



Welcome to the Smart Policing Initiative Phase VI Inaugural Meeting

Boston, MA

June 29-30, 2015

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



Site Introductions and Agenda Overview

Catherine McNamee and James "Chip" R. Coldren, Jr.

9:00 – 9:30 a.m.

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Agenda Overview – June 29

- Site Introductions/Agenda Overview
- Welcoming Remarks: Director Denise O'Donnell
- Boston Police Department Keynote
- SPI Principles and Practices
- Successful SPI Initiative: Kansas City SPI
- Guest Lunch Speaker: U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz
- Sustainability Practices in SPI
- Smart Technology
- Peer-to-Peer Networking
- Criminology 101/Busted Myths
- Closing Remarks: Director O'Donnell

Agenda Overview – June 30

- Overview of Day's Agenda
- Site Presentations: Toledo and Portland
- Site Presentations: Henderson and Miami
- Police-Community Collaboration
- Peer-to-Peer Networking
- Research and Coordinator Roundtables
- Closing Remarks
- Boston Police Department Site Visit – Harbor Tour

Meeting Goals

- Dialogue with BJA leadership
- Hear from sites at various stages of implementation
- Receive and record (podcasts) site updates
- Focus on issues of sustainability, analysis, technology, and collaboration
- Focus on other core Smart Policing principles
- Focus on capacity assessments and TTA plans
- Build the Smart Policing community of practice



Welcome from Bureau of Justice Assistance Director Denise O'Donnell

9:30 – 9:45 a.m.

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Boston Police Department Keynote

Commissioner William Evans, Deputy Superintendent John M. Brown, Dr. Anthony Braga

9:45 – 10:15 a.m.

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Break

Podcasts: Cambridge and Kansas City

10:15 – 10:30 a.m.

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SPI Principles and Practices

Catherine McNamee and James "Chip" R. Coldren, Jr.

10:30 – 11:15 a.m.

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SPI Site's Engaging in Smart Policing Principles and Practices

- Boston, MA
- Lowell, MA
- Philadelphia, PA
- Los Angeles, CA

Smart Policing Principles in Action

- Focus
- Innovation
- Research Partnership
- Technology
- Collaboration
- Sustainability



Smart Policing Initiative

Reducing violence in Kansas City: Past, Present, and Future



Chris Young - Operations Sergeant

Kansas City Missouri Police
Department, Violent Crimes
Enforcement Division
No Violence Alliance Operations

Rosilyn Temple

President of Kansas City
Missouri Mothers In
Charge

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Kansas City, Missouri



Kansas City, Missouri Demographics

- Population 464,310
 - 59% White
 - 29% Black
- Metropolitan population 2.35 Million
- 315 Square miles, same land size as comparable cities of Atlanta, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Cincinnati combined (335).
 - Atlanta 132 miles²
 - Cincinnati 79 miles²
 - Minneapolis 58 miles²
 - St. Louis 66 miles²
- Four counties: Jackson, Clay, Cass, Platte



Kansas City Crime

- Historically one of the top **10** most violent cities in the United States
- Averages **106** Homicides per year
- Averages **3,484** Aggravated Assaults per year
- Crime typically contained within urban core
- 13 square miles of 315 account for **47 %** of all homicides

	Murders/100k	Agg. Assaults/100k
Kansas City	22.9	755
Jacksonville, FL	8.3	381.4
Seattle	6.2	229.4
Chicago	15.9	458.9
Boston	6.2	306.4



Smart Policing Initiative begins... and then transforms

- In 2011, local stakeholders began to rethink how violent crime was being addressed in Kansas City. They realized that something had to be done differently.
- Stakeholders made the decision to apply for a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Smart Policing Initiative.
- Upon being awarded that grant, the Kansas City Police Department, in partnership with the University of Missouri-Kansas City, initiated a foot patrol project covering some of the most violent crime "hot spots" in the city.



Smart Policing Initiative begins... and then transforms

- In 2012, incumbents left the three offices of police chief, county prosecutor, and mayor. With new officials in those key places, the ground became fertile for attempting more ambitious and collaborative initiatives for reducing violence.
- Those three officials, along with several others, formed the Kansas City No Violence Alliance (KC NoVA) to plan and execute a focused deterrence strategy specifically to reduce group-related violence. Although a positive move overall, that shift in leadership and priorities caused the foot patrol project to lose traction.
- In 2013, the Smart Policing Initiative grant was shifted to focused deterrence. The foot patrol project involved the police and a research partner. KC NoVA, on the other hand, is a multi-agency focused deterrence effort that has become the primary strategy for addressing violent crime in Kansas City.



Kansas City No Violence Alliance (KC NoVA)



- Established June of 2012
- New mindset for Kansas City, MO - reduce violent crime
- New agency heads “the perfect storm”
 - KCPD
 - Prosecutors- Federal and State
 - ATF needing violence reduction mantra
 - New mayor
 - UMKC partnership developing
 - “Focused Deterrence” chosen
- KCPD project manager selected



Kansas City Governing Partners



JACO & City
Prosecutors



City of Kansas
City



KCPD



ATF



FBI



KC NoVA
Kansas City No Violence Alliance



U.S. Attorney



MO Probation & Parole



UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY

University of
Missouri - Kansas
City

The Goal of KC NoVA

- Reduce Homicides and Aggravated Assault

- 2012 - 108 homicides
- 2011 - 109 homicides
- 106.3 Annual Average
- 3,484 Annual Average for Aggravated Assaults



“Smarter Policing”

- KC NoVA draws upon the strengths of the community, academic partners, and the criminal justice system to identify the networks most likely to be involved in violent crime.
- Dedicates the finite amount of resources to the very small percentage of individuals in Kansas City that cause the most problems.





The implementation process begins, Fall 2012

Build Intelligence

Build intelligence models and relationships to direct the finite resources of the PD to the core group of individuals involved in, or likely to become involved in, violent crime.

Build Relationships


Build relationships in the community to establish a moral voice that impacts violence.

Establish a Structure

Establish a structure of outreach to those who want to change, and need the help to make change.



KC NoVA - First Steps



- Dime block gang network
- Developed by UMKC and Det. Cramblit
- Process took two months
- Silos of intelligence
- IT Barriers / Crystal Reports
- Product delivered December 2012



KC NoVA
Kansas City No Violence Alliance

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Problem Sets

Using official data and human intelligence to understand the problem




Dime Block Intelligence


- 360 members in group
- 202 in largest connected group
- 60 currently were on probation / parole
- 32 pending cases were in Jackson County processes
- 126 members had active warrants
- 22 warrants were felony
- One killed in December 2012 shootout
- Four indictments for murder in group January 2012



Dime Block Betweenness Centrality (Warrant)



Dime Block Betweenness Centrality (Probation & Parole)



Demonstration Crackdown – Operation Clean Sweep



- January 2013 KC incurred 15 homicides in first four weeks.
- Operation Clean Sweep organized to introduce NoVA formally to the public, and the targeted criminal element.
- Conducted January 28, 29, and 30, 2013



Demonstration Crack down – Operation Clean Sweep



- Enforcement arm included over 125 KCPD, ATF, FBI, US Marshals, Postal Inspectors, Codes Enforcement
- 47 warrants cleared
- 15 new Federal, State charges filed
- 91 residences checked or knock and talked



Law Enforcement Resource Center

- Centralized Investigative Analysis combining Intelligence, Crime, and Operational Analysis
- 35 Personnel Division Supporting a Kansas City Regional Fusion Center, Real-Time Crime Center, and Investigative Analysis Unit
- Mission of Reducing Violent Crimes through the infusion of Technology into Intelligence-Led Policing



Intelligence Analysts Trained

- March and April 2013
- Two analysts trained by Dr. Fox, UMKC, in Social Network Analysis
- Training funded by LISC (Local Initiative Support Cooperation)
- Analysts assigned to the newly formed LERC (Law Enforcement Resource Center)
- Immediately began streamlining intelligence development and showing value to investigative elements.
- Produced Impact 2013 Network
- This network contained “data” only from official sources and systems




Impact 2013

- Network starting point
 - Suspects of all aggravated assaults and homicides for the past 2 years (2011 & 2012)
- Two relational steps using FIF's – Aggravated Assault Reports
 - All associates of violent suspects
 - All associates of the associates of violent suspects
 - Total number of individuals = 2,161




Impact 2013

Five largest Group Optimized Layout



The 514

Five largest groups optimized layout




- Efforts to implement focused deterrence model continue
- 121 identified through centrality measure for invitation to call ins
- 80 of the 121 on Probation and Parole
- Area Command established:
1 Sergeant and
6 officers



April 17th NoVA's first "Call-In" April 2013



SNA begins to grow, but the focused deterrence mission begins to creep



- KCPD ATF Operation Ink Guns
- 225 weapons purchased
- 61 Federal Indictments
- Largest Federal Sweep in KC History

Red = Call In
Green = Probation
Blue = Call In & Probation
Black = Ineligible



NoVA hits the reset button

- 2013 winding down
- Approaching 100 homicides
- Entire governing board, researchers, key staff travel to NYC to troubleshoot focused deterrence effort
- Good “official data and SNA”
- Horrible “group / gang data”
- New intel process for our group violence reduction strategy begins January 2014



Violent Crime Intelligence Squad Created

- 5 Detectives and 1 Sergeant
- Collect intelligence on violent groups and individuals.
- Partners with Violent Crime Enforcement Squad to address violent group problems before they arise.
- Provide intelligence to Patrol and Investigative Elements to prevent violence from occurring.
- Responsible for conducting quarterly group audits



Group Audit Process

- Draw intelligence from “official” police reports; Suspects, Victims, Witnesses of Homicide / Agg Assault.
- Invite representatives from NoVA partners and KCPD Patrol and Investigative Elements to a Group Audit Meeting (Quarterly) (about 70 people attend)
- Identify groups / gangs and their loose or structured relationships.
- Identify “beefs” and “alliances” between groups.
- Compile human and documented police intelligence of those involved in violence into one sociogram.



September 2014 Group Audit 4 Results


- 57 department members. Line-level officers.
- 66 violent groups identified.
- These groups had a total of 832 members.
- About the groups
 - 47.5% of the groups were considered extremely violent
 - 13% of the groups were considered highly organized




Group Social Structures

Determine social structure of all “groups” involved in violence.

A group is any social structure of individuals connected by relationships, and not necessarily designated as a “gang.”




Group Audit Sociogram




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Group Audit Sociogram



Group Audit Sociogram




Group Audit Scoiogram






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Kansas City No Violence Alliance

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LERC Capabilities – SNA - Crime Data - Mapping



Sum of @Event Activity Factor / Dispatched_Date & Group Name



The Approach

Focused Deterrence



KC NoVA
Kansas City No Violence Alliance

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Group Interventions

- Conduct notifications via “call-in” to key individuals of all groups putting them “on notice” that violence will not be tolerated and has severe consequences to the first group that commits a murder.
- Offer Social Service support such as “life skills, substance abuse, anger management, education, employment preparation etc.”
- Follow up with severe enforcement on first group that commits a murder utilizing the full strength of the NoVA collaborative.
- Repeat group intervention process a minimum of four times per year, each time educating the groups of the consequences of violence, and what has happened to others who committed violence before them.



Selection for Call-In

- 66 groups identified through group audit
- 2 individuals selected from each group
- Consideration given to those holding “betweenness centrality”
- Consideration given to individuals on Probation and Parole



Kansas City's Local Chapter of Mothers In Charge




Success


Outcomes, Processes, and Organizations




Aggravated Assault Incidents in KC, 2010-2014



KC Monthly Homicides (Cumulative Per Month)



Kansas City Homicides Rate / 100K: 1950-2014




KC NoVA
Kansas City No Violence Alliance


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Process

- The number of field interview forms completed has increased by more than 35 percent.
- Creating this feedback process with patrol officers facilitates street-level buy-in and creates better intelligence, resulting in more efficient policing and effective crime prevention



Organization



Expanding Partnership with entire MO DOC

- Custom Notification Teams
- Instead of waiting on quarterly Call-In's, interrupt cycles of violence as intelligence is learned and shared.
- Partnering with Missouri Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Reentry Process and the Director of Adult Institutions
- Custom Notifications Teams – NoVA Reentry Prison Visits
- Intelligence Sharing with Missouri DOC Inspector Generals Office



Challenges

Sustaining the partnership

- Sustaining funding
 - Much of the project is sustained by the organizations involved; however, some grants are essential for the social service aspects.
- Mission Creep
 - Others want the partnership to help solve other problems.
- Staying innovative
 - Is it possible the new approach will become the norm and be less effective? What else can be done to reduce violence further?
- Training new partners
 - New people get involved all the time. How do we make sure they are up to speed?



Future

- SNA application can expand to other crime types and other sources of data
 - Crime types- Gun crimes, Property, Fraud
 - Sources of data- NIBIN, phone records, financial records
- How can SNA be used, not just to assist investigations, but to inform strategies?
 - How does enforcement change based on network structure?
 - How can we use new/innovative tools to impact networks?



Smart Policing Initiative Support, TTA, Resources

- SPI assisted us in creating an evidence-based, data-driven, focused deterrence strategy that allowed us to achieve the lowest homicide rate in Kansas City's history since 1972.
- SPI's flexibility allowed for adjustments in our strategies which ultimately transitioned into the NoVA Project.
- SPI provided support that assisted with driving our strategies that made our NoVA Project more effective.
- The Bureau of Justice SPI Technical Training and Assistance put us back on track and provided course correction.



QUESTIONS?



Lunch

U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz

12:15 – 1:00 p.m.

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Sustainability Practices in SPI

Cambridge SPI, Lowell SPI, Philadelphia SPI, Mike White (facilitator)

1:00 – 2:15 p.m.

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Agenda

- Sustainability of Smart Policing
- Sustainability Efforts of SPI Sites
 - Cambridge, MA
 - Lowell, MA
 - Philadelphia, PA
- Closing Thoughts & Best Practices for Sustainability

What is Sustainability?

- Sustainability addresses:
 - Embedding change so that it survives over time
 - Continuing to produce desired or better than expected outcomes
- Presumes that the change has produced benefits and that it is worth the effort to maintain

**From Nola Joyce's webinar: <http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com/tta/sustaining-smart-policing-webinar>*

Sustainability is a Founding Principle in Smart Policing

- Sustainability:
 - Is stressed early on
 - Comes through deliberate, strategic planning
 - Requires buy-in from all levels of the agency
 - Becomes less difficult when you have support from external stakeholders (e.g., community).



Keep in Mind: Some things are not worth sustaining. SPI tests new ideas.

Two Approaches to Sustainability

1. Sustaining Smart Policing principles
 - Analysis
 - Collaboration & Communication
 - Research partnership
 - Actionable data
2. Sustaining Smart Policing strategies and tactics
 - Establish proof of effectiveness & cost-effectiveness for hot spots, problem-oriented policing, focused deterrence, etc.

SPI Examples of Sustainability

- Modifying officer performance/promotion evaluations (Frisco, Glendale)
- Reaching out to agencies in the region (Boston, Cambridge, Kansas City)
- Routinizing collaboration with external stakeholders (Indio, Palm Beach, Reno)
- Enhancing crime analysis capabilities (Los Angeles, Shawnee, Port St Lucie)
- Providing specific training on SPI – roll calls, on-line, academy (Lowell, New Haven, Philadelphia)



Common Sustainability Challenges

- Getting buy-in internally (just another grant)
- Leadership turnover (losing your champion; losing your chief)
- External events that are beyond your control
- Gaining external trust and support
- Limited resources
- Measuring Effectiveness
 - How do you measure organizational change?
 - How do you translate the “quantoid-speak”?
 - Why is this taking so long?



Cambridge, Everett, Somerville Police Departments: Sustaining Operation RASOR

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Introduction

- **Regional Analytics for the Safety of Our Residents**
- Departments share information about impact players, habitual offenders, crime data, known associates, etc.
- We will engage the community and safeguard civil liberties, protect privacy rights, and ensure that all constitutional rights are upheld, in our collective effort to improve the quality of life in neighborhoods across three cities

Goals

- 1) Prevent future victimization and social harm of the offenders
- 2) Reduce crime within the three cities of Cambridge, Everett, and Somerville
- 3) Determine whether the modified focused deterrence approach is a successful alternative strategy.

Focused Deterrence

Operation RASOR

- Cross-Jurisdictional
- 3 District Courts
- Data Driven
- Social Harm
- Limited leverage
- Complete partnership with services providers
- Police assist with service delivery & case management

Pulling Levers

- Single Jurisdiction
- 1 District Court
- Officer identified
- Violent crimes
- Complete leverage
- Separate messages from providers and LE
- Police typically focus on traditional enforcement efforts only

Intervention Phases

- 1) Identification
- 2) Outreach
- 3) Notification Meeting
- 4) Resource Delivery
- 5) Relentless follow up

Offender Candidates

- Not in-custody or wanted – were invited to meetings by mail and in-person visits (both open cases & no cases)
- Outstanding arrest warrants – police conducted warrant sweeps and if arrested and held for arraignment these offenders were invited to meeting
- In-custody – were in jail or prison so case managers arranged individual notification meetings prior to (when feasible) or upon release

Notification Meetings

- Treatment candidates self-select into two groups:
- Participants – those who chose to participate
 - Completed intake assessment & develop treatment/ action plans
 - Met regularly with their case management team
- Non-participants – those who chose not to participate (or are removed)
 - Received more intensive enforcement efforts through a plan developed for each offender by case management team

Focused Deterrence Detectives

- Training on the concepts of focused deterrence
- Understanding the benefits to the community and department
- Dedication to objectives
- Flexibility in work schedule
- Meaningful partnership with Social Service Coordinator
- Ability to work as a multi-agency team when needed

Sustainability

- Buy-in from detectives, officers, executives
 - Takes time
- Top down vs bottom up
 - Need support from top and support from detectives
- Willingness to learn, assess, and change
 - Takes time
- Monthly High Risk Offender Meetings

Operation RASOR

- The Cambridge Police Department along with Somerville and Everett have made a commitment to continue to use and expand the program in order to:
 - prevent future victimization and social harm of the offenders
 - reduce crime
 - increase police legitimacy
 - further develop collaborative efforts



Sustaining SPI Principles

City of Lowell, Massachusetts Police Department &
Suffolk University

June 29-30, 2015

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Presentation Overview

- Lowell, Massachusetts and the Lowell Police Department
- Practices of Change
- Lowell Smart Policing Initiatives (SPI)
- Sustaining SPI Principles
- Challenges

Lowell, MA & the Lowell Police Department

- City of Lowell, MA
 - Located 30 miles north of Boston
 - Approximately 107,000 residents who are ethnically and economically diverse
 - Median household income in Lowell (\$50,192) vs MA (\$64,509) (2011, US Census)
- Lowell Police Department
 - 245 Authorized Sworn Strength
 - Active partner with researchers and academic institutions since the early 1990's
 - Changes are informed by learning – the LPD as a learning organization

Transformation of the LPD

- Pre-mid-1990s  Primarily a closed organization focused on reactive and heavy law enforcement strategies
- Mid- 1990's – 2000  Community Policing
- Early 2000s  Community Policing & Problem-Oriented Policing
- Mid-to-late 2000s  Community Policing, Problem-oriented Policing & Problem-Solving Policing
- Late 2000s to Present  Smart Policing
- Change in the LPD has been evolutionary - occurring as a result of cumulative efforts over time. Change has come from the dynamic interplay between individuals (within and outside) and the local and professional context.


Evolution of Institutionalization within the LPD



Test Strategies

Incorporate Training

Reorganization



Lowell SPI Strategies

Place-based Strategies	Offender-based Strategies	Organizational Strategies	Institutionalization
Intervention & comparison hot spots	Created criteria for focus on 25 Offenders of interest	Identify systems changes needed to support SPI	Re-organization of LPD
Identify evidence-based strategies to use in interventions	Identify evidence-based strategies to use in interventions	Create or modify policies or practices related to data collection, analysis and dissemination	Reinvigorate community policing through teams; decentralize crime analysis; increase problem-solving
Explore new and innovative strategies based on evidence or promising practices	Establish and strengthen interagency partnerships for intervention and suppression	Improve communication & coordination within LPD relative to SPI concepts and implementation	Modify Compstat for accountability and information sharing; expand management structure
Conduct process and outcome evaluation	Conduct process and outcome evaluation	Conduct process and outcome evaluation	Gather community feedback; conduct process and outcome evaluation

Practices and Principles of Sustainability

- Smart Policing as a concept and not a project.
- Modified management and deployment practices.
- Embedding the evidence-based practices within the organization.
- Updating policies and institutionalized practices.

Development of a Plan

Questions to ask yourself while building a plan:

Are you relying too much on outside funding while testing concepts?

Do your line-level officers know the concepts?

Do your supervisors know and understand the concepts?

What needs to change to sustain these practices?

Sustaining the Plan

When do you start thinking about sustainability?



Challenges to Change



Structural

- Resources (human, financial, technological, training)
- Institutional arrangements
- Process to meaningfully engage



Cultural

- Resistance
- Multiple & conflicting interests
- Change takes time
- Acceptance of EBP and problem-solving



Behavioral

- Changing or shifting roles
- Skill needs
- Personnel limitations
- Communication
- Coordination
- Relational approaches

Challenges

**ALL CHANGE
MEETS
RESISTANCE...**

IF THERE IS NO
RESISTANCE,
THERE IS NO CHANGE.



Officer Resistance


- It's just another project

Timing

- Leadership changes
- Changes take time

Technology

- Delays in implementation
- Does not work as planned



- Experimenting with new ideas generated by diverse groups
- Engage in research that is actionable, relevant and timely
- Create opportunities for cross-agency conversations
- The importance of creating communication systems (dialogue, sharing, awareness) followed by structural adaptations (Compstat, modifications to training and IT)
- Importance of active participation of diverse LPD representatives in change identification, implementation and evaluation – allowing participants to make sense of need and change efforts (Working Group)
- Build off of and take advantage of experience

For more information...

- William Taylor, Superintendent of Police
- Maryann Ballotta, LPD Director Public Safety Research and Planning
- Brenda J. Bond, PhD, Research Partner, Suffolk University



Sustaining Smart Policing in Philadelphia

Philadelphia Police Department

Kevin Thomas, Director of Research and Analysis

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.


Previous SPI: 2008-2009

- **The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots** (Criminology, 2011)
 - Temple University (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, Wood)
 - Began after initial study in 2008 on 43 sites



Previous SPI: 2008-2009

- **The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment**
 - Experimental design
 - Focused on violent street crime
 - Commanders identified 120 hotspots for random selection, sized by number of intersections
 - 200+ officers in 60 violent crime hotspots over 12 weeks in two phases
 - No specific policing tactics



Previous SPI: 2008-2009

- **The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment**

- Results

- violent crime in the target areas decreased 23 percent,
 - drug-related incident detections increased 15 percent,
 - pedestrian stops conducted by police increased 64 percent
 - vehicle stops increased 7 percent, and
 - arrests increased 13 percent

- Outcomes

- Foot beats become standard practices

**Descriptive Statistics
for Counts of Violent
Events
by Time Period,
Experimental and
Control Areas**

Status (Time Period)	Sum	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Skewness
Target (Before, t_0)	359	5.98	5.00	4.04	1	18	.96
Target (During, t_1)	306	5.10	5.00	3.08	0	15	.77
Control (Before, t_0)	296	4.93	4.50	3.34	0	14	.79
Control (During, t_1)	327	5.45	5.00	4.26	0	21	1.63




Previous SPI: 2009-2010

- **Does What Police Do At Hot Spots Matter? Philadelphia Policing Tactics Experiment**
 - SPI Study with Temple University (Ratcliffe, Haberman, Groff, Sorg, Joyce, Taylor)
 - Tested foot patrol, problem-oriented, and offender focused approaches in 81 experimental places



Previous SPI: 2009-2010

- **Does What Police Do At Hot Spots Matter?**
 - Experimental Design:
 - 20 hotspots per intervention type
 - Randomized across each intervention
 - Foot Patrol
 - Commanders given discretion to determine patrols
 - Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)
 - 1 day POP training
 - Action plans/reviews/interviews
 - Offender Focused
 - Identified repeat violent offenders with central intel team
 - Tactical teams assigned
 - Most frequent tactic used was surveillance followed by aggressive patrol



Previous SPI: 2009-2010

- **Does What Police Do At Hot Spots Matter?**
 - Results
 - Offender focused sites
 - 42 percent reduction in all violent crime
 - 50 percent reduction in violent felonies
 - Problem-oriented/foot patrol did not significantly reduce violent crime
 - Possible explanation include dosage, hotspot stability over time, and implementation (grid size and rookie vs. veteran officers)
 - Outcomes
 - GUNSTAT
 - Gang audit/focused deterrence evaluation
 - Only rookies utilized for foot beat patrols
 - Foot beat grids maintained centrally by Patrol Operations




Previous SPI: 2011-2014

- **Analysis Coordinator (Crime Analysis Training)**
 - Training conducted by Temple University
 - 3 cohorts training police officers in crime science, basic MS Excel, and GIS software



Analysis Coordinator Program



Previous SPI: 2011-2014

- **Analysis Coordinator (Crime Analysis Training)**
 - Current Status
 - 26 trained officers plus 6 civilian analysts in the Real Time Crime Center
 - Centralized support team (Research and Analysis Unit):
 - 4 Research and Information Analysts
 - 4 Geographic Information System Specialists
 - 1 Intelligence Analyst/Geospatial Specialist at Fusion Center (DVIC)
 - 1 Senior Developer/DBA



2015 Smart Policing Initiative

- **Hypothesis Testing with Patrol Operations**
 - SPI Study with Temple University
 - Randomized Districts (10 treatment, 10 control)
 - Crime-focused, scientific method of problem solving through advanced training of uniformed crime analysts and police supervisors. The PPD will develop a model for long-term crime reduction strategies through this scientific decision-making process.

Activity	Time frame	Completed by
Work with PPD Director of Research and Analysis and his team to identify matched districts that have not had previous hypothesis testing training	One month	End of July 2015
Design simple pre-workshop survey related to officer perception of problem-solving in each district. PPD to distribute and administer	One month	End of July 2015
Run five one-day hypothesis testing workshops (each day comprising two districts)	Ten days (five prep, five workshop)	End of September 2015
Coordinate with PPD analysis team and assist with the analytical problems resulting from workshops	Two months	End of December 2015
Create multimedia training materials	As needed	End of March 2016
Distribute (with PPD assistance) follow-up surveys	One month	End of April 2016
Collect and review follow-up surveys	One month	End May 2016



Logic Model

Inputs (resources and constraints)	Activities (what the program does)	Outputs (program products)	Initial Outcomes (knowledge, attitudes, skills)	Inter-mediate Outcomes (behavior)	Long-Term Outcomes (condition)
Resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temple University Center for Crime Science PPD's Research and Analysis Unit PPD Analysis Coordinators PPD officers, supervisors, and commanders BJA Funding Constraints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Culture shift in some supervisors Problems may need an investment to solve Feasibility of solving all identified problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train Analysis Coordinators in advanced scientific methods. Train supervisors and command staff in developing hypotheses and utilizing analysis Develop hypotheses as a district and test Create an action plan to address problems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # of advanced trainings # of supervisors trained in using analysis Developed hypotheses Analytical products that test hypotheses and recommendations Action plans for recommendations Evaluation of the program Model for scientific method from evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased skills of analytical techniques Increased knowledge of scientific method and problem solving Increased ability to use analytical products Change in culture of supervisors relying on data and analytical products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More scientific products from analysis coordinators Supervisors utilizing a scientific approach to problem solving Tracking of tasks through action plans and measuring success 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduced chronic crime issues in specific areas Change in culture to be more data driven Organizational model in using scientific method

Assumptions: Each Analysis Coordinator will be able to produce at least one fully tested problem. Each problem will have an achievable solution. All supervisors will buy into the process



External Factors: Turnover amongst officers, changes in assignments, priority needs of district personnel, city-wide resource drains, staffing needs of major events (Rope visit, DNC)



Sustaining Crime Analysis Capability

- **Sustainment: A Centralized Analysis, Research, and Geospatial Support Unit**
 - Research and Analysis Unit
 - Product Support, Standardization, Quality Assurance, Research Support
 - Data Automation and Centralized Dissemination, Automated Reporting
 - Web-based Mapping and Analysis Applications

Centralizing Decentralized Data



Program Sustainment Challenges/Efforts

- Officer Promotions / Transfers
 - Screening Process for proposed analysts
 - Internalizing On-boarding Analysis Training
 - Simplifying Analysis Products (Product Framework/Checklist, Templates)
 - Commander Training on using Analysts
- Product Quality and Span of Control
 - Divisional Analyst Coordinators (proposed)
 - Geographic Workgroups (Criminal Intelligence, Fusion Center Analysts)
- Embedding Analytical Process into Operations
 - Decision-making at the appropriate rank
 - Crime Briefing cannot be the only accountability mechanism
- Maintaining Data Foundation
 - Getting a budget
 - Enterprise governance while maintaining authorship within a consolidated IT organization



Closing Thoughts, Lessons Learned

- Integrate SPI into **training**.
 - SPI principles become sustainable once they are integrated as core components of training curricula.
- Create a cross-sector **agency working group** to guide SPI.
 - SPI is less likely to be sustained if it remains the domain of a single unit.
- Integrate SPI activities into the **regular duties of officers and staff**.
 - Do not rely on overtime (OT). Reliance on OT will tie the SPI activities to grant funds. When the grant funds disappear, so too will the SPI activities.

Closing Thoughts, Lessons Learned

- SPI leaders must **communicate and market** their activities.
 - “Spread the good word” both inside and outside the agency.
 - Reduce the unfamiliarity with SPI.
- **Engage other stakeholders**, especially the community.
 - Raise the expectations of those stakeholders so they “demand” that SPI activities continue.
- SPI agencies must be **flexible and responsive to data-driven decision-making**.
 - Course-corrections based on the data may be necessary.
 - External events may intervene and force a shuffling of priorities.
 - SPI agencies must be “nimble” and adaptable.



Smart Technology: Body-Worn Cameras and Less Lethal Force Technologies

Michael White and Charles Stephenson

2:15 – 3:15 p.m.

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.



Body-Worn Cameras and Smart Policing

Assessing Research, Resources and Next Steps

Michael D. White, Ph.D.

June 29, 2105

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Presentation Overview

- The Issues
- The Evidence
 - Phoenix Smart Policing Initiative & Smart Policing Site Survey
- The BJA National BWC Toolkit & Other Resources
- Next Steps

My Background and Expertise

- Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State University (ASU)
- Senior Subject Matter Expert with SPI
- Author of the US DOJ “Assessing the Evidence” (2014) Report
- Testified before President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
- One of the primary authors of the US DOJ National Body-Worn Camera (BWC) Toolkit
 - <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/>
- Principal Investigator on Arnold Foundation-funded study of BWCs (multi-site randomized controlled trial)

Timeline of Key Events for BWCs

- 2005 – Plymouth Basic Command Unit (UK) test BWCs
- 2009 – Oakland (CA) Police Department rolls out 200 BWCs
- August 2011 – BJA awards SPI grant to Phoenix Police Department to deploy BWCs
- August 2013 – Ruling in the *Floyd* case against the NYPD (BWCs as a remedy)
- Spring 2014 – US DOJ “Assessing the Evidence” report and PERF report released
- August 9, 2014 – Michael Brown killed in Ferguson
- December 2014 – White House announces Community Policing Plan

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S PLAN TO **STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY POLICING**

- 1 Reform the way the federal government equips local law enforcement, particularly with military-style equipment.
- 2 Invest in increasing the use of body-worn cameras and promoting proven community-policing initiatives.
- 3 Engage law enforcement and community leaders in devising new ways to reduce crime while building public trust.

wh.gov/community-policing

Timeline of Key Events for BWCs

- March 9, 2015 – Deadline for SPI proposals (three BWC grants)
- April 19, 2015 – Freddie Gray dies while in-custody of the Baltimore Police Department
- May 2015 – US DOJ releases the National Body-Worn Camera Toolkit
- June 16, 2015 – Deadline for proposals for US DOJ Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation Program (\$17 million)


US DOJ “Assessing the Evidence” Report (White 2014)

Origins of the Report

- Prepared for an OJP Diagnostic Center engagement

Purpose of the Report

- Review the available research (the “puzzle” analogy)
 - Identify all relevant issues and claims (pro and con)
 - Provide a framework for evaluating the technology (the “edge pieces”)
 - Assess the current state of evidence on each claim
 - Make recommendations for next steps



The Available Research on BWCs

Country	Study	Citation	Independent Evaluation	Comparative Design
England	Plymouth Head Camera Project	Goodall 2007	Yes; Process Evolution Limited	No
Scotland	Renfrewshire/Aberdeen Studies	ODS Consulting 2011	Yes; ODS Consulting	No
United States	Rialto (CA) Police Department	Farrar 2013	No	Yes
United States	Mesa (AZ) Police Department	MPD 2013	No*	Yes
United States	Phoenix (AZ) Police Department	Katz 2014	Yes; Arizona State University	Yes

Additions:

Jennings et al. (2014) – Journal of Criminal Justice (Orlando PD – just officer attitudes)

Katz et al. (2015) – Final Report Phoenix Smart Policing Initiative

Ariel et al. (2015) – Journal of Quantitative Criminology (Rialto study)

A handful of internal department reports (Oakland, CA)

Perceived Benefits and the Evidence

Benefits
Increased Transparency (~) and Legitimacy (?)
Improved Police Officer Behavior (~)
Improved Citizen Behavior (~)
Expedited Resolution of Complaints and Lawsuits (~)
Improved Evidence for Arrest and Prosecution (~)
Opportunities for Police Training (?)

(?) no evidence currently available to support this claim

(~) some evidence to support this claim, more research needed

(+) strong evidence available to support this claim

Some Compelling (Preliminary) Evidence

Rialto (CA) Police Department

- Citizen complaints dropped by 88% (24 to 3)
- Use of force dropped by 60% (61 to 25)

Mesa (AZ) Police Department

- Citizen complaints dropped 60% among BWC officers (pre-post)
- BWC officers generated 65% fewer citizen complaints than non-BWC officers
- Use of force dropped by 75% among BWC officers
- Policy matters- under a more discretionary policy, the number of recorded encounters declined by 42%

Las Vegas (NV) Metropolitan Police Department

- To date, 33 officers “exonerated” from complaints because of BWC evidence

Some Compelling (Preliminary) Evidence

Phoenix (AZ) Police Department

- Citizen complaints against officers:
 - BWC officers: declined by 23%
 - Comparison officers: increased by 10.6%
 - Other officers in the PD: increased by 45.1%
- Average Daily Arrest Activity:
 - BWC officers: increased by 42.6%
 - Comparison officers: increased by 14.9%
- Domestic violence cases with BWC video:
 - Were more likely to be initiated by the prosecutor's office (40.9% vs. 34.3%)
 - Had charges filed (37.7% vs. 26%)
 - Resulted in a guilty plea (4.4% vs. 1.2%)
 - Resulted in a guilty verdict at trial (4.4% vs. 0.9%).

Perceived Concerns and the Evidence

Concerns
Citizens' Privacy (+)
Officers' Privacy (+)
Officers' Health and Safety (?)
Training and Policy Requirements (+)
Logistical/Resource Requirements, including data storage and retrieval (+)

(?) no evidence currently available to support this claim

(~) some evidence to support this claim, more research needed

(+) strong evidence available to support this claim

Other Emerging Concerns

- Officer review prior to report-writing and making statements
 - Differences between officer recollection and BWC very likely
- Public records: redaction, privacy, and resources
- Legislative Mandates
 - 100+ bills currently being considered (mostly unfunded)
 - South Carolina to be the first statewide mandate

Other Emerging Concerns

- The BWC may show more or less than what the officer sees
- Prosecutor Buy-in and preparedness
 - PHX SPI DV case processing: no BWC (43.5 days); BWC (78.1 days)
- Activation Compliance


Phoenix SPI: Activation Compliance

Figure 1: Proportion of Incidents with Video



Phoenix SPI: Activation Compliance

**Figure 2: Camera Activation Compliance
by Incident Type**



Recommendations for Next Steps

- Agencies should proceed cautiously – most claims not sufficiently tested
 - Be clear about goals, desired outcomes
- Rigorous, independent research is needed
 - Research/practitioner collaborations
- Policy guidance from leadership organizations is needed

Recommendations for Next Steps

- Build a comprehensive working group of stakeholders at the beginning of the adoption process
- BWCs holds great promise as a training/learning tool
 - Academy
 - Violence Reduction
 - Sentinel Events

BJA National Body-Worn Camera Toolkit

- February 26-27, 2015: Two-day Expert Panel at the White House
- May 2015: Toolkit “goes live” at <https://www.bja.gov/bwc/>
- Serves as an information warehouse on BWCs (FAQ format) in the areas of:
 - Research
 - Policy
 - Technology
 - Privacy
 - Training
 - Stakeholders
- Law Enforcement Implementation Checklist



National Body-Worn Camera Toolkit

This toolkit is a comprehensive clearinghouse for criminal justice practitioners interested in planning and implementing a body-worn camera program in an effort to strengthen community trust and confidence in the justice system and improve officer and community safety.

[Implementation Guidance](#)

- Body-worn camera (BWC) programs can support law enforcement strategies to improve public safety, reduce crime, and strengthen relationships between police and the community.
- Comprehensive BWC programs are guided by policies that effectively incorporate research, promising practices, community input, and vital implementation considerations.
- This toolkit consolidates and translates the developing body of knowledge on BWCs for law enforcement, criminal justice professionals, advocacy organizations, and community members.
- **Why should you trust this toolkit?** The materials in this toolkit were compiled from a broad group of interdisciplinary experts and practitioners that represent the full range of criminal justice system, advocacy, and community organizations.

What policies, protocols, and practices should I consider?

[Read More](#)



○○○○○○○○



National Landscape

- a. Resources authored by Local, State, and Tribal agencies
- b. Camera or video related legislation
- c. Questions and answers about BWC implementations

[See National Landscape Page](#)



Getting Started

This toolkit organizes frequently asked questions, resources, and other information by key topics areas, including research, policy, technology, and privacy. In addition, information about specific stakeholder interests can be found on that particular group's page. If you want to gain a quick understanding of the technology, recommended policies, and key privacy considerations, this toolkit section should help you get started.

- Learn more by reviewing the [Implementation](#) page
- Download the [Law Enforcement Implementation Checklist](#) for guidance
- Why Trust This Toolkit?

Subject Matter Experts Share



Getting Started FAQs

- What are officer body-worn cameras?
- How are body-worn cameras different from dashboard cameras and CCTV systems?
- How can we use body-worn cameras to increase trust between law enforcement and the public?
- How can body-worn cameras facilitate review of critical incidents, including use-of-force?
- Do body-worn cameras contribute to positive effects between law enforcement and the communities they serve?
- Do body-worn cameras reduce use-of-force by law enforcement?
- What are some of the concerns with a body-worn camera program?
- What is the best way to implement a body-worn camera program?
- What is the Body-Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program?
- What are the primary limitations of body-worn cameras that should be conveyed to community members, policymakers, and other stakeholders?

[View More Getting Started FAQs ...](#)



10 Limitations of Body Cameras

The Force Science Institute describes limitations to police-worn body cameras for consideration when developing policy, protocols, and training

[Read the Paper](#)



BJA Expert Panel

Justice professionals representing law enforcement, courts, prosecution, public defense, labor organizations, and advocates for privacy, victims, and juveniles initiated Toolkit discussions

[Read More](#)

Getting Started Resources

Show 10 entries

Search:

Title	Icon	Date	Source	Resource Type	Category
A Primer on Body-Worn Cameras for Law Enforcement	★	09/01/2012	U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice (NIJ), National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)	Informational Resource	Background
Implementing a Body-Worn Camera	★	12/31/2014	Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), COPS	Guideline/Recommendations	Research

Step 1: Learn the Fundamentals

1.1. Become familiar with available materials

- Review [Why Trust this Toolkit](#) and the [Implementation](#) toolkit page
- Review the [National Landscape](#) materials to access the most up-to-date shared resources from across the country

1.2. Build a basic understanding of body-worn cameras and related considerations

- Read through the background and essential reading materials on the [Getting Started](#) toolkit page
- Identify key links, available templates, and other resources available on the [Research](#) toolkit page

Step 2: Develop a Plan

2.1. Define program goals, objectives, and desired outcomes

- Review materials available on the [Implementation](#) toolkit page

2.2. Understand program costs and identify potential funding sources

- Perform a search on "cost" in the toolkit and read the [Implementation](#) toolkit page materials about cost
- Seek out information about regional resource and partnership opportunities

2.3. Identify stakeholders and define a stakeholder engagement/communication plan

- Engage law enforcement stakeholders and discover/seek champions for each community
 - Union, patrol, training, supervisors, legal, internal affairs, records, technology, research/planning
- Engage broader justice stakeholders and discover/seek champions for each community
 - City and county prosecutor, public defender, courts
- Engage external (non-justice) stakeholders and discover any obvious champions
 - City leadership, privacy/advocacy groups, community leaders, residents, media

2.4. Build project plan and identify a project sponsor, project manager, and stakeholder leads

- Review the [Implementation](#) toolkit page materials and templates related to planning

2.5. Develop a plan and identify research partner to document process and image of BWC program

- Implementation process, officer outcomes, departmental outcomes, case outcomes, citizen outcomes

Step 3: Form Working Group(s) and Identify Collaboration Opportunities

3.1. Identify any regional opportunities that offer economy of scale, program sponsorship, or governance

- Seek out whether any existing regional procurements, data storage capabilities, multi-disciplinary working groups, and/or community oversight/relation groups could offer opportunities for reduced cost or overhead

Training

Proper training can be a determining factor in the success of an agency's body-worn camera (BWC) program. As with any new law enforcement initiative, the various roles within an agency (patrol officers, supervisor, internal affairs, information officers, etc.) may require unique content, approaches, and delivery methods. An often overlooked but critical factor in the implementation and sustainment of an effective BWC program is educating and training parties outside the law enforcement agency, such as information technology support, prosecutors, defense bar, judiciary, and other relevant stakeholders that may obtain access to the video recordings.

As part of a comprehensive training plan, an agency should consider educating the public and media on the technology, policies, and operational aspects of the proposed BWC program.

Subject Matter Experts Share



Training FAQs

- ① [Who should deliver training to law enforcement officers about the deployment of body-worn cameras?](#)
- ① [Should there be efforts by the law enforcement agency to educate the public about body-worn cameras?](#)
- ① [What do law enforcement agencies need to do to prepare the prosecutor and other criminal justice agencies for the implementation of a body-worn camera program?](#)
- ① [What are the key policy areas law enforcement should consider before implementing a body-worn camera program?](#)

There is a wide-range of important issues that may be governed by a law enforcement agency's internal administrative policy. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) report (PERF, 2014:37) identifies a range of key policy issues, including:

- Basic camera usage: who will wear the cameras; where will the cameras be worn (hat, sunglasses, chest, etc.).
- Designated staff member: identify who is responsible for maintaining, charging, reporting, documenting malfunctions, and issuing new cameras.
- Recording protocols: when to activate and deactivate camera, and when recording is required, discretionary, and prohibited.
- Video downloading process: who will download, when download will occur, where data will be stored, and how it will be safeguarded from tampering.
- Method for documenting chain of custody.
- Data retention periods for different categories of recorded data (evidentiary, non-evidentiary).
- Process for accessing and reviewing data: identify who is authorized to review and under what circumstances (e.g., individual officers, supervisors).
- Process for releasing recorded data to the public, including redaction processes, timelines for release, and data specifically prohibited from release.
- Process for contracting with third-party vendors for data storage.

Other resources for policy considerations include: a report by the National Institute of Justice Sensor, Surveillance, and Biometric Technologies (SSBT) Center of Excellence (2012); the International Association of Chiefs of Police Body-Worn Cameras Model Policy; and the Office of Justice Programs Diagnostic Center Report (White, 2014).

Several policy areas are described in greater detail below.

National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) for the National Institute of Justice, Primer on Body-Worn Cameras for Law Enforcement: <https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Body-Worn-Cameras-508.pdf>

International Association of Chiefs of Police, Body-Worn Cameras Model Policy and Paper: <http://www.theiacp.org/ViewResult?SearchID=2401>

System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) for the Science and Technology Directorate, Body-Worn Video Cameras for Law Enforcement Assessment Report: http://www.firstresponder.gov/SAVER/Documents/Body-Worn-Cams-AR_0415-508.pdf

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) for the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned: <http://www.justice.gov/isao/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf>

Other Resources

- Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)/Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) Report
- National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Market Survey
- Model Policies: IACP, ACLU



Next Steps

- Thousands of agencies “going it alone”
- NIJ-funded studies currently in Las Vegas, NV, and Los Angeles, CA
- 50 agencies funded in fall 2015 through the US DOJ Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation Program
- 3-5 new SPI Sites – BWC programs
- Laura and John Arnold Foundation funding
 - Arizona State University; PERF; Urban Institute

THANKS!

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Less Lethal Technologies for Law Enforcement

Charles Stephenson

June 29, 2015

This project was supported by Grant No. 2013-DP-BX-K006 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the SMART Office. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Less-than-lethal Force

- Definition
- Use
- History
- Policy
- Training
- Modern-day examples
- New technologies
- Future technologies

Definition

- Less-lethal weapons are weapons or any devices that are intended to be less likely to kill a living target than are traditional weapons. Such weapons are also termed as non-lethal weapons, less-than-lethal weapons, non-deadly weapons, compliance weapons, or pain-inducing weapons.

Use

- Technologies designed to temporarily incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain an adversary in a variety of situations.
- Primary use in law enforcement is in confrontations, suicide interventions, riots, prison disturbances, and hostage rescues.
- Most often used when lethal force is not appropriate; lethal force is justified but lesser force may subdue the aggressor; and lethal force is justified but its use could cause collateral effects, injury to bystanders, damage to property and environment.

History

- The concept of limiting the application of force to something short of lethality has been applied throughout history.
 - Early examples
 - CALTROPS such as Water Chestnuts were used to slow mounted soldiers (331BC); today's version has not changed much.



History

- Early examples (cont.)
 - Mounted Officers for crowd and riot control (early 1900s)
 - Water cannons for crowd and control (1930s)



History cont.

- Early examples
 - Trained working dogs
 - Tear gas (1919)



Policy – Example

- Use of less-lethal force must be objectively reasonable and necessary in order to carry out the officer's law enforcement duties.
- Only officers who are trained and certified in the use of less-lethal devices and techniques may use them.
- A less-lethal device is not a substitute for the use of deadly force. However, does not preclude the use of a less-lethal device for this purpose if the use of deadly force would otherwise be objectively reasonable.
- All incidents resulting in the use of less-lethal force must be reported.

Policy – Example

- If practical, supervisory personnel shall photograph or videotape any marks or injuries resulting from the use of less-lethal devices.
- Less-lethal devices may be used as a compliance tool on a subject offering, at a minimum, active resistance in a manner that the office reasonably believes may result in injury to themselves or to another person.
- Less-lethal devices shall be deployed in a manner that minimizes risk of injury to persons or damage to property.

Training – Example

- No authorized officers shall be allowed to carry a less-lethal device until they have successfully completed an approved initial course of instruction for such device and have been certified in its use.
- Only certified instructors shall instruct and certify law enforcement personnel as less-lethal device end users/operators or instructors.

Modern-Day Examples

- Acoustic technologies (the use of sound to communicate, distract, disorient, and incapacitate)
 - acoustic hailing devices
 - stun grenades or flash bangs (170dB)
 - directional long-range acoustic devices



Modern-Day Examples

- Light technologies (the use of light to distract, disorient, or temporarily blind)
 - flash bangs, blinds for 5 seconds
 - throw lights, strobe effect
 - green lasers, temporarily blinds



Modern-Day Examples

- Impact technologies (the use of blunt force trauma to subdue or gain control)
 - truncheons/batons
 - bean bags
 - plastic or rubber bullets and balls
 - water cannons



Modern-Day Examples

- Electrical technologies (the use of electrical shock or current to immobilize or incapacitate)
 - stun guns
 - electric shock projectiles
 - shock shields
 - shock batons



Modern-Day Examples

- Chemical technologies (the use of chemicals to incapacitate and or control)
 - tear gas (CS or CN)
 - pepper (OC) spray



New Technologies

- Non-lethal munitions
 - SmartRounds Technology, LLC
 - Smart Bullets™ New class of smart non-lethal projectiles that can be fired from a 12-gauge launcher. These smart bullets use MEMS micro-electro-mechanical technology and a CMOS image sensor to activate the projectiles before it reaches a target.
 - ShockRounds™ designed to produce a powerful high-pressure pulse (similar to flash bang) just before it hits the target.
 - PepperRounds™ projectile is actuated before it hits the target, the incapacitant is dispersed over larger area than that of pepper balls that break on impact.
 - HemiRounds™ wireless, electroshock rounds designed to deliver a human electro-muscular incapacitation pulse (50,000 volts) to the body at long range.



New Technologies



- Non-lethal munitions
 - SDI (Security Devices International Inc.)
 - Blunt impact projectile with collapsible nose that mushrooms upon impact to absorb some of the kinetic energy of the bullet and spread the impact of the nose over a larger area of the target.
 - Malodorant round contains a highly noxious payload that delivers an appalling odor.
 - OC that allows for a surgical application of pepper spray at a safe distance. It can be targeted against an individual or a small group within a localized physical area, eliminating the risk of injury and debilitating discomfort to bystanders.
 - CS Tear Gas Powder Round combines blunt trauma with the effects of a micro pulverized irritant powder to maximize pain compliance.

New Technologies

- Non-lethal munitions
 - Alternative Ballistics
 - Blunt impact projectile.
 - THE ALTERNATIVE™ decreases the velocity of the bullet and allows the projectile to impact the threat, lessening the bullet's penetrating energy.



Future Technologies

- Smart bullets
 - TranquilRounds projectile containing tranquilizer in mist form that sprays combatants and eliminates their will to fight (drowsy, weak, disoriented).
 - Obstacles to overcome are the speed of reaction to the drug (must take effect in two seconds or less) and delivery of proper dosage.
- Radio-frequency vehicle stopper
 - Portable vehicle stopper would disrupt a vehicle's electrical components to cause the engine to stall.
 - Obstacles must be self-contained, portable and take into consideration power brake/steering issues.

Future Technologies

- Active personnel denial system
 - Non-lethal counter personnel capability that creates a heating sensation, quickly repelling potential adversaries with minimal risk or energy to user or subject.

Technology Wrap-up

- There is yet to be one technology available that fits every situation that may be encountered in the field!
- The issue of the use of non-lethal technology is ever changing both in the perceived view by the public and with new technologies being made available.
- It is recommended that departments review their policies and procedures for the use of such technologies on a regular basis to adjust for changes in technology.

Webinar Announcement

- Date and time: August 26, 2015 – 2:00-3:30 p.m. EST

Contact information

- Charles Stephenson
 - cas5767@gmail.com
 - (843) 810-3046



Break

Podcasts: Philadelphia and Los Angeles

3:15 – 3:30 p.m.

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Peer-to-Peer Networking

3:30 – 4:15 p.m.

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Facilitated Peer-to-Peer Networking

- Breakout into four rooms

Room	Topic	Facilitator
A	Internal Outreach/Collaboration	Kunard
B	Organizational Change	Woodmansee
C	Research and Analysis	Decker
Executive Room	External Outreach/Collaboration	White

- Each group will attend 2 of 4 discussions, for 15 minutes each
- Discussion hosts will summarize and report out for the final 10 minutes

Group/Room Assignments

	Bruins	Celtics	Red Sox	Revolution
Group	Alberto Fernandez Chris Young David A. Gamero Jason Kuzik Maryann Ballotta Rosilyn Temple Sean Sothern William Taylor Robert C. Haas Renee Mitchell	Anthony A. Braga Christopher Wendt Greg Stewart John M. Brown Michael Troendle Rob T. Guerette Safa F Egilmez Steven DeMarco James J. Mulcahy, Esq.	Paul Ames Tina Emrich Amber Perenzin Christian Peterson Duane T Poole Jennifer Maconochie Kris R. Henning Michael Miceli Ryan Fisher	Kevin Thomas Maria Cheevers Brenda J. Bond Daniel Wagner Julie Schnobrich-Davis Mary Claire Buckley Sean MacDonald William Phillips
1 st Breakout Room	A	B	C	Executive Room
2 nd Breakout Room	B	A	Executive Room	C



"Busted Myths" In Criminology

Scott Decker, Ph.D.

4:15 – 5:00 p.m.

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General Principles


- Research in criminology over the past two decades has exposed several “facts” as myths.
- This presentation identifies a number of those myths and discusses their significance for strategies, policies, and interventions designed to reduce crime.
- Throughout, we will discuss smart policing principles.

The Ten Busted Myths

1. Nothing works
2. “Scared straight” works
3. Prevention doesn’t work
4. More criminal justice means less crime
5. Most citizens don’t like the police
6. Crime is going up
7. Immigration causes increases in crime
8. Most citizens don’t support community supervision
9. School-based crime prevention doesn’t work
10. There is nothing the police can do about crime

1. Nothing Works

- Prevailing wisdom of the 1970s
 - “Nothing works”
 - Prompted by Robert Martinson’s (in)famous article and book
 - Reviewed 231 studies – concluded that there was little evidence that rehabilitation worked
 - Cited in a Supreme Court decisions
 - Used as justification for federal sentencing guidelines
 - However...
 - Evidence was not as conclusive as Martinson made it seem
 - Further reviews came to different conclusions




1. Nothing Works

- Today's view
 - Many things work in corrections
 - Must focus on clear outcomes, fair and consistent application, and incorporating best practices
 - Key elements
 - Assign caseloads of a reasonable size
 - Use best practices
 - Integrate rehabilitation efforts with other social service and family interventions
 - Use the principles of smart supervision

2. “Scared Straight” Works

- Premise of Scared Straight programs
 - One of the most popular juvenile interventions
 - Expose young offenders to experiences designed to scare them away from delinquency
 - Visit security institutions
 - Interact with serious offenders
 - Visit emergency rooms
- Impact of Scared Straight
 - Appeals to common sense
 - However, evaluations suggest it has the opposite effect



A 1978 documentary detailed juvenile interactions with offenders in Rahway State Prison

2. “Scared Straight” Works

- Possible interventions given what we know
 - Consider results from evaluation by Petrosino and Finckenaue
 - Scared Straight may actually glorify crime and prison life
 - Engage youth with balanced stimuli (positive and negative)

3. Prevention is Not Effective

- Prevention was included with rehabilitation and the “nothing works” movement
- Prevention is among the most versatile and cost-effective forms of intervention
 - Especially true for juvenile interventions
- Prevention is not a panacea for all crime
 - Must be focused, well-defined, and applied to the right population

3. Prevention is Not Effective

Principles for Successful Prevention Programs

Clearly define the population

Determine the form of prevention (primary, secondary, tertiary)


Consider early intervention models

Combine criminal justice prevention with other social support efforts

Look to best practices, meta-analyses, and rigorous evaluations

4. More Criminal Justice Means Less Crime

- A common refrain in criminal justice is that we need **more**:



- Seems inherently reasonable
- Reality is that adding more employees and more facilities alone won't and doesn't reduce crime

4. More Criminal Justice Means Less Crime

- Evidence of the complexity of the resource ↔ crime relationship
 - Variation in ratio between number of sworn officers and population; not clearly linked to crime rates
 - Crime rate generally declining over time even as resources become more scarce
 - State-wide policies to reduce prison population haven't been linked to increases in crime rates

4. More Criminal Justice Means Less Crime


- What does this imply for interventions?
 - SMART principles should be observed, whether for policing, prosecution, or supervision
 - Data-driven strategies and problem statements are at the key of successful responses to crime
 - Using best practices in a data driven environment and partnering with other agencies will produce the best results

5. Most Citizens Don't Like the Police

- General Social Survey (GSS)
 - Has asked about citizen attitudes toward police since 1974
 - Results vary from year to year
 - As expected, reflect major events related to police-citizen engagement (e.g., Rodney King)
 - In general, the surveys show positive citizen attitudes toward the police
 - Variations in attitudes by population subgroups (race, gender, age) but most subgroups (including racial subgroups) generally report positive attitudes toward the police

5. Most Citizens Don't Like the Police

- BJS Police-Public Contact Survey (focuses on traffic and street stops)
 - Results are similar to GSS
 - Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites report favorable attitudes toward the police, even when stopped and ticketed
 - Attitudes remain favorable when citizens believe they were treated fairly, even if stopped, ticketed, searched, or arrested



5. Most Citizens Don't Like the Police

- Maintaining positive police-citizen relationships is a key to maintaining favorable perceptions of the police.
- Research on procedural justice shows that:
 - Citizens who believe that the law is being fairly applied, even when they are subject to sanctions, will be less likely to offend, and
 - More likely to cooperate in crime control activities in their neighborhoods.

5. Most Citizens Don't Like the Police

Key elements for police-community relations

Providing training in “fair and equitable” policing for all police department employees as outlined in the 21st Century Task for Report on Policing.

Emphasizing principles of procedural justice.

Treating citizens with respect in all situations. This should include clear explanations of the reasons for actions as well as no use of the “F” word.

6. Crime is Going Up

- Remains one of the major misconceptions about crime
 - Both among members of the public as well as many in the field of criminal justice
- Steady movement of cases through the system must make it look like crime is going up
- In reality, crime has been in a steady decline for over 20 years
 - Longest period of decline since we began measuring crime in the 1930s
 - Supported by various data sources (UCR, NCVS)


6. Crime is Going Up

- Declines have continued through:
 - Economic recession, high unemployment, immigration, other social and economic changes.
- Can be attributed to:
 - Smarter policing, changes in demographics, and smarter use of correctional sanctions

FIGURE 1

Total violent victimization rate and prevalence rate, 1993–2010

Rate per 1,000 persons age 12 or older



Note: See appendix table 1 for populations, estimates, and standard errors.

^aNumber of victimizations per 1,000 persons age 12 or older that occurred during the year.

^bNumber of persons per 1,000 age 12 or older who experienced at least one victimization during the year.

^cDue to methodological changes in the 2006 NCVS, use caution when comparing 2006 criminal victimization estimates to other years. See *Criminal Victimization, 2007*, www.bjs.gov, for more information.

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–2010.

6. Crime is Going Up

- Can take advantage of decline by:
 - Promoting investment in neighborhoods
 - Many neighborhoods are attractive investment opportunities now that crime has declined
 - Cities and law enforcement should work to make the public (and the investment community) aware of these changes
 - Maintain efforts to keep neighborhoods safe
 - CPTED and crime prevention should be integrated with redevelopment and gentrification
 - Enlist the public in public safety efforts
 - Redouble efforts to understand the crime decline in particular neighborhoods and spread those models to other locations

7. Immigration Causes Increases in Crime


- The prolonged crime decline in the U.S. occurs during a period of record immigration including undocumented individuals.
- Border jurisdictions have experienced the highest levels of immigration and crime declines.
 - El Paso, TX is among the safest large cities in the country and has very high levels of immigrant populations both documented and undocumented.
 - First generation immigrants (both documented and undocumented) tend to have lower crime rates than US residents.
 - However, by the time these individuals are second generation their crime rates resemble those of US citizens.

7. Immigration Causes Increases in Crime

- Immigration presents challenges for law enforcement, corrections, schools, and health care.
 - Recent research on policing immigrants (Decker, Provine, Varsanyi, and Lewis) shows that most police departments lack a policy on how to deal with undocumented immigrants and provide little or no training to their officers.
 - There is a dramatic need for bilingual officers in law enforcement, particularly in jurisdictions with high levels of immigrants.

7. Immigration Causes Increases in Crime

- Immigration presents challenges... (continued)
 - With little coordination of policy between federal and local law enforcement, many local law enforcement agencies are left “on an island” to work out their own problems.
 - Both the *Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing* and the Major Chiefs Committee of IACP have valuable recommendations to offer in this regard.



8. The Public Doesn't Support Community Supervision

- Concern that the public doesn't support efforts to supervise offenders in the community.
 - Sometimes this concern is directed against probation other times at parole.
 - However, when asked if they prefer offenders who are released from prison or found guilty but not imprisoned to be unsupervised, almost all citizens prefer that offenders be supervised.
- With nearly 4.2 million probationers and 850,000 parolees (Bureau of Justice Statistics), community supervision provides a lot of protection for the public.

8. The Public Doesn't Support Community Supervision

Improving Effectiveness of Community Supervision

Using SMART supervision, including data-driven strategies.

Using best practices in supervision, including risk assessment, assigning appropriate strategies to specific offender groups, and assessing danger carefully.

Coordinating supervision with other partners in the criminal justice system, community, and social services arenas.

9. School-based Crime Prevention Doesn't Work

- Challenges in educational system writ-large raise concerns about effectiveness of school-based crime prevention programs.
- However, many programs are successful:
 - Average 7th grader receives or participates in 8 prevention programs in school (Gottfredson)
 - Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program has consistently demonstrated impact in reducing gang membership, and increasing prosocial attitudes and behaviors
 - Drug prevention programs based on skill building (though not DARE) show positive results

9. School-based Crime Prevention Doesn't Work

Key elements of successful school-based crime prevention

Prevention programs in school should be coordinated.

Prevention programs in school should be based on best and promising practices.

Prevention programs in school should integrate principles of cultural competency.

10. There is nothing the police can do about crime

- The police can't be everywhere.
 - There aren't enough to watch every potential offender and crime location.
- Recent efforts suggest that when efforts are focused and data-driven, police can overcome this challenge.
 - Policing places
 - Targeting high-rate offenders
 - Coordinating efforts with other agencies

10. There is nothing the police can do about crime

Key elements of successful crime prevention efforts

Develop a diverse, comprehensive understanding of the crime problems.

Focus on problem assessment especially as applies to community oriented policing.

Emphasize smart policing principles and focus on places, persons, and specific types of crime.

Constantly assess and evaluate understanding of the problem, strategies, and outcomes to create a continuous feedback loop to improve efforts.

Concluding Thoughts and Keys to Continued Success

- What we need to be successful is a laser not a blunt instrument.
- Look to best practices, meta-analyses, level III or IV evaluations.
 - Where possible, randomized control trials are the preferred research design.
- Maintain a strong focus through the execution of a strategy.
 - The focus should be on some combination of place, crime type, offender type or “criminogenic commodity” (e.g., guns, drugs, money movement).

Concluding Thoughts and Keys to Continued Success

- Approaches should be data-driven in their origins, implementation, modification, and evaluation.
- Strategies should be well-coordinated with other criminal justice agencies, the public, and governmental and non-governmental agencies.
- Training is a hallmark of successful strategies.
- Principles of procedural justice should be considered in all strategies.

Resources

- Jerome Miller review of “What Works”. <http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/rehab.html>
- Andrew Petrosino, “Beyond Scared Straight”.
<http://www.sagepub.com/isw6/articles/ch15petrosino.pdf>
- Justice Department Discourages use of Scared Straight Programs.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/news_at_glance/234084/topstory.html
- Crime Prevention @ CrimeSolutions.gov. <http://www.crimesolutions.gov/>
- The impact of Incarceration. <https://criminelab.uchicago.edu/page/incarceration>
- Public attitudes toward the police. <http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=70>
- What caused the crime decline? <https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline>
- Immigration and crime.
http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/does_immigration_increase_crime
- Citizen support for community supervision. <http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/newsroom/press-releases/0001/01/01/one-in-31-us-adults-are-behind-bars-on-parole-or-probation>
- School based crime prevention. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/works/chapter5.htm>
- Impact of police on crime. http://eml.berkeley.edu/~jmccrory/chalfin_mccrory2012.pdf and
<http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/criminal-justice/the-impact-of-community-policing-meta-analysis-of-its-effects-in-u-s-cities>



Closing Remarks from Director Denise O'Donnell

5:00 p.m.

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