these positive interactions with SIP officers only led to positive opinions of SIP officers. They thought that the individuals viewed SIP officers as being the ones who provided services and were there to help them while

officers with more traditional roles were seen as having the primary function of arresting individuals. One of these three officers pointed out that some individuals in the community traditionally viewed SIP officers as being different than other police officers, but with the switch to shirts with badges on them, they realized that they have the same responsibilities as traditional officers as well. According to two officers, however, they stated the positive attitudes toward the police is first limited to a single SIP officer, spreads to the rest of SIP, and finally eventually affects police officers not associated with SIP.

In the end, this question cannot be answered without interviewing members of the community as well as individuals who participated in the programs and services at SIP. Based on the officers' perceptions though, it appears that offering services through a police-oriented program at least improves perceptions of police officers who work at that program. It also appears reasonable, however, for some individuals these positive interactions and services will influence how they view the police as a whole.

Without prompting, three officers also discussed how improved relationships between the SIP officers and the clients have other benefits as well. They pointed out that providing services and improved relationships helped monitor these clients and got information from them. For example, one officer noted that many individuals came out prison released after their full sentence had been fulfilled. Since these individuals were not required to give a last address, there would not be an address for the police to monitor them. If these individuals were coming into SIP for services, however, they would then have contact information (e.g., addresses, cell numbers) for some of these high-risk offenders in case they did need to contact them for possible questioning. Thus, the individual received beneficial services and the police obtained information on how to contact high-risk individuals if necessary. Two officers commented that

through the improved relationship between the individual and SIP, the police could gain information about crimes that would not have been available if not for this trust.

Parole and Probation.

The probation and parole officers provided little comment on whether they thought that offenders viewed the police-provided services differently than other services. The ones that did comment on this, however, supported the views of the police officers – services were seen the same way regardless of the source. The probation and parole officers also supported the views of the police officers that providing police services had improved images of the police. They did not comment or have insight on whether these improved images applied to the entire department, but they believed that SIP officers were seen in a positive light by the probationers and parolees because the officers were seen as helpful and providing services rather than just trying to lock them up. One parole officer also pointed out that these SIP services showed the parolees that both agencies were trying to help provide services but that there were two groups also monitoring them.

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court

Considering that the individuals associated with the services component, DJJ, and Juvenile Court had more interaction with juveniles than the other groups, it was not surprising that their views reflected what these police-oriented services meant for juveniles as well as for adults. The respondents were mixed on whether clients viewed police-provided services differently than services provided by other agencies. An individual with strong knowledge of these programs simply stated that it depended on the offender. He/she thought it was easier for the adults to accept the services and get something out of it, particularly if the services were

mandated by the courts. He/she thought that it was harder for juveniles to understand the importance of the services. He/she thought, however, that this struggle existed with juveniles in general regardless of who ran the program. Another individual, however, with strong knowledge of SIP programming stated that he/she thought it did make a difference if the services were provided by the police. He/she stated that the police provided additional support to the programs and thought that clients were more committed to the programs or services because the police were involved. They may have the feeling that someone was looking for them if they did not attend court-ordered programs. Another individual who only worked with adults stated that he/she thought that the clients might treat the programs with more focus and seriousness since it was related to the police rather than the court system.

Most of the individuals associated with providing services or working with juveniles thought that the services at SIP improved the attitudes that the clients and community members had about police officers. Similar to the insights discussed by police, parole, and probation officers, they thought that police provided services improved clients' attitudes toward the police because of having positive interactions and receiving help that they normally did not experience. The police were once again seen as being there to help individuals and not just lock them up. Although a couple thought that these positive attitudes of the clients and the community would expand to that of the entire department, most of them thought that it would simply be limited to the SIP officers. Since their experiences with other police officers would still be for traditional purposes, the clients might compartmentalize their perceptions to only SIP officers.

What is your perception of how the police department in general feels about SIP and Smart Policing?

A program like SIP cannot be as effective unless there is acceptance by administration and police officers across the department. To know how police administrators and police officers not assigned to SIP supported SIP and the SPI, surveys of those individuals would need to be conducted. That was out of the purview of this evaluation. The employees at SIP, however, were asked what their perceptions of how the police department in general felt about SIP and Smart Policing. This information provides at least indirect information regarding how it was viewed.

Police.

The police officers believed that police administration supported SIP and the components of the SPI. There did not appear to be any concerns from the officers about what the Director of SIP, the police chief, or his/her staff felt about SIP's mission and their effectiveness. Basically all of the officers were concerned, however, about what the average patrol officer and detective in Savannah thought about SIP. This was particularly evident in the January 2013 interviews. They felt that police officers knew very little about SIP. One of the officers referred to SIP as one of the best kept secrets in the police department. It was estimated by one officer that before he came to SIP that maybe only half of the officers knew that SIP existed. Unfortunately, this half basically associated SIP with the place where they could get their patrol cars washed. Other officers expressed similar concerns. They thought that historically non-SIP officers associated SIP with "babysitting prisoners," "washing cars," or the "hug-a-thug program." Possibly worse, they felt that some non-SIP officers thought that SIP was a place where officers went before retiring so they could work 9-5, do nothing, and allow offenders to get away with whatever they wanted. A couple even mentioned that they have taken personal slack from officers because of their assignment.

These perceptions, however, were changing in their minds. They felt that there had been intentional efforts to get information out about SIP and how it could help both patrol officers and detectives. These educational campaigns, through a newsletter, Compstat, roll call, and discussions with officers, has helped these perceptions. It was also possible in the minds of one or two officers that the increased number of operations had also improved knowledge of and respect for SIP. This allowed non-SIP officers to not only see SIP officers conduct enforcement tasks but allowed them to work alongside them on these operations. They felt that officers and detectives who have made efforts to find out about SIP have liked what they have seen and have found that SIP has valuable information. A couple of officers specifically stated that they did not understand why detectives did not talk with them more about information that SIP might have. It appears that if a detective had a personal connection with an officer at SIP, then he/she might call. It was the perception, however, that less experienced detectives did not know much about the possible information that SIP possesses, especially more current addresses.

In November 2013, all officers were asked whether they thought that the average patrol officer's perception of SIP had changed since January. All agreed that it had. SIP had increased efforts to raise awareness and educate both patrol officers and detectives in several ways. For example, they went to each precinct and did training during roll calls about the services of SIP. They also met crime suppression officers. When they conducted special operations, precincts would have officers and the supervisors take part in planning and conducting the operation. SIP had also increased its effort to provide information to SARIC, allowing officers to get intel through SARIC rather than having to contact SIP. Based on these and other efforts, SIP officers reported that patrol officers knew more about SIP, thought more highly of them, and were calling or e-mailing for information. Some officers still reported misperceptions and

miscommunication, such as patrol officers knowing that they existed but still not knowing what they did, but all interviewed officers agreed that the perceptions were improving, awareness of SIP was improved, and that they were receiving more calls for information from patrol officers.

Probation and Parole.

Most of the probation and parole officers had no insight on this question when asked in January or November 2013. Only two provided their views in January 2013. They both stated that higher administration, including the chief, were embracing SIP and wanted to keep funding it in the budget. Although one officer thought that more officers were interested in coming and working at SIP, he/she thought that the average police officer thinks that SIP was a "sham" and that they don't do anything. The other officer agreed with this statement by saying that he/she did not think that lower level patrol officers saw the value in SIP. He/she thought, however, that if patrol officers saw and had a better understanding of the entire criminal justice process, and not just the arresting component, that it might help them understand the importance of the different agencies at SIP working together. He/she thought that the officers would see that SIP was actually proactive in helping releasees, parolees, and probationers from committing future crimes instead of the reactive nature of making arrests.

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court

The views of the employees associated with SIP services, DJJ, and the Juvenile Court matched pretty closely with that of the SIP police officers, particularly those individuals who spent a majority of their time at SIP. The individuals who provided services thought that many of the officers knew little about SIP, but this was improving over the recent months before January 2013 due to information sharing with commanders, captains, and officers about how SIP

can be used as a resource and investigative tool. One of them mentioned that all the captains and some lieutenants have come over to see first-hand what SIP does. Two individuals associated with services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court commented on how there could be a divide between less and more experienced officers. They thought that the more seasoned officers were more familiar with SIP and saw its positives because they realized the importance of providing services to these high-risk individuals. One person stated that he/she had not heard any complaints from non-SIP officers about SIP and thought that the enforcement-focused operations have helped this perception.

When asked again in November whether these perceptions have changed since January, three of the service oriented or juvenile-specific personnel though that the perceptions had improved since January. They believed that the perceptions had been improved for the same reasons as discussed by the police officers. One employee, however, thought it had not improved. He/she thought that patrol officers who have friends over at SIP or who have been on SIP operations have an improved perception of SIP, but he/she did not think that it affected patrol officers' perceptions and awareness overall. Without surveying patrol officers, it was not possible to actually assess whether perceptions improved. However, even if this last person, who was clearly in the minority, is correct, overall perceptions by the police department had to improve mathematically since some officers would have increased their awareness.

What is your perception of how other criminal justice agencies feel about SIP and Smart Policing?

As already been made explicit throughout this report, a crucial component of the perceived successes of SIP was having the multiple agencies under one roof to provide services

and monitor the individuals in a holistic way. Thus, an understanding of how these different

agencies felt about SIP indicates their connection to the central mission of the program.

Police.

The views of how the police officers thought that the other agencies associated with SIP

felt about SIP ranged from "not being sure" to all agencies being 100% behind it. Most officers'

opinions were somewhere in the middle. The officer who was not sure about the other agencies'

beliefs held this belief because the other agencies were just coming back into the mix. On the

other end, the officer who thought that the agencies were 100% behind it stated that these

agencies would not have officers or personnel here otherwise. He/she thought that these

agencies enjoyed being able to share some information in their databases with the other agencies.

Another officer stated that the other agencies were supportive and wanted to help and control

crime because these issues affected these other agencies as much as it did the police department.

Some officers differentiated how the different agencies felt about SIP. In general, they thought

that parole loved SIP, were unsure about probation, and thought that DJJ enjoyed the services of

the police department at SIP but have had relational problems with the police department. They

all believed that parole had a good handle of what SIP was, what it offered, and how parole and

the police could work together. They were either unsure about probation or thought that

probation was still learning about how to become involved with the process. Three officers

specifically pointed out that DJJ liked it because of the ability of the police to make arrests.

Juvenile probation cannot serve their own warrants because they have no weapons. With their

relationship with the police due to SIP, juvenile probation did not need to call 911, but instead

could talk with officers at SIP. A SIP officer could help make an arrest or call dispatch to have a

patrol car sent over there if a SIP officer could not make it.   Thus, DJJ's participation at SIP

could provide needed support to make arrests and to improve juvenile probation officer safety. Finally, several of the police officers pointed out that the relationships between all the agencies and the police at SIP were improving. They thought that the relationship between these agencies at the time of the interviews in January were stronger than it had been in years. They were learning how to work together again after a having a hard time recently of sharing information and resources.

Parole.

In this section, I did not report the insights of the probation officer, whether positive or negative, since it would violate confidentiality. The interviews of the parole officers indicated that parole loved and appreciated SIP, supporting the perceptions of the police officers. One of the parole officers pointed out that the Director of parole helped found SIP. Others stated that they loved it, thought it was a good program, enjoyed the smaller caseloads they had at SIP, although they were more high-risk parolees, and that they could get immediate help and services.

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court.

Overall, the views of individuals associated with services at SIP, DJJ, and Juvenile Court matched the perceptions of the police officers. Although one person was unsure because of his/her lack of contact with the other agencies, the others expressed clear support for how the different agencies, including DJJ and Juvenile Court, felt about SIP. It was supported that DJJ loves SIP, particularly because they did not have arrest powers and needed assistance from the police to serve a warrant, make an arrest, and bring them to detention. Due to this, they received more respect from their clients and felt safer in their job duties. The juvenile court saw SIP in a positive light as well. They, including the judges, saw it as a good place for free services to help

juveniles. Two pointed out that DJJ and the Juvenile Court's newer presence at SIP supported

the notion that they were more supportive of SIP now than in the recent past. One of them

pointed out that this was important because most of the referrals come from the officers.

Therefore, if the officers were not present, SIP was going to receive fewer referrals, and their

classes were not going to be full. Finally, one of them made an interesting point about the

importance of all agencies having positive connections with SIP and how they treated the clients.

Everyone needed to be working on the same page to help the clients. If the client felt that one

agency cared and another agency did not, then it was going to send mixed messages and confuse

and demoralize the client, decreasing the effectiveness of the programs specifically and SIP as a

whole.

Has SIP/Smart Policing improved relationships with other criminal justice agencies or organizations?

If collaboration between agencies is going to be effective, clear communication among

the agencies is essential. To examine how SIP has helped relationships and communication

between agencies, personnel at SIP were asked, "Has SIP/Smart Policing improved relationships

with other criminal justice agencies or organizations? How?" They were asked this question in

January 2013 and then were asked to update how their relationships had been since January in

the November 2013 interviews.

Police.

All seven police officers who answered this question responded, "yes." SIP had

improved relationships among all agencies. Within SIP, it started with each agency

understanding the concept of SIP and having discussions of where each fits in.   Without clear

communication, agencies would be on different pages of what the goals of SIP were and how the

various agencies planned to meet those goals. In addition, one officer pointed out that information sharing is literally impossible without clear and solid communication between the agencies. Although SIP had always embraced the importance of all agencies being involved with SIP, several agencies had pulled out from the program, partially due to communication problems between the different agencies according to the officers. By the time of the January 2013 interview, adult probation had returned with one officer and was planning to send another. DJJ had pulled back, but had decided to vest itself again. By the time of this interview, these agencies were back at SIP and the police officers all saw this as a positive and improving sign.

During the November 2013 interviews, four of the seven officers said that relationships had improved between January and November 2013 while the other three said that it stayed the same or alluded to that conclusion. No police officer thought that the relationships with the other agencies had deteriorated. They thought there was more interaction between officers of different agencies, even with offices who are non-SIP assigned. At the same time, they pointed out that the relationship issues among the agencies were not really with the officers but more at the director/supervisor levels. Thus, they stated these relationships improved which therefore improved the relationship between the agencies as a whole. The other three officers thought the relationships were about the same, with one of them pointing out that communication can always be something that improves.

Parole and probation.

All five parole or probation officers responded "yes" to this question as well. One officer said that there were more open lines of communication and support; he/she felt comfortable talking with others in different agencies at SIP. Another said that parole had very strong

relationships and trust with the various agencies that were present at SIP. It was very important for them to maintain and build upon that trust and cooperation. Two parole officers started that it absolutely has helped communication and understanding. They argued that the police in general, particularly the average patrol officer, did not really know what probation and parole do. SIP can help the SIP police officers but also the non-SIP officers as well understand probation and parole functions. At the November 2013 interviews, the two parole officers interviewed stated that their relationship with the police department continued to improve between January and November, one of them liking that the director at the end of this time period asked him/her about his/her job and caseload and showed strong interested in wanting to learn what he/she did with his/her job.

Services, DJJ, and Juvenile Court

All three individuals associated with services, DJJ, or Juvenile Court also responded, "yes." In fact, they thought SIP significantly improved relationships between agencies. If all the agencies were not there, the juvenile agencies would in fact have little interaction with some of the other agencies. In general, they would not really work with the other agencies unless they had someone who was about to become an adult. All individuals associated with services, DJJ, or Juvenile Court who were interviewed in November 2013 continued to think that the relationships had improved over the last ten months. Their argument was that different agencies had come back after being less than participative. Although these agencies had already been back at the time of the previous interview, it show, however, there was a perception that relationships were continuing to improve and that agencies that were once gone were not simply just back but more contributing partners.

Satisfaction of non-police agencies' roles in SIP

Agencies can have solid relationships amongst themselves and have positive perceptions of SIP, but this is not the same as being satisfied with one's role. To explore this issue, non-police personnel assigned to SIP were asked in November 2013 whether they were satisfied with their agency's role at SIP and whether they felt that their agency should play a larger role.

At the time of the November 2013 interviews, the other agencies associated with SIP (probation was not interviewed) *were* satisfied with their current roles and did not see many different ways for their agencies to contribute differently to SIP, particularly with budget constraints. The two parole officers were satisfied. One did not see a necessity for an increased role with the other thought an expanded role was possible. The first parole officer stated that two parole officers were enough and that the parole office provided him/her the caseload; it was not dictated by SIP. Thus, according to this officer, the status quo was working, the partnership was fine, and it should not be changed. The other parole officer stated that the rest of SIP listens to what they have to say and that maybe in the future they could play a bigger role. But for now, they were shorthanded and did not have time for extra responsibilities. Considering that the state of Georgia moved to allowing parole officers to work from home offices, an increase in parole officers at SIP would necessitate fewer parole officers being allowed to work from home. Thus, an increase, but probably not a dramatic one, in parole officers at SIP in the future is possible.

In addition, the services and juvenile oriented agencies were satisfied with their current roles in SIP as well, especially considering their limitations in arrest powers. For example, the individuals with the juvenile court or juvenile probation did not have arrest powers. Therefore, their participation in warrant sweeps is non-existent even though they could go on curfew and

compliance checks with officers. Thus, their role was constrained and could not expand having a

stronger presence at SIP. They felt, however, that SIP did appreciate the information that they

were legally allowed to provide regarding gangs and certain problems in certain areas. Some of

this information was information that the police might not be aware of if it was not for their

partnership with DJJ and the Juvenile Court. As for the services, such as WIA and Work

Ventures, they were self-contained and had specific responsibilities to fulfill. Although they

would like additional funding to increase employment opportunities, their *role* would not change

with these improvements.

How was information shared among the agencies

In the November 2013 interviews, SIP personnel were asked what the processes were for

information to be shared between agencies at SIP. According to the interviews, information was

primarily shared through two different means: (1) informal conversations and requests; and (2)

weekly briefings.

The primary way for information to be shared was via informal discussions. Except for

meetings before operations and weekly roll calls, all other information was primarily shared

through everyday interactions with colleagues. In essence, this literally consisted of walking

over to someone and talking to them, or possibly e-mailing them. This was why everyone agreed

that if other cities created a SIP-like program, the agencies needed representatives in the same

physical building. Much of what they did was based on relationships, being in physical

proximity to each them, talking to others at the desk, and having informal conversations. In

general, this worked for most instances between the different agencies. One exception was when

the director of SIP needed information from personnel in a different agency. This led to

problems for some agencies since personnel did not directly report to the SIP director but rather their own supervisor. Depending on the information requested, he/she might not be allowed to provide it. In other cases, they might need supervisor permission. Thus, the recent trend has been that if the SIP director needed information from personnel in a different agency, particularly if it deals with juveniles (DJJ, Juvenile Court), the director would talk to that agency's supervisor assigned to SIP who would then either provide the information or ask their employee to provide the information. But in most cases, informal discussions between personnel were encouraged. Much of what worked at SIP would come to a screeching halt if each employee needed to ask his/her supervisor to ask a different agency's supervisor to ask an employee for information.

The second way for information to be shared between agencies was the weekly meeting on Monday mornings that lasts for about an hour. Depending on who one talks to, he/she might refer to it as a roll call, a roundtable, or a briefing. Regardless of the name, the goal of the meeting remained the same. The goal was to get everyone in all agencies see the overall goals and provide a snapshot of the big picture for the week. As can be inferred from the goal, all agency personnel assigned to SIP were invited and encouraged to attend. At the meeting, the director usually started by discussing his/her goals or priorities for the week, usually supported with statistics or data that pertained to the specific issue. Data on how the programs were producing was usually provided as well. All agencies were asked to share information so all agencies know what each other was doing for the week. They could also talk about successes as well as problems or weaknesses. This discussion allowed the entire SIP team to discuss the issue and problem solve as a group. Other possible items that may be discussed at a weekly meeting were policy changes, information from other city departments, and requests of help on cases.

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For example, the City's Department of Human Resources might present information on sexual harassment in the workforce. In addition, the Criminal Investigation Division might talk about a case they were working on and hoping to get information. Although one or two police officers assigned to SIP would find a short 15 minute daily brief to be beneficial to provide focus for the day, most officers thought the weekly meeting was sufficient considering that additional meetings would be held before any operation. It should be noted that individual agencies, such as parole, held additional meetings for their specific agency as well.

Assessing the balance between treatment and enforcement

SIP is an interesting program in that it brings many agencies together to provide both monitoring and treatment to high-risk offenders and clients. This made it unique from a traditional police program that primarily focused on law enforcement. Thus, it was important to assess how well SIP balances these two competing, but actually complementary, components – enforcement and treatment. During the November 2013 interviews, the SIP personnel were asked to describe the balance between treatment and enforcement at SIP and whether this balance changed due to two recent changes in SIP Directors. These questions helped assess the personnel's views of the culture of SIP as well as examine whether a program like SIP can keep that balance even when Directors were changed.

The overwhelming and consistent trend among all personnel, regardless if they were police offices, parole officers, service employees, or working only with juveniles, was that SIP was an equal balance – 50/50 – between treatment and enforcement. They acknowledged that there were times through the month, such as when they were preparing for a major operation (e.g., warrant sweep), when the focus becomes primarily enforcement oriented. These

operations, however, did not interfere with the providing of services to either adults or juveniles. They all understood that treatment was necessary to give the clients the best opportunities not to offend. A few brought up again the internal rewards of recognizing someone on the street and the former client thanking the officer for the program and how it turned his life around. At the same time, the officers realized that enforcement was necessary as well to keep individuals accountable for their behavior. In general, they pointed out that their preference was to help the individual with the services and treatment (i.e. the "carrot"), but that they were police officers who needed to enforce the law and will send them before a judge if necessary (i.e. the "stick"). A couple wanted to emphasize that they did not come to SIP to retire, but because they wanted to take a new approach to helping people. There was a realization that they were not going to be able to fix the crime problem by "locking [people] their way out of it."

In addition, most of them believed that this balance has stayed consistent throughout the three administrations of the three directors of SIP who have supervised SIP during the course of this evaluation. Some actually stated that the balance had improved. These individuals thought that SIP had moved away from some of its traditional law enforcement responsibilities and had become too service-focused. They thought that this issue might have been more with the sergeant role than the director role. With the increase of operations, they saw the enforcement component become more of an equal partner with that of services.

With all that said, the internal structure itself of the organization does not support this equal balance. The Director of SIP has been generally a police officer. He/she reports to the police department which will always want to place more weight on basic enforcement measures, such as crimes committed, arrests made, and operations ran. Thus, an internal structure that is managed solely by the police department can always appreciate the non-punitive aspect of SIP,

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depending on the police administration, but it is difficult to imagine a police department as a whole that would place equal weight on the non-punitive measures as the punitive ones. It might be the case that a program like SIP is able to have its non-punitive components but only if the traditional law enforcement operations were seen as effective or appropriate. Thus, any police program can probably err on decreased effectiveness on the treatment side more than the enforcement side. In addition, for any program similar to SIP with the police department primarily responsible for its operations, the equal balance between treatment and services will not be maintained due to the structure, but rather it can only be maintained by the culture that has already been established and the priorities placed on both components by the SIP director.

Finally, we turn to issues that administration need not necessarily fix, but issues that were of concern to SIP personnel and therefore at least need to be assessed. Weaknesses in the Smart Policing program as perceived by SIP personnel are discussed first and weaknesses in SIP as a whole.

Concerns of Smart Policing currently in Savannah

In the November 2013 interviews, the personnel involved at SIP were asked about the weaknesses of Smart Policing as it was currently implemented in Savannah at that time. These are not necessarily issues that must be fixed. They are issues, however, that personnel were concerned about and need to be assessed by administration.

- Too many individuals on the Smart Policing caseload to properly monitor and provide services. Considering that parole officers at SIP have caseload of 40-50 since they are supervising high-risk offenders, the same caseload could be applied to the Smart Policing Top 100 caseload if the list of offenders is chosen strategically.
- The lack of participation by individuals in the community to take advantage of their services has been quite challenging. Although they make contact with many individuals, it has been difficult to get many individuals to voluntarily agree to

services. Administration should think of different strategies to encourage individuals to want to participate in SIP's programs. More job opportunities if graduating from SIP programs could be one possibility.

- The consistency of keeping contact with the Top 100 waned over time greatly depending on the officer assigned to the caseload.

- Although there has been many educational efforts, many citizens in the community, as well as patrol officers on the force, are still not familiar with the services available at SIP, including some of the programs associated with the Smart Policing program. Continued focus on educating and increasing awareness to the public and the police department needs to be ongoing.

- The Top 100 list needs to be reassessed to ensure that the highest risk offenders are on the list. Individuals who are currently incarcerated in prison for long periods of time should not be on the list.

- Some were concerned that the Top 100 list focused too heavily on older offenders who might be aging out of crime regardless of their programs. Administration needs to assess whether the Top 100 list should focus on younger individuals and provide them services before more serious crimes are committed. Reentry programs for older offenders can still exist even with this refocus of efforts.

- There is a need to continue to get real-time intelligence to precincts and patrol officers in a timely way. When problems are identified, the data might not be formatted in the way that it needs to be in order to analyze and disseminate. At this time, there are not enough individuals trained to analyze crime data and send it out in real time to do more intelligence-led policing. Because of this, some of their efforts still feel reactive in nature although they are trying to be more proactive and predictive.

- For some, they find that it is too labor intensive, too much paperwork, and too much computer data entry. It can feel that a person may have to enter the same information into three different databases. Some feel that too much time is spent on data entry and not enough on helping people. This is felt particularly by other agencies which have their own databases. Entering information into their own data system takes priority. SIP tried to address this by allowing other agencies to fill out paper forms so SIP staff can enter it. However, the other agencies do not and have not been filling these paper forms out. Thus, valuable information, particularly with juveniles, is not being entered into the ETO system for all to view. SIP is thus working with incomplete data which can paint an incorrect picture, especially when it comes to juvenile crime.

- The Smart Policing caseload has moved from one person to another a few times over the last several years. This can lead to inconsistency in monitoring and services provided.

- The Smart Policing caseload needs to remain one officer's sole responsibility to ensure proper monitoring and services provided.

What's not working or needs continued improvement within SIP?

The different agencies at SIP were also asked what was not working within SIP. As with all the interview answers, including their answers on successes, these answers are simply the perceptions and insights of the individuals that work there. Although they have the best insight on what is happening on an everyday basis, it does not mean that every perception or opinion is actual factual. Thus, this information is presented for SIP to assess the validity of these concerns to examine whether changes need to occur. Similarly, for agencies contemplating on creating programs similar to that of SIP, these are issues to keep in mind.

- Building security can be a major concern for individuals considering the different types of agencies under one roof as well as the different types of clients that walk through. Thus, any agency needs to consider the building security that houses these agencies and programs. In many cases, the programs are offered at night. One officer thought that SIP needed to be more proactive with building security. They have a lot of people on this property and one cannot tell if they are offenders or civilians. Considering that many of the individuals coming to SIP are offenders, he/she thought that a clear message, literally a big sign, needed to exist that clearly stated that this was a police building and that if you have contraband you will be going to jail. He/she thought this was particularly problematic because of the differences between juvenile officers who did not carry weapons and he/she saw as more trusting than the police. He/she thought that there should be a secure area where individuals were not brought through because of security reasons, such as wanted posters, guns, tasers, or being able to hear conversations that they should not be hearing.
- Overload of work: One officer thought that SIP was working pretty well, but that more officers were necessary for them to be able to see more people and to provide more help. He/she felt overloaded with seeing all the people that he/she needed to see as well as the amount of information that was needed to be entered into the computer
- Continued internal (e.g., beat officers, administrators) and external (e.g., the community, City Hall, etc.) education of the services that they offer. SIP has made great strides in

educating the police through COMPSTAT, operations, training at roll calls, and various other ways. In addition, they have spent time discussing SIP services with local government officials, meeting with neighborhood associations, and creating a newsletter, among other efforts. These efforts need to be sustained

- There is still a heavy concern that police offices in general do not know what SIP is about, even though the knowledge and perception is improving.

- Many employees in several agencies noted that programming for both juveniles and adults at SIP has become weak.   Some, however, considered the current programming to be juvenile-focused. Some of the specific programs they would like to see increased are cognitive behavioral, anger management, GEDs for adults, substance abuse for adults, and increased employment opportunities. When programming does exist, they view it as short (e.g, one day) and not as thorough and comprehensive as their clients need.

- The Department of Labor's lack of participation at SIP currently is viewed as a weakness and an impediment to helping clients find jobs. Some believe that the programming will not increase in effectiveness until the programming and services can lead more directly to jobs.

- One of their data tracking systems, ETO, is not being utilized well by many officers and agencies. The lack of data entry by many agencies is leading to good intel being lost on high-risk offenders. This could be improved by either more administrative staff to help enter information into ETO or improved supervision and enforcement of data entry into ETO. The individuals who enter information into ETO generally have supervisors who monitor whether they are doing so. Individuals who are not being required or monitored to enter information into ETO, including police officers, are not using ETO as much as they should. Performance evaluations should reflect whether SIP personnel enter information into ETO as required.

- The morale is low for police officers in SIP as well as for the entire police department because of frequent changes in leadership at SIP and at the police chief level in Savannah.

- The police department's budget as a whole is down, leading to two fewer officers at SIP. Until the shortage in patrol is corrected, SIP will continue to be short staffed.

- It is viewed that not enough funds are placed with SIP to fully fund the services that the clients and community needs, including, but not limited to educational, housing, and employment help.

- SIP used to have two program coordinators. It currently only has one. It is not realistic to stay staffed at that level.

- Examine whether a SIP board is necessary. The SIP board would consist of supervisors or representatives of each agency involved at SIP as well as outside members (e.g., retired judges, community members, etc). The Director of SIP would report to the SIP board, not the SCMPD. The board could possibly report to the city manager or council.

Sustainability of Smart Policing in Savannah

To assess the sustainability of some of the components of the Smart Policing program in Savannah, as well as get ideas on how this could occur, the various agencies were asked to assess these possibilities. In January, they were asked, "What are your ideas on how to keep SIP and Smart Policing in Savannah sustainable after federal funds stop?" Because of the wording of the question, the answers focused on both SIP and SPI.

At the time of the January interviews, all individuals expressed the importance of SIP and SPI needing to continue to exist because of the important contributions and successes as expressed in their answers to previous questions, but few had ideas on how to actually make this happen. The reality is that the average police officer, parole officer, service provider, etc. were not aware of the overall budget and the intricacies of it. Some of them feel that decisions on budgets are simply political in nature. And while it would be naïve to overlook the politics of budgets, particularly when it comes to local municipal budgets, an important aspect of budget decision making comes down to "bang for your buck." They believe that basically all you can do is show what you are doing is working. Thus, the comments of the five people who expressed ideas on how to keep SIP and SPI sustainable came down to showing higher-ups the importance of what they were doing. This requires at a minimum, however, quantifiable data to show effectiveness, the capability of having someone articulate those messages, and a receptive ear.

Fortunately for SIP and Smart Policing in Savannah, SIP has historically been appreciated by police administration. This would appear to be able to continue considering that the previous director of SIP at the time of the November 2013 interviews is the Assistant Chief

of Police and the director before him is the Chief of Staff to the Police Chief. Thus, two individuals with direct experience with SIP who understand the mission of SIP and have the ability to articulate that message have important roles in police administration outside of SIP to be able to demonstrate to police administration, the city council, and the community alike what SIP is and what SIP has accomplished. This should bode well for both the sustainability of SIP and SPI into the future.

At the same time, its effectiveness needs to be illustrated with quantifiable data. As this evaluation summarized earlier, SIP is able to present an annual report that showcases what it is accomplishing. An important focus of the previous year (2013) was to improve the tracking of offenders and the services they are provided through a new program called ETO (Effort to Outcome). This helps provide more up-to-date information on what specific services are being provided to their clients. In addition, information about SIP is being presented to commanders at the weekly COMPSTAT meetings to indicate what is being done. This information sharing at COMPSTAT should also help support the sustainability of SIP and the SPI components since the various precincts, whether commanders, detectives, or patrol officers, will have a better understanding of the information available at SIP, increasing its perceived value throughout the entire police department.

Currently, SIP and its programs are city funded. This was seen as a positive of parole since they are state employees. The funding for SIP and its SPI components being funded solely by city funding and grants, however, is a problem for future sustainability. Grants eventually end and receiving future grants is uncertain. That leaves the budget basically up to the city. Considering the various agencies that are involved in SIP, the sustainability of SIP and SPI would be much clearer if additional funds were secured from the state to help protect year-to-

year budget decisions by one level of government. In addition, securing funds from other agencies or levels of government would help solidify the relationships between these agencies at SIP and would help SIP be viewed more a multi-agency program as well, rather than a police program where different agencies collaborate.

With the November question, the question referred more specifically to the Smart Policing project, "Can the work of the Smart Policing project continue after the grant ends? How so?" With this question, the answers of the officers focused more exclusively on components of the SPI, namely the use of crime analyses/mapping and following a TOP 100. Considering that no one brought up electronic monitoring, it is evident that this component is seen as an add-on that is not sustainable without funding unless it is simply offender paid. But with regarding how to keep the "program" continuing after grant funds end, the focus was not on how to get more individuals on monitors, but how to continue making strategic decisions based on crime analyses and to monitor and provide services to a Top 100.

Overall, the police officers interviewed were positive that these two elements of Smart Policing will continue past the grant. Someone with inside knowledge on this issue stated, "It is going to continue."   The way that this will primarily be accomplished is continuing the work of making Smart Policing a part of the culture of what they do as a department. The goal is to make sure it is not seen as a trend or simply as an add-on program. At SIP, Smart policing is clearly at the heart of what they do. For true sustainability, however, it is argued that they need to move the ideas of Smart policing over into the entire department, particularly patrol. Since patrol officers are the "backbone of policing," they will be the ones on an everyday basis having interactions with people who are getting out of prison. The patrol officers can be provided timely intelligence about the critical issues in their beats. They can take the ideas learned from

Smart Policing and bring it to their beats and neighborhoods. Considering the role of the previous Director as the Assistant Chief of Police who oversees patrol, this initiative, although not easy, can be provided a high priority.   Other police officers believe that the city has already shown interest and acceptance of the importance of crime analysts and see the use of crime analysts for the foreseeable future.

The larger concern among the officers, however, was funding for the Top 100 program. One individual thought that there was no problem with continuing doing something similar to the Top 100 program since they were doing something similar before it by a different name. Thus, SIP has always shown interest in the idea and will continue to do so under some name.   Another officer thinks that SIP should fund one or two officers with caseloads of 50 each and that SIP would be interested in doing so. Another officer thought that SIP would continue the Top 100 program but that it by itself does not require a person will full-time responsibilities of monitoring the Top 100. Another individual with some knowledge of the budget thought that assigning 1-2 officers to the Top 100 full-time would be impossible because of the decreased department budget. He/she said they would continue the Top 100 program, but that it could not be a person's sole responsibilities. An individual on the services sides of SIP with some knowledge of the budget as well thought that the Top 100 program would continue but he/she did not see the current possibility of assigning a full-time officer to it. Based on these comments, and what the evaluator witnessed, it seems clear that SIP is interested in maintaining the Top 100 program because they see the importance of identifying high-risk offenders and offering them services and programs, but that it is not feasible at this time to assign an officer to those duties as his/her only responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE

In 2008, the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department was alarmed that a total of 12,535 Part I crimes occurred; 1,285 were violent crimes. The SCMPD were particularly concerned about the amount of crime that was committed by repeat offenders. Between the years 2007-2010, almost three thousand (2,874) inmates were released back into Chatham County. Based on the individuals returning from the prisons, they estimated that 81% were repeat offenders. Extrapolating from that percentage, they estimated that repeat offenders were responsible for 1,040 of the total 1,285 violent crimes committed in 2008 and 913 of the 1,128 violent crimes in 2009.

To address this problem, the SCMPD focused on two primary strategies: (1) to identify "hot spots" via thorough data collection and analyses and create holistic solutions in partnership with other state and local agencies to address those specific problems; and (2) to identify repeat violent offenders and decrease their recidivism by providing intensive monitoring, including electronic monitoring in some cases, and services. The SCMPD implemented this initiative through the police-funded Savannah Impact Program (SIP). SIP is an innovative multi-agency program which provides intensive monitoring and services to high-risk offenders who are on parole, probation, and under no supervision.

The focus of this evaluation centered on: (1) evaluating the overall impact of the Smart Policing program by examining crime rate trends pre- and post-Smart Policing Initiative implementation; (2) assessing whether individuals in the Top 100 who received services at SIP committed fewer crimes, particularly violent crimes, than individuals who did not receive SIP services; and (3) interviewing SIP personnel, including employees of the SCMPD, parole,

probation, DJJ, Juvenile Court, and service provides, in both January and November 2013 to provide insight into what did and did not work with Smart Policing in Savannah in the context of the Savannah Impact Program.

Percentage change in raw count analyses between Savannah, Columbus, cities with populations of 100,000 to 249,000, and nationally did not support that SPI had an impact on violent crime, robberies, and aggravated assault in Savannah. Savannah's significant decreases in violent crime, robbery, and aggravated assault primarily occurred before SPI was implemented in 2011. Percentage change in raw count analyses comparing the Central District, an area that received more Smart Policing focus than other areas, with that of the Downtown and Southside Precincts indicated that SPI impacted both the overall amount of violent crime as well as robbery in the Central District. The evidence, however, did not support that the SPI had more of an impact on aggravated assaults, including assaults with guns.

Both univariate and multivariate analyses did not find strong evidence to support that SIP services decreased the odds of future offending by Top 100 clients who received them. Univariate analyses, including tests of difference between proportions, cross-tabulations, and correlations, did not indicate that the treatment and service groups committed fewer crimes than the control and comparison groups. Exploratory analyses, however, indicated that probationers and parolees who received services committed fewer crimes and had fewer probation and parole violations than probation and parole clients who did not receive services. The multivariate analyses found that providing services significantly reduced the odds of committing future crime at certain time stages, but only when weakening the tests of significance. Receiving one service reduced the odds of being arrested within the first year. Providing employment services over the first 18 months also decreased the odds of being arrested of a crime within 18 months. At the 30

113

month mark, providing an employment service at least one time over the 30 month period significantly reduced the odds of being arrested for a crime.

SIP personnel, including individuals in the SCMPD, probation, parole, DJJ, Juvenile Court, and individuals who provided services, were interviewed in January and November 2013 to answer questions on: (1) the progress of SPI and SIP; (2) impact of SPI and SIP; (3) whether running reentry programs through a police-oriented program affected how clients viewed the services and the police; (4) perceptions of the police about SIP; (5) perceptions of other agencies about SIP; (6) whether SIP has improved relationships between different agencies; (7) satisfaction of non-policing agency roles in SIP; (8) how information is shared among the agencies; (9) the balance between treatment and enforcement at SIP; (10) concerns of Smart Policing in Savannah; (11) concerns of SIP; and (12) the sustainability of Smart Policing in Savannah. The general consensus among all personnel was that SIP was an effective program that succeeds because it consists of multiple agencies, balances treatment with enforcement, and was successfully able to provide services to high-risk offenders. They believed that providing services to clients improved the views of clients toward at least SIP officers. Although they were concerned that many police officers and detectives were unfamiliar with the resources of SIP, they saw this lack of awareness changing. They perceived that agencies such as parole, probation, and DJJ loved SIP and that SIP, including its Smart Policing components, has improved relationships among the various agencies. SIP personnel provided possible issues for police administration to examine regarding both SIP and Smart Policing. Finally, personnel considered the Smart Policing components of crime mapping and the Top 100 program to be sustainable because they have shown themselves to be effective, have become integral parts of SIP, and have influenced the police department as a whole.

Future research can build upon the findings of this study. A study that examines a larger sample with more individuals receiving services could find more significant impacts of the services rendered. In addition, a study consisting of a larger sample of individuals on probation and parole who receive SIP services could help isolate under what conditions SIP services decrease recidivism the most. In addition, some of the questions posed in the evaluation, particularly those asked during the interviews, would best be asked directly of clients rather than SIP personnel. Future possible studies could survey the clients of SIP and ask them their perceptions of SIP, how police-based services differ from traditional reentry services, whether receiving police-based services influences their perceptions of the police, and what they would like changed with SIP. Similarly, police officers in the SCMPD could be surveyed to assess their knowledge, awareness, and perceptions of SIP. Finally, in addition to strategic planning, the use of crime mapping could be used for evaluation efforts to examine whether operation sweeps and other efforts have influenced crime rates in a particular area.

This evaluation concludes with advice that the SIP personnel had for other agencies who are interested in: (1) identifying a Top 100 list to monitor and provide services; and (2) creating collaborative partnerships similar to the Savannah Impact Program.

What advice do you have for other agencies wanting to create Top 100 lists to whom to provide services?

The creation of Top 100 or WOW (Worst of the Worst) lists are not necessarily new. Creating a Top 100 list, however, to contact them to try to provide services through a police-centered program is innovative. The SIP personnel were therefore asked during the November 2013 interviews what advice they would give to agencies wanting to create a Top 100 list to

contact and to provide services to. Their suggestions and insights, as well as my own, are

provided below. Many of the suggestions apply to the creation of any Top 100 list.

- o Simply be consistent with whatever standard is chosen in creating the list. This not only applies when creating the list to begin with, but when deciding to remove individuals from the list. Have a process and follow it.
- o The list needs to be regularly reviewed and updated using the process in place.
- o The primary focus above all when creating the list should be on the severity of the person's offenses.
- o The individuals responsible for creating the Top 100 list should focus on younger offenders before they commit more serious offenses rather than older offenders who are aging out of crime.
- o Get information from as many police sources. Do not solely rely on police arrest records or intelligence units. It is important to also talk to the crime suppression unit and detectives in the various precincts about individuals that are of concern who need additional monitoring and/or treatment.
- o Agencies should consider creating two separate lists – one for adults and one for juveniles.
- o DJJ and Juvenile Court can provide information for the Top 100 on individuals who are about to age out of the juvenile system.
- o Consider getting the majority of the information on who to add to the Top 100 list from other agencies other than the police department. They might be best as saying who is most at risk and who particularly might need services and be amenable to them. The police typically will only have information on police arrest data within the city and jail data; juvenile court, probation, and parole have been supervising them across the entire state and therefore have state-wide data.
- o Have a discussion with parole and probation before putting its clients on the Top 100 list. They might appreciate the extra monitoring and services for its clients. They might also, however, believe that they are adequately supervising their clients. If this is the case, the police department can place its resources, in both monitoring and providing treatment, with non-probationers and non-parolees.
- o Ensure that the list is inclusive in that it includes individuals not just coming out of prison, but also consider individuals with a history of going in and out of jails, as well as individuals who are already currently released.
- o If an individual on the Top 100 list moves out of the area, remove them from the list but keep their name on a separate list. They should be replaced on the Top 100 list. The other list, however, should be periodically examined to examine whether they have moved back into the area.

- It is not a valuable use of time to continue to monitor someone who will be in prison for a long time. They should be removed from the list and placed on a different list. Another individual should then be selected using the process in place to take his/her place on the list.
- All of your resources should be in place before or at the same time as creating the list in order to be able to have all the agencies help monitor the list as well as provide appropriate services and treatment.
- A brochure is necessary to hand the person to explain the program and the different services that exist.
- It is best to assign one or two police officers to be in charge of monitoring and helping the Top 100. This allows for the client to gain trust in the one officer who can more easily provide that client individualized help.
- When an officer is assigned to monitor and help the Top 100, it should be his/her only job responsibilities.
- The ideal caseload would be a maximum of 50.
- The person designated to work with the Top 100 needs to be dedicated and have the spirit of a social worker in that they need to want to help the individual. This can and will include helping them get GEDs, clothing, boots, social security cards, food stamps, get into job readiness classes, and many other various tasks that a traditional police officer typically does not do. This same person, however, needs to be prepared to also sit in an office and complete a lot of paperwork.
- You should try to make contact with each person at least twice per month.
- When trying to provide services to juveniles on the Top 100 list, consider the individual's family history since the entire family may need to be "treated" if you are going to be successful with helping the youth.

What advice do you have for other cities or agencies wanting to create collaborations similar to SIP?

During the November 2013 interviews, all SIP personnel were asked to provide their advice on how to start collaborations similar to SIP in a different city. The specific question was, "What advice do you have for other cities or agencies wanting to create collaborations similar to SIP?" Below I provide these comments and my insights as bulleted points for the reader to consider.

- Every city is going to be different. With cooperation between agencies and the public, anything is possible.
- Cities interested in starting a program similar to SIP should come to Savannah to see it in person. Cities have already done this. It is not possible to truly understand what SIP is without seeing it in person.
- If cities cannot send representatives to Savannah to see SIP in person, they should consider bringing a Savannah SIP officer to their city in an advisory capacity.
- They should evaluate their crime statistics so they know what specifically to focus on.
- Clearly articulated Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) are necessary between the agencies to specify each agency's roles, responsibilities, who they report to, and how they will be held accountable.
- Have it possibly set up as a task force where there is one director who everyone in all agencies needs to report to.
- Individuals differed on how many agencies should be included at first. One officer suggested that the success of SIP is that all of the agencies – parole, probation, DJJ, and Juvenile Court – are involved. He/she argued that all agencies should be involved from the very beginning so they all feel equals in the creation and implementation of it, be more vested, and the program will be more effective from the start. Another individual thought that idea was too complex. He/she recommended to start with two agencies, such as the police and parole, and then slowly add one agency in at a time.
- It needs to be under one roof. A part of the success of the program is the informal communication that occurs between officers in different agencies since they are literally working side-by-side. This also will help curb the territorial disputes between agencies and lead to better information sharing.
- Get input from everyone. All agencies have different sources of information to share. All agencies need to be viewed and treated equally.
- Need to include juvenile agencies, such as DJJ and the Juvenile Court, into the program.
- Have clear standard operating procedures for all agency employees to follow while assigned to the program.
- Have a clear organizational chart.
- Although informal communication between the agencies is essential for intel sharing, more formal weekly or daily meetings are necessary for all personnel to attend that week's schedule and issues.
- Ensure that all possible resources and agencies within the city are aware of what you do.
- The Department of Labor should be a part of the program considering the importance of providing employment opportunities to high-risk clients.

- An equal balance between treatment and enforcement needs to exist to reach the same success as the Savannah SIP.
- The Director needs to be a person who can work with agencies that have vastly different responsibilities and articulate the mission of the program to both personnel and outside constituents.
- Educate patrol officers from the very beginning regarding the services available at SIP. This education needs to start in training and continue through routine reminders at roll calls.

Final Comments

SIP is an innovative program that brings multiple agencies together to better the community by monitoring and providing services to Savannah's highest risk offenders. Its willingness to take chances on new ideas is important to its culture and future sustainability. Over the last several years, SIP's adoption of Smart Policing components, such as using crime mapping to assess crime problems or identifying high-risk offenders, has started to spread to the entire police department. In a way, it is an example of how police departments can experiment with new ideas on how to provide better services to its community members before implementing them more fully at the departmental level. Other cities would benefit by examining whether some of the successes achieved by SIP would benefit their communities and departments as well.

Brief Summary of the Savannah Impact Program (SIP)

The city of Savannah experienced an increase in violent crime during 1999 and 2000, particularly in homicides and aggravated assaults. Due to the belief that repeat offenders, who were mostly on probation and parole, were the primary cause of this increase in crime, the city of Savannah formed partnerships with the Department of Corrections (e.g., probation), the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Department of Labor to create a unique and intensive supervision program. Hence, the Savannah Impact Program was born in 2001. It was their belief that high-risk parolees and probationers, whether adult or juvenile, if left inadequately supervised and supported would continue their propensity to re-offend. It was therefore their goal to improve community safety by both increasing supervision and providing services to high-risk probationers and parolees. They accomplished this through jointly supervising identified high-risk parolees and probationers. In addition, reduced caseloads allowed for the ability to make more frequent contacts with the parolees and probationers to ensure that they are following the terms of their conditional releases from prison. The supervising officers would coordinate with case managers or counselors to create individual assessments of the services needed. These services would be provided to parolees and probationers under one roof, allowing for a more holistic approach to providing educational, employment, and counseling support while also allowing for successful monitoring.

In 2005, SIP expanded its efforts from monitoring and providing services to only probationers and parolees to individuals who were being released into the community without any conditional provisions of supervision. In order to identity these individuals, the Re-Entry

Unit selects potential candidates with the assistance of the Department of Corrections. The basic

criteria for which an individual needs to qualify for this program are: (1) Chatham County

resident; (2) Chatham County conviction; (3) over three years of incarceration history; and (4)

the commission of a violent crime conviction or special circumstance case. The participant is

interviewed prior to release to offer program services, including employment, educational,

substance abuse counseling, and help with clothing, housing, and medical issues. Participants

receiving services from this Re-Entry Team participate completely on a voluntary basis. After

the interview, a background and history check will be done, a hard file will be made, officers will

contact family members to help with housing needs, and an individualized plan of action is made

before the offender's release. The Re-Entry Unit works with a long list of community members

including, but not limited to: SCMPD; Department of Corrections; U.S. Attorney's Office;

Georgia Department of Labor; Department of Motor Vehicles; Department of Family Services;

The Social Apostolate of Savannah; and the Rape Crisis Center of the Coastal Empire.

According to a brochure created last year, the Re-Entry Unit has successfully helped more than

450 clients reintegrate back into the community with only 14 cases of recidivism.

Today, the criminal justice agencies that have partnered together to form SIP are:

Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department; Georgia Department of Corrections –

Probation Division; Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles; Department of Juvenile Justice; and

the Juvenile Court. SIP's motto is "Building Better Lives." In its first newsletter released last

year, it provided its vision statement as:

> "The Savannah Impact Program (SIP) is committed to developing a crime-free,
> economically thriving community for all people. The Savannah Chatham Metropolitan
> Police Department (SCMPD) will establish community partnerships which promote and
> assist enhancement of individuals "at risk" or fulfilling the "future" of the City of

Savannah. SIP will function as a specialized division of SCMPD providing assistance to local and state community supervision agencies by offering cognitive-behavioral programs; job readiness/work experience training and community supervision accountability compliance. This community collaborative will utilize the principles of effective intervention when rendering services to ensure validated performance outcome."

In fact, this vision statement is congruent with the community partnership focus of the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department's mission statement: "The mission of the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police Department is to provide quality services in partnership with our community which promotes safe and secure neighborhoods."

SIP has identified three goals:

1) To assist community supervision agencies with accountability enforcement by means of curfew checks, GPS monitoring, and conditional release compliance;
2) To provide cognitive-behavioral training programs, supportive service assistance, and vocational skilled training opportunities in efforts of removing barriers to employability;
3) To provide job readiness soft skills training, on-the-job training, temporary paid-work experience, and placement/referral to permanent employment opportunities.

To accomplish these goals, they have set eight (8) program objectives:

1) Identifying offenders who are most problematic and likely to re-offend;
2) Continuing individual assessments and screenings based on risk and needs;
3) Developing individual case management plans;
4) Counseling clients to include substance abuse, individual and family, and anger management;
5) Assessing educational needs;
6) Focusing on cognitive skills – changing behaviors, attitudes, and decision making;
7) Providing employment training and opportunities;
8) Implementing graduated sanctions.

SIP contains and provides several forms of services and programs for juveniles and/or adults.

Below are some of these services and programs.

1) *GED/Educational Services*: SIP provides educational services to juveniles who have been excluded from the school system. Students entering the program participate in TABE testing in order for an individualized educational plan to be developed. Educational services include on-site GED preparatory classes, individual tutoring sessions, peer learning experiences, and pro-educational recreation activities. The facilitator focuses on offering interactive teaching methodologies to assist low skilled participants lacking social and/or cognitive skills. In addition to traditional classroom instruction, the program is supplemented with computers, audio-visual aids, nad other equipment and materials. Classroom instruction exists four days a week, three hours day, for students 16 years and older. Finally, the GED facilitator coordinates and schedules the GED registration and examination for eligible participants. He/she also fosters enrollment opportunities in vocational and continuing education courses at a local technical college.

2) *Cognitive Skills Training Classes:* Cognitive behavioral classes are offered to both juveniles who are under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice and the Chatham County Juvenile Court as well as adults under the supervision of Georgia's State Board of Pardons and Parole and State Probation. This program is offered to juveniles at no cost and is fully funded by the SCMPD. These classes integrate the principles of cognitive and behavioral theories. It attempts to help the client change their behaviors by addressing the root internal thought processes.

3) *Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT):* Moral Reconation Therapy focuses on raising moral reasoning so society's norms and social rules are an integral part of a client's decision-making process.

4) *Motivation for Change (M4C):* Motivation for Change is a course that helps clients with each of the five stages individuals experience when bringing about change in their lives. Each stage deals with different issues and tasks that help the client make changes in their criminal, substance abuse, and other problematic behaviors.

5) *Anger Management*: Anger management is a course designed for juveniles that is designed to reduce the client's acts of aggression by examining their behaviors, attitudes, and actions.

6) *Summer Enrichment Program*: During the Summer Enrichment Program, at risk juveniles are offered pro-social activities, cognitive skills, and life skills lessons in a structured summer camp experience at SIP. Both SIP police officers and staff act as mentors and advisors during this camp.

7) *Work Ventures:* In order to help provide employment opportunities for probationers and parolees, Savannah Impact Work Ventures was created in 2004 with a special function to clean lots that have been identified by the Property Maintenance Department as being derelict under city code. The primary tasks fall under lot maintenance, graffiti removal, car washing, and building maintenance. In 2010, the Work Ventures program started to clean and maintain SCMPD police vehicles. In

2011, Work Ventures employees began doing maintenance work at the police headquarters. The two goals of Work Ventures are: (1) a city and county where parolees and probationers are provided employment; and (2) a city in which all derelict lots are brought up to code.

8) *Work Investment Act (WIA):* The WIA is a grant that provides eligible youth (14-21) help in achieving academic and employment success, effective and comprehensive activities, including educational and skill competencies and provide effective connections to employers. It provides opportunities for eligible youth to participate in activities related to leadership development, decision making, citizenship, and community service. Finally, it provides supportive services for eligible youth to remove barriers to academic and employment achievement.

9) *Second Chance Employment Program:* The Second Chance Employment Program provides twenty hours of job readiness and soft skills training. It assists participants in securing employment by partnering with private sector employers. Course Topics include: career planning process; resume writing, job search process, mock interviews, completing job applications, dressing for success, reducing job-loss risk, explaining a felony conviction, interviewing techniques, skills and interests, job retention, and barriers and challenges to employment."

APPENDIX II

# Total Violent Offenses by Beat

Central

**Central Precinct
Beat 31
Period May 2010- April 2011**

Central Precinct
Beat 33
Period May 2010- April 2011

Beat 33

Metropolitan

Thomas
Square

24%

76%

- Metropolitan
- Thomas Square

Central Precinct
Beat 35
Period May 2010- April 2011

Beat 35

Midtown

12%

28%

60%

- E. Hill/Vic Manor
- Live Oak
- Midtown

Live Oak

E. Hill/Vic.
Manor

Total Jurisdiction
Convicted Felon Residents
5,500

West Chatham Precinct
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
January-Sept 20, 2011: 24,709
Probation: 1062
Parole: 186

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Downtown Precinct
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
Jan-Sept 20, 2011: 22,426
Probation: 536
Parole: 123

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Central Precinct
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
Jan-Sept 20, 2011:
26,361
Probation: 1179
Parole: 256

Downtown

Central

W. Chatham

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Southside Precinct
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
Jan-Sept 20, 2011:
23,124
Probation: 1083
Parole: 130

West Chatham

Southside

Islands

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Islands Precinct
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
Jan-July 2011:
25,321
Probation: 999
Parole: 210

Islands

Central

Southside

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Jurisdiction Wide
Rooming Houses
Probation and Parole

Calls for Service
Jan-July 2011:
121,761

Legend
★ Confirmed and Suspected Rooming Houses
• Parole
• Probation

Appendix IV

Savannah-Chatham County
Total Jurisdiction
Total Aggravated Assault: 192
January-June 2013

County Wide Offender Maps

From 2011

From 2013

Total Violent Part 1s by Beat

Central Precinct

■ 2012 ■ 2013 (Jan-June)

Beat	2012	2013 (Jan-June)
Beat 31	57	23
Beat 32	37	10
Beat 33	26	20
Beat 34	27	15
Beat 35	51	26
Beat 37	18	14

Central Precinct
Beat 31
Violent Part 1s
January-June 2013

Beat 31: 23 Total

Neighborhoods
■ Cuyler/Brownsville — 70%
■ Cann Park — 9%
■ Jackson Park — 17%
■ Beach High — 4%

Central Precinct
Beat 33
Violent Part 1 Crimes
January-June 2013

Beat 33: 20 Total

- Metropolitan 80%
- Thomas Square 20%

Central Precinct
Beat 35
2013 Violent Part 1 Crimes
January-June 2013

Beat 35: 26 Total

- E. Hill/Vic Manor 8%
- Live Oak 31%
- Midtown 61%

Offender Locations in Neighborhoods of Cuyler/Brownsville, Metropolitan, and Midtown

Legend
- Probation
- Parole
- Chatham County Juvenile Court
- DJJ

Crime Statistics for Savannah, Columbus, Group II, and Nation

		Violent Crime	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Property Crime	Burglary	Population
Savannah	2012	775	21	19	435	300	6,995	1,756	137,266
	2011	768	24	31	437	276	7,924	1,833	136,794
	2010	742	17	25	417	283	7,646	2,083	136,322
	2009	990	29	37	582	342	8,796	2,203	135,850
	2008	1,157	25	33	745	354	9,012	2,380	135,378
	2007	1,163	22	66	678	397	8,018	1,810	134,906
	2006	1,054	25	56	625	348	8,061	1,609	134,434
Columbus, GA	2012	994	17	31	423	523	11,268	2,709	196,178
	2011	933	15	40	413	465	12,450	3,342	192,385
	2010	1,005	15	38	477	475	13,442	3,454	184,576
	2009	1,153	13	47	574	519	14,684	3,792	186,224
	2008	1,274	30	72	635	537	14,537	3,271	186,217
	2007	1,316	24	57	618	617	13,791	2,652	188,944
	2006	1,187	17	19	582	569	13,825	2,773	191,221
Group II (100,000 to 249,999	2012	158,138	1,875	9,752	54,430	95,081	1,181,869	274,186	
	2011	155,680	1,871	9,872	50,811	93,126	1,184,388	283,947	
	2010	156,707	1,744	9,481	51,275	94,207	1,155,269	273,363	
	2009	165,046	1,875	10,022	56,341	96,808	1,198,242	275,636	
	2008	169,212	1,981	10,057	61,874	95,300	1,195,752	268,600	
	2007	175,657	2,186	10,379	62,922	100,170	1,205,107	260,130	
	2006	174,186	2,157	10,342	62,416	99,271	1,235,046	261,270	
Nationally	2012	1,214,462	14,827	84,376	354,520	760,739	8,975,438	2,103,787	313,914,040
	2011	1,206,005	14,661	84,175	354,746	752,423	9,052,743	2,185,140	311,587,816
	2010	1,251,248	14,722	85,593	369,089	781,844	9,112,625	2,168,459	309,330,219
	2009	1,325,896	15,399	89,241	408,742	812,514	9,337,060	2,203,313	307,006,550

2008	1,394,461	16,465	90,750	443,563	843,683	9,774,152	2,228,887	304,059,724
2007	1,422,970	17,128	92,160	447,324	866,358	9,882,212	2,190,198	301,621,157
2006	1,435,123	17,309	94,472	449,246	874,096	10,019,601	2,194,993	299,398,484