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New Findings from the Smart Policing Initiative (SPI)

Cambridge, MA; New Haven, CT; and Rochester, NY SPI Thursday, November 17

2:00 to 3:20pm

Hilton, Grand Salon 3, 1st Level

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Evaluating focused deterrence: A randomized control trial in three jurisdictions **Operation RASOR** November 2016 **Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology**

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Overview

- Focused Deterrence defined
- Previous Research
- RASOR in Massachusetts
- The Intervention
- Methods
- Findings



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Focused Deterrence

- AKA "lever pulling"
- Deter future violent behavior of chronic offenders by communicating directly with them
- Tell offenders about the impact on the community and new efforts in response
- Use 'all available legal sanctions (levers)' when violence occurred



Results of Previous Programs

- Boston successful: violent offenses slowed; youth homicides declined but program ended after five years
- Indianapolis, Stockton (CA), High Point (NC) showed success too
- Other agencies did not fare as well: Baltimore and San Francisco had implementation problems
- Braga and Weisburd's systematic review found that 10 of 11 studies showed some crime reduction



Results of Previous Programs

- Indianapolis: only study that looked at recidivism and individual behavior of probationers (2002-2005)
- Two treatments: law enforcement and community leader meetings
- Found no differences between treatment and control groups that received either a law enforcement meeting or community leader meeting
- Recidivism was the same across treatment and control groups arrested for similar offenses, failed urine tests, technical violations



Results of Previous Programs

• Why did Indianapolis probationers fail?

- Treatments were not intense
- Post-meeting follow up was 'seriously limited'
- No evidence of levers being pulled after the meeting
- Call-in meetings were the primary mechanism used to alter the behavior of probationers



RASOR: Focused Deterrence

- Three jurisdictions: Cambridge, Everett, and Somerville
- Intervene with persons who engage in social harm
- Law enforcement = police, district attorney, probation
- Community/service = mental health, treatment, job possibilities, homeless, clergy, community organizations





Primary goals of Operation RASOR

- 1. Prevent future victimization and social harm of the offenders
- 2. Reduce recidivism of those who create social harm
- 3. Determine whether the modified focused determine approach is a successful strategy.





Focused Deterrence

Operation RASOR

- Cross-Jurisdictional
- 3 District Courts
- Data-driven
- Social Harm
- Limited Leverage
- Complete Partnership with Services Providers
- Police Assist with Service Delivery and Case Management

Pulling Levers

- Single Jurisdiction
- 1 District Court
- Officer Identified
- Violent Crimes
- Complete Leverage
- Separate Messages from Providers and Law Enforcement
- Police Typically Focus on Traditional Enforcement Efforts Only





Five phases of intervention

- 1. Identification
- 2. Outreach
- 3. Notification Meeting
- 4. Resource Delivery
- 5. Relentless follow up








Identification Phase

- Regional database combined RMS for CPD, SPD, EPD
- Over 300,000 unique individuals
- Over 5,000 are a defendant/suspect and cross jurisdictional
- Algorithm used to determine social harm score
 - Offense weight, role of individual, gang involvement, use of firearm, drugs, and the time lapse between the incident and the present



Social Harm

Percentage of Individuals with Percentage of Weight



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Outreach Phase

- Crime analysts, police officers, and detectives developed detailed case profiles
- Each candidate was assigned a police case manager who notifies candidate of status as an impact player
- Candidates invited to the notification meeting
- Case manager attempted to engage the family or friends of candidate



Notification Meeting Phase

- Candidates informed of the harm they are causing to communities
- Services available to assist in changing behavior
 - Substance abuse programs, employment opportunities, housing options, and other available services
- Continued criminal behavior will resort in a combined effort to hold candidate accountable
 - Arrests, prosecutions, and enhanced sanctions
 - Risk of punishment is higher because they are being watched



Notification Meetings

- Treatment candidates self-selected into two groups:
 - Participants those who chose to participate
 - Completed intake assessment & develop treatment/ action plans
 - Met regularly with their case management team
 - Non-participants those who chose not to participate (or are removed)
 - Received more intensive enforcement efforts through a plan developed for each offender by case management team



Resource Delivery Phase

- Participants met with the social service provider coordinator for an assessment.
- Developed goals and an action plan.
- Social service coordinator and police case manager provided follow up with participant.
- Relentless follow-up by case managers.



THE EXPERIMENT





Methodology

- A randomized controlled trial (RCT)
- Randomized block design and stratified allocation for top 150 offenders on list
- Top 1-50 in database randomly assigned to Treatment & Control groups
 - Allows for equal numbers of treatment and control groups for each notification meeting



Methodology

- Three Cohorts and three call-in meetings:
 - April 2014
 - August 2014
 - November 2014
- Interventions by case managers from April 2014 to June 2015
- Measured recidivism in the treatment and control groups
- Used 'survival' analysis for the outcome evaluation



Implementation Measures

- Was the treatment and control implemented as planned?
- Observations of call-ins
- Interviews with officers, community/service providers to determine how they followed protocols
- Contacts with offenders keep records or logs






Findings

- No statistically significant differences in time to arraignment between treatment and control subjects for the full sample.
- For cohort 1: treatment group had a longer time to arraignment compared to control subjects, but this difference was not statistically significant
- For cohort 2, the control subjects had a longer time to arraignment compared to RASOR subjects and this difference was statistically significant.
- For cohort 3, the control subjects had a longer time to arraignment compared to RASOR subjects, but this difference was not statistically significant.





Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate





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
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Findings

- Considerable differences in the amount of time spent per case between the cohorts. This may explain why the results from cohort 1 were more consistent with the hypothesized relationships.
 - Cohort 1 received on average 706.8 officer-minutes of case management time
 - Cohort 2 received on average 58.4 officer-minutes of case management time
 - Cohort 3 received on average 37.6 officer- minutes of case management time





Conclusion

- Future studies:
 - Examine the relationship between dosage (case management time) and impact
 - This study suggests that the effectiveness of focused deterrence may be related to the amount of time spent by officers in case management activities.





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New Haven CT Smart Policing Initiative

Chris Sedelmaier, PhD - University of New Haven

Sgt. Roy Davis - New Haven Police Dearpatment

November 16, 2016

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Project Background

- September 2011: The New Haven Police Department (NHPD) and University of New Haven (UNH) in partnership receive a USDOJ SPI grant.
- Goal: Sustain and support evidence-based policing at all department levels and seek to use research findings to inform police leadership and improve decision making throughout the department.



Initial Challenges

- One month after the grant award, NHPD Chief resigns. New chief calls for return to foot patrol and community policing.
- NHPD also severely understaffed.

- "How do we instill lasting change in organizational culture, when the organization is constantly changing?"
- "How do we do more with fewer officers?"



Four-Legged Plan

- 1. Foot patrol officers would use problem-oriented policing techniques to engage the public and involve them in identifying neighborhood problems.
- 2. Application of SARA model
 - Officers identify problems
 - Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) supplies "flash sheets" neighborhood-level analysis products that the officers could take with them into the field.
- 3. Treatment area selection by risk terrain modeling to identify areas most at risk for future violent crime.
- 4. Leadership stability in the form of a district manager and sergeant team assigned for the duration of the
- ³⁰ project.





The New Haven Project


- February 2013: New class of 19 sergeants received two-week training in problem-oriented policing techniques, the SARA model, and basic leadership issues.
- May-June 2013: CAU identifies high-risk violent crime areas in Newhallville neighborhood using location quotient, risk terrain modeling.
- July 2013: Walking beats begin in Newhallville neighborhood with specific directive to use SARA techniques to address violent crime, reach out to local community.



Site Selection


- Newhallville highest location quotient of crime in New Haven.
- NHPD Crime Analysis Unit created risk terrain models to identify risky areas in a manner more complete than relying on any single variable.
- The same criteria used to create the Newhallville risk areas were used to generate risk areas in other parts of New Haven.
- Comparison neighborhoods chosen based on location quotient calculation for violent crime. The selected neighborhoods scored higher than the rest of the city.
 - Fair Haven
 - Hill
 - West River
 - Edgewood













Data Collection – Violent Crime

- CAU produced weekly reports on Newhallville neighborhood.
 - Major crimes (of which violent crimes are a subset)
 - Calls for service: police-initiated calls vs. public-initiated calls
 - Comparison between risk terrain modeling identified riskareas, other areas
 - Major crimes and calls for service by TOD/DOW
- Measuring Change
 - 13 weeks prior, 13 weeks intervention, and 13 weeks post.
 - Comparisons: 2012, comparison neighborhoods.
 - Seeking impacts on violent crimes, calls for service.



What Happened? (Neighborhood Level)

- Violent crime decreases in Newhallville
 - 19 percent reduction from pre-intervention through intervention period
 - 40 percent further reduction in the 13-week postintervention period
 - Driven by sharp reduction in shootings
 - Significant difference from Edgewood neighborhood



What Happened? (Neighborhood Level)

		Pre- Interven- tion	Interven- tion	Post- Interven- tion	Pre-Post Change (Percent)
Newhallville	Grand Total	73	82	49	-32.9%
	Violence Total	42	34	20	-52.4%
Hill	Grand Total	140	110	87	-37.9%
	Violence Total	38	50	35	-7.9%
Fair Haven	Grand Total	102	94	82	-19.6%
	Violence Total	41	34	34	-17.1%
West River	Grand Total	53	34	44	-17.0%
	Violence Total	14	6	15	7.1%
Edgewood	Grand Total	59	45	42	-28.8%
	Violence Total	10	10	19 Data. Analysis, Solution	90.0%

What Happened? (Risk Terrain Modeling Area Level)

- Every violent offense decreases in Newhallville risk terrain modeling areas, period-over-period
 - 36 percent reduction from pre-intervention through intervention period
 - 56 percent further reduction in the 13-week post-intervention period
 - Small raw numbers, but important reductions
 - Areas accounted for 60 percent of all violent crime in Newhallville before intervention; 47 percent during intervention
- Significant difference from comparison neighborhoods, but a caveat.
 - Seems due to robbery increase in Fair Haven.



What Happened? (Risk Terrain Modeling Area Level)

		Pre- Interven- tion	Interven- tion	Post- Interven- tion	Pre-Post Change (Percent)
Newhallville	Grand Total	38	32	20	-47.4%
	Violence Total	25	16	7	-72.0%
Hill	Grand Total	64	53	45	-29.7%
	Violence Total	25	26	14	-44.0%
Fair Haven	Grand Total	20	34	24	20.0%
	Violence Total	7	6	11	57.1%
West River	Grand Total	11	6	9	-18.2%
	Violence Total	1	0	5	400.0%
Edgewood	Grand Total	9	5	6	-33.3%
	Violence Total	0	1	1	100.0%

POLICING

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Bureau of Justice Assistance U.S. Department of Justice

Unforeseen Challenge: Labor Issues vs Treatment Integrity

- Union Contract and Treatment Integrity
 - This issue has impacted all others
 - Could not use static roster of officers for Newhallville walking beats – assignment goes to officer with lowest overtime hours.
- Traditional Problem-Oriented Policing needs stable assignment
 - Individual or small team of officers remains dedicated to "their" problem for the duration of the issue.
 - How to implement with rotational assignment?

Comparing Models

Traditional Problem-Oriented Policing

- Individual officer:
 - Scans
 - Analyzes
 - Responds
 - Assesses


New Haven SPI – "Adaptive Problem-Oriented Policing"

- Patrol officer
 - Scans
- DM/SGT/CAU
 - Analyzes
 - Develops response for Patrol to implement
 - Assesses





Treatment Strength Concern





"Frequent" vs, "Non-Frequent" Officers

- Activity log data
- No practical difference in citizen contacts, response activities
 - Frequent Officer shifts identified more emerging problems
 - May indicate comfort level between officers, community members
- Big Lesson: Problem-Oriented Policing can work, even with rotational assignment!



More Information

- The New Haven Spotlight Report was released this summer, and is available at:
 - <u>http://www.smartpolicing</u> <u>initiative.com/tta/spotligh</u> <u>t/new-haven-ct-site-</u> <u>spotlight</u>



New Haven, Connecticut Smart Policing Initiative

Employing Evidence-Based Policing Strategies to Engage the Community and Reduce Crime

August 2016

Christopher M. Sedelmaier and Natalie Kroovand Hipple

Smart Policing Initiative Spotlight Report







Smart Policing Initiative Rochester, New York, 2016 Preventing Dispute Related Violence

> Michael Ciminelli, Chief Joseph Morabito, Commander Nick Petitti, Dir. of Business Intelligence Rochester Police Department

John Klofas, Ph.D. Irshad Altheimer, Ph.D. Center for Public Safety Initiatives Rochester Institute of Technology

The Skeleton: 3 + 1 Dispute Intervention Components

- 1. Identify Disputes
- 2. Assess the risk of violence in the disputes
- 3. Intervene for the purpose of preventing violence

4. Ongoing Assess of the process and outcomes of dispute cases.





Background Research: Related Studies Done for the Project

- Violence Incident Reviews
- Extensive ride-alongs
- Analysis of Rochester Shooting Database
- Officer Focus Groups
- Pathways to Peace Focus Group
- Analysis of Monroe Crime Analysis Center Dispute Bulletins
- Dispute Incident Reviews with Police, Prosecutors, Probation
- Tracking program process



Research Findings

- A lot of police work involves low level disputes which do not result in violence.
- But a lot of violence (60% of shootings) does involve disputes.
- So differentiating between low risk and high risk disputes is important.
- Disputes are multiple events that can be recognized after the fact.
- Disputes can also be recognized while in process because they involve a series of connected incidents.
- Police work is not usually organized around the concept of dispute. Most of the times cases are treated as individual events. But analysis shows that many are linked.
- Organizing around disputes can lead to a range of interventions to prevent further incidents when the risk of further dispute related violence is identified.



An Operational Definition of Dispute

Retaliatory Dispute Definition

 A violent retaliatory dispute is an interaction involving conflict, over a period of time, between two or more individuals and/or people associated with them and marked by two or more events involving confrontation or intimidation, in which at least some of those events involve violent acts or credible threats of violence.



Why have we not focused on Disputes?

- Police operations focus on individual cases.
 Combinations of cases may not be identified.
- Criminal Records data focus on individual crimes. Researchers cannot easily look across cases to identify connections
- Group interventions focus on group affiliation. Often groups are identified then violence associated with the group is identified.
- Until the growth of crime analysis it was difficult to focus on a sequence or cluster of cases. Now better tools exist.



5 Steps in Dispute Focused Violence Prevention

- 1. Identification & Level 1 Risk Assessment
- 2. Level 2 Risk Assessment
- 3. Review of Active Disputes
- 4. Development and Implementation of Interventions for High Risk Disputes
- 5. Ongoing Assessment



Step 1: Identifying Disputes

- Patrol Officers know disputes.
- Community members know disputes.
- Crime Analysts identify disputes from reading crime and incident reports.
- There are behavioral indicators of disputes:
 - Reckless endangerment (house shot up)
 - People stopped in neighborhoods carrying weapons
 - Repeated fights
 - Conflict between known violent offenders



Step 2: Dispute Risk Assessment

(These were identified through analysis of identified disputes, incident reviews and focus groups with police officers)

- 1. Current event violence
- 2. Linked past events
- 3. Involvement of weapons in this dispute
- 4. Participants' prior violence
- 5. Participants' reputation
- 6. Participants gang, drug, gun, recent incarceration history
- 7. Recruited or family problem connections
- 8. Associates' gang, gun, drug history
- 9. Physical proximity of parties
- 10. Other aggravating or mitigating factors



Step 3: Weekly Review

- Strong Command Staff Engagement
- Review of Level 2 and Additional Information
- Direct Participation of Criminal Justice Partners
 - District Attorney
 - State Police and County Sheriff
 - Probation and Parole
 - Non-Law Enforcement
- Identification of "Account Executive"
- Identification of Interventions
- Information/Data Collection



Questions to Consider

- Is there anything specific to be done in terms of investigation?
- Can participants be arrested now or taken into custody for anything, including probation or parole violations?
- Can other action be taken which can lead to an arrest (including, for example, motor vehicle license or other violations, traffic offenses, warrants, etc.)?
- Should the dispute participants be directly questioned or confronted (ex. Knock and talk)?
- Are there others who should be brought into the effort to prevent violence in the dispute (family, community leaders, street outreach, SROs etc.)?
- Is there other direct action that can be taken (ex. assist in relocation, help manage debts, change school)?






Step 4: Development and Implementation of Interventions

- Primary goal is prevention of further violence
- Arrest may or may not contribute to that goal
- Interventions tailored to individual dispute fact are best
- Broad range of interventions should be encouraged



Investigative Interventions

• Focused on investigating dispute incidents to lead to arrest





Crossover Interventions


• Enforcement action focused beyond the current dispute incidents

Knock & Talks	Dispute Letter	Mental Health Arrest	Intelligence Gathering	
Warrant/DMV Checks	GPS Support	Property Code Enforcement	Social Service Checks	
Targeted Enforcement	Saturation Patrol	Probation & Parole Searches	Consent Searches	



Direct Prevention Interventions

• Direct preventive action other than arrest related







Step 5: Ongoing Assessment

- At each meeting, review recent past cases to document interventions and their effectiveness.
- When violence has occurred in reviewed disputes conduct comprehensive incident reviews
 - What happened,
 - How the intervention went
 - What other steps could have been taken
 - What lesson can be learned
- Continually collect and analyze data on the dispute



Key Factors Supporting Dispute Intervention Focus





Unanticipated Issues

- Importance of the ongoing planning process
- Evolution of the planning process to include new program elements
- Program disruption associated with external factors (Promotion of program leaders, departmental reorganization)
- Problem of changes in key personnel (Dispute analyst was changed 4 times in 8 months)
- Limited deviation from intervention strategies involving investigation and arrest
- Limited ability to track data and assess effects and outcomes



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Questions?



