Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) Commerce City and Brighton Sexual Assault Task Force

Final Evaluation Report

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About the Report

This report details the background, implementation, evaluation and results, successes and challenges of the Commerce City Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) 2017-2021 project, funded by the Bureau for Justice Assistance (BJA). The Sexual Assault Task Force (SATF) is a multi-jurisdictional sexual assault unit prioritizing trauma-informed policing and victim-centered services. It was implemented in January 2018 in Commerce City and Brighton, Colorado, two adjacent jurisdictions and continues operating according to program goals at the time of this report's publication. Maximizing limited resources by combining two agencies into one unit is an innovative approach to addressing sexual violence. With the support of a multidisciplinary team of community stakeholders, weekly case reviews, and the integration of victim services, the SATF intended to positively transform sex crime investigations in both cities.

The project was evaluated for efficacy, including a comprehensive case review process to determine if the quality of investigations improved with the implementation of specialized, trained detectives in the SATF. This evaluation was funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance SPI Grant #2017-WY-BX-0004. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Commerce City Police Department, or Brighton Police Department.

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Summary of Findings

Sexual assault continues to be one of the most difficult violent crimes to investigate and prosecute (Police Executive Research Forum, 2012). Research consistently shows significant case attrition from initial report through to prosecution and trial (Bennett, Edwards, Murphy & Birk, 2016; Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Spohn & Tellis, 2012). In addition, a substantial number of cases are never reported to law enforcement in the first place (Black, et al. 2010; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019; Spohn & Tellis, 2012). Extra-legal factors often affect whether a case is investigated and prosecuted (Frazier & Haney, 1996; Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019; Spohn & Tellis, 2012) and a lack of training for law enforcement can often lead to the revictimization of survivors and discontinuing their participation in the process (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Lorenze, Kirkner, Ullman, 2019; Police Executive Research Forum, 2012). Holding perpetrators accountable for sexual assault and engaging survivors in the investigation present ongoing challenges to the criminal legal system.

Commerce City and Brighton, Colorado are two adjacent small to mid-sized cities northeast of Denver. Each city has its own police department and partners on several initiatives such as victim services and SWAT. Both agencies identified the need to improve their sexual assault response, investigation, and victim engagement. Neither agency had the resources to establish and sustain a sex crimes unit on their own. Therefore, they decided to pool their resources and launch a new initiative addressing sexual assault in their communities. Established in 2018 with the support of a Bureau of Justice Assistance Smart Policing Initiative grant, the Sexual Assault Task Force (SATF) was a pilot project to evaluate the efficacy of a multi-jurisdictional approach to sexual assault investigations. This report details the results of the evaluation of this innovative project.

Evaluation Method
To evaluate the efficacy of the SATF, a robust case review of pre- and post-SATF sexual assault investigations was conducted. Fifty percent of sex crime cases from both agencies were part of the case review and cases were randomly selected from three years prior to the SATF's implementation and three years after the SATF's implementation (2015-2020). Given the high volume of cases at each agency over six years, it was not logistically possible to review all cases, and based on discussions with Interrupted Time Series experts and a review of the literature, the team rested on 50%. Each case was reviewed by two out of three reviewers: a Brighton sergeant, Victim Services Manager, and project researcher. The scoring rubric contained five sections, and each section contained several individual rubric items each scored on a scale of 0-3. Rubric items were developed from national best practices identified in the literature of sex crimes investigations (see Appendix 3) in addition to input from the SATF sergeant and Victim Services Manager who are experts in the field.

Case Review Results

Data analysis was conducted on 564 reviewed cases using the Interrupted Time Series model. The analysis was run with all overall case scores and with a set of monthly averages (all scores within a month averaged to produce a single score). The latter provided 71 data points for each agency (35 months pre-SATF and 36 months post-SATF; there were no December 2017 cases reviewed). In both analyses, the results did not show a discontinuous shift in case review scores once the SATF was implemented. However, results did show a gradual increase over time in case scores, with the most noticeable change seen in Commerce City. Overall case scores and detective case scores were significantly and substantially affected by the detective's gender, with women receiving higher case scores overall. Patrol officers' scores, however, were not affected by either the patrol officer's or the detective's gender. Cases with higher scores were filed with the DA's office at a greater rate however, given the complexity of each case and the differences in facts, we did not do an analysis to determine any causal links between case scores and DA prosecution rates. Overall, despite the increase in case scores over time, indicating a higher quality of work product, we did not see a concomitant increase in DA case filings.

Victim Services
In addition to case score analysis, the evaluation also included an evaluation of victim services. As part of a regular effort to improve victim services, the Brighton and Commerce City Victim Services Unit sends service evaluations to any victim of crime to whom they provide services. For the purposes of the SATF, the program evaluation was amended to relate to SATF program goals. Evaluations were emailed or texted depending on the survivor's preference and consent. The survey used in this project was not drawn from a validated scale as it was an in-house survey developed to meet grant requirements. Data gleaned from victim surveys is reported to state and federal funders and used internally for program improvement. Overall, those survivors who worked with the SATF and responded to the survey expressed high levels of satisfaction with their experience and 100% of respondents said they felt believed.

> The Commerce City Police Department and the Commerce City/Brighton Sexual Assaults Task Force members we dealt with made us feel comfortable from the beginning to the end. Everyone we spoke to [was] very kind and supportive through the whole process. We can't thank them enough.

> The task force was very helpful and caring. They made [us] feel like we were taking the right path and supported throughout the whole process.

Implementation Interviews
As part of a process evaluation, the researcher conducted biannual interviews with SATF detectives, advocates, and agency leadership. The interviews focused on their experience with SATF implementation, what they learned, and what recommendations they had for other agencies choosing to implement a similar model. Key themes included: teamwork, process/infrastructure barriers, benefit of embedded victim services, officer wellness, co-location pluses and minuses, conflicting communication, strengthened community partner relationships and value (although this decreased

over time), increased knowledge of sex crimes and survivor responses, and a mixed belief in the appropriateness of housing sex offender management at the SATF.

> The Sexual Assault Task Force (SATF) has been a rewarding assignment and I believe the quality of sex assault investigations has definitely increased for both cities since its inception. When I consider the current detectives assigned to the SATF, I know that I can count on each one of them to assist me when needed, which makes it an incredibly positive working environment.

1. The Basis for the SATF

Sexual violence is a nationwide problem. Research has demonstrated time and again the high rates of sexual violence in our communities (Black, et al., 2010; Fisher, Cullen & Turner, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000) and the numbers of non-reporting victims/survivors remains high (Black, et al. 2010). Despite its prevalence, the criminal justice system continues to struggle with holding offenders accountable (Bennett, et al, 2016; Frazier & Haney, 1996; Morabito et. al. 2019; Spohn & Tellis, 2012; Spohn & Holleran, 2001) and responding effectively to victims/survivors of sexual violence (Bennett et al., 2016; Frazier & Haney, 1996; Koss et al, 2004; Koss, 2006; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Spohn & Holleran, 2001; Spohn & Tellis, 2012).

1.1. Needs and challenges of investigating sexual assault

Spohn & Tellis (2016) reviewed sexual assault cases in Los Angeles (LA) an found that the LA Police Department and LA Sheriff's Department both had high rates of exceptionally clearing cases inappropriately and/or without documented reasons. In terms of prosecution research, Lonsway & Archambault (2012) investigated the "Justice Gap." Their research showed that only 0.4-5.4% of sexual assaults are prosecuted, with only 0.2-5.2% of cases resulting in any kind of conviction (p. 157). A more recent study documenting adult sexual assault cases in Salt Lake County, Utah discovered only 6% of cases were successfully prosecuted (Valentine, Shaw, Lark, & Campbell, 2016). Morabito, Pattavina & Williams (2019) replicated these and Spohn and Tellis's (2016) findings in their multi-site study analyzing criminal justice pathways and outcomes for 2887 sexual assault cases. In all, 45 (1.6%) of cases reported to the police concluded with a trial in court (p. 108). Mary Koss has written extensively on sexual violence response and argues the "largest single impediment to meeting SVs [survivor/victim] justice needs through existing mechanisms is the small numbers who are able to access legal processes" (2006, p. 209). Koss et al (2004) in another study argue that "only a small fraction [of sex assault cases are] ending up in the courtroom" (p. 1438). Morabito et al's (2019) study affirms this. In Rosay et al's (2011) study of sexual assault cases in Alaska from 2003-2004, they found that only 46% of cases were even referred to prosecution. Of the 46% referred for prosecution, only 28% were accepted. Lonsway & Archambault's (2012) research identified "that there is little to no change in the rate of prosecution, conviction, and incarceration for rape in the past two decades" (p. 158). This attrition has been well documented and happens at all levels of the criminal justice system. The experiences documented in research are no different in Commerce City and Brighton.

Law enforcement agencies are often referred to as the gatekeepers for the criminal justice system (LaFree, 1989; Alderden & Ullman, 2012; Kelley & Campbell, 2013). They hold considerable power in determining whether a sexual assault case is thoroughly investigated and referred to prosecution. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (2012) brought together several leaders in law enforcement and identified ongoing struggles in police investigations of sexual assault including an overuse of the unfounding classification to close a case (see Spohn & Tellis, 2016). A lack of training and an attachment to outdated beliefs about sexual assault were also highlighted as impediments to successful law enforcement investigations (PERF, 2019, Shaw, Campbell, Cain, & Feeney, 2017). Given

this "gate-keeping" role law enforcement agencies often play in isolation to outside feedback, a multi-jurisdictional, centralized approach to combating sex crimes has the potential to transform the way adjacent jurisdictions respond to and investigate sex crimes, serve victims, and maintain consistent oversight of sex offender registration.

Currently, law enforcement agencies collaborate on a case-by-case basis. However, these are one-time collaborations rather than a systematic approach consolidating resources to streamline and specialize practice. An important demonstration of the need for cross- or multi-jurisdictional coordination of law enforcement for sexual assault cases is most notably evidenced in a 2011 serial rapist case. Marc Patrick O'Leary, a serial rapist, committed numerous rapes in Washington and Colorado, purposefully in different jurisdictions, believing law enforcement would not connect the dots. And this was true, for several years. This lack of communication, compounded by a lack of belief in the victims who came forward, allowed O'Leary to repeatedly perpetrate. However, Colorado law enforcement officers, Det. Stacy Galbraith and Sgt. Edna Hendershot identified a pattern in Colorado and in Washington. They initiated connections with other local law enforcement agencies, ultimately leading to O'Leary's arrest. During an interview with police after O'Leary had been convicted, they shared O'Leary "realized police departments often did not communicate. So he deliberately committed each rape in a different jurisdiction" (Miller & Armstrong, 2015, p. 10).

This example is a jarring demonstration of the need for law enforcement agencies to work more openly across jurisdictions, especially in those adjacent to each other to combat sex crimes. A multi-jurisdictional task force moves beyond one-time collaborations as evidenced in the O'Leary case, creating a permanent group of specialized investigators. Multi-jurisdictional task forces have been used for other widespread crimes, in particular, drugs (Coldren & Sabbath, 1992; Smith et al, 2000) but are seldom applied to the issue of sexual assault. What has evolved over the last twenty years are community sexual assault response teams (SART). These have largely proven to be a successful example of community level, multi-agency interventions in sexual assault response (Morabito, Pattavina & Williams (2019) Zajac, 2006; Greeson & Campbell, 2013; Greeson & Campbell, 2015; Greeson, Campbell, Bybee, & Kennedy, 2016). The SATF takes this collaborative premise for sexual assault response and applies it to two adjacent law enforcement jurisdictions. SARTs are inter-professional, interagency groups, whereas the SATF will more closely mimic the composition of a drug task force, while at the same time, working with the district attorney, community partners, and the local SART coordinator.

The SATF created an opportunity for an intervention through an agency-level partnership. Commerce City Police Department (CCPD) and the Brighton Police Department (BPD) believed piloting this project will successfully demonstrate the efficacy of the task force framework for sexual assault investigations and sex offender registration and management. It will also offer opportunities for other law enforcement partnerships on this issue in the future.

1.2. The history of sexual assault response at CCPD and BPD

The CCPD and the BPD have demonstrated an ongoing commitment to providing exceptional service to victims of crime. Brighton and Commerce City have also seen an increase in sex crime reporting and predict this trend to increase. Both BPD and CCPD UCR/NIBRS data documented an increase in rape reports from 2015 to 2017. However, given the narrow definition of rape used for UCR/NIBRS data[1], there are numerous sex crime cases excluded in these published numbers nor do they include reports that are misclassified or unreported. Given population increases in both cities, the #MeToo movement, and the implementation of the You Have Options program (YHOP), both agencies anticipated sexual assault numbers to grow. In addition, Commerce City did not have a targeted strategy to effectively manage the increase in sex offenders moving to its city, leaving compliance management to untrained police officers. At Brighton, sex offender management was overseen by civilian staff who had received training. However, there was interest to move this work under a sworn police officer.

Internal Reviews
The investigation and prosecution of sexual assault has long been an area in need of improvement (Koss et al., 2004; Koss, 2006; Rosay, et al., 2011; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Valentine, Shaw, Lark, & Campbell, 2016). Given this reality, and an internal acknowledgement at both CCPD and BPD of the need to improve their work, a formal sexual assault response audit was conducted at CCPD in 2015, and BPD's Victim Services reviewed sexual assault cases for completeness in 2013-2014. The CCPD audit and BPD review analyzed investigation numbers and outcomes, reviewed victim feedback, and tracked filings through the DA's office.

Both CCPD's audit and BPD's internal review revealed significant deficiencies. Results identified included longer than acceptable wait times for victim contact by detectives, a lack of trauma-informed investigation approaches, victim disengagement from the investigative process, and incomplete and/or low-quality investigations. As a direct result of CCPD's audit and BPD's internal review, BPD implemented the YHOP in 2015 and CCPD implemented YHOP in January 2017. The YHOP program centers a victim's needs, moving the investigation at their pace, utilizing trauma-informed policing and victim advocacy support.

No Specialized Sex Crimes Units
In both CCPD and BPD, there is no specialized sex crimes unit such as those often found in larger law enforcement agencies. The absence of a specialized unit at either department led to cases assigned to non-specialized investigators who lacked key skills to support and engage victims, and thoroughly and effectively investigate sex crimes. Without specialized investigations and trauma-informed training, sexual assault victims disengaged from the process, and cases were not accepted for prosecution (Lonsway, Welch, & Fitzgerald, 2001; Police Executive Research Forum, 2012; Wentz & Archbold, 2012). In fact, for 2017, the district attorney filing rate for sexual assault cases for victims 13 years old and

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[1] 2013 definition: "penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim. Attempts or assaults to commit rape are also included in the statistics presented here; however, statutory rape and incest are excluded." https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/rape

above in the 17th Judicial District (which encompasses Brighton and Commerce City) was a mere 6% (G. Schmitz, personal communication, April 12, 2018). One of the primary arguments used by district attorney's offices for not filing cases is that there is no reasonable likelihood of successful prosecution or that there is insufficient evidence to move forward. What is often not stated in reasons for declined case filings is that sometimes, investigations are not of the quality they need to be to successfully prosecute a case (J. Prince, personal communication, April 20, 2018).

Inappropriate Case Closures/Dispositions

Spohn and Tellis's (2016) research in Los Angeles, along with Lonsway and Archambault's research (2012), found troubling rates of unfounding investigations and exceptional clearances by law enforcement agencies. Filing rates at the DAs office are also low nationally (Rosay et al, 2011; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Spohn & Tellis, 2016; Valentine, Shaw, Lark, & Campbell, 2016). In the Police Research Executive Forum's (2018) report, it stated "Proper case coding, classification, and clearance are essential to maintaining an accurate picture of sexual assaults within a jurisdiction, and to ensuring that investigations are thorough and complete" (p. 49).

Tables 1 & 2 detail the primary dispositions for sex crimes at CCPD and BPD prior to the SATF's implementation. CCPD data shows 2015-2017 a downward trend for unfounding cases over those same years, with the rates of Inactive case dispositions increasing slightly. Rates of Exceptional Clearance remained static for CCPD during this time period but Closed by Filing and Lack of Prosecution (LOP) rates decreased. Cleared by Arrest increased marginally. Prior to the SATF, cases closed as "Closed by Filing" did not necessarily mean charges were filed by the DA. Therefore, we should not assume the numbers listed under this disposition represent cases filed for this time period. Cleared by Arrest (CLAR) almost always means charges were filed initially by the DA (they could later be dismissed). At CCPD, there were also three versions of Cleared by Arrest utilized by detectives: Cleared by Arrest, Cleared by Arrest Felony, and Cleared by Arrest Misdemeanor.

For BPD, there were no clear trends in the disposition data prior to the SATF. Closed by Filing was utilized frequently but as with CCPD, this disposition does not actually represent the number of cases that were filed. Exceptional Clearance was used far less regularly at BPD than at CCPD, as was Unfounded. Inactive cases remained fairly constant from 2015-2017.

Table 1

Pre-SATF (2015-2017) CCPD Sexual Assault Case Dispositions

Year	CLAR[a]	Closed by Filing	LOP	Unfounded	Exceptional Clearance	Inactive
2015	2	18	5	6	12	37
2016	5	14	5	3	10	37

2017	4	11	2	4	14	46
Total	11	45	12	13	36	120

[a] includes closed by arrest felony and closed by arrest misdemeanor

Table 2

Pre-SATF (2015-2017) BPD Sexual Assault Case Dispositions

Year	CLAR	Closed by Filing	LOP	Unfounded	Exceptional Clearance	Inactive
2015	2	19	0	1	1	36
2016	2	30	1	3	1	33
2017	0	17	1	1	4	22
Total	4	66	2	5	6	91

For the years 2015–2017, 55 sexual assault cases were presented from BPD to the 17th Judicial District, District Attorney's office, and 73 were presented from CCPD (see Tables 3 & 4). This is a mix of adult and juvenile cases. The presentation rate is fairly low across BPD and CCPD at 26% and 28% respectively. Of those cases presented to the DA's office, the filing rates for both agencies are fairly high at 71% for BPD and 73% for CCPD. On its face, it appears the DA's office is accepting a large percentage of sexual assault cases from these agencies; however, a significant number of sexual assault cases were not being presented to the DA's office for consideration and discussion. As discussed earlier, this is illustrative of law enforcements gate keeping role in sexual assault prosecutions. As Alderden and Ullman (2012) state in their research: "One cannot fully appreciate the factors that influence prosecutorial decision making without understanding what types of cases get to that point in the processing continuum in the first place and what types of cases are weeded out at earlier points in the process" (p. 526).

This "weeding out" could occur for several reasons, including a victim's wishes (see Figure 18). It could also be attributable to an investigator's assessment that there is a low likelihood of prosecution at trial (Alderden & Ullman, 2012). In 2017, the then Denver DA received significant criticism for low sexual assault case prosecution rates. The data showed that most cases declined were listed as "no reasonable likelihood of conviction" (Halsne & Koeberl, 2018). The new DA, elected in 2018, didn't improve those rates significantly with a prosecution rate of 33% (Halsne & Koeberl, 2018), again with many cases declined because of a belief they were not winnable. This reason is provided frequently in sexual assault

cases and is complex to tease apart why such a conclusion was reached (and such analysis was not a part of this study). According to Alderan and Ullman (2012), while there are studies addressing prosecutorial decision-making in sexual assault cases, there is far less research evaluating the decision-making process for sex crimes detectives. This could therefore be a productive avenue for future research. Previous research has shown that extralegal factors have influenced a detective's decision to forward a case for consideration by the DA (Lonsway, 2010; Kelley & Campbell, 2013) including the presence of alcohol and prior DA prosecutorial decisions. Case characteristics, law enforcement agency investigation quality, rape myth acceptance, insufficient evidence, lack of a medical forensic exam to name a few possibilities, can all be related to the failure to present a case or the decision not to prosecute. (Unfortunately, this pilot project was not able to collect detailed case characteristic information consistently enough to report.) Often these reasons are not documented at the law enforcement agency nor at the DA's office. Much like Lonsway and Archambault's (2012) research identified a justice gap, the 2015-2017 data from BPD, CCPD, and the 17th Judicial District DA's office (Tables 3 & 4) reflect similar patterns: very few cases go to trial.

Table 3
2015-2017 CCPD Sexual Assault Cases[a] / DA decisions

Year	Assigned	Presented to DA	Cases Filed	Cases Declined	Plea Deal	Trial	Guilty Verdict
2015-2017	262	73	53	20	35	7	4

[a] includes sexual assault, sexual assault on a child and unlawful sexual contact

Table 4
2015-2017 BPD Sexual Assault Cases[a] DA decisions

Year	Assigned	Presented to DA	Cases Filed	Cases Declined	Plea Deal	Trial	Guilty Verdict
2015-2017	209	55	39	16	33	3	2

[a] includes sexual assault, sexual assault on a child and unlawful sexual contact

The ongoing struggles to successfully investigate sexual assaults and the landscape of case assignment to untrained detectives in both cities, necessitated implementing a new and innovative approach to sexual assault investigation and sex offender registration and management to improve response comprehensively and effectively.

2. Study Design and Methodology

2.1. Study location

Brighton and Commerce City are located in Adams County, Colorado with a small portion of Brighton located in Weld County. Both cities are located in Colorado's 17th Judicial District. The combined population for Brighton and Commerce City per U.S. Census Bureau (2019) data is 101,890 (Brighton: 41,554 and Commerce City: 60,336). 44,810 citizens of Brighton and Commerce City identify themselves as Hispanic/Latino. Both cities are experiencing significant population growth which is predicted to continue over the next several years and impact reporting and offender numbers.

2.2. Data, research design, and analytic strategy

As part of the SPI evaluation of the SATF, the project team designed a case review process to compare cases from before and after the SATF's implementation. The initial case review strategy was to review 100% of sexual assault cases for three years before and after the SATF's implementation. However, it quickly became apparent this was not achievable given the work responsibilities of two of the three reviewers. Instead, the review team opted to review 50% pre-SATF sexual assault cases and 50% post-SATF sexual assault cases from both agencies. The purpose of this extensive case review was to help us understand the SATF's efficacy as a model for innovative policing.

The overarching research question driving the project evaluation was:
R_1: Will the implementation of the Sexual Assault Task Force as an innovative policing strategy increase the quality of sexual assault investigations?

To answer this question, the SATF/SPI team developed a case review rubric and an accompanying reviewer guidance document utilizing national best practices for law enforcement sexual assault investigations including tenets of YHOP (see Appendix III). Current research (Alderen & Ullman, 2012; Bennett et al, 2016; Jimmerson, 2013; Kelly & Campbell, 2013; Women's Law Project, 2013; Rosay et al, 2011; Spohn & Tellis 2016) along with leading professional agency (such as the Police Executive Research Forum and the International Association of Chiefs of Police) recommendations were reviewed and integrated into the rubric. The rubric has five sections: Patrol, Investigations, Victim Services, General Case Completeness, and a Weighted section. The Weighted section includes rubric items the original SATF Sergeant, Victim Services Manager, and best practices identified as requiring greater weight in the scoring process (for example, calling a victim advocate).

The three reviewers were 2018-2019 SATF Sergeant Monce Portillo, Project Director and Victim Services Manager, Kim Messina, and Project Researcher, Dr. Lisa Ingarfield. Five test cases were evaluated early in 2018 and the review team convened to discuss results and address any discrepancies in scoring. Adaptations were made to the reviewer guidance document based on clarification gleaned from the test case review process. Two more cases were test reviewed with the new guidance and the team met one more time to ensure consistency between reviewers.

Case review itself is a best practice in policing (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018) and fundamental to understanding areas of needed improvement as well as areas of efficacy. By understanding both the challenges and successes in pre-SATF cases, the SATF/SPI team can adjust their practice to improve the overall case quality as the SATF evolves.

Case Review Process
The evaluation team reviewed 564 cases in total, approximately 50% of cases from 2015-2020 excluding failure to register and cases that were miscategorized. The 2015-2017 cases were retrieved by the records department at each agency in 2018, and the 2018-2020 cases were retrieved at the start of the following year to ensure most if not all cases had closed (e.g., 2018 cases were reviewed in mid-2019). As with any law enforcement investigation, cases reported in the last quarter of the year often remained open into the following year, slowing down the team's ability to review a random sample of cases investigated by the SATF.

Case review rubric items were based on national best practices and practitioner knowledge. Each case review rubric item is graded on a scale of zero to three. If a rubric item is not relevant, for example offering a medical forensic exam in a third-party report, then it is marked 'not applicable.' If there is no evidence the rubric item has been addressed or completed, it is scored zero. Conversely, if there is evidence the rubric item has been addressed thoroughly, it is scored with three points. Partial adherence to the rubric item will garner a score between one and two based on the rubric guidance. Each section is then averaged and weighted to a percentage of the overall score for a particular case. Reviewers must see evidence of the rubric item in the case file. Scoring cannot be based upon prior and/or undocumented knowledge.

Each case had two reviewers, with each reviewer scoring approximately two thirds of the cases. The two reviewers' scores were averaged to determine a final score for each case, then the scores per month were averaged to reach a single monthly data point for each agency. Where the two reviewers had a score discrepancy greater than 20 percent (less than 80 percent inter-rater reliability), they met to talk through the case and their scoring decisions in relation to the rubric guidance. The score changes were tracked and documented. This also acted as an ongoing check on the integrity of the case review process. As Table 5 demonstrates, approximately 30% of cases for each year had a rating discrepancy of more than 20% between reviewers necessitating a review and discussion of the scoring process.

Table 5
Case Review Details

Year	Number of Sexual Assault Cases (CCPD/BPD)	Number of Cases Reviewed (CCPD/BPD)		Number of Cases with Second Review (CCPD/BPD)	
	n	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
2015	147 (81/66)	83 (49/34)	56	26 (18/8)	31%

2016	154 (81/73)	87 (45/42)	56	31 (18/13)	35%
2017	147 (92/55)	73 (41/32)	50	24 (9/15)	33%
2018	198 (104/94)	109 (59/50)	55	33 (19/14)	30%
2019	207 (131/76)	98 (61/37)	47	33 (19/14)	34%
2020	234 (140/94)	114 (67/47)	49	38 (24/14)	33%

3. SATF Implementation

The SATF was implemented in January 2018, with detectives interviewing for positions in late 2017. The SATF team moved into the co-located office space in the Adams County Government Center in April 2018. Prior to moving to the SATF office space, detectives and advocates on the team remained at their home agency. One detective was not able to join the SATF until after the team had moved into its new office space. Weekly meetings began once the team was complete. See section 3.2 for the implementation timeline.

The innovative strategy utilized for the Commerce City SPI project focused heavily on collaboration between law enforcement agencies and community partners to address sexual violence. Community partners attended weekly meetings at the SATF offices, creating opportunities for open communication and shared insight. The Commerce City SPI site borrowed from the concept and practice of community based SARTs. In addition to fostering a highly collaborative environment through community partner involvement, the SATF also involved weekly case reviews. Rather than an isolated detective making decisions about a case, the investigation can be discussed from varying viewpoints to crystalize the best next steps. Since a victim advocate and DA are present for these conversations, both survivor-centered, trauma-informed perspectives, along with prosecutorial questions can be asked before a case is ever presented to the DA. This enables a more thorough and comprehensive process and one where implicit bias is less likely to affect decisions. Case reviews began in May 2018.

3.1. SATF Goals and Objectives

The project's primary goals were to pilot a multi-jurisdictional taskforce for sex crimes and to improve sexual assault investigations at small to medium sized law enforcement agencies where there are insufficient resources for a single agency sex crimes unit. As part of the SPI process, the SATF had five primary goals that were met throughout the three-year grant cycle:

Goal 1: Develop and Implement a cross-jurisdictional SATF
      Objective 1: Identify and hire five Detectives and one Sergeant to serve on the taskforce.
      Objective 2: BPD and CCPD will establish taskforce policies and protocols for the taskforce.

Goal 2: Increase the efficacy of SA investigations
> Objective 1: Adopt best practice standards for SA investigations
> Objective 2: Develop an "investigation quality and increased efficiency" matrix to assess thoroughness and quality of investigations.
> Objective 3: Increase efficiency of SA investigations.
> Objective 4: All taskforce team members will be trained in forensic experiential trauma interviewing techniques, SA dynamics, victim behavior, trauma responses, sex offender registration and management
> Objective 5: Taskforce will meet weekly to discuss cases, share resources, problem-solve, and provide support to each other in their work.

Goal 3: Increase capacity for SA investigations and general crime investigations
> Objective 1: Creation of SATF and specialized detectives to reduce specialized case investigation burden on general detective pool

Goal 4: Victims will be served more effectively across both jurisdictions
> Objective 1: Engage victims more effectively in the investigative process.
> Objective 2: Victims will report a more supportive experience of working with law enforcement.
> Objective 3: Establishment of victim directed case closures

Goal 5: Increase sex offender registration compliance and reduce sex offender registration violations
> Objective 1: Consolidate all sex offender registration duties under the taskforce.
> Objective 2: Increase contacts with registered sex offenders by 100 per cent over three years.

3.2. Implementation Timeline and Key Milestones

Year	Month	Implementation Milestone
2016		
	November	SATF Concept developed
2017		
	January	Application for Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) grant funding submitted
	January	2018 budget approved by both agencies to include the SATF regardless of grant funding
	October	SPI grant awarded
	October	Discussions with Adam's County Government Center (ACGC) about SATF office space

October	Finalized Intergovernmental Agreement for shared SATF; signed by City Council
November	BPD Sgt. Domenico assigned as SATF sergeant
December	CCPD adopts the *Sex Offender Tracking and Registration* system (SOTAR)
December	SATF detective interviews held and detectives hired (three from CCPD and two from BPD); 1.0 FTE VA specialists assigned to SATF

2018

January	2018 SATF case assignment begins
February	CCPD SOTAR agreement finalized. Initial implementation training begins
February	Commerce City signs lease agreement with the ACGC
February	In-service training on sexual assault and SATF provided to both BPD and CCPD officers
March-April	SATF moves into ACGC
March-December	Data transition from Colorado Sex Offender Registry (COSAR) to SOTAR begins
April	BPD signs agreement with SOTAR
April	Third CCPD detective (Det. Rodriguez) assigned to the SATF
April	SATF hosts and attends *Introduction to Forensic Experiential Trauma Interviewing* (FETI) and FETI Certification training
April	SPI site visit and press conference announcing SATF initiative
May	Weekly SATF meetings and case reviews begin
May	Sgt. Domenico promoted to Commander and reassigned; BPD Sgt. Monce Portillo assigned to SATF
June	Sex offender management for both cities consolidated under one detective (Det. Bores)
October	BPD Det. Ruybal retires; BPD Cpl. Underwood assigned; 0.5 FTE Victim Advocate assigned to SATF
October	Progress update and presentation to CCPD and BPD Command Staff
December	CCPD Det. Cordova promoted to sergeant and reassigned; CCPD Det. Brunner assigned

2019

	April	Det. Erickson reassigned; Det. Rolfe reassigned
	May	CCPD Det. Bores temporarily promoted to sergeant and reassigned, CCPD Det. Baez assigned
	Mid-year	2018 SATF Annual Report released
	July	Progress update and presentation to CCPD and BPD Command Staff
	October	Sgt. Portillo reassigned; BPD Sgt. Moore assigned to SATF then shortly thereafter reassigned
	October	BPD Cpl. Underwood assigned as SATF Sergeant
2020		
	February	BPD removes sex offender management from the SATF and returns to agency
	March	The District Attorney's office suspends court appearances. This was a decision by the Chief Judge of the 17th Judicial District based upon the recommendation of the CDC in the interest of public safety, limiting direct contact to slow the spread of COVID-19.
	April	CCPD Det. Rodriguez reassigned; CCPD Det. Michieli assigned
	April	Det. Baez reassigned; Det. Bores assigned
	April	CCPD and BPD implement work from home schedule for officers during COVID-19 outbreak
	April	Det. Bores reassigned; Det. Baez reassigned to SATF
	Mid-year	2019 SATF Annual Report released

3.3. Training

Training is a critical component of the SATF's success and the positive outcomes victims experience while interacting with SATF detectives and advocates. Ensuring the SATF team is well-trained in sexual assault response best practices and the effects of trauma on victim behavior increases their ability to provide trauma-informed, victim-centered / offender focused services. It also provides detectives and advocates with the tools they need to better understand the nuances and elements of sexual violence and how to better investigate such personal violent crimes. Fundamental to understanding how to effectively investigate sex crimes is the need to move away from traditional investigation techniques that focus on what the victim did to cause the sexual assault, instead focus on how and why the offender chose this victim. Learning about trauma-informed approaches to police investigations enables detectives to engage more effectively with the victims they are working with instead of blaming them explicitly or implicitly. A useful definition of trauma-informed policing is "a framework for police officers to recognize and appropriately address the complexities of trauma experienced by

survivors…to acknowledge symptoms, and to use response tactics accordingly to prevent further individual trauma" (Laurencin, 2020, p 591). To ensure all SATF team members used trauma-informed approaches in their work with victims, they participated in Forensic Experiential Trauma Informed (FETI) training. FETI methodology provides instruction on:

1. The importance of understanding your role during an interview
2. How and why, you should separate the interview from the investigation
3. The potential impact of trauma and stress on memory and recall
4. <u>Empathic Listening™</u>
5. <u>Unidirectional Interviewing™</u>
6. Experiential Information Collection™
7. Strategies to increase neutrality and equity
8. Best practices for accurate documentation of the interview.

SATF team members also attended YHOP training, a program in which both Brighton and Commerce City were certified prior to the development of the SATF. Many SATF team attended training on the registration of sex offenders that included information on the state and local laws related to sex offender requirements while living in Brighton and Commerce City. SATF team members also attended other valuable victim-centered training such as the Colorado Organization of Victim Assistance (COVA) Conference and sexual assault investigations as well as investigative courses focused on sex offenders.

3.4. SATF Implementation Successes and Challenges

There were several successes and challenges identified from implementing the SATF that could be useful for other agencies considering implementing a similar program.

Case Dispositions
The Commerce City SPI project tracked cases to determine the factors impeding a law enforcement agency's presentation of a case to a DA and a DA's decision to file or not file a case. In reviewing data for this plan, we identified discrepancies between the number of cases categorized by the law enforcement agency as "filed" and the filing numbers from the DA's office. Through streamlining the SATF's disposition categorization and with DA involvement in the task force, the SPI team attempted to resolve these numerical discrepancies.

Co-Location
On the whole, co-locating the SATF detectives and advocates built cohesion and enhanced communication. However, some SATF members identified in the implementation interviews they found the location isolating. Since they are physically separated from their peers at their home agency, some members felt "out of the loop," and like they were losing a connection to the larger team of officers at the central agency building. Multiple detectives identified a lack of clear communication streams coming into and out of the SATF in interviews. Another issue connected to the physical

separation from the main law enforcement agencies was the creation of an echo chamber. Negative concerns tended to fester and resistance to change developed. This was documented through individual interviews and researcher observations. The lack of external interaction appeared to create suspicion of external ideas and perspectives, often resulting in feelings of distrust and under-appreciation on the part of SATF team members. Many detectives regularly articulated how under-appreciated they felt given their workload.

Another concern with co-location is its possible contribution to the decline in mental health. Much of what is discussed at the SATF is sex crimes. This lack of exposure and engagement with detectives or advocates who are working different crimes, such as auto-theft or financial crimes, meant SATF team members rarely got a break from this difficult subject. While detectives and advocates are free to visit their home agencies and interact professionally and socially with their non-SATF peers, this can be challenging when the SATF has such a high case load, the burden of which can feel heavier than if the cases were not violent crimes against a person. Exploration of this possible connection would be useful in designing joint sex crime taskforces in the future.

Blending Two Cultures
Minimal attention was given in the planning stages to blending two agency cultures. Since Victim Services and SWAT were already joint ventures between the two agencies, the SATF's difference to both collaborations was partially overlooked. Each agency has a different work culture, different expectations, different investigation processes, and different IT requirements. These discrepancies caused some challenges during the SATF's formation as reported by detectives and leadership during the project's interviews. This is a continuing problem; especially as new detectives rotate into the task force. While the cultures were not measured in an scientific sense, the discrepancies were a frequent component of SATF discussions and problem solving and were documented by the project researcher as part of the process / implementation evaluation. However, the longer the SATF has maintained a stable group of detectives and advocates, the more able it is to manage these cultural differences effectively.

Infrastructure
In hindsight, more time and attention should have been devoted to infrastructure issues such as IT, evidence uploading, and report writing. It was incredibly challenging to work with three IT systems each with their own security protocols (CCPD, BPD, and Adams County Government Center). This inconsistency created delays in granting CCPD detectives' access to BPD's system and vice versa. Given Colorado state law, evidence has to be stored by the agency in which the crime occurred. Thus, there was no way to combine SATF evidence into one location, with one storage protocol. Since there were delays in granting detectives access to each agency's systems, this meant CCPD detectives had to upload evidence for a CCPD case investigated by BPD detectives and the same was true for CCPD detectives working BPD cases. IT continues to be a concern although the larger issues encountered initially have been mostly resolved.

Intra-Agency Wide Buy-In

One of the concerns arising in the SATF's first year was the rumor mill at each agency about its success. In some cases, agency staff members were undermining the SATF from afar. Also, SATF detectives who were taken by surprise at the level of work required or the number of cases they were working, contributed to building a growing misunderstanding about the SATF's purpose. For some CCPD and BPD detectives in general investigations, it felt as though the SATF had taken staff away from their teams, leaving them short-handed.

A specifically crafted message from agency leadership about the SATF may have helped to reduce some of the chatter, as well as involving more agency leaders in the planning stages for the SATF. This issue did dissipate after the first year and a more positive narrative emerged from both agencies about the SATF.

Staff Turnover
One key goal of the SATF that has not been met is staffing sustainability. The intended goal was to have detectives remain in their roles long-term. This would enable detectives to build experience and skill and the SATF would not have to constantly train detectives, which has a resource and financial impact. Unfortunately, the team saw a much higher turnover rate than anticipated. In some cases, this was due to retirement, promotion, and in others it was due to burnout. In 2019, three SATF sergeants were reassigned as well as losing two detectives and an advocate. These changes undoubtedly affected team morale by creating an extra burden on the remaining detectives and advocates who were responsible for training new team members. In some cases, new team members had little to no sex crimes investigation experience. While the SATF hasn't found "the" solution to this problem, a stronger focus on officer wellness may have assisted those detectives who "burned out" (see Interview section later in the report). In addition, a stronger on-boarding process and communicating with detectives about the goals of the program and the desire for detectives to stay for at least three years, may have also assisted.

Training Delays
One effect of high staff turnover has been an inability to train new detectives and advocates quickly. The Neurobiology of Trauma and FETI trainings were not available on-demand (although COVID-19 has changed some of this), and sexual assault investigation training, especially for newer detectives is often only offered once a year. Unfortunately, significant training opportunity was lost due to staff turnover – which led to repeated training for new members and not building expertise we were hoping for. Another identified problem is a lack of an on-boarding or "orientation" process for new detectives. It was unclear whether expectations about the inclusion of victim advocates as collaborators in the investigation were clearly explained, as well as some of the logistical problems investigating cases from two different agencies. Since this problem has been identified, the SATF is working to establish a more formal and robust orientation for new detectives or advocates joining the team.

Community Partners Inclusion
Including community partners and mirroring a multidisciplinary team approach seen in other fields and in sexual assault response (i.e., SARTs), was central to the SATF's conceptual development. Community

partners are regular attendees at weekly meetings and communication between CCPD, BPD, and community partners has increased exponentially over the course of the pilot project. COVID-19 affected the efficacy of weekly meetings and given varying pressures experienced at different agencies for COVID-19 related concerns, community partner attendance became less consistent in 2020. It became clear that in-person meetings were more effective at building connections than video calls. In 2021, reinstating in-person weekly meetings as soon as it was safe to do so became a priority.

In addition to the effects of COVID-19 on the broader team, while community partners were almost exclusively effusive about the SATF, this was not always shared by the SATF detectives. For many detectives, adapting to sharing information with community partners was challenging. While detectives acknowledged the skill and expertise community partners had in their individual areas, a "stay in your lane" mentality began to surface in 2019. Detectives didn't always feel it was appropriate for community partners to offer perspectives on their cases, much like they felt it would be inappropriate for them to offer thoughts on how the community partners conducted their work. This disconnect has not completely resolved itself and is affected by staff turnover. Community partners now attend meetings every two weeks because the SATF leadership wants to ensure the meetings are meaningful, relevant, and impactful for all members who attend. Strong messaging about the purpose and value of community partner involvement has been diminished.

4. Evaluation Results

4.1. Case Review

In total, the review team reviewed 564 cases from 2015 to 2020. Fifty percent of cases from each year were reviewed and were randomly selected from lists generated by the records department for the 2015-2017 time period, and from the SATF case tracking log for 2018-2020. Cases included in the review were those where the primary crime was sexual assault on a child, sexual assault, or unlawful sexual contact. Sometimes cases had multiple crimes associated with them such as False Imprisonment, Domestic Violence, or Enticement of a Child. Each case was scored by two reviewers on a scale of zero to three and an average case score was determined. Where the reviewer's two scores deviated by more than 20%, they met to review their scoring and make scoring adjustments. Figure 4 shows the average monthly scores by agency pre-SATF and the combined CCPD and BPD scores post-SATF and Figure 2 plots the average of all case scores by year and agency.

Table 6 below shows the descriptive statistics for the average monthly case scores (on a scale of 0-3) for each year in the review process by agency.

Table 6
Case Review Descriptive Statistics by Agency, 2015-2020

Year	Mean	Median	Range	SD	Var.

	CCPD	BPD	CCPD	BPD	CCPD	BPD	CCPD	BPD	CCPD	BPD
2015	1.78	2.06	1.85	2.05	1.02	1.04	0.28	0.63	0.08	0.08
2016	2.15	2.14	2.1	2.14	0.96	0.36	0.31	0.11	0.10	0.01
2017	2.16	2.08	2.14	2.14	0.78	1.09	0.26	0.30	0.07	0.09
2018	2.47	2.10	2.46	2.11	0.54	0.95	0.17	0.29	0.03	0.08
2019	2.14	2.33	2.19	2.37	0.46	1.02	0.26	0.34	0.07	0.11
2020	2.29	2.23	2.26	2.23	0.36	0.39	0.13	0.12	0.02	0.02

It was hypothesized that the implementation of the SATF would lead to higher quality case investigations. With better trained detectives and consistency in the unit coupled with integrated victim services and a trauma-informed approach, victims would stay engaged in the process resulting in better cases. Results of independent samples t test comparing the pre- (n = 243, M = 2.05, SD = 0.50) and post-SATF (n = 321, M = 2.20, SD = 0.45) case score means were significant, $t(483.76) = -3.66$, $p = .001$, indicating the post-SATF implementation case review scores were significantly higher (2.20) than those prior to the SATF's implementation (2.05). However, the results of the Interrupted Time Series (detailed below) do not show evidence of a discontinuous change in scores when the program was implemented, even when controlling for other factors that might affect score levels.

When evaluating the increase in case scores over time, it is important to understand the three years in which the SATF was piloted. In 2018, its first year, the SATF team were not able to move into the co-location until April and lost two detectives at the end of the year as well as changing sergeants halfway through. Training in trauma-informed interviewing also came a few months into the start of the SATF as well as refreshers in the YHOP program. In addition, there were several infrastructure impediments in the first year (detailed later in the report). In 2019, the SATF experienced significant staffing instability with three sergeants, additional new detectives (who had not recently been trained on trauma-informed interviewing, YHOP or the expectations of the SATF) and victim advocate changes. Then, 2020 brought the COVID-19 pandemic which was extremely challenging in terms of completing comprehensive investigations, especially victim interviews.

Figure 1
Box Plot Average Monthly Case Scores by Agency, 2015-2020

28

Figure 2

Average Case Score Means by Year and Agency

The purpose of an interrupted time series (ITS) is to compare periods of time before and after an intervention, to assess potential causal effects of an intervention program or policy. It is a method "commonly used in criminology and criminal justice to evaluate the effects of interventions" (Maguire, Nix & Campbell, 2016, p. 10). The ITS analysis uses "repeated measures on an outcome variable to estimate the causal impact of an intervention" and is appropriate to be utilized within quasi-experimental research such as a program intervention (McDowell & McCleary, 2014, p. 2654). Since the evaluation involved observations in excess of 50 (71 total monthly observations, and 564 individual case observations), the ITS method fit the project nicely. The project's research question – does the SATF improve sexual assault case investigations – also fit the ITS method since this is a common question asked when using an ITS analysis. The timing and delivery of the SATF intervention was under our control, in that it was not naturally occurring, but it was not a project where we could have a control

group. It would not have been ethical to separate survivors of sexual violence into an intervention and control group when we know the control group would not receive the same level of care and support for such a life changing and traumatic experience. Secondarily, it would require operating double the police capacity, and randomly assigning survivors to either work with the SATF or the original system. The Interrupted Time Series method is more rigorous than a simple comparison of means between pre- and post-intervention case scores. Balancing ethics, resources, and rigor led the evaluation team, with support from SPI subject matter experts to choose the ITS method.

For the ITS, we ran two Ordinary Least Squares analyses: one using each individual case score (n = 564) and one which utilized an average of each month's scores giving us 35 pre-SATF (there were no cases reviewed in December 2017) and 36 post-SATF for both agencies (71 total data points). Because there were no cases in December 2017 for both agencies, we were not able to run the Auto-Regressive, Integrated, Moving Average (ARIMA) which is often used in an ITS analysis (an additional ARIMA analyses are available upon request). Originally, the evaluation team was only going to run the ITS analysis using the monthly aggregated scores, however, running the analysis using the individual case scores versus the monthly aggregated averages acknowledges the greater level of nuance and variation in the scores overall

Coding

The crimes are grouped as sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, unlawful sexual contact, and "other," with the sexual assault category as the reference category. This means the coefficients related to sexual assault on a child, unlawful sexual contact, and "other" are in comparison to the scores within the sexual assault category. So, for example, within the BPD analyses the coefficients for unlawful sexual contact and "other" are both negative (see Table 7 in Appendix 1), which would denote these case scores were lower than the scores for general sexual assault cases. None of the coefficients regarding the categories of crime were statistically significant at any level. The codes used in the analysis include "inlist" which assigned a value of 1 if a variable is equal to any of the listed string values (e.g. inlist(crime, "sexual assault", "sa / incident report") would return a value of one for any rows in which the crime variable was equal to "sexual assault" or "sa / incident report" and a value of zero otherwise), "regexm" assigned a value of 1 if a variable contains the listed string (e.g. regexm(crime, "sac") would return a value of one for all rows in which the crime variable contained the text string "sac" and zero for all others). The tables and the variable key for Tables 7-9 and 12-15 can be found in Appendix I.

Overall Scores

Due to the sample sizes within these analyses, it was anticipated that we would not find statistical significance in all results. However, even without widespread statistical significance, our results do show important relationships which can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the SATF intervention for BPD and CCPD. Case scores were also analyzed to uncover any influence of reviewer pairings (researcher and Project Director, research and sergeant, sergeant and Project Director) on the results. Overall case scores in general were not affected by the combinations of possible reviewers. Tables 7-16 feature the results of the analysis and can be viewed in Appendix 1.

In Tables 7 and 8, the analysis for BPD and CCPD scores, the first three variables listed "yr_mon", "post", and "inter" are the important variables to focus on as they are central to the ITS analysis. They represent the pre-trend (yr-mon), post-trend (post), and any jump between the two (inter). Given the goal of the project was to demonstrate whether an intervention such as the SATF could have a statistically significant effect on case quality as determined by a case score identified through a case review process. The ITS analysis tests the data to identify if a discontinuous shift occurs in scores after an intervention. For the purposes of this project, we were looking to see if at the time of the intervention and beyond, the cases scores jumped from pre-intervention trends. Such a potential shifts in scores would suggest an impact from the intervention (the SATF) upon the dependent variable (the case score). Unfortunately, the results of the SATF case score analysis do not show such a jump.

An important component to consider when reviewing these results is to understand that for a clear jump to exist between pre and post case scores, it would require the program to lead to instantaneous improvement in sex crimes investigations. While this is not impossible, it would likely require a combination of major and abrupt shifts in behavior, poor (or at least notably suboptimal) initial behavior, or major innovations. It is not unusual for interventions such as this to initiate more gradual change over time, and certainly the overall trend in case scores is positive. Gradual change will not yield a statistically significant result in an ITS. While we have identified through internal auditing that CCPD and BPD needed to be doing something differently in their sexual assault investigations, there was no widespread issues with detectives committing clear unforced errors in their sex crimes investigations prior to the SATF's implementation. The detectives who were providing subpar investigations were relieved of their sex crimes duties prior to the implementation of the SATF (as a result of the audits). No detectives in either agency received a substantial level of guidance different to what they had been previously receiving and the detectives in the SATF were not all investigating sex crimes at the time of implementation. If those circumstances had been different, then we might have seen a discontinuous shift in case scores at the time of SATF implementation. However, in most cases where best practices are implemented and training occurs over time, it is more reasonable to expect a gradual change in case quality because of the time it takes to implement the changes, even with a well-designed program. Gradual improvement across scores can also be due to a causal effect and may even reflect sustainable impacts due to an intervention, rather than a singular and later potentially dissipating shock.

Consistent with a more gradual rollout of an intervention, the results show a general improvement over time. This improvement appears to be driven by CCPD (Table 8) (the coefficient for "yr_mon" goes away when restricting attention to BPD cases [Table 7] and roughly doubles when restricting attention to CCPD). However, the improvement in CCPD takes place entirely before the SATF (Table 8) (since the coefficient on "inter" almost perfectly cancels out that on "yr_mon"). While this may seem counterintuitive, CCPD was actively working to dramatically improve their response to sexual assault cases in the period leading into the SATF intervention, and this also influenced CCPD's willingness to adopt the SATF intervention. CCPD conducted its case audit of the 2013-2014 case year in 2015 and found some troubling issues in their sex assault investigations. This discovery led to several cases being reopened (Jimmerson, 2013) and some officers being reassigned. CCPD trained all staff on the neurobiology of trauma and YHOP in Fall 2016 and introduced and adopted the YHOP in January 2017.

Both the audit and the training likely contributed to the increase in case scores prior to the implementation of the SATF. The yearly case score means for CCPD jumped from 1.74 in 2015 to 2.15 and 2.16 in 2016 and 2017 respectively, and then to 2.47 in the first year of the SATF, 2018. An independent samples t-test showed these increases in mean scores to be statistically significant at the <0.01 level.

In the regression analysis, we included several other variables including crime type, agency of jurisdiction and of detective, gender of patrol and detective, and age of victim (child, adult, at-risk). At the SATF, detectives' home agencies do not always align with the jurisdiction in which the crime occurred, so it is worth separately analyzing whether home agency and jurisdiction have separate effects. Similarly, "is_child" and "crime_sac" overlap, but not perfectly. This is also not surprising, because the victim needs to be a child (when the assault occurred) for the crime of sexual assault on a child to be charged, but not all crimes against children qualify as sexual assault on a child.

To review all interrupted time series associated tables (Tables 7-15, please see Appendix 1)

Figure 3

Average Monthly Case Scores, 2015-2020

Figure 3 is a representation of the average monthly case scores for each agency before and after the intervention. As you can see, there is no obvious, discontinuous jump in case scores on the graph but there is a general trend upwards overall. This graph is useful in understanding the overall positive trend case review scores achieved over six years.

Table 10 illustrates the results of the time series analysis where the case score data was aggregated by month to create one average score. Aggregating each month's scores to a single average datapoint prevents the influence of other variables (such as gender or crime) from being observed in the results. The regression is weighted by the number of cases listed for each month. Aggregating case scores to one observation per month removes a large amount of variation in scores (hence the much larger adjusted R-squared values), but weighting this way allows months with a higher number of cases to have more influence on the regression results than months with very few cases. In column 6 of Table 10, the variable "post" is almost statistically significant (p = .106), but the point estimate is negative and attributable largely to some particularly low scores in February 2018. ARIMA results (not shown in the Appendix, but available upon request) did not show any statistically significant positive results, but in several cases showed a negative shift in case score means. This may be because whenever a new system is implemented, there are initial disruptions and adjustments that take time to address. In the case of the SATF, we know they did not move to their co-location until April 2018 and were not a complete team until May 2018 when the last detective joined.

Given the ITS revealed a statistically significant improvement over time in case scores only for CCPD and only prior to SATF implementation, we ran a one-way between subjects ANOVA to compare all six years in the study (2015-2020) on CCPD's average monthly case scores. The results showed significant differences between years with respect to CCPD's average monthly case score at the $p<.001$ level [$F_{(5, 65)}$ = 5.912, p = 0.000]. Because the results were statistically significant, we ran the Tukey post hoc test comparing each of the six years with one another. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for CCPD monthly average case scores in 2016-2020 (M = 2.24, SD = 0.26) were positively, significantly different (see Table 11) from 2015 (M = 1.78, SD = 0.28). For BPD, the results of a one-way between subjects ANOVA were not statistically significant ($F_{(5, 65)}$ = 1.929, p = 0.102).

Patrol Scores
Patrol scores improved steadily in the post-SATF period at BPD (Table 12). However, the coefficient on "yr_mon" is only statistically significant for BPD in the narrowest column and the coefficient on "inter" is never statistically significant, suggesting that scores remained relatively steady over time when controlling for other factors. Female patrol officers had higher scores than male patrol officers in BPD, but not in CCPD (Table 13); overall scores tended to be higher for BPD officers. The results appear to show higher scores for at-risk adult and child victims; however, it appears that the bigger issue is the type of crime committed (although crimes against at-risk adults hover around statistical significance).

In speaking with detectives about why they believed patrol scores increased after the implementation of the SATF, they surmised the following may have had an impact:

- Patrol is calling SATF detectives out earlier in the case meaning the patrol officer receives more direction from a trained sex crimes detective.
- Patrol officers have started to pick up on the patterns required by the SATF team and changed their behavior.
- Patrol officers now receive feedback regarding their sex crimes cases, whereas due to a lack of specialized detectives before the SATF, there was no one to provide patrol officers with useful and effective feedback on their reports and handling of sex crimes cases.
- Patrol officers are more regularly receiving in-service training in sex crimes, trauma, and YHOP.
- SATF detectives are in the position to sometimes mentor patrol officers, leading to a vested interest on the part of the patrol officer in supporting sex crimes investigations and investigators.
- As sex crime caseloads have risen over the last three years, patrol officers are exposed more often to sex crimes.
- Former SATF detectives who have left and returned to the street have shared with their colleagues the appropriate steps that need to be taken at the patrol level.
- SATF detectives can highlight when a patrol officer does well on a case, an eventuality that rarely occurred before the SATF. By letting patrol officers know directly (versus through their sergeant) what they can do differently and what they did well, patrol officers are receiving on-the-job training in real time which makes them more effective.

Detective Scores

Although results from Table 10 suggest that detective scores may have increased gradually over time, controlling for reviewers, genders, and locations makes the time trend for detectives go away. It is important to note there is not a statistically significant shift in detective scores at the onset of the SATF, but this doesn't mean the SATF had no effect on the work product of the detectives on the team. Female detectives have higher scores on their cases (see below section on gender), and there's marginal evidence of higher scores for sexual assault on a child. (See Tables 14 & 15).

Case Scores and Gender

Law enforcement continues to be a male-dominated profession (National Institutes of Justice, 2019), however, with women and girls the primary victims of sex crimes, it can be helpful to have women detectives and advocates trained and available (Schuck, 2018). Indeed, Schuck's (2018) research illuminated higher case clearance rates when women police officers handled rape cases. Wentz and Archbold (2012) found some support for the Intra-Female Gender Hostility Thesis which posits women officers are more likely to believe rape myths and blame victims than men. Research in general on gender differences, however, has been lacking but what research there is, has mostly found men to be more likely to support rape myths and blame victims (Wentz & Archbold, 2012). Even though generally women are found to be more sympathetic, it isn't a case of just providing "any" woman officer; the officers must be trained in sexual assault response and trauma and demonstrate an ability to engage empathetically with victims of sex crimes and their families (Jordan, 2002). Officer education level and work experience are correlated with lower levels of rape myth acceptance (Wentz & Archbold, 2012).

In addition to the Interrupted Time Series analysis results showing gender as having a significant and substantial effect on case scores, we ran an independent sample t test to compare the individual case scores for men and women detectives on the SATF. In this study, overall scores and detective scores were significantly and substantially affected by the detective's gender, but patrol officers' scores weren't affected by either the patrol officer's or the detective's gender. The women detective's case scores from the case review (n = 169, M = 2.28, SD = 0.42) were higher the men's detective scores (n = 384, M = 2.08, SD = 0.47), and there was a significant difference seen for gender, $t(361.78) = 5.03$, $p = .001$. We ran the same analysis on the patrol officers' individual case scores and no significant effect for gender was identified, $t(561) = 0.345$, $p = .73$. Women (n = 131, M = 2.14, SD = 0.44) and men (n = 432, M = 2.13, SD = 0.49) had similar scores across all years. It is worth noting there were no female detectives at CCPD in the reviewed cases until later in the data, with only two women detectives overseeing a handful of the cases reviewed in 2015 and 2016 (both BPD detectives). In 2016, CCPD had one woman detective appear in two of their reviewed cases. This detective worked considerably more of the reviewed cases in 2017 and went on to join the SATF in 2018. While the scores were significantly higher for women detectives than they were for men, we do not have the voices of victims to more deeply understand how this difference affects their experience working with SATF detectives, if at all.

Across the board, having a female detective is associated with higher scores - although female detectives outperformed male detectives to a larger degree in BPD than in CCPD. Victim's age (child, adult, at-risk) had no effect on scores (large coefficients and standard errors for at-risk adults are largely because they appear very rarely). However, sexual assault on a child had higher overall scores than other offenses.

Discussion
Even though the ITS analysis did not show a discontinuous jump in mean case scores after the implementation of the SATF, it does show a gradual increase in scores over time. The improvement seen by CCPD is most stark with an improvement of between 0.13 and 0.15 points per year. However, the improvement seen by CCPD stops at the point of the implementation of the SATF. This could be for several reasons including training, oversight, and an implicit or explicit belief that if a detective is working in a specialized unit, they do not have more to learn or improve. The other key aspect to note, is the introduction of YHOP in January 2017 and the training on trauma, YHOP and sexual violence that preceded it. This likely accounts for a jump in scores over the course of 2016 and 2017 for CCPD detectives.

BPD's patrol officers saw score improvement beginning in 2018. This could be because of closer work with a specialized unit and more specific feedback from SATF detectives on their work. However, this potential new level of feedback was also true for CCPD patrol officers, and they did not see the same improvement in scores. It is unclear as to why there is this discrepancy between each agency's patrol officers.

Some questions the analyses raise that could be fertile ground for further exploration as both agencies continue to work to improve their sexual assault response include:

- Is there a particular reason why detectives' gender gap in scores was more noticeable in BPD than in CCPD? Does that say something good about the female detectives in BPD, something good about the men in CCPD, or something bad about the men in BPD?
- Is there a reason why female BPD patrol officers outperform male BPD patrol officers, but nothing like that appears to be the case for CCPD?
- Is there a reason why unlawful sexual contact would be associated with higher patrol scores but not higher detective scores or overall scores?
- There are few variables that appear to affect detectives' scores. In theory, we do want detectives to put in their best work regardless of the type of victim or the type of case, but it's not obvious that that's what we're seeing and in some cases it's clearly not what we're seeing.
- Why would CCPD's improvement stop perfectly in January 2018?

Despite remaining questions and opportunities for further research and evaluation, it is important to underscore that over the course of six years (2015-2020), both agencies did see a gradual increase in their case scores.

The following pages illustrate the SATF case score trends over time. Figure 4 includes both agencies and their individual aggregated average monthly case scores from January 2015 through December 2021. As you get closer to 2020, the scores get closer together, as compared to those scores in the pre-SATF timeframe (2015-2017). The case scores in 2020 were much more consistent than in prior years. Figure 5 shows the same pre-SATF data as in Figure 4 but combines CCPD and BPD average monthly scores from 2018-2020. One of the issues arising in considering the best method for analysis was how to analyze the scores together instead as single agencies. Pre-SATF implementation each agency operated separately with differing policies and expectations for sexual assault investigations, it would therefore be misleading to combine their case review scores. However, in the 2017-2020 time period, after the implementation of the SATF, both agencies were working as one unit. We were therefore able to collapse those scores together by averaging all reviewed cases scores for a particular month, regardless of agency. This aggregation is depicted on the right side of Figure 5. There are several peaks and valleys, with some particularly high case scores in months 48-50 and then in 2020 (months 60-72), the scores coalesce around a mean of 2.3.

Figure 6 provides an overview of the three years prior to the SATF's implementation and the three years post SATF implementation. It indicates key milestones at both agencies related to sexual assault investigation including training and staff turnover. This assists us in contextualizing the case scores to understand what confounding factors may have been relevant as we try to understand the data. In 2018 and 2019 the case scores are inconsistent, with some highs and some lows. This may be in part because 2018 was the SATF's first year of operation and the team was not complete until April, plus the inevitable growing pains of a new unit, especially one that brings two agencies together. In 2019, the SATF saw significant staff turnover especially in the sergeant position and that undoubtedly led to an

inconsistent oversight of detective's work which could account for the wide array of case scores. 2020 was the first stable year, pandemic notwithstanding, and we can see here the case scores were much more consistent, and there was far less staff turnover during the year. There was only one sex crimes detective transition (Rodriguez out, Michieli in). Baez and Bores manage sex offenders and their transitions do not meaningfully affect the work productivity of the SATF's sexual assault investigation case load. In 2020, Figure 6 shows the case scores are much closer together indicating a more consistent set of practices in investigating sex crimes.

Figure 4

Average Monthly Case Scores - Both Agencies, 2015-2020

Measure Names
○ BPD
✱ CCPD

Measure Names
▇ BPD
▇ CCPD

Figure 5

Monthly Average Case Scores by Agency, 2015-2017 and Combined Agency SATF Monthly Scores, 2018-2020

Figure 6

Average Monthly Case Review Scores, Both Agencies, 2015-2020 including Implementation Timeline

4.1.2. Case Review and District Attorney Decisions

One of the persistent issues in the criminal legal pipeline is the high rate of case attrition as cases move through the system (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012, Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019, Rosay et al, 2011, Spohn and Tellis. 2016). It was also hypothesized that with better quality cases at the law enforcement level, the DA would be able to file more cases and hold offenders more accountable. The findings in this project do not support this hypothesis. We have not seen an increase in cases filed as compared to pre-SATF numbers.

However, while the number and percentage of cases presented and filed has not increased (see Tables 27 and 28) with the inception of the SATF, the case review score mean for those cases accepted by the DA is higher than the case review score for those cases declined for filing. An independent samples t-test revealed filed cases (n = 99, M = 2.37, SD = 0.31) had a significantly greater mean score than those that were declined (n = 56, M = 2.15, SD = 0.37) $t(153) = 3.89$, $p = <.001$.

Figure 7
Average Case Scores 2015-2020 - Filed cases (2.37 mean)

Figure 8
Average Case Scores 2015-2020 - Declined cases (2.15 mean)

Cases that the DA accepts for filing have higher review scores overall, which partially supports the hypothesis that better cases get filed (necessitating the highest quality of case investigations). However, we are unable to say definitively if police departments improve scores by a certain amount, cases are *more likely* to be filed. While the mean of filed cases is higher and the mean difference statistically significant, we are not able to test for causality because each case is different, and detectives can work very hard on a case that is still declined by the DA. A well-investigated case doesn't necessarily mean the case is fileable if the facts of the case don't support the likelihood of success at trial. The DA *may* be in a better position to move forward with a case when an investigation is completed thoroughly and correctly, but the facts of the case matter to the extent that effort is not the sole factor in deciding whether to file a case. The results did show cases involving children are more likely to be presented to the DA than if the victim is an adult, however, this pattern did not hold with filing decisions. The case has almost an equal chance of being filed (conditional on reaching the DA) whether the victim is an adult or child.

Figures 9 and 10 show the case score and length of time the case takes to close, separated by declined and filed cases. There does not appear to be any pattern. There were 28 cases over 100 days pre-SATF and 41 after the SATF implementation. Cases appear to take longer post-SATF implementation but the length of time a case is open doesn't appear to have any relation to whether a case is filed. Of the 28 cases open for longer than 100 days pre-SATF, nine (32%) were declined and 19 (68%) were filed, and post-SATF, the declined/filed ratio is 49/51%.

It is worth noting that cases open for longer do not necessarily mean the detective is doing more work on the case. There could be several reasons a case is open for a long time. These include waiting for forensic lab results (state law requires results be available within 180 days of submission to a lab), more urgent cases can delay follow up on less urgent cases, or lack of response from a victim or suspect. The case review process found that several cases were open for extended periods of time without any active work documented. In some cases, the case was just waiting for a detective to write a final supplemental report with details about closing the case. In some of the more egregious examples, cases were not closed due to a lack of a final supplement for six months or more. In other cases, they were categorized

as active for months at a time when the victim was not ready to move forward due to their need for healing, but the case was not inactivated. It then appears on a detective's list of "Active" cases, but no investigation is conducted on the case per the victim's request.

Figure 9

Date of Assignment to Date of LE Closure (days), 2015-2017

Figure 10

Date of Assignment to Date of LE Closure (days), 2018-2020

Figures 9 and 10 focus on the length of time a case takes to close in relation to the scores the cases received in case review. One of the ongoing struggles in sex crime investigations is the length of time cases take to investigate. Often, cases remain open, hanging for months and sometimes years. This elongated process can lead to survivors dropping out of the process when they don't hear anything from detectives for months at a time. Alternatively, detectives have been known to close cases very quickly without any investigation because they do not believe the survivor, or they are generally disinterested in investigating sex crimes (Spohn & Tellis, 2016). One of the goals of the SATF was to avoid either of these situations and work to ensure cases are investigated fully and completed in a timely manner. When there are delays, they are communicated to the survivors and their family regularly as well as detectives working to overturn every stone instead of prematurely closing a case. As both graphs indicate, there is no striking visual difference between the two time periods in length of time and case score. The cases in the post-SATF period (2018-2020) do appear to score higher, and there is a higher percentage of cases staying open for longer. Analyzing this data was of interest to the Chiefs of both departments but we are unable to draw any meaningful conclusions about the effects of the SATF on these variables.

Another area of interest is the length of time it takes the DA to make a filing decision on a case. Figure 11 details both filed and declined cases and their DA decision time in days. The cluster of dots in the bottom right corner indicate the higher the case scores the quicker the DA decides whether to file or decline a case. There is a slight visible trend upwards from right to left, bottom to top, and as you get further away from the bottom right-hand corner the dots are redder (indicating declined cases). What this could mean is the lower the score the longer a case is with the DA awaiting a filing decision, and the longer the case is at the DA's office, the more likely it will be declined. However, it is important to underscore this connection is speculative and this project has not analyzed or identified a causal relationship between these variables.

Figure 11
Case Score / DA Decision Length (Filed and Declined 2018-2020)

Case Score/DA Decision Length (Filed and Declined 2018-2020)

In addition to case review scores, the three reviewers met to discuss themes they identified across all the cases they reviewed. The review team did this for pre-SATF cases and again for post-SATF cases. The themes identified are outlined below in Tables 16 & 17.

4.1.2. Case Review Themes

Table 16

Case Review Themes Pre-SATF 2015-2017

Pre-SATF Case Review Themes	Example
Crime Scene	A lack of crime scene documentation A lack of crime scene visitation A lack of crime scene discussion in the case report narratives
Patrol	Lack of case investigation Cases closed and not sent to investigations SROs investigating a report before pulling a CR SROs relying on third party interviews such as school administration rather than investigating themselves and documenting first-hand information and/or setting up a forensic interview.
Timelines	Inconsistent dates in narratives Discrepancy of dates between patrol and detectives

	Gaps in time unaccounted for, sometimes more than six months.
	Report flow is often inconsistent.
Grammar and style	Use of quotation marks (e.g. "rape") around words like rape, period, and various body parts.
	Spelling mistakes
	Incomplete sentences
	Incorrect names of victims and suspects
	Using appropriate language to describe the assault. For example, sexual assault is not sex. The suspect did not have sex with the victim, they assaulted them. Lack of use of non-consensual sex language.
Suspect	Little investigation directed at the suspect documented in the file
	Background check rarely included in case file
	Suspects are often not interviewed (in cases where they could have been)

Table 17

Case Review Themes Post-SATF 2018-2020

Post-SATF Case Review Themes	Example
Crime Scene	Improvement in crime scene documentation. Detective crime scene call outs by patrol occur more frequently.
Patrol	Patrol officers prematurely calling the SATF when on their way to a sex assault but would not have any information to share. This was particularly troublesome when officers would call the on-call detective after hours.
Timelines	Continued inconsistency in date documentation. Unaccounted gaps in time, sometimes in excess of six months. This is often the case because of the overuse of running supplements. Significant delays in detectives entering their final supplements leading to less specificity in the report because of elapsed time.

	Case status/disposition rarely noted in case files.
Grammar and style	Reduced use of quotation marks ("...") around words like rape, period, and various body parts. This was more prevalent in reports where officers/investigators didn't believe the victim. Continued issues with spelling mistakes. Continued issues with incomplete sentences. Continued issues with incorrect victim and suspect names.
Victims	Lack of detective and victim advocate contact with victim. Victim often not contacted for weeks after the report. Detectives sometimes interviewing children instead of using forensic interviews (or in addition to the FI). Victim Advocates called out/notified more frequently.
Suspect	Slightly improved suspect investigation documented in the case file - primarily with cases that were filed. Background checks are rarely included in case files. Improvement in suspect contact and interviews (in cases where the suspect could have been interviewed).
Documentation	Rarely documented disposition after a DA decision. Inconsistent DA file/declined notification letters uploaded into the case file. Lack of victim advocate documentation of victim contact. Running supplements - supplements not entered when information occurs, but rather, at the end of the case. This impedes the sergeant from knowing the status of the investigation because there are no updated details in the case file. Lack of appropriate videoing equipment led to interviews being recorded by body cameras. Development of expertise is evident in the flow of the report and steps taken in investigation. Overall improvement of case report tone as it relates to victim blaming and disbelief. Less personal bias appearing in reports.

Trauma-informed knowledge	Patrol and detectives appeared to improve their documentation and acknowledgement of the effects of trauma on victims and families.

Understanding repetitive operational gaps or concerns in sexual assault investigations is an important step in developing strong investigative strategies and alignment with sexual assault investigations national best practices. While there was noticeable improvement in investigations post-SATF to those reviewed pre-SATF, there is a continued need for additional work to be done in tightening up investigations. Most crucially, the review team continued to find errors or absences in documentation. The gaps in time were most alarming. Frequently, reviewers could not discern when or if contact was made with a victim or why there was such a large gap in time between entries. Even when detectives did not employ the running supplement documentation strategy, reviewers continued to find unexplained gaps in time between entries. This was also true for victim advocates. Other areas include basic writing skills, grammar, and spelling, ensuring the names for the victim and suspect are correct throughout the report, and ensuring dates are consistent.

Some detectives were meticulous note takers on some cases but not on others. Developing clearer expectations about the type and frequency of case entries will help maintain consistency in the unit on report writing. It will also help others in the agency and in the DA's office understand the investigation more clearly.

4.2. Caseload

From the SATF's inception through today, the number of cases the four detectives (a fifth is responsible for sex offender management) and sergeant have managed far exceeded expectations. From 2017 to 2018, the agencies saw a combined 46% increase in cases, and while 2019 was consistent with 2018, 2020 saw another increase of 18%. At the time of writing, 2021 is on track to surpass 2020 in cases assigned to the SATF. These increases anecdotally represent an affirmation of the SATF's work and emphasizes the need for a clearly defined wellness program, the absence of which in some cases accelerated the departure of detectives from the SATF.

While many jurisdictions saw decreases in reporting of intimate partner violence and sexual abuse during the pandemic because children had a lack of access to supportive adults in school or partners experiencing intimate partner sexual violence were unable to leave home to access shelter support or stay with family/friends (Evans, Lindauer, & Farrell, 2020; Godin, 2020), the SATF did not experience such a decline.

Table 18 details the total number of cases assigned to the SATF and the combined number of cases for sexual assault on a child, sexual assault, and unlawful sexual contact. These three crimes comprise the

primary crimes removed from both department's general investigations units. Other sex crime related cases the SATF intermittently investigates include failure to register, domestic violence, harassment, exploitation of a child, child abuse, and enticement of a child.

Table 18

Total Number of Cases by Year Post-SATF

Case Type	2018		2019		2020		
	n	% Incr.	n	% Incr.	n	% Incr.	Total
Total Cases[a]	224	46	222	-1	261	18	707
Sex Crimes Only[b]	197	37	207	5	234	13	638

[a] All cases assigned to the SATF in that year (often includes exploitation, domestic violence, and failure to register)
[b] Sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and unlawful sexual contact

Tables 19 & 20 show caseload increases over the last six years and Figure 12 shows the number of cases by crime investigated by the SATF. The case numbers jump significantly at the inception of the SATF in 2018 and the years that follow. To better compare pre and post caseload numbers, the data presented only includes the crimes of sexual assault on a child, sexual assault, and unlawful sexual contact as these are the primary crimes investigated by the SATF. It is important to note, however, as documented in Table 18, the overall caseload, when including all cases assigned to the SATF represents higher percentage increases over the previous years and therefore, should be considered when addressing infrastructure and staffing.

Table 19

Pre-SATF Sex Crimes[a] Caseload, 2015-2017

Agency	Pre-SATF			
	2015	2016	2017	Total SC Cases
CCPD	94	87	81	262
BPD	55	90	64	209
Totals	149	177	145	471

[a] Sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and unlawful sexual contact

Table 20

Post-SATF Sex Crimes[a] Caseload, 2018-2020

Agency	Post-SATF							
	2018		2019		2020		Total SC Cases	
	n	% Incr. over 2017	n	% Incr. over 2018	n	% Incr. over 2019	n	% Incr. over 15-17
CCPD	104	11	130	26	140	7	374	43
BPD	93	71	77	-19	94	24	264	26
Totals	197	36	207	5	234	13	638	35

[a] Sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and unlawful sexual contact

Figure 12

Sex Crimes Investigated by the SATF, 2018-2020

4.3. Case Dispositions

One issue identified when merging two law enforcement agencies and two sets of policies at the SATF was the vast array of case dispositions available in both case management systems. Given this, pre-SATF data is much harder to understand than data collected after the SATF's implementation. A decision made by the SATF Commander reduced the dispositions at the SATF to five: Inactive (INAC), Exceptionally Cleared (CLEX), Cleared by Arrest (CLAR), Unfounded (UNFND), and Lack of Prosecution (LOP). In the 2015-2017 time period, both agencies would often close or clear a case as Closed by Filing, meaning the case was presented to the DA's for a filing decision but not necessarily filed (charges accepted). This causes confusion when trying to track those cases filed and declined by the DA's office. Officers would also close a case as Lack of Prosecution, but not always when a case was declined by the

DA. They might use this disposition if they decided for themselves, it was not a prosecutable case but did not present it to the DA for a filing decision.

After the SATF's implementation and disposition streamlining, any case not presented to the DA's office was closed as Inactive, Exceptionally Cleared (e.g., when the SATF is assisting another agency) or Unfounded. When charges were accepted by the DA's office, cases were Cleared by Arrest (CLAR), and cases declined were closed as Lack of Prosecution (LOP). Dispositions previously used that were discontinued at the SATF include: Closed by Other (CBO), Cleared by Arrest Misdemeanor (CLAM), Cleared by Arrest Felony (CLAF), Closed by Filing (FILI), Non-Criminal Closure (NONC), Closed by Non-Criminal Summons, Inactive DNA Cases (DNA), Not Reviewed, & Arrest Warrant Applicable (AWA).

Figure 13
SATF Case Dispositions, 2018-2020 (all cases)

Post-SATF (2018-2020) CCPD Sexual Assault[a] Case Dispositions

Year	CLAR	Closed by Filing	LOP	Unfounded	Excep. Clearance	Inactive
2018	23	0	13	7	12	57

2019	27	0	13	7	20	58
2020[b]	16	0	11	2	28	72
Total	*66*	*0*	*37*	*16*	*60*	*187*

[a] Sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and unlawful sexual contact

[b] 8 cases still active at the time of writing

Table 22

Post-SATF (2018-2020) BPD Sexual Assault[a] Case Dispositions

Year	CLAR	Closed by Filing	LOP	Unfounded	Excep. Clearance	Inactive
2018	21	0	14	5	3	52
2019	13	0	12	3	11	36
2020[b]	8	0	13	4	19	44
Total	*42*	*0*	*39*	*12*	*33*	*132*

[a] Sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and unlawful sexual contact

[b] 5 cases still active and 1 pending DA decisions at time of writing

4.4. Victim Services

Centering victim's voices in the investigation process is central to effective sex crimes investigations. Engaging in trauma-informed policing assists a victim in feeling heard and supported. It also acknowledges the connection between the brain and the body when someone experiences trauma. Many behaviors law enforcement has historically been taught to believe are suspect, are manifestations of trauma for victims, such as changing stories or flat affects.

In addition to providing crucial support and advocacy to victims of crime, the SATF victim advocates provide support, education, and guidance to family members. This support can often make the difference between a family member believing or disbelieving the victim. When victims have a strong and consistent support structure around them, they can access their healing journey more easily and are more likely to stay engaged in the criminal justice process if they have chosen to participate.

By integrating victim services into the SATF and training all detectives on the neurobiology of trauma and Forensic Experiential Trauma Interviewing techniques, the SATF anticipated meeting the following goals and objectives in the SPI project:

Goal 4: Victims will be served more effectively across both jurisdictions

Objective 1: Engage victims more effectively in the investigative process.
Objective 2: Victims will report a more supportive experience of working with law enforcement.
Objective 3: Establishment of victim directed case closures.

During the SATF's first three years, 2018-2020, the victim advocates assigned to the SATF served 1458 primary and secondary victims. Of those, 708 were the primary victims. Victim advocates provide information, guidance, resources, and a compassionate ear to victims and their families, guardians and/or support people. The criminal justice process can be painful and scary, and the role of an advocate is to shepherd primary and secondary victims through the process, validating concerns, providing psychoeducation about trauma, and being a conduit for the victim and their support people to access detectives and other key people in the investigation.

One of the areas where victim advocates are most utilized is in forensic interview attendance During the SATF pilot project, a total of 471 forensic interviews were conducted and victim advocates attended every interview. The staff time for forensic interviews is significant, totaling approximately 500 hours per year Advocate attendance at forensic interviews is crucial to a trauma-informed, holistic approach that centers on the victim's needs. Supporting victims and their families at key points in the investigation is an important part of the criminal justice process. An advocate can be a familiar voice and face at the forensic interview creating cohesiveness for the victim and their family. This cohesiveness enables advocates to continue building the trust or bonds they had previously established prior to arrival at the forensic interview with the victim and family.

Victim advocate attendance at forensic interviews also allows them to spend time with the parent/guardian or other support person in a quiet environment, allowing them to ask questions they may not have thought to ask previously. Advocates can address any parental/guardian or support person needs arising from the initial disclosure and address basic human needs to help the parent/guardian or support person better support the victim. It also allows for time to educate victims on normal trauma reactions, behaviors, or feelings the victim may experience, and explore the benefits of therapy for the entire family unit. It can be difficult for others to understand, however oftentimes, the parents/guardian or support person are tremendously traumatized by a disclosure, rendering them unable to support the victim. Families have reported that the support, education, and calm, compassionate presence of the advocates made the difference in trusting the criminal justice process as it unfolded.

Table 23
Pre-SATF Primary and Secondary Victims Served, 2015-2017

Agency	2015	2016	2017	Total Served
CCPD				

Primary Victims	70	64	93	227
Secondary Victims[a]	78	97	137	312
BPD				
Primary Victims	58	52	79	189
Secondary Victims	56	91	118	265
Totals	262	304	427	997

[a] Secondary victims comprise friends, family, and associated individuals connected to the victim and the crime

Table 24

Post-SATF Primary and Secondary Victims Served, 2018-2020

Agency	2018	2019	2020	Total Served
CCPD				
Primary Victims	119	142	160	421
Secondary Victims[a]	102	150	180	432
BPD				
Primary Victims	105	80	102	287
Secondary Victims	95	91	132	318
Totals	421	463	574	1458

[a] Secondary victims comprise friends, family, and associated individuals connected to the victim and the crime

The SATF victim advocacy team saw staff turnover in October 2018, with its full-time advocate leaving the agency. The advocate previously serving as the 0.5 FTE bilingual sexual assault victim advocate, took over the full-time position with the SATF in November 2018 and a second 0.5 FTE SATF victim advocate was hired to take her place. Over the next two years, the victim advocate team saw additional staff turnover as many of the advocates assigned to the SATF either left the organization for another job opportunity or struggled in the position. Working at the SATF required an advocate who was able to work independently since they were not in an office with other victim advocates doing similar work. Much like the SATF detectives, the advocates sometimes felt isolated. The reason to embed SATF advocates in the unit of detectives required skills and communication that was different from the expectations for advocates serving general crime victims. Advocates who took the roles within the SATF therefore, found it difficult to adapt with the extra responsibility and autonomy. Feeling comfortable voicing a counter opinion to detectives in service of a victim's needs and rights can be daunting, and this was sometimes compounded by the detectives' lack of awareness about the role of an advocate as a partner and not an administrative assistant.

As part of their regular program improvement plan and local and state grant funding requirements, the Victim Services Unit (VSU) sends all victims a satisfaction survey. The survey can be completed on a phone, tablet, or desktop computer and is emailed and texted to clients at the conclusion of their case. The VSU manager added additional questions to the survey sent to victims served by the SATF to learn about their experiences with the pilot project. The SATF specific survey was finalized in 2019. The victim survey has received 17 responses; however, we are not able to identify a response rate due to limitations associated with the VSU database tracking capabilities. Every victim who is served should be sent a survey if they consent, however, there is not currently a way to verify the number of surveys sent. While there are only a few responses to the survey, the responses the VSU did receive are overwhelmingly positive as it relates to the victim's experience working with the SATF.

Of the responses received, 90% of victims reported positive experiences. Victims stated they felt informed, heard, and believed by all levels of the sexual assault response process from patrol to advocates to investigators. In cases where prosecution was declined, victims still felt like they had been supported by advocates and detectives. This team approach provides the best possible experience for victims, even when a case does not move forward. For this, the victims expressed sincere appreciation.

> I was very pleased and honored to have [victim advocate] and [detective] there with me every step of the way. They made me feel powerful and able. I wasn't a victim to them, I was a survivor. They helped me get my strength and spunk back. (SATF served victim, November 2019)

> I would like to say that my entire family appreciates everything [detective] and [victim advocate] did throughout this journey. [Detective] showed that he was understanding all of the issues and making us feel at ease through the hard time. The [victim advocate] was amazing... and without those 2 and the rest of the staff that helped us, I would be completely lost. They are amazing humans and showed that there are still wonderful and compassionate people in this world. (SATF served victim, July 2020)

> I am thankful for Commerce City Detectives and Brighton Sexual Assault Task Force. They made a scary situation a lot less scary. Having the victim's advocate there by my side allowed me to feel safer. Every person I encountered from the detectives, to the nurse, to the victim's advocate went above and beyond to make me feel heard, trusting, and safe. Thank you. I could never repay or say thank you enough for the care I received. (SATF served victim, June 2020)

> I just want to say that [the] Detective...and [victim advocate] made me feel heard, respected and supported...[the] Detective...was very respectful and didn't make me feel uncomfortable [in the interview] even though I was discussing very uncomfortable issues. He made me feel like I wasn't being judged or not believed. [The victim advocate] also helped me feel like anything I needed she would get me in contact with the resources to help as much as possible...I will proudly advocate for the Sexual Assault Task Force any time. (SATF served victim, July 2020)

==It is always challenging to garner feedback from victims and survivors of sexual violence because of the nature of the trauma they have endured.== Determining the best time to request feedback can also be challenging because some cases can extend into months and sometimes years. Prior research has identified that asking survivors about their experiences with service professionals does not generally lead to a re-traumatization that is often assumed (Campbell, Adams, Wasco, Ahrens & Sefl, 2010). Even so, care must always be taken when developing program efficacy data collection strategies for victims and survivors. Most state and federal grants require victim service agencies to capture usage and satisfaction data, enabling many agencies to utilize data already collected for alternate purposes. Response rates are often low however, and like many surveys inside and outside of the criminal legal system, responses tend to be either on the high satisfaction or the low satisfaction end of the spectrum. It is therefore hard to draw any conclusive insights from the victim/survivor survey data for this project. The Brighton and Commerce City Victim Services will continue to research and develop ways to make it easier for victims and survivors to share their feedback about their experiences with the SATF.

4.5. Sex Offender Management

Commerce City and the City of Brighton integrated their respective Sex Offender Registration and Management programs into SATF from its inception. Not only would the SATF provide a structure and process for the effective registration and management of sex offenders, it would also allow for an easy transfer of knowledge and information with detectives working on holding sex offenders accountable. Both cities did not feel their current processes of registration and management including house checks was as effective as it could be and CCPD had struggled with meeting statutory requirements.

Two of the five assigned SATF detectives were initially focused part time on managing the sex offender registration and management process for their respective agencies. The SATF spent a significant part of 2018 transitioning to a new sex offender management database, Sex Offender Tracking and Registration (SOTAR). This necessitated entering all prior sex offenders and new sex offenders into the new database in addition to their inclusion in the state mandated Colorado Sex Offender Registration (COSOR) system. Given the volume of work involved, this task impeded the ability of the detectives responsible for sex offender management to also manage a case load effectively. Approximately halfway through 2018, the SATF consolidated all sex offender registration and management across both cities under one detective, freeing the other detective to work exclusively on investigations.

While the new strategy proved successful for a time, there continued to be areas of improvement needed to increase efficiency and effectiveness. This system eventually became unsustainable and sex offender management returned to both home agencies in late 2019. However, CCPD's sex offender management detective remained at the SATF whereas BPD hired a new civilian staff person located at BPD. Inclusion of sex offender management and registration under the SATF umbrella was contentious from the outset and there continues to be unresolved disagreement about the legitimacy of housing sex offender management at the SATF. This is further discussed in section 4.7 Implementation Interviews later in this report.

Unfortunately, there is limited data on pre-SATF sex offender numbers. Given a sex offender management database change in 2018, a change in each agency's record management system, and different people responsible for sex offender registration and management prior to the SATF, each with their own process for documentation, we do not have reliable comparable numbers for before the SATF's implementation. Integrating sex offender management and registration under the SATF has in many ways streamlined data collection and enabled both departments to better track the rise and fall of sex offenders in their community. CCPD has a much clearer understanding of new registrations, re-registrations, house checks, and overall sex offender numbers now as compared to prior to the SATF. However, BPD did see a decline in quality of sex offender management which in part led them to pull their sex offender registration and management function back to the police department and out of the SATF.

One goal of the SATF was to improve sex offender registration and management and including working to hold sex offenders accountable when they do not register. Table 18 shows the number of Failure to Register (FTR) warrants issued before and after the SATF. Unfortunately, neither city saw an increase in the number of warrants issued after the implementation of the SATF and in Brighton, the issuance of FTR warrants dropped from 24 to 16, a 33% reduction in warrants issued as compared to the pre-SATF time period. It is important to note however, that while an increase in the issuance of FTR warrants could indicate an increase in the efficacy of a police department's sex offender registration and management program, it is only one measure of potential success. Active and attentive management of sex offenders overall is a large component of program efficacy and may even serve to reduce the number of FTR warrants needed. Brighton did remove sex offender registration and management from the SATF in 2019; a tacit acknowledgment the new system was not as effective as they had hoped.

Table 25

Post-SATF Sex Offender Failure to Register Warrants

		Year					
		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FTR Warrants							
	CCPD	4	5	2	4	5	8
	BPD	9	10	5	4	7[a]	5

[a] BPD sex offender registration and management was removed from the SATF in late 2019

The number of sex offenders in both cities has risen steadily since 2018 as Figure 14 indicates below. There is no data for September 2019 as the SATF was transitioning sergeants and sex offender management data was not documented during this time.

Figure 14

Total Sex Offenders by Month and Year in Commerce City and Brighton, 2018-2020

Figure 14 illustrates the overall increase in sex offenders each month and year from 2017-2020. Sex offenders registered in Commerce City rose by 14% from 2018-2019, and by 8.9% from 2019-2020. The increase was much smaller for Brighton 2018-2019 (0.9%) and on par with Commerce City from 2019-2020 (9.8%). Over the 2018-2020 time-period, the number of sex offenders has steadily increased at rates higher than each city's population growth. Commerce City saw an average population growth from 2018-2020 of 3.6% and Brighton saw an average increase in population of 2.3%.

Overall, sex offender registration and management did not unfold as intended in the original conception of this project. The original goal to increase sex offender registration compliance and reduce sex offender registration violations was partially met. For Commerce City, sex offender

registration compliance was vastly improved given they were not entirely in compliance with city and state requirements at the start of the project. Brighton Police Department were already doing well in this area and did not find, per feedback from the Chiefs and other team members, that moving sex offender registration and management assisted them in improving their processes. For more information on the outcomes and recommendations for sex offender registration and management, please see section 4.7, Table 30 and the subsequent discussion, and section 5.3.

4.6. District Attorney Filing Rates

One area in which the SATF project hoped to effect change was in DA filing rates. It was hypothesized that if the cases investigated by both BPD and CCPD were of better quality, and with less follow up work required, the DA would be better able to accept the charges proposed and file the case. Unfortunately, this did not bear out in the data collected.

There are two metrics:
1) Cases filed as a percentage of total cases investigated
2) Cases filed as a percentage of total cases presented to the DA for a filing decision.

The latter yields much higher percentages than the former. Figure 15 shows the filing rates as a percentage of total cases for 2015-2020. Figure 16 shows the percentage of cases filed out of those presented to the DA for a filing decision. As illustrated, the percentage of cases filed is very high when looking only at those presented to the DA. Since the DA does not have the opportunity to review cases not presented to them, this is the more appropriate way to assess DA filing rates. However, LE officers make decisions not to present cases to the DA for a variety of reasons, and Figure 19 illustrates many reasons used by the SATF. Pattavina, Morabito, & Williams (2016) show some support for the relationship between DAs and detectives as a potential barrier to making arrests and filing cases when DAs are involved at the investigation step in the process: "It is possible that the motivations for prosecutor-driven decisions to reject cases at the arrest stage guide the ways police approach investigations and influence their decision not to arrest" (p. 319).

Figure 15
Percentage of Cases Filed out of Total Cases by Agency, 2015-2020

In both Figure 14 and 15, while the overall trend is upward, there appears to be a decline in the percentage of cases filed during the 2018-2020 post SATF implementation period, whether we calculate from total cases assigned or cases presented to the DA for a decision.

Figure 16
Percentage of Cases Filed out of Cases Presented to the DA by Agency, 2015-2020

Tables 27 & 28 compare the combined three years prior to the SATF's implementation with the combined period of evaluation, three years after implementation. For both agencies, while the percentage of cases presented to the DA for a filing decision has stayed static, the percentage of cases declined has risen and the percentage of cases filed has dropped for the period after the SATF's

implementation. The tables show filing rates as a percentage of all cases investigated, not broken down by crime type. Please review Figures 22 and 23 for more detail. There are several reasons this inverse relationship could have occurred, and without reviewing the details of every case filed and declined to establish patterns, if any, it is difficult to speculate as to why filing percentages have decreased when case quality has risen.

Table 26
CCPD sexual assault cases[a] / DA decisions - 2015-2017 and 2018-2020

Year	Assigned	Presented to DA	Cases Filed	Cases Declined
2015-2017	262	73 (28%)	53 (73%)	20 (27%)
2018-2020	375	103 (27%)	67 (65%)	36[b] (35%)

[a] includes sexual assault, sexual assault on a child and unlawful sexual contact
[b] includes two diversion cases

Table 27
BPD sexual assault cases[a] / DA decisions - 2014-2017 and 2018-2020

Year	Assigned	Presented to DA	Cases Filed	Cases Declined
2015-2017	209	59 (28%)	42 (71%)	17 (29%)
2018-2020	264	82[b] (31%)	46 (56%)	34[c] (37%)

[a] includes sexual assault, sexual assault on a child and unlawful sexual contact
[b] an additional two cases are pending as of writing
[c] includes four diversion cases

Figure 17
SATF Case Crime Type Breakdown, 2018-2020

The two crimes most often reported to the SATF are *sexual assault on a child* and s*exual assault*. The latter crime usually involves adult victims, but not exclusively. Once a case is investigated, it can be closed in several ways. However, one of the areas of focus for much research into the failures of the criminal justice system for sexual assault survivors is whether a case is filed with the DA's office and an arrest is made (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Kerstetter, 1990; Morabito et al. 2019; Rosay, Wood, Rivera, Postle, & TePas, 2011; Spohn & Tellis, 2012). For a DA to decide on whether to file charges, a case must be provided to them for review. A large percentage of cases never make it to the DA for a filing and charging decision and this was true for the SATF's caseload. While the data from all three SATF years show the crimes of *sexual assault on a child* and *sexual assault* were numerically equally unlikely to be presented to the DA for a filing decision (Figure 17), when viewed as a percentage of total cases investigated by the SATF for a particular crime, sexual assault cases are not presented to the DA at a slightly higher rate (74%) than *sexual assault on a child* cases (64%).

Figure 18
Sex Crime Cases not Presented to the DA, 2018-2020

Presented?   Crime Type

Part of this discrepancy may be that adult sexual assault cases are challenging to prosecute because they often rest on a consent defense when there are no witnesses who can corroborate whether it was non-consensual (Morabito, et al. 2019). Additionally, adult sexual assault often includes alcohol, and victims are very reluctant to come forward. Reports are often delayed which can create difficulty in prosecution (Morabito, et al. 2019). In cases such as these where there are challenging facts of a victim who is unable to participate at the time and needs more time for healing, the detective will make the choice not to present the case to the DA for a decision. As Pattavina et al's., (2016) research suggested, the more involvement a DA has in the earlier stages of the investigation, the less likely it is a case will be filed. One area of exploration this project did pursue, and which could be a future area of research, is whether the DA's involvement in case reviews and weekly SATF meetings negatively affected the number of cases presented to them for a filing decision.

Figure 19 illustrates the primary reasons SATF detectives do not present cases to the DA for a filing decision. The top three include lack of evidence, the victim is unable to participate in the investigation at that time, and a victim choosing the YHOP program. Accurate documentation of which victims are actively choosing the YHOP program is difficult to identify and there are discrepancies between the VSU and SATF data related to why a case is closed or inactivated. For many cases where the victim is unable to participate in the investigation, they may also be eligible for the YHOP program, but YHOP was not documented as the reasons for the case inactivation. If "Victim Unable to Participate" and YHOP are combined (115), then the largest reason cases are not presented is victim directed, which is a central guiding principle of the SATF's trauma-informed policing. "Unable to Contact Victim" means the detective and/or victim advocate has not been able to reach the victim to speak with them about the case and "Pending Victim Contact" means there has been contact, and the detective is waiting for a call back. These are nuanced differences and after speaking with the SATF sergeant, it was decided to keep these reasons separate rather than collapsing them under "Victim Unable to Participate." *Other Jurisdiction* refers to cases reported to the SATF but were committed in a different jurisdiction. Most cases Exceptionally Cleared are sent to other jurisdictions. Several additional reasons were associated

with one to three cases including offender death, case previously reported, or unable to determine jurisdiction. Where a "+" is shown, it indicates more than one reason provided.

Figure 19
Reasons Cases are not Presented to the DA, 2018-2020

21% for *sexual assault on a child.* Tables 29 and 30 show the rates of criminal justice process case attrition. This gradual pruning of cases, leading to a small percentage making it to trial, is in line with prevailing research and is sometimes coined "the justice gap" (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Morabito et al, 2019).

Table 28
SATF Sexual Assault on a Child Case Attrition, 2018-2020

Year		Assigned		Presented		Filed		
		n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*% of presented*	*% of total SAC cases*
2018	SAC	88	39	34	39	24	71	27
2019	SAC	119	54	43	36	30	70	25
2020	SAC	114	44	32	28	14	44	12

Total	321	45	109	34	68	62	21

Table 29
SATF Sexual Assault Case Attrition, 2018-2020

Year		Assigned		Presented		Filed		
		n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*% of presented*	*% of total SA cases*
2018	SA	92	41	30	33	17	57	19
2019	SA	80	36	21	26	12	57	15
2020[a]	SA	107	41	14	13	6	43	6
Total		279	39	65	23	35	54	13

[a] As of the time of the report, 14 cases were still active from 2020

Lonsway & Archabault's 2012 research on case attrition or the "Justice Gap " bears out in the data from the SATF. Given the many different charges that can be filed, the below chart is restricted to just the crimes of sexual assault and sex assault on a child for the post-SATF time period. Data from the pre-SATF time period is inconsistent. There are cases pending a DA decision or pending a court appearance at the time of writing, so the numbers below may shift slightly by the end of 2021 but not significantly.

Figure 20
SATF Case Attrition (SA and SAC only), 2018-2020[a]

[a] Pre-SATF data is inconsistent
[b] There may be additional convictions from the 14 pending trial cases; 2 of the 3 convictions were a split plea and conviction.

Figure 21

All SATF Case Crime Types Presented to the DA, 2018-2020

Presented?	Crime Type	Number of Records
Yes	Sexual assault on a child	109
	Sexual assault	65
	Failure to register	18
	Unlawful contact	11
	Indecent exposure	4
	Non-Sex Offense	4
	Enticement of a child	3
	Other	2

Figure 22

All SATF Case Crime Types Filed, 2018-2020

Filed?	Crime Type	Number of Records
Yes	Sexual assault on a child	68
	Sexual assault	35
	Failure to register	18
	Unlawful contact	10
	Indecent exposure	4
	Non-Sex Offense	4
	Enticement of a child	2

Figure 23

Sex Crime Cases Declined, 2018-2020

The SATF project did not evaluate the reasons DA's provided for declining cases. This information is useful for detectives to know so they can make changes to their investigation strategies. Figure 24 presents basic feedback provided by the DA's office on declinations. The numbers align with those seen nationally (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Spohn & Tellis, 2012; Morabito et al, 2019). "Unclear" means no reason was provided or the detective did not note the reason in their case file. While it is true that each case is different, the context of each crime changes, and each case is evaluated on its merits, at some point, the individualized nature of cases and file and decline rates combine to illustrate a pattern. Case quality has increased at the SATF as has detective and victim advocate knowledge. To have no observable change in filing rates is disappointing.

Figure 24

Reasons Given for DA Decline to File, 2018-2020

4.7. Implementation Interviews

4.7.1. SATF Team and Key Staff

Over the course of the SPI project, Defi Consulting interviewed SATF team members and key staff approximately every six months for three years. The intention of the interviews was to better understand the SATF implementation process from their individual vantage points. For the detectives

in each general investigations unit, interviews were offered to understand whether the SATF had relieved any of their workload through the removal of sex crimes from the case they work since this was a goal of the project. Interviewees across both agencies included: Chiefs of both agencies, CCPD Deputy Chiefs Commanders of both agencies, SATF detectives, and victim advocates.

Interview Themes

Over the course of 2018, the SATF has developed cohesion, connectedness, and efficiency in the work they perform. Detectives and SATF leadership have provided invaluable insight into the implementation of the SATF including logistical and administrative challenges impeding their work. As the year progressed, many of the initial concerns were alleviated as the SATF developed its identity and its own practices and processes. The overall consensus from all involved is the SATF works well, and each person is invested in its success, believing the need for the team has become self-evident through the sheer volume of cases received and requests from other agencies for assistance.

Table 30

SATF Team Implementation Interview Themes

Theme	Example Interviewee Quote
Infrastructure	
Technology as a barrier	You have to have a home base, hosting agency where everything is done the way that agency does it...not...I gotta drop photographs in this system that I can't access because one police department won't give me access. I can work their case, but they don't trust me to have access to it, then I need to bother someone else [to upload the file].
Two systems/cities	Having two different ways of doing things, it's very frustrating and sometimes you forget...and you have to go back to it, and redo work which takes even more time to do.
	We have a lot of...things crossover where...like the suspect was in Commerce City, well now he is in Brighton doing this...It's nice to be able to work in Commerce City and Brighton because usually they...go back and forth between the cities it seems like, so that's been helpful to work in both cities...it's helpful that we're all together and we talk amongst ourselves...it's just a huge resources to have other detectives right here.

SATF Development	It didn't take too much to sell it...the first inclination, or the first concern that people had in the rank and file was well, we are going to take more officers off the street or we are going to take more detectives out of investigations and send them down there and it's going to hurt us, our caseload here. So we had to have the discussions about stop and think about the SA caseload that's going down there...there's going to be a little bit of give and take there.
Specialization	That's been huge actually, because you don't have someone saying "what are you doing, you have this case"...everyone knows about the cases, and they know how long it takes, they know everything you have to do, so there's not that pressure [to close cases quickly]. Being at the task force you benefit from specialized training, and I think without that training a lot of these cases I would've just thrown to the side and said this isn't going to go anywhere...being able to focus exactly on this case, you put more time and effort, your understanding and you realize, no, this is going to go somewhere.
Staffing/Caseload	When I first came over here it was a little chaotic. Nothing was working...Definitely need more staff, not only investigators but victim advocates...Just the caseload, it's not stopping and everyone is getting overwhelmed with the amount of cases, and these cases take forever to get done. I think the amount of cases...I think that's a success, that in itself, saying we have had this many cases assigned to our task force...It's insane and crazy but it's pretty exciting, too.
Support	The teamwork within the task force and the collaboration with other agencies (DA's office, Ralston House, Social Services, etc.) [has been really good]. You can see that detectives actually want to be at the task force helping victims of sex crimes and their passion to help other Detectives with anything before even being asked is refreshing.

Embedded Victim Advocacy

That's also been really helpful. In a sense, they kind of help you with your investigation as far as scheduling and working out stuff with, what the victim's schedule looks like and trying to schedule forensic interviews...having them here is super helpful...it's a constant communication...it's been really good.

I don't know how we would deal without them...my perception of that is they are the ones keeping a lot of the victims involved...I think maybe that's the piece on the other side [in general investigations] that was missing as well because you have victim advocates but they are general and I think now, specifically now, the attention we give the victim is really far more than what a detective could handle and so keeping them engaged and keeping them, understanding what's going on...I think it's been great.

Sex Offender Management

Inefficient use of resources

At this point, since we don't have enough investigators, I think it is causing an issue because we have an investigator assigned to the task force who is not being able to get cases...with that one person doing it, I think is a great idea because things are getting better...but at the same time you are limiting...another investigator from the task force.

Compatibility with mission

It doesn't matter either way...I am neutral on it. I don't want to do it...As far as it being here, I don't really have any qualms...it still could be a benefit here to know we have a direct line to who the sex offenders are, 'cos that still does apply to what we are investigating, and I think that part of it is a benefit.

It's nice every now and then when you have a sex offender who is offending in a new case...to be able to get that quick information but other than that I don't know what else it benefits being at the taskforce.

Communication

Intra-agency	People's perception…It's tough to…have them [officers] understand what these cases really entail…You need to bring…validity to this, maybe, is I think what needed to be done and I don't think that was really what the case was, I think is what needed to be done…nobody wants to work those cases, that's kind of the stigma.
	We are isolated away…now it's starting to get better. It took a while to let, to voice our concerns about being contacted, even though some still get missed. They are finally starting to give us a call, involve us.
Inter-agency	I think it's a little more open-minded here, people are open to ideas. For example, the roundtable we had today earlier at the meeting…that probably wouldn't have happened…taken input from an advocate, taken input from a social worker, the forensic interviewer …those kinds of collaborations and conversations wouldn't have taken place [prior to the SATF].
	Without having [the DA] on our task force and helping and guiding…and having that communication with the district attorney's office…I think that's huge. From when I was a detective to now, because those kinds of filings didn't happen…To say we filed three sex assaults…in a matter of five, six months, I think is pretty impressive.
Community Relationships	
Successes	I have noticed that they [the DA's office] are more open…open-minded I guess when it comes to this sort of investigation.
	It's good to have the DA's there, even social services, it's good to have them there because there's, sometimes we need to let them know this is going on and no one is catching it.
	That's a great thing…I think having the relationship and understanding where they are at…changes my perspective…it is interesting to have different groups together because…this might be a place they come up with

	something and I think that's good...I think ...sometimes (a lot of times!) as cops we get fully engulfed in our case and sometimes you don't see things...when someone says something you're like, oh yeah, you're right.
Resistance	It [community involvement] has no impact on the way investigations are done. Investigations are investigations are investigations no matter how you put it...what we created was taking care of the victims, focusing on the victims more. [Q: but that makes your investigations easier, no?] No...an investigation is an investigation...As long as I have been doing this job I have done investigations the same way.
	Doctors absolutely not. I don't see a reason why they need to be there...I don't think someone who hasn't had any law enforcement experience should have any input on how an investigation goes...because it's not going to change the way I do things...Everyone needs to stay in their lane...The outcome of the case is my doing.
Officer Wellness	
Access to wellness support	The well-being basically...I think that's something that's been completely overlooked...I have gotten some heavy cases and the last case...put my heart and soul into it...it's not about burnout...this is about as easy as it gets, you come and go as you please, you work at your leisure, and as long as you do your work and put the time in you'll be fine...when we lose it is when we don't focus on the [detectives] who are actually investing their time and putting their heart and soul into some of these cases and it is [expletive] their lives up.

The areas persisting thematically throughout the three years of implementation interviews for SATF members were the relevance of sex offender management within the SATF, caseload and the need for more staff, and the good and the bad of involving community partners.

Sex Offender Registration and Management
The value of including sex offender management under the SATF remained unclear over the course of the three years. Members of the SATF team and those connected to the program broadly differed in their opinions with no clear consensus emerging over time. The only moderately noticeable shift in opinion over the three years involved the strength of opinion on the issue. Keeping sex offender registration and management at the SATF initially fell more clearly into a yes/no binary and then shifted

over time to a feeling of ambivalence. Many in favor of keeping it in the SATF saw it as integral to the work of the team, despite little evidence at the SATF of overlap between registered sex offenders and offenders investigated for new sex crimes. Philosophically for proponents of keeping it at the SATF, it fits with the SATF's mission and therefore should stay. One interviewee shared:

> I agree it should be there…my thought process behind that is, again, the cases we're working with, being able to maybe more quickly identify, where we may have one of our registered sex offenders out there perpetrating crimes, we may be able to pick up on that quicker…than if we were just doing it in house processing paperwork.

Given the level of administrative involvement to manage sex offenders across both cities, individuals who felt it should be removed generally believed it was an inefficient use of resources to have a detective manage the program when there are so many incoming sex assault cases needing investigating. They also felt philosophically there was no place for sex offender management work in a unit serving victims. This view was bolstered by the continued lack of overlap between past and current sex offenders in the cases they were working.

One of the initial drivers of including sex offender management and registration in the SATF was to remove it from untrained officers at Commerce City and civilians at Brighton and place it with more senior and knowledgeable officers to increase the efficacy of the management and registration, including more quickly requesting warrants for out of compliance offenders. However, this reasoning was lost over time as detectives became overwhelmed with sex crime cases and a feeling that the fifth detective working on sex offender management could be better utilized. With COVID-19 in 2020, this also affected the frequency with which house checks could be performed to verify residency for registered sex offenders.

Some of the ongoing struggles identified over the course of this project included a lack of continuity across files and management of sex offenders at each city due to the requirement of keeping both hard and digital copies files for active and deactivated sex offenders. An interviewee commented:

> …there are still continuity issues with sex offender management which could be eliminated with not keeping paper files of active and deactivated sex offenders at the Brighton Police Department as they are also kept digitally. Maintaining paper files has proven to be cumbersome and time consuming. While each city has its own unique ordinances pertaining to sex offenders, it has become challenging to manage them without the assistance of a permanently assigned civilian staff.

Clerical duties associated with sex offender management consume a significant amount of time for the detective overseeing the process, which reduces time available to conduct (or oversee) home checks and pursue fugitive sex offenders who've elected to fall out of compliance. While consolidating sex offender duties under one detective generally created a more efficient process, it removed redundancy. This created unnecessary delays in service without a second or third staff person fully trained to

manage all aspects of sex offender management during periods where the primary detective is away. It also meant that when the sole sex offender management detective was out of the office, another detective had to assume the duties without comprehensive training. This took them away from their ever-increasing investigative caseloads. One of the goals of the SATF was to ensure all detectives were educated and trained on managing and registering sex offenders. Given the caseload increases over time, this goal was not met.

In late 2019, sex offender management and registration for the two cities separated and returned to each agency. CCPD kept their stake in sex offender management at the SATF by leaving their detective at the unit, however, BPD decided to move their sex offender registration and management physically back their home agency and hired an Evidence Technician to complete the process rather than keep it with a sex crimes detective.

Infrastructure
As with any new program, structural challenges and concerns inevitably arise. Infrastructure was one of the largest themes arising from the implementation interviews. The SATF team drawing on their lived experience on the team were able to share some constructive perspectives on challenges faced, as well as possible solutions. As a pilot program, it is important to learn from these challenges and make adaptations where possible as issues arise.

Staffing and Caseload
From the outset, the SATF caseload has been a point of concern and it has only steadily increased over the three years of the project. The first round of implementation interviews were conducted approximately four to six months into the SATF's implementation and concerns were articulated even at this early stage about staff to caseload ratios. Specifically, it was unclear as to the efficacy of the process used that led CCPD and BPD to determine five detectives would be sufficient, especially when two detectives (at the time) were working sex offender management:

> When everyone came and asked each detective what hours it would take [to determine what staff the SATF needed], I think they were so focused on saying it takes 40 hours to do a case...because they don't work these cases, we just tried to stick a number on them...in reality these cases are more personable, there's more victims, there's more time spent and with You Have Options...these cases take a long time.

This perspective remained a consistent thread across all interviews with SATF team members throughout the three years. As caseloads increased, in some cases by significant amounts, and staffing levels remained static, morale among the team declined. A disconnect between conducting full and thorough investigations and a perceived desire to close cases quickly emerged:

> The focus has been on making numbers, closing cases as quickly as possible and dealing with shortcomings in cases that are filed after they get to the DA's Office. The unit has been chronically understaffed from the start, which is understandable for a new unit. This, along

with the push for closing cases, has created an environment where Detectives have to choose between giving the cases the attention they deserve, or filing them partially completed, knowing that they were going to have to do more follow-up work on those cases later.

When asked early in the implementation if something could have been done on the front end to better prepare for the increase in sexual assault reporting, an agency leader didn't believe so because for him, cases always ebb and flow in this way:

> No, I don't think so...I think it's one of those things it's just, we're subject to the whims of nature. You know how, how is this going to go? We can staff and staff and staff in any unit in the Police Department. And for some reason it's never enough. Uhm, it's like nature in a vacuum. If you have the vacuum, something is going to come along to fill it. And I think what we saw with the Sex Assault Taskforce is really no different from than we've had, a year before the taskforce was established, we had a run of cases and calls in the city...that we hadn't experienced before, just the different kind of calls, the level of violence, the level of crime, but since then it's tapered off and who's to say when it's going to explode again? And, I think this is no diff than with the taskforce even if it tapers off some and slows down, it's going to come back.

Ultimately, the rise in sexual assault reporting was perceived as a good thing by leaders in both departments because it reinforced the need for a unit such as the SATF.

In addition to handling sexual assault on a child, sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact, it was suggested the SATF also take on Internet Exploitation cases. In the interviews, individuals tended to agree it would make sense for Internet Exploitation cases to come over, however, there was universal acknowledgement with the SATF's staffing levels, this would not enable this to be done effectively. Investigating Internet Exploitation crimes well requires a level of proactive work that the SATF is not staffed for. There was also some sentiment that just because something has "sex" in the title doesn't mean it belongs at the SATF (such as sex offender management or internet exploitation).

Two Systems
Another sturgeon theme to emerge continually across the four rounds of interviews was the merging of two systems, sometimes three if you include the Adams County Government Center where the SATF is located.

> The biggest issue is that we are dealing with two different departments, two different ways of doing things and that is not how a task force runs.

> Maybe we have a host agency, which is difficult for smaller agencies [because of administrative resource availability]...to have something like that, where you have a hierarchy making sure things are getting done right.

Some of the suggestions to mitigate the problems of a two-three system merge included:

- The need to consider creating separate CR numbers for the SATF.
- Booking evidence into one agency to ensure all SATF detectives have access to view and upload all evidence.
- The need for a SATF policy and procedure manual and forms specific to the SATF versus for each partner agency.
- One designated IT department to minimize administrative confusion over who is responsible for the various IT issues.

The SATF Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) document took an extremely long time to complete and was not available until the third quarter of 2019, 21 months after the SATF was established. This delay was in part due to the merging of two systems and policies as well as the need for multiple reviews. Having this document in place prior to the implementation of the SATF would have assisted with some of the confusion expressed by team members in the first year.

IT barriers continued to exist long into 2019 with one agency refusing to give employees of the other agency VPN access to their system. The SATF is a collaborative project yet given both agencies' internal city policies, many of the needs of a collaborative unit were not immediately met because the complexities had been underappreciated in the development stages.

> What we'd do before we got things started was probably be to wait until we have everything in place, all the infrastructure, all the technology, the doors are open, the whole thing together before we made that move...and I think to have all that in place would have...people are watching and looking for chinks in the armor.

> We probably should have identified some of our technical challenges a little bit, so now I think that was just poor execution on our part...That and quite frankly, we didn't include any technical experts -- IT people -- in this when we started doing it, and my understanding is that was a nightmare.

Co-Location
Since the SATF brought together two agencies, it was determined to house the team in one location rather than having each set of detectives work out of their home agency. Doing this would assist in building team cohesion and enhance communication among advocates and detectives. For most of the SATF, the benefits of being co-located outweighed pitfalls such as disconnection from their home agency. There were a few detectives who yearned to be back in their home agency because they missed the energy and feel of working among a larger group of people. There was also concern that cultures were shifting without them there and that might make it hard for them to reintegrate should they leave the SATF:

I mean it has its ups and downs. It's nice to be in one central location with people who are doing the exact same thing as you are. You know you can ask them quick questions, especially with [city]. Hey, is this in your area or do you know these people? Or can you help me out? Instead of going to [city] trying to find someone right but at the same time I have like, I have no idea what's going on at my own Police Department. Yeah, like I go there and there's new people and you're like who are you or the cultures over there [are] starting to change.

Victim Advocacy

Much like many of the other groups interviewed, the victim advocate team highlighted workload as a challenge. Initially, there was only one victim advocate assigned to the SATF and this was quickly expanded to 1.5. The increasing number of primary and secondary victims, in addition to the volume of forensic interviews, case management has been difficult. However, this challenge is counterbalanced by the overwhelmingly positive experience of being an integral part of the SATF. The proximity to detectives working on cases has been invaluable and has allowed for enhanced victim support as well as clearer communication and more effective case management. Best practice and research consistently show having a dedicated and well-resourced victim advocate unit greatly enhances case quality and victim engagement in criminal investigations. Inclusion of the victim advocacy unit in the implementation of the SATF has been a crucial element in its success. This was echoed across advocates, detectives, and community-based partners.

> The victim said on multiple occasions she was happy [her case] was taken seriously. She was worried that because of his position he would get away with it, but it was clear by [the] SATF response he was going to be held accountable. -- victim advocate

Officer Wellness

Supporting detectives and advocates who are working in the SATF was not initially included in the planning for the SATF. This is perhaps one of the largest learning points from the pilot project. Given the intensity of the subject matter and the volume of cases, burnout or compassion fatigue loomed large over the SATF beginning in its first year.

> It's a tough job...I think it is tougher than being a detective as you are dealing with a lot of personal pain...so I think staying on top of that...and making sure they [detectives] have resources available to help them through those tough times...we could do something like debrief on some of these more serious cases.

> ...making sure that you recognize when you're not good, so that it doesn't get to the point where you can't work on these cases any longer, or whatever the case may be.

> There is still a looming issue that we are dealing with...burnout. Cos sexual assault investigations take a toll on you. I don't think we are doing a very good job of sort of managing that...Nobody's broke yet...but when they do, they usually break very badly...I've seen it happen, and then you're disciplining people for things that we have an obligation to sort of self-

correct. So, I know I've had conversations with [staff] about it, but you know, we really got to be on the lookout for this. This is new. This is all they're handling. This is shift in the way they've done things and you know when you're dealing with sex crimes. That takes a toll on you personally and we really got to [make] sure people can manage that and get them some assistance before they...ask for it.

Despite a growing awareness among leadership for the need to provide supportive resources, a plan did not come to fruition over the course of the SPI grant period. This was in part due to resources COVID-19, and a reluctance on the part of the SATF team members to ask for (and accept) help (Evans, Pistrang, & Billings, 2013). President Obama's Taskforce on Twentieth Century Policing identified officer wellness as one of its primary pillars. Their recommendations included police departments prioritizing ensuring officers have physical, social, and mental health resources and support (Office on Community Oriented Policing, 2015).

Communication
Over the course of the SATF's implementation, a recurring theme was communication. Internal and external partner communication grew more effective through the SATF but internal communications appeared to falter. This internal communication inconsistency first arose with the initial stages of implementation where rumors spread in one agency about the efficacy of the SATF and the "unbearable" nature of the caseload. This rumor mill had a deleterious effect on the SATF's reputation which in turn affected officers' desire to work at the SATF when a vacancy arose. The intentionality of the genesis of rumor mill is unclear, however a more swift suppression of these concerns may have assisted the SATF in its early stages, when new organizations are the most vulnerable.

> Communicating expectations to people that were going to join. I think we just assumed that this would sell itself and not everybody was a good candidate for it. And I think we've seen that with literally people just retiring and ahh, I don't want do this no more...We probably should have done a little bit more getting people ready to adapt to this level of work and the pace and environment of it.

> I understand that they have certain ways of doing things and they can't disclose every detail to us, but it would be nice to communicate for an example, [staff person] leaving right, like no one knows what's going to happen...No one knows when this is going to happen. And we didn't know it was happening. It's been very hush hush and I just don't understand why.

> Looking back, [we needed] more deliberate progress reports, more of a deliberate plan, more detailed plans as to how we would put all this together, with some contingencies...we were all feeling around in the dark, feeling where we needed to go.

Some of the general detectives articulated the value in having regular updates from the SATF so they understood the work they were doing and the kinds of cases they were working. This appeared to occur in the beginning, with SATF members attending the week general detective meetings at both agencies but then tapered off at least at one agency over time. This perhaps led to rumors about what it was like

at the SATF to spread without contradiction and also contributed to some SATF detective's feelings of isolation at the SATF.

4.7.2. General Detective Units

Goal 3: Increase capacity for SA investigations and general crime investigations
Objective 1: Creation of SATF and specialized detectives to reduce specialized case investigation burden on general detective pool

Interview Themes

Over the course of the SATF's first year, thoughts about the importance and value of the SATF ebbed and flowed among detectives in the general investigation units at both agencies. Broadly speaking, detectives were, and continue to be, supportive of the SATF, recognizing the value of having a specialized team of detectives working on these cases. There were a few detectives that did not feel it was a good use of resources, and this was especially prevalent during the time the rumor mill was in full swing related to the SATF being chaotic and an awful place to work:

> The concern that people had in the rank and file as well, we're going to take more officers off the street, or we're going to take more detectives out of investigations and send them down there and that's going to hurt us, our caseload here [general investigations]. So we had to have the discussions about now stop and think about the sexual assault case load going down there [to the SATF]...we're taking that out of this organization and moving it down here [to the SATF]. So there's going to be some a little bit of give and take there...which it seems to have leveled out and worked out.

One of the goals of the SATF was to relieve the burden on detectives in the general units by removing challenging and time-consuming cases from their work loads. Perspectives on whether this goal was met depended on staffing levels in each department. When the staffing levels were low, the effect of no longer having to do sexual assault cases was minimally felt. When a unit was at or close to capacity with staffing, the absence of the sexual assault cases was more positively felt. Some detectives were resentful of the detectives being taken out of general investigations and assigned to the taskforce and felt as though it demonstrated a hierarchy of value in the department:

> I definitely think having a taskforce is good. They don't tell us really, like how many cases they are doing and stuff. So, you know, I don't know if I can really make a judgment of, you know, they are fulfilling the work of two people that we would have done otherwise or anything like that. I definitely don't like doing those cases, so I don't mind that they do them. We have also been short staffed, because we had to send a second detective to the drug taskforce that they never fulfilled up here, so we have been ridiculously busy for that reason...one thing that happened too, they lost one of their detectives over there [the SATF] and it was more important for them to refill that spot, than it was...than our department was so they took one

of our detectives over there...that definitely rubbed some people the wrong way....it was very clear...which group of detectives was more important.

Many detectives commented on how their time had been freed up to do different things or complete tasks on their to-do list they had not previously been able to get to. Some didn't really notice a big change because they didn't work many sex assaults themselves. Others expressed relief they no longer had to work sexual assault cases. Very few expressed missing the work:

> I went from anywhere between 22 to 28 cases I was holding at the time, and I would have sex assault cases, now we've gotten caught up on having manpower here and the taskforce takes those cases, so now I average between 9 and 13 cases, so I am able to give a lot more time to those victims on persons and property stuff.

> All in all, I mean it really hasn't affected me necessarily because I wasn't doing a lot of that type of work but if we didn't have the taskforce, I would be, I am sure I would have a few of those types of cases in the mix...I haven't done really any forensic interviews since then, since the taskforce came on board...all the time I was going down to do the forensic interviews, not really doing that now, so I guess that's kind of helped save some time or whatever letting me focus on some of this other stuff.

4.7.3. Community Partners

Interview Themes

In addition to internal interviews with CCPD and BPD, Defi Consulting also conducted interviews with community partners associated with the SATF. The purpose of these interviews was to understand their experience of implementation and their perceptions of progress, efficacy, and relationships. Interviewees included the 17th Judicial District SART, The 17th Judicial District DA's Office, the local Child Advocacy Center, a local counseling center, and the Department of Human Services.

> We are really excited to be a part of the task force. And really feel like it's one of a kind and such a benefit to everyone, especially families.

Onboarding
Similar to new SATF detectives, community partners expressed a desire for a more structured onboarding process to explain their role on the taskforce, the structure of the meetings, and what the team needs from them. Many partners just felt their way and were sometimes concerned about stepping on toes. The benefits of being involved however, outweighed these concerns about protocol.

Increased Knowledge of Criminal Justice System
Across all the community partners interviewed, they felt that being a part of the SATF was valuable in part because it assisted them in understanding the criminal justice system. Having more in-depth first-

hand knowledge of how law enforcement investigations worked enabled them to better serve their clients and partners.

> We are getting a lot out of it...our clients get a lot out of it and that's, that's continued to grow even just in knowing very specifically who the detectives are it really helps with our clients when they walk in the door that we have more connection with each of them [detectives] and so I think that's made it easier to converse and know their styles through our clients eyes and then to interact with them here and hear their case presentations and the way they talk about victims and cases and things like that. That's been helpful.

Enhanced Relationships

Overwhelmingly, community partners agreed the SATF was an important and helpful initiative. Being included in the development of the SATF and in its implementation has been of great value for community partners. They have experienced stronger relationships with both police agencies and with the SATF detectives, specifically. With an increase in communication and trust, outcomes have improved. All community partners expressed gratitude in being included in the weekly meetings and shared that it was very helpful for them to hear and understand more effectively the work detectives and advocates undertake when investigating a case and supporting a survivor. In turn, they felt understanding about the work they do, and the value they bring to a process, has increased among their law enforcement partners on the SATF.

> My experience has gotten better and mostly that's been because of relationships being built and comfort level increasing I think when I first joined, I was a little uncertain of what the format of the taskforce meetings were the agenda what they wanted our role to be so I was more quiet just kind of listing and observing until I learned what the norms of the meeting were and what they wanted from our participation. I had to learn that through experience instead of this is what we hope to hear in the meetings from you guys or what we could benefit from.

Improved Communications

Every partner agency expressed how communication between their agency and the law enforcement agencies involved in the SATF had improved. For many, the change was significant and made their work far easier. Having access to detectives' cell phones coupled with feeling comfortable calling for support, guidance, and questions, was transformation in terms of service provision. This improved communication landscape reduced miscommunications and conflict between agencies that has historically derailed relationships.

> Just this week we had a client walk in the door that knows that the case was transferred over here but doesn't know who the detective is, doesn't know who they are supposed to talk to, or who they have a victim advocate for, and I think it has been really helpful for clients if we say we go to a meeting with them on Wednesdays, are you okay if we ask and help get somebody in contact with you. I think they feel very much like, like we are all collaborating to help them, and I think that's their impression. I think it helps legitimize their experience.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

As the literature identifies, there are persistent concerns about how law enforcement handles sex crimes investigations process (Frazier & Haney, 1996; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Lorenze, Kirkner, Ullman, 2019; Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019; Police Executive Research Forum, 2012; Spohn & Tellis, 2012) and case attrition as cases move through the criminal legal system (Bennett, Edwards, Murphy & Birk, 2016; Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019; Lonsway & Archambault, 2012; Spohn & Tellis, 2012). The purpose of this SPI project was to implement an innovative approach to sex crimes investigation, maximizing resources at two medium-sized law enforcement agencies who are unable to implement stand-alone sex crimes units. The project evaluated whether the innovative approach – a multi-jurisdictional sexual assault taskforce with community collaboration – could increase the quality of case investigations and ultimately, increase the number of cases submitted to, and accepted by, the DA for prosecution. While the project revealed a steady increase in sex crimes case investigation case review scores, we did not see a discontinuous jump in scores at the point of SATF implementation, and we did not see an increase in the number of cases filed at the DA's office. The attrition of cases seen in literature, most notably Lonsway and Archambault's 2012 study, was again seen in this project's results nearly 10 years later (see Figure 20). The results, however, do not necessarily support the null hypothesis that the SATF had no impact on sex crimes investigation quality because there was a gradual increase in case quality over time as evaluated by a comprehensive case review. Additionally, as the SATF stabilized, the case scores became more consistent. Cases accepted by the DA's office for prosecution had a higher mean score than those that were declined. While no causal relationship was identified between case score and prosecution rates, this observation is still important as agencies continue to develop new and innovative ways to hold sex offenders accountable through the criminal legal system.

5.1. Impact of COVID-19

In the first quarter of 2020, the SATF received a high number of reported cases. However, this trend dipped in March to April as the surrounding community grappled with how best to respond to COVID-19 and seek support services safely. The SATF had to pivot quickly to maintain quality services and investigations despite several new restrictions. As for many in law enforcement, 2020 was a challenging year, navigating barriers not experienced before. It required innovative thinking and problem-solving skills from all members of the SATF. Some of the restrictions the SATF faced included limited to no in-person contact with victims, witnesses, and suspects, working from home, limited access to resources, and restrictions on collecting evidence and forensic interviews. SATF detectives utilized their victim service partners as much as possible to reach out to victims and families to help them understand the delayed process.

Despite the dip in reported cases in March to April 2020, and the ongoing need to manage changing restrictions, sexual assault cases reported to the SATF consistently grew from May through December

2020. The pandemic required the SATF detectives and advocates to think on their feet about ways to continue victim-centered and offender-focused investigations when responding to a scene or interviewing victims face-to-face when this exposed SATF staff and victims to COVID-19. To mitigate the risk to all parties, the SATF utilized phone calls for interviews and wore protective gear and physically distanced themselves when responding to calls. This certainly affected the ability of SATF detectives and advocates to build rapport with victims but enabled cases to keep moving forward, which is a central priority of the SATF.

One of the founding principles underpinning all SATF investigations is understanding and identifying emotions and the effects of trauma on victims. This became more challenging with face masks and phone or video calls. However, given the SATF detective's and advocate's training, each staff person worked hard to understand a victim's experience even without visual cues. In addition to the SATF shifting its investigative practices in light of COVID-19 restrictions, community partners also faced challenges. Local schools and the local Child Advocacy Center were closed for a period of time which limited both outcry from children and the ability to conduct forensic interviews. The SATF tackled the limited forensic interviews by scheduling interviews only for cases involving children who had been removed from the home or if a sibling or adult had to be removed from a home. With the remaining cases that did not fall under those emergency parameters, the SATF kept in touch with the families and worked on other parts of the investigation. During this time, there was a two-three-month delay in scheduling forensic interviews. The SATF detectives and advocates worked diligently to ensure victims understood the reasons for these delays.

5.2. The Justice Gap

Unfortunately, the SPI SATF pilot project did not see any changes in district attorney filing rates. As prior research has repeatedly shown (Lonsway & Archambault, 2012, Morabito, Pattavina & Williams, 2019, Rosay et al, 2011, Spohn and Tellis. 2016), case attrition is a persistent problem. One of the goals of the SATF was to increase the quality of the cases through more thorough investigations. While the case review process did show an increase in case review scores over time, there was not a concomitant increase in DA case filings. One deficit in the current project was a lack of focus on the reasons SATF detectives chose to withhold cases from the DA and why the DA declined cases presented to them. This process is opaque and warrants further illumination to understand why case attrition continues to be an issue. It is important to note here that presentation to DA rates and DA case decline and file rates offered without context can be misleading. For example, many survivors request cases do not move forward, and this is an important piece of the story observers and critics must understand. However, without this context, the lack of increase in DA filings despite an increase in case investigation quality reinforces prior research findings.

As identified in Figure 20 and above, many victims and survivors do not persist through the full scope of the criminal legal process. Justice does not look the same for every victim and it is important law enforcement, advocates, medical providers, counselors, and others understand this. There are three main reasons victims and survivors do not report or delay their report of sexual assault to law

enforcement: (1) fear of not being believed, (2) confidentiality and (3) fear (of retaliation or of law enforcement). If a victim or survivor overcomes these initial barriers, they may then disengage later in the process due to additional barriers making them unable to continue participation. The barriers arising later in the process include: a victim's basic human needs are not being met (food insecurity, house instability, employment etc.,) the criminal legal system is moving too fast for them, fear people in their lives will find out as the process gets more involved, and their impaired memory affecting their perception of the validity of their experience (and perhaps, how memory can affect other people's perception of their truthfulness). Many victims and survivors choose to report their sexual assault because they want the opportunity to tell someone what happened to them, to hear that their experience was not okay, to be believed and receive meaningful support services. Connecting victims and survivors with support services to allow the healing process to begin is crucial and has been associated with greater participation in the criminal legal system (Campbell, 2006). It is also important that the support a victim or survivor receives on reporting to law enforcement is consistent in the weeks to follow. Since some of the possible victim and survivor support services are not available or unknown without reporting to law enforcement, this can often lead to victims and survivors never contemplating coming forward. Why a victim or survivor either never engages or disengages at some point in the criminal legal process is complex and seeing the criminal legal process through is not universally the "right" answer for victims and survivors of sexual assault. While victim and survivor attrition is a problem across the United States when it comes to holding sexual assault perpetrators accountable, meaningful change in this area will take more than increased knowledge of and funding for victim services. Focusing on prevention is a key part of this process, and one that is still vastly under-funded in comparison to criminal legal responses.

5.3. Lessons Learned

One of the most important lessons learned through the Commerce City SPI project was the need to invest more time and thought into the "how" framework required to combine two agencies, with two different cultures, and two different ways of operating. Developing a cohesively crafted message about why a cross-jurisdictional SATF is important, ensuring staff across both agencies are aware of the initiative and understand how its goals will add further value to the agencies involved. The infrastructure struggles, in particular the continued problems associated with IT, created unnecessary barriers for detectives to perform their work. This is an area of need that was underestimated.

Additionally, it has become clear that a formal, structured "on-boarding" or orientation process for new detectives joining the SATF (and perhaps for community partners) is necessary. This is a tool that can establish clear expectations, share cultural norms, and explain new systems since they will be learning at least one new way of conducting business. Early and regular training should be prioritized, especially for detectives new to sex crimes, or new detectives overall. On the job training is often a matter of necessity but where possible, ensuring this training occurs before the SATF is launched or before detectives join would be immensely helpful. Detectives already in the SATF found they were spending time with new detectives training them and answering questions that then kept them from their cases, and this sometimes felt like an additional burden.

The SATF did suffer when it rotated through three sergeants in 2019 (the SATF has had four sergeants in total). Continuity of leadership is very important in a new program because strong leadership can support stability and team efficacy. The decision of who to place at the SATF, or a similar new assignment, also matters greatly. Ideally, officers should be engaged, innovative thinkers, willing to try new things, and open to feedback (especially if an agency employs case review as a continuous improvement method to enhance success). New teams such as the SATF must avoid complacency and stagnation through humility and constant encouragement to learn new skills. Embracing a "you don't know what you don't know" attitude will help keep the team on the cutting edge of sex crimes investigations and trauma-informed service provision.

Embedding victim advocates in the SATF has been central to its success. Detectives have articulated this time and again, and the advocates have provided invaluable services to survivors and to detectives. This cannot be overstated. Having a team built with like-minded professionals can allow it to be flexible and change direction if need be. This extends to involving community partners and stressing that all voices are valued at the table, and each partner in the SATF has something useful to offer because of their different vantage points. The hard work of reducing the siloed nature of criminal justice work leads to stronger investigations and more supported survivors.

An additional lesson learned retrospectively was that each agency had a different view of where they were with the quality of their sex crimes investigations. The literature on sexual assault investigations supports how law enforcement agencies act as gatekeepers of the criminal legal system (LaFree, 1989; Alderden & Ullman, 2012; Kelley & Campbell, 2013). As the Police Executive Research Forum (2012) has previously identified, many law enforcement professionals investigating sexual assault continue to hold on to outdated beliefs about sexual assault and sexual assault victimization (Shaw, Campbell, Cain, & Feeney, 2017; Wentz & Archbold, 2012) and this is exacerbated by a lack of training (Stevens, 2006). In this SPI project, BPD felt they were performing generally well, having implemented YHOP in 2015 and trained all detectives and officers in the program and the neurobiology of trauma in 2014. CCPD knew they needed to improve, however, they perhaps believed they were more advanced than they were. Both agencies felt they were utilizing best practice in sex crimes investigations. However, as the SATF progressed, the gap between perception and reality became clearer. Therefore, prior to the implementation of a SATF, all agencies need to ensure detectives and the whole team are in alignment about what best practices in sex crimes investigation are and then enforce those best practices if they are not being utilized. Both cities, to some extent, were entrenched in the way they operated which created some inflexibility to changing strategies among detectives and SATF leadership.

Lastly, the need to build in a wellness program for officers and advocates working on sex crimes or crimes of violence every day is profoundly important. Without such a program, detective and advocate performance can be negatively affected and the likelihood of burnout increases. Implementation of a wellness program demonstrates to team members their mental health matters to the department. SATF work is emotionally challenging and acknowledging it verbally isn't always enough. Agencies cannot underestimate the toll this can take on their staff. Involving SATF personnel in the process of

defining what wellness activities or training feels right for them will assist with utilization rates. Trying to individualize activities when resources permit customization is also recommended.

5.4. Implementation Recommendations

Development of Staffing Structure
Throughout the pilot project, SATF staffing has been a persistent concern. For many the unit has been chronically understaffed from its inception. A possible solution to address this ongoing concern is to add additional detectives or an investigative technician who could take the lead on forensic interviews, a time intensive task, and other tasks that do not require a sworn officer to perform. In the absence of additional staff to relieve the workload, strong and supportive leadership and mentorship to detectives and advocates could assist with increasing morale and reducing turnover.

Training and Expectations
An issue emerging over the duration of the pilot project was staff turnover. Beyond the struggle of turnover itself, when new detectives or advocates joined the unit, they often did not have prior sexual assault investigation training, trauma-informed interview training, and YHOP training before joining. This led to new staff learning "on the job" which placed the more seasoned detectives and advocates in a position to train and mentor them. However, given caseloads, this was not always feasible. New detectives either struggled to keep up with investigations or reverted to old ways of investigating that didn't center on victim needs or utilize victim advocates. For advocates, this sometimes led to inconsistent contact with victims and in some cases minimal follow up after the original contact.

A possible solution to this ongoing problem is to ensure, where possible, new staff receive the training required to effectively participate in the unit prior to joining the team or within one month of joining. It would also be productive to develop an orientation session, led by the sergeant, that all new staff are required to attend on their first day. In this orientation, the new staff member can be educated on the SATF's expectations and purpose, the need to include victim advocates in their work, and the need for case review and communication with community partners. Technical issues such as accessing systems and evidence uploads can also be covered, reducing the need for new detectives and advocates to rely on current staff for guidance. The need for new staff to start working immediately because of heavy caseloads and burnout can prevent orientation meetings, explanations of the project and case review, so these should be prioritized. It is also recommended that teams utilize interviews for all new SATF team members. Avoid appointing people to the unit to ensure every person working on the SATF knows the expectations and structure.

Lastly, ongoing training in sexual assault investigations and victim-centered, trauma-informed police work should be prioritized. While COVID-19 derailed several opportunities for training, there were online options available. Any staff person who attends a training should be required to bring the information back to their team in an educational session to ensure as many individuals as possible are benefitting from the new knowledge.

Standard Operating Procedures

This document should be completed prior to the start of the new unit. In addition, unit staff members should be educated on the joint protocols and policies as they may differ from what they are used to. When questions arise, the SOP should be consulted and amended if the issue arising is not addressed in the document. Consider implementing different ways of making explicit the goal of an SATF -- a pilot project where cases will be reviewed, and feedback provided -- so that detectives and advocates understand the expectations from the outset. This can all be contained in the SOP, if appropriate, and explained during a unit orientation.

Case Review and Weekly Meetings

The original intention for the SATF was to host a multidisciplinary meeting each week to connect with partners, share cases, and support and conduct a weekly case review. Each week, a detective would share their most pressing case and the case that has been open the longest and one detective would lead a case review session. This usually entailed the detective sharing a case they were currently working on or had recently closed with the team, provide a detailed account of the facts, and cover what work had been completed. In effective case reviews the detective should prepare in advance for the presentation and specific questions should be posed to the team to assist the detective in thinking differently about the case and to offer new insight on additional steps that may be useful. Including community partners in this discussion was key to the SATF's design. Soliciting external perspectives, even when external members may not know the details of investigation processes, can be invaluable. The purpose of a robust case review process is to enhance the strength of the investigation and recognizes that there is always more to learn. Each stakeholder will likely approach the case from a different angle, and this reduces the likelihood of an echo chamber where a person's thoughts about a case are reinforced.

Over time, these case review sessions decreased, especially with COVID-19. Resentment also built up related to the feedback community partners provided on cases. Research on law enforcement engagement with outside organizations has shown that it can be very effective (Zajac, 2006; Greeson & Campbell, 2013; Greeson & Campbell, 2015; Greeson, Campbell, Bybee, & Kennedy, 2016).]. Conversely however, the "gate-keeping" role law enforcement agencies often play (LaFree, 1989; Alderden & Ullman, 2012; Kelley & Campbell, 2013) is in isolation to outside feedback, and the SATF was intentionally designed to break down these silos. However, the impetus to lean into the "stay in your lane" mentality did manifest over time. This was exacerbated by the move to virtual meetings affected attendance and engagement. Community stakeholders were often missing, and detectives had little to share and were not prompted for more detail. When meetings did occur, detectives were often distracted and the meetings lasted less than 30 minutes. Since little was gained from attending because the structure had so fully deteriorated over time, detectives began to resent the meetings, and detectives and community stakeholders ceased to prioritize the time. As COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, the team was able to meet more regularly in-person, and this did shift the nature of the meetings. However, case reviews, when they occur, are usually brief, unprepared, and do not elicit much feedback from partners. In addition, when asked, SATF participants routinely share that they have "nothing to report" or that they are "busy" without providing further details.

In the information technology field, teams of coders often engage in "code reviews." This involves a person on the team reviewing another person's code. They do this to catch errors, offer advice on alternate, perhaps more effective ways of writing programs, and to also learn the different ways coders program. A similar process could be implemented at the SATF or any general investigations unit. This would ensure a continuous improvement model and enable detectives to get second opinions in a more formal way. The sergeant continues to review all cases to make sure detectives are appropriately closing cases and engaging with victims. They will also be able to review feedback provided by others and provide additional insight.

Implementing such a process does take time away from working a detective's individual cases which, given the continued increase in cases, could feel unnecessary. However, the goal of case review -- whether at a weekly meeting or structured like a code review -- is to assist detectives in getting better at investigating, which eventually will lead to more efficient, but still thorough investigative practices. Such a practice should be woven into the SATF from its inception with the sergeant ensuring the case review happens as intended.

Implementation Fidelity
To ensure a new project or team is successful, attention to its implementation is crucial. The degree to which a program is implemented as planned is an important measure of success. If a program does not achieve its stated outcomes, is this because the program idea is ineffective or is it because the program was not implemented correctly? Resources, staffing changes, mission drift, and unpredictable environments can all affect how a program is implemented.

The SATF outlined its logic model, identifying the elements needed to implement the taskforce and what the anticipated outputs and outcomes would be. One assumption in the development of the SATF model was that detectives would join the SATF and then stay there for the duration of the pilot, thus developing expertise as they honed their sex assault investigation skills. However, this key ingredient for the SATF in the planning stages did not come to fruition and the SATF experienced significant staff turnover throughout the three-year pilot. The nature of policing and promotion and overall staff shortages at both police departments did not always align with the goal of maintaining a consistent team of detectives and advocates at the SATF. In hindsight, the planning team could have planned more specifically for this eventuality, creating a contingency plan for when staff changes occurred to include interviewing new candidates as they did the original team members and ensuring all needed training occurred within one month of joining the SATF.

Along with staff turnover, several other issues arising from inconsistent implementation arose throughout the three years that were exacerbated by high staff turnover. Communication among SATF member, community partners and the home agencies about the successes and failures of the SATF were not contained effectively. This led to many detectives feeling resistant to apply to become an SATF member when an opening arose. In some cases, this led to detectives being appointed vs requesting assignment. (This was also affected by staff shortages at each agency). Given the SATF was

a pilot project, and the intention was to staff it with innovative, open-minded, solution-focused detectives and advocates, losing the "opt-in" component for staff affected the presence of this overall mindset as time went on. Caseload increases stretched each detective and advocate to their limit and restricted the sergeant's ability to provide mentorship and guidance, as well as direction when expectations were not being met (for example, when victims had not been contacted, or cases sat open for months without work, or the over-use of running supplements in their case narratives).

Another central component of the SATF model is the inclusion of community partners and weekly meetings with case review. This element of the pilot project was crucial to maintain fidelity to the implementation plan. Central to the philosophy of the multi-disciplinary team or sexual assault response team model, from which the SATF borrowed, is that multiple perspectives improve outcomes on sexual assault cases (Greeson & Campbell, 2013; Greeson & Campbell, 2015; Greeson, Campbell, Bybee, & Kennedy, 2016). The weekly meetings were an opportunity to share ideas, catch up on cases, and discuss particularly challenging cases where a detective needed some support. In the first year, the weekly meetings were the most robust, with good attendance and dialogue and discussion on cases. Detectives would provide updates on their most recent case and their oldest case and then a detective would present a case for review by the team. As time passed however, and with SATF team member turnover, the expectation of the weekly meetings and case review appeared to fade. While community partners would attend with regularity, detectives would often provide no updates ("nothing to report") and the meetings would be over quickly. This bolstered the argument from SATF team members that the meetings were ineffective and should only occur bi-weekly or not at all. When time is limited, meetings need to feel useful. Rather than the community partner meetings and case review becoming a source of strength and utility, the internal perception shifted and resentment over attendance built. Detectives would regularly schedule interviews or other meetings over the weekly timeslot, and there was no longer an expectation they would hold this time each week. Covid-19 exacerbated this situation even more. As meetings went to an online format, and community partners were stretched in pivoting to continue to provide services to clients, attendance slowed, and the meetings got faster. This was perhaps inevitable given the nature of working in a pandemic without a guide map for how to best maintain connection. However, as the community emerged from the worst of the pandemic, community partner attendance had dropped to bi-weekly by design, and case review rarely occurred.

Case review is a process by which people involved in a case recount the facts and all the steps they have taken. This presentation is often accompanied by a written narrative to assist the team in understanding the dynamics of the case. There is an opportunity to ask questions and offer ideas. Suggestions from a community partner are just as valid as suggestions from an advocate or from a law enforcement officer. Case review requires a willingness to acknowledge we don't know what we don't know and that other professionals, whatever their vantage point, may have something useful to offer. Through consistent and comprehensive case reviews, detectives, advocates, and community partners can learn what went well and where improvements can be made. Being open to a review in this way requires humility and a desire to learn and grow. As identified above, for some detectives, it felt problematic for non-law enforcement professionals to offer their opinion on cases because they needed to "stay in their lane." One solution to avoid the deterioration of weekly meetings and case review is to

set clear expectations with all team members about the purpose and importance of the meetings. If there is a staff person who does not prioritize the meetings, then this can be a conversation between them and their supervisor. New team members should be oriented to the expectations of the meetings and case review, and each team member can sign confidentiality agreements and develop a clear set of guidelines for how the meetings should proceed, so everyone is operating under the same set of guidelines.

Lastly, as identified in the interview themes, infrastructure and technology proved a significant barrier in the first year of the SATF. Details such as how to blend two departmental policies and practices, and a third (Adams County Government Center's) IT requirements were underestimated. The details of this component of implementation far exceeded the SATF planning team's expectations, leaving them playing catch up to address issues not identified in the planning stages. Across all interviews, SATF team members and leadership alike felt this was an area that required more forethought and planning for implementation than it ultimately received.

Expansion to Other Police Departments
An intention of the SATF project was to determine the efficacy of addressing sex crimes across adjacent jurisdictions. An idea surfacing through this pilot project was whether to expand the unit beyond Commerce City and Brighton to other adjacent jurisdictions. Given the Denver Metro area has several small to mid-size law enforcement agencies without dedicated sex crimes units, broadening the reach of the SATF could be a useful tool for a number of agencies.

However, as infrastructure delays made themselves clear, the likelihood of taking this next step became less likely. SATF team members overall agreed in principle it would be a strategic and important move to consider adding a third and possibly fourth agency, but they just felt ill-equipped to move in this direction. This is in part to under-staffing, and the need for any partner agency joining the SATF to adopt YHOP, which not every agency in the area is supportive of. Currently, the decision to approach an additional agency is on hold.

Community Partners
One possible way to strengthen relationships and make expectations clearer for community partners and for the SATF is to develop memoranda of understandings for each partner participating in the SATF. This way, their role can be clearly defined, which for some partners was still a little uncertain even after three years of participating. It would also set a strong foundation for their role in case review and perhaps empower them to participate more frequently in discussions.

5.5. Case Quality Recommendations

The results of the case review show that in general, case scores trended upwards. While the interrupted time series analysis doesn't show a discontinuous jump in scores after the implementation of the SATF, we do see cases getting more consistently above 2.0 points. The below table categorizes the scores into low, moderate, and high. After discussions with the commander and sergeant of the SATF, it was

determined that case scores above 2.0 were desirable and case scores below 2.0 would be used as an opportunity for learning so as to enact improvements moving forward.

Table 31
Case Review Scores Low, Moderate, High, 2015-2020

Year	Low (0-0.99)		Moderate (1-1.99)		High (2-3)		
	CCPD	*BPD*	*CCPD*	*BPD*	*CCPD*	*BPD*	*Total*
2015	3	2	25	11	21	21	83
2016	0	0	21	13	24	29	87
2017	1	1	10	9	30	22	73
2018	0	3	20	19	39	28	109
2019	2	0	15	8	44	29	98
2020	1	0	15	17	51	30	114
Total	7	6	106	77	209	159	564

The overall percentage of cases below the 2.0 marker was 35% (n= 196). Between 2015-2017, the percentage of cases under 2.0 points was 40% (n=96). After implementation of the SATF, the percentage of cases under 2.0 dropped to 31% (n=100). Overall, there were few cases with scores under 1.0 and the percentage of cases under 1.0 in the pre and post time frames stayed fairly static with 2015-2017 at 3% (n=7) and 2018-2020 at 2% (n=6).

For cases scoring over 2.0, the best practices appearing in many of the cases:

1. Victim advocate notified
2. SATF called (not just referred)
3. Victim interview usually completed (where applicable)
4. Contacting the victim within three business days of being assigned the case
5. Well-documented supplements in the case file
6. Witnesses identified and interviewed (where applicable)
7. Investigative techniques beyond interviewing.

In total 118 cases were scored at 2.5 or higher, 17% (n=40) during 2015-2017 and 24% (n=78) in the post-SATF implementation period. Common characteristics of cases scoring above 2.5 included those items noted above and:

1. Victim advocate called out

2. Crime scene documented by patrol
3. Detective contacts victim either same day as assignment or with three days
4. Inclusion in a report of how the victim was feeling and information related to the senses
5. Ongoing and frequent victim contact by the detective and advocate
6. Some evidence of investigation into the suspect documented
7. Suspect interview (where applicable)

In sum, greater oversight by the SATF sergeant to ensure cases are not lingering and best practices are utilized is recommended. In addition, ensuring supplements are entered when the work is done and not several months later as a running supplement. Document all contact with the victim and ensure contacts are made regularly so that months do not pass where a victim is not provided an update. Also, working on good writing to reduce the number of inconsistencies between patrol officers and detectives on the facts of the case such as dates and names. Spelling mistakes were also frequent and sometimes changed the meaning of the paragraph. Being willing to adapt or discontinue long-held practices because they are no longer considered best practice and paying attention to ensuring some cases do not receive more attention than others, especially when some cases have more usable facts than others (such as a medical forensic exam, early outcry, and witnesses).

5.6. Case Review Recommendations

The process and implementation of a comprehensive case review was a cumbersome and lengthy process. However, the review team learned some critical lessons for any department wishing to implement a case review process to audit sexual assault cases and ensure investigative best practices are utilized. Based on the team's learning throughout this process, the following recommendations for future case review projects were developed:

1. Ensure effective time management of the review process. Encourage reviewers to dedicate a certain amount of time each week to completing the review process. This prevents cases from building up over time leading to mammoth review sessions.
2. The decision to re-review all cases where the reviewers' case scores were out of alignment by 20% was critical. The discussions were productive and led to better scoring and a deeper understanding of the unique dynamics of investigating a sexual assault case.
3. It is possible that spreading the case review out over several months negatively affected the scores of earlier cases. Much like grading academic papers, the first papers read and scored can sometimes receive better or harsher grades because of their position in the grading line. We do not know whether this did affect scoring but recommend future reviewers be aware of this possibility.
4. Make it a requirement for the reviewers to add notes to the grading rubric so that when an alignment conversation was needed, reviewers can recall why they scored a certain item the way they did. This is especially important when lower or very high marks are provided for certain items.
5. Outside reviewers:

    a. It may be beneficial to consider recruiting reviewers from outside the SATF or equivalent unit. For the SATF case review, the SATF sergeant was a reviewer as was the Victim Services Manager. Both individuals had contact with many of the cases reviewed and were able to pull information from their memories. This did lead to ongoing discussion about grading cases based only on what is in the case file and not on what they remembered. If an outside reviewer is used, then this person should be well-trained in sexual assault investigations, victim and suspect behavior, and responses to trauma.

    b. If a reviewer has a pre-existing relationship with the detective on a case being reviewed, it can introduce additional bias.

    c. On top of normal duties, it was very challenging for the two reviewers in the department to find time to complete such a comprehensive case review.

6. There should be agreement on what best practice says and what the expectations are of detectives, patrol, advocates as it relates to the implementation of best practices at the start of the project. When there is staff turnover, ensure this conversation occurs with the new staff member very early on in their tenure.

7. Lastly, consider implementing ongoing peer case review where each SATF member regularly reviews another person's case.

In addition to these recommendations, the review team made notes on the rubric and guidance to incorporate at the conclusion of the project for future use. Both the rubric and guidance can be found in the appendices.

5.7. Future Research

No project can comprehensively address and review every component of the criminal legal pipeline for sexual assault cases. This project focused on investigation quality and victim-centered policing. While a DA was present at nearly all the weekly meetings and maintained excellent relationships with SATF detectives and advocates, the project did not see an increase in cases filed as compared to the pre-implementation timeframe, despite the rising quality of the cases. While each case is unique and there are several contextual factors affecting the decision to file charges in a sexual assault case, missing from this project was an attendant focus on the DA's decision-making process as a partner to the law enforcement investigation.

Future areas of research for a multi-jurisdictional sex crimes unit could include an analysis of the reasons a DA declines to file a case, an analysis of why a detective decides not to present a case to the DA (given this is a research area of need per Alderen and Ullman, 2012), a comparison between filing and declination decisions and case scores and case characteristics, and persistent barriers to filing cases.

A significant gap in this study are the voices of victims served by the SATF. While the Victim Services Unit did send a satisfaction survey as part of their ongoing program improvement plan as required by

state and federal grants, the SATF did not receive many responses from victims. Capturing experience data from sex assault victims and secondary victims is a persistent challenge. Future research and evaluation in this area is needed to assist in determining the success of a pilot project such as the SATF. Success is not always defined by the filing of cases and charging of suspects and understanding what success means to victims, and how they felt working with SATF detectives and advocates can shine a brighter light on this area.

The results did indicate the significant effect of detective gender on case scores. This was not a primary research question for this project, however, could be an interesting avenue to pursue further to try and understand why women had higher case scores than men on sex crimes investigations and response.

Further evaluation of the Commerce City and Brighton SATF would also be useful once the SATF is more stable, and the U.S. is no longer dealing with a pandemic and intermittent shutdowns. Measuring the effects of a comprehensive new staff orientation and earlier training on SATF team members, as well as the efficacy of a consistent and robust case review process with established stakeholder involvement is recommended. Another avenue of exploration could be the integration of an officer wellness program since this issue was left unaddressed at the SATF and the literature supports an association between high stress police environments and exposure to trauma as key drivers of deteriorating mental health in police officers (Violanti, et al., 2017). Lastly, should the SATF or similar unit seek to integrate a third or fourth agency, tracking and evaluating the process of inclusion would also prove useful in determining the capacity for such an expansion and the effects on case quality and victim engagement.

5.8. Sustainability

Both agencies are committed to continuing the partnership beyond the life of the SPI grant. Since the project has proven successful, and sex crimes continue to be an under-reported violence crime, maintaining a proactive stance in tackling the crime, supporting victims, and holding offenders accountable remains a priority of both agencies. The SATF will continue to be co-located at the Adams County Government Center, and work will continue in establishing a wellness program for detectives and advocates. Efforts are ongoing to address case load and provide additional staffing. In January 2022, an investigative technician will be posted to join the SATF.

The SATF sergeant and commander will re-energize weekly meetings with community partners and break down some of the barriers that have arisen over the last two years as it relates to engaging community partners in case review. Creating a space where everyone's voice is equally valued will be a primary goal moving forward.

As this project ends, both Commerce City and Brighton have had a forward progress mentality. The agencies have met and discussed the success and challenges of having this specialized unit and how those affect the continued development of the SATF. Commerce City recently hired a Crime Analyst who is currently working with Dr. Ingarfield to gain knowledge of important data collection techniques

to continue to analyze SATF data to measure the progress of the SATF. SATF Leadership has met with Chiefs Nichols and Southard to discuss staffing levels to sustain the increase in cases experienced by the unit. Each agency has committed to reviewing departmental budgets and adding staffing when able. In 2022 a new Investigative Technician position will be hired through Commerce City, funded by each city in accordance with the original formula outlined in the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). This Investigative Technician will assist SATF detectives with many of the tasks that can be completed by a civilian, allowing detectives to focus on other elements of the investigation. Each agency has also begun to review the current IGA governing the SATF, removing language specific to the BJA SPI grant and replacing it with language around the continued growth of the SATF. Each agency has also committed to regular meetings to ensure it does not depart from the victim-centered and offender-focused strategies the SATF was founded upon.

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Interrupted Time Series Analysis Variable Key and Variable Tables

yr_mon = time trend (January 2018 = 0, February 2018 = 1, March 2018 = 2, etc.; December 2017 = -1, November 2017 = -2, etc.)

post = 1 if yr_mon>=0, 0 if yr_mon<0

inter = 1 if yr_mon>=0, 0 if yr_mon<0

patrol_fem = 1 if patrol officer listed as female, 0 if male

det_fem = 1 if detective listed as female, 0 if male

is_BPD = jurisdiction is Brighton

patrol_is_BPD = patrol officer is from BPD

det_is_BPD = detective is from BPD

is_atrisk = victim listed as at-risk adult

is_child = victim listed as child

crime_sac = crime is categorized as sexual assault on a child

crime_usc = crime is categorized as unlawful sexual contact

crime_other = crime isn't categorized as sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, or unlawful sexual contact

Table notes: ITS Coefficients (resulting statistic) are on the top line, standard errors in parenthesis beneath the coefficient

Table 7
Interrupted Time Series Analysis - BPD Individual Case Scores

Variable	BPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0016
	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)
Shift in means (post)	0.0284	0.0268	0.0277
	(0.1352)	(0.1359)	(0.1389)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	0.0080	0.0080	0.0078
	(0.0065)	(0.0065)	(0.0066)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.0760	0.0764	0.0754
	(0.0730)	(0.0733)	(0.0739)

Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.2257 ***	0.2252 ***	0.2224 ***
	(0.0679)	(0.0681)	(0.0689)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	0.0187	0.0184	0.0242
	(0.0898)	(0.0900)	(0.0913)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		(omitted)	(omitted)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		-0.0093	-0.0271
		(0.0635)	(0.1027)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.0254
			(0.1078)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			-0.0259
			(0.1082)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			-0.0225
			(0.2538)
N	242	242	242
Adj. R2	0.0658	0.0618	0.0505

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01
Included but not shown: reviewer indicators, constant term

Table 8

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - CCPD Individual Case Scores

Variable	CCPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	0.0117 ***	0.0113 ***	0.0110 ***
	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)
Shift in means (post)	-0.1104	-0.0983	-0.1133
	(0.1208)	(0.1238)	(0.1241)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	-0.0103 *	-0.0101 *	-0.0105 *
	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0055)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	-0.0325	-0.0306	0.0064
	(0.0613)	(0.0616)	(0.0624)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.1247 *	0.1248 *	0.1245 *
	(0.0639)	(0.0640)	(0.0636)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	-0.0231	-0.0210	-0.0270
	(0.0715)	(0.0717)	(0.0716)

Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		0.1494	0.1355
		(0.1839)	(0.1828)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.0301	-0.1900 *
		(0.0544)	(0.1060)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.2802 **
			(0.1144)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			0.0331
			(0.0998)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			0.0237
			(0.2197)
N	322	322	322
Adj. R2	0.0761	0.0727	0.0898

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01
Included but not shown: reviewer indicators, constant term

Table 9

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - Both Agencies Individual Case Scores

Variable	Both Agencies		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	0.0062 **	0.0060 **	0.0058 *
	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)
Shift in means (post)	-0.0581	-0.0485	-0.0500
	(0.0890)	(0.0901)	(0.0905)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	-0.0030	-0.0030	-0.0036
	(0.0042)	(0.0042)	(0.0042)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.0103	0.0104	0.0222
	(0.0471)	(0.0472)	(0.0473)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.1681 ***	0.1685 ***	0.1648 ***
	(0.0467)	(0.0468)	(0.0468)
Is the agency BPD? (is_BPD)	0.0307	0.0323	0.0357
	(0.0488)	(0.0490)	(0.0490)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	-0.0031	-0.0022	0.0025
	(0.0503)	(0.0503)	(0.0503)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		0.1473	0.1465

		(0.1818)	(0.1815)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.0183	-0.0935
		(0.0413)	(0.0730)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.1467 *
			(0.0775)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			-0.0019
			(0.0726)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			0.0010
			(0.1659)
N	564	564	564
Adj. R2	0.0589	0.0568	0.0619

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01
Included but not shown: reviewer indicators, constant term

Table 10
Interrupted Time Series - Monthly Average Case Scores

Variable	Both	CCPD	BPD	Both	CCPD	BPD	Both	CCPD	BPD
		Overall Score			Patrol Score			Detective Score	
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	0.0085 ***	0.0135 ***	0.0016	0.0038	0.0066 *	0.0001	0.0063 *	0.0101 **	0.0008
	(0.0027)	(0.0039)	(0.0043)	(0.0032)	(0.0037)	(0.0047)	(0.0035)	(0.0047)	(0.0054)
Shift in means (post)	-0.0736	-0.1010	-0.0333	-0.0922	-0.1720	-0.0037	-0.0762	0.0320	-0.1962
	(0.0753)	(0.1100)	(0.1165)	(0.0886)	(0.1052)	(0.1292)	(0.0964)	(0.1304)	(0.1475)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	-0.0049	-0.0121 **	0.0049	0.0092 **	0.0051	0.0156 **	-0.0018	-0.0078	0.0060
	(0.0036)	(0.0051)	(0.0056)	(0.0042)	(0.0049)	(0.0062)	(0.0046)	(0.0061)	(0.0071)
N	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71
Adj. R2	0.2689	0.2303	0.0519	0.3944	0.2643	0.2986	0.1188	0.2254	0.0002

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01

Table 11
CCPD Scores by Year Tukey HSD Posthoc Results

Year		Mean Difference	Standard Error	Sig. (*p*)
2015	2016	-.36239*	.10104	.008
	2017	-.37295*	.10331	.008
	2018	-.42774*	.10104	.001
	2019	-.34844*	.10104	.012
	2020	-.50178*	.10104	.000

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level

Table 12

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - BPD Patrol Scores

Variable	BPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	-0.0007	-0.0008	-0.0010
	(0.0048)	(0.0047)	(0.0048)
Shift in means (post)	0.0035	0.0159	0.0268
	(0.1411)	(0.1415)	(0.1441)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	0.0191 ***	0.0189 ***	0.0188 ***
	(0.0068)	(0.0068)	(0.0068)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.1336 *	0.1300 *	0.1337 *
	(0.0762)	(0.0762)	(0.0767)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.0466	0.0500	0.0541
	(0.0708)	(0.0708)	(0.0714)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	0.0475	0.0496	0.0426
	(0.0937)	(0.0936)	(0.0947)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		(omitted)	(omitted)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.0739	0.0159
		(0.0661)	(0.1065)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.0701
			(0.1118)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			0.1206

			(0.1122)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			0.2673
			(0.2632)
N	242	242	242
Adj. R2	0.1218	0.1227	0.1182

Standard errors in parentheses

* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01

Included but not shown: reviewer indicators, constant term

Table 13

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - CCPD Patrol Scores

Variable	CCPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	0.0066 *	0.0061	0.0061
	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)
Shift in means (post)	-0.1765	-0.1664	-0.1503
	(0.1180)	(0.1199)	(0.1207)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	0.0042	0.0043	0.0040
	(0.0054)	(0.0054)	(0.0054)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.0131	0.0203	0.0360
	(0.0600)	(0.0596)	(0.0606)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	-0.0395	-0.0395	-0.0327
	(0.0624)	(0.0620)	(0.0618)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	0.0226	0.0302	0.0124
	(0.0699)	(0.0695)	(0.0696)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		0.2990 *	0.2713
		(0.1781)	(0.1777)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.1140 **	-0.0693
		(0.0527)	(0.1031)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.2271 **
			(0.1113)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			0.1507
			(0.0971)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			-0.1579

			(0.2136)
N	322	322	322
Adj. R2	0.0701	0.0835	0.0929

Standard errors in parentheses
* = p<.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01
Included but not shown: reviewer indicators, constant term

Table 14

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - BPD Detective Scores

Variable	BPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	-0.0030	-0.0030	-0.0032
	(0.0058)	(0.0059)	(0.0059)
Shift in means (post)	-0.1436	-0.1396	-0.1305
	(0.1737)	(0.1746)	(0.1783)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	0.0124	0.0123	0.0117
	(0.0083)	(0.0083)	(0.0085)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.0496	0.0484	0.0475
	(0.0938)	(0.0941)	(0.0949)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.2686 ***	0.2697 ***	0.2655 ***
	(0.0872)	(0.0874)	(0.0884)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	0.1255	0.1262	0.1364
	(0.1153)	(0.1156)	(0.1172)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		(omitted)	(omitted)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.0244	-0.0481
		(0.0816)	(0.1318)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.0975
			(0.1383)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			0.0050
			(0.1389)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			0.0731
			(0.3257)
N	242	242	242
Adj. R2	0.0762	0.0726	0.0631

Table 15

Interrupted Time Series Analysis - CCPD Detective Scores

Variable	CCPD Only		
Pre-trend (yr_mon)	0.0058	0.0055	0.0053
	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0050)
Shift in means (post)	0.0051	0.0134	-0.0092
	(0.1499)	(0.1536)	(0.1555)
Post-trend adjustment (inter)	-0.0016	-0.0015	-0.0014
	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)
Is the patrol officer female? (patrol_fem)	0.0884	0.0924	0.1136
	(0.0761)	(0.0764)	(0.0782)
Is the detective female? (det_fem)	0.2780 ***	0.2780 ***	0.2777 ***
	(0.0793)	(0.0794)	(0.0797)
Is the detective from BPD? (det_is_BPD)	-0.0708	-0.0666	-0.0662
	(0.0888)	(0.0890)	(0.0898)
Is the victim at-risk? (is_atrisk)		0.1849	0.1760
		(0.2280)	(0.2291)
Is the victim a child? (is_child)		0.0627	-0.0790
		(0.0674)	(0.1329)
Is the crime SAC? (crime_sac)			0.1810
			(0.1434)
Is the crime unlawful sexual contact? (crime_usc)			0.0309
			(0.1251)
Is the crime something else? (crime_other)			0.2024
			(0.2754)
N	322	322	322
Adj. R2	0.0885	0.0865	0.0843

SPI SEXUAL ASSAULT TASKFORCE - SA INVESTIGATIONS LOGIC MODEL

Objectives/Purpose: *To increase the efficacy & quality of sexual assault investigations; Increase victim engagement in the process; Increase prosecution of sexual assault cases; Reduce load on general investigations*

Problem(s) – "Context or Motivation"	Inputs – "raw materials" *staff and resources going into the project*	Outputs/Activities – "what are we doing with the raw materials" *Activities the project will undertake, such as solutions/strategies to be tested, planned training, evaluation efforts, and SPI TTA*	Outcomes/Results – "how we know change has occurred/what is the change we expect"
Low reporting of sexual assault in Commerce City and the City of Brighton, Colorado Limited victim engagement in SA investigations Turnover of detectives with expertise in SA investigations Lack of time due to general investigations load to effectively investigate SA Limited training of detectives on SA investigations, trauma, interviewing, and effective victim engagement Audit results indicating deficits in SA investigations and victim follow up	Staff from both agencies: 2 x detectives from BPD 1 x sergeant from BPD 3 x detectives from CCPD 1 x commander from CCPD 1.5 x victim advocates 1 x victim services manager (Project Director) 1 x DA assigned to SATF Strategies for Policing Innovation BJA grant funding Supplemental funding from Commerce City and City of Brighton Adams County Government Center shared workspace Researcher time and expertise Assigned DA to project	(1) Develop a cross-jurisdictional sexual assault taskforce (2) Hire five detectives, one sergeant, and one commander (20%) to staff the SATF and assign 1.5 victim advocates (1 x FTE; 0.5 FTE bilingual advocate) (3) Development and implementation of SATF policies and practices (4) Pool agency resources to support SATF operations (5) Identify and acquire a shared workspace for the SATF (6) Certify SATF detectives, commander, and sergeant in Forensic Experiential Trauma Interviewing (April 2018) (7) Train victim advocates on principles of Forensic Experiential Trauma Interviewing (April 2017) (8) Train SATF members of SA investigation best practice and victim engagement (ongoing) (9) Development of investigation and patrol checklists (10) Weekly case review SATF meetings (11) Development of investigation quality rubric to provide ongoing evaluation of case investigation quality (12) Follow up interviews with detectives upon case closure (13) Follow up interviews with general investigation detectives about workload (14) Development of assessment tool for victim satisfaction and engagement (15) Documentation of implementation process (16) Quarterly meetings with police departments to update leadership on process (17) Inclusion of DA in SATF meetings and case reviews to streamline communication between LE and DA	**Short Term (learning: awareness, knowledge, skills, motivations)** SATF detective certified in FETI and utilize skills in victim interviewing (6) Victim advocates trained in basics of FETI (7) Stronger relationship between LE and DA (10)(17) **Medium Term (action: behavior, practice, decisions, policies)** Improved quality of SA investigations (9)(11)(12)(13) Increase in DA filings of SA cases (17) Increase in victim engagement during the investigative process (1)(6)(7)(14) Decrease in length of time between SA report and filing with DA (when there is probable causes and victim wants the case to move forward) (1)(3)(8)(9)(10)(17) Increase in number of SA cases handled by SATF as compared to general investigations pre- SATF (1)(2)(3)(4)(8)(9)(11)(12)(13) Increase in completion of general investigation cases and quality (13) 100% participation by victim advocates in sexual assault cases (5)(7)(8)(10)(14) **Long Term (consequences: social, economic, environmental etc.** Increase in SA reports to CCPD and BPD (1)(2)(3)(4)(6)(8)(9)(10)(14)(17)

Assumptions: beliefs about the program, personnel involved, the context of project plans
Agency leadership support, detectives want to be on the taskforce and are open to shifting their practice as necessary, all individuals involved in the SATF are bought into its purpose and likelihood of success, specialized unit will positively affect efficacy of SA investigations, detectives hired will stay for at least three years

External Factors: outside factors that interact with and influence the program action
DA collaboration, community awareness of YHOP and taskforce model, City of Brighton and Commerce City financial health, sexual assault response team continues to thrive, number of victims reporting SA to LE, Children's Advocacy

SPI SEXUAL ASSAULT TASKFORCE - SO MANAGEMENT LOGIC MODEL

Objectives/Purpose: *Consolidate all sex offender registration duties under the taskforce; Increase contacts with registered sex offenders by 100 per cent over three years; Ensure taskforce members are educated in sex offender registration management policies and protocols.*

Problem(s) – "Context or Motivation"	Resources/Inputs – "raw materials"	Outputs/Activities – "what are we doing with the raw materials"	Outcomes/Results – "how we know change has occurred/what is the change we expect"
Large numbers of sex offenders moving to	Staff from both agencies:	(1) Implementation of a cross-jurisdictional sexual assault taskforce serving Commerce City and the City of Brighton	**Short Term (learning: awareness, knowledge, skills, motivations)**

Sexual Assault Investigations National Best Practices

Document	Author	Best Practice
Core Standards for Sexual Assault Investigators	The National Sexual Assault Kit Initiative	Assign an investigator at the earliest possible time Investigator should respond promptly to crime scene (if applicable). Create well-defined written policies related to crime scene response, investigator assignment and investigative timing Continually reassess case as facts emerge Document initial briefing given by first responder If at crime scene, document physical conditions, witnesses, and anyone else Document information that is known and unknown Develop and refer to a checklist for next steps Interview victims, witnesses, and suspects Possess a deep understanding of the effects of trauma Allow for uninterrupted narratives of the event Record interviews If crime scene is not initially know, through interviews attempt to locate it. Visit the crime scene and document the scene. Connect victim with a victim advocate Complete a background check and criminal history of suspect. Identify possible links to other crimes and crime trends. Document in file Ensure case file is complete, with every action taken and not taken, with explanation. Do not include opinions.
Sexual Assault Incident Reports: Investigative Strategies	IACP	Collect forensic evidence from victim, suspect, and location of crime Witness interviews and statements Do not unfound reports as false based on victim interview or victim responses Collect as much evidence and support as you can to demonstrate the sexual contact was nonconsensual. Avoid language that implies consent such as "they had sex" or "he had sex with her." Instead use "he forced his penis into her vagina" Ensure every sexual assault reported is assigned a tracking number A victim's reluctance to move forward with an investigation does not indicate a false report nor a reason to conduct a sub-standard investigation Case coding and clearance decisions should be based on careful review of the evidence collected in the case Make sure to document victim's feelings in the report – focus on senses Fully document any fear – e.g. did the victim describe not being able to move? Document threats specifically – avoid general statements such as "he threatened her." Remember, the mere presence of the perpetrator may be considered force. Patrol should not do the preliminary interview Make sure to understand how victims communicate No. This is not always done verbally Create and document timeline of events Do not sanitize or clean up language used by the victim and try to use their own words. Where you are directly quoting a victim, use " "

		Where alcohol or other drugs have incapacitated a victim, ensure you are documenting this to illustrate increased vulnerability and not victim culpability For the interview, ask if the victim would like a support person such as an advocate Provide victim with written community referrals and resources Recognize and understand the impact of trauma on victim memory and behavior Document suspect behavior prior to the assault Speak with suspect friends and families for possible outcry witnesses Pay attention to the likelihood of co-occurring crimes Build and maintain rapport with the victim through ongoing contact and updates. Assure the victim that their responses are normal.
Rape Survivors' Experiences With the Legal and Medical Systems: Do Rape Victim Advocates Make a Difference?	Rebecca Campbell, Phd https://doi.org/10.1177/107780120527 7539	"Survivors who had the assistance of an advocate were significantly more likely to have police reports taken and were less likely to be treated negatively by police officers. These women also reported less distress after their contact with the legal system."
Sexual Assault Response Policy and Training Content Guidelines	IACP	Delayed reporting is normal Be understanding and patient with victims Contact a victim advocate as soon as possible (patrol) Ask about and document any strangulation (patrol) Offer an MFE (patrol) Call an investigator (patrol) Document crime scene Identify witnesses and document
National Best Practices for Sexual Assault Kits: A Multidisciplinary Approach (chapter 4 Investigative Considerations)	NIJ	Victim -centered and trauma-informed approach Victim participation is enhanced by the presence of an advocate Victims define justice differently, respect their interpretation Document every report of sexual assault and treat every repot as valid Every report should be investigated thoroughly Ensure access to an MFE is applicable Document every action taken in the case file Every sexual assault evidence kit should be tested Ensure all crime scene evidence is collected, documented, and included in the case file Collect evidence from other locations as applicable, including technology and social media Make sure witnesses are interviewed Complete a criminal background and history on the suspect – document this in the case file. Ensure any crime lab results from forensic analysis are documented in the case file Even if no DNA profile is developed, continue the investigation. Do not close the case on this basis. If there is a CODIS hit, detectives must follow up on the investigation
Improving the Police Response to Sexual Assault	PERF	Victim-centered interviewing Interviewers should have specialized training in interviewing sexual assault survivors

		Schedule follow up in-depth interview for after the victim has had 1-2 full sleep cycles
		Record interviews
		Use a safe interview location
		Use open ended questions
		The victim interview is not an interrogation
		A victim's hesitancy to recall the event, prior relationships with suspect and decision not to report immediately have no bearing on a victim's credibility
		Return all calls and emails from the victim as soon as possible (no more than 1-2 days later), even if just to acknowledge the call. Document all follow up in the report
		By staying in regular contact with the victim, detectives build rapport which is crucial for a successful investigation
		Detectives should create the conditions where victims feel they have choices and are able to control the pace of the investigation
		Develop policies to notify the victim once the kit has been analyzed and returned to the department.
		Develop systems to track forensic evidence at every stage of the process.
		Complete a thorough investigation before arresting a suspect
		Reports should be as detailed as possible, starting with the first responder. Provide details chronologically. All leads followed, results of the leads, all interviews, all evidence, all action steps, all victim communication, do not paraphrase or sanitize victim language
		Any alcohol or drug use describe in neutral tones
		Standardize what should be in reports so all reports are of similar quality
		Victim recantation does not mean a report is false
		Do not unfound cases without a complete and thorough investigation "Categories such as "inactive" or "suspended" may be used for cases in which the investigation has gone as far as possible to date, but remains unsolved, and there is no basis for unfounding" p. 52 Inactive cases where no work has been done because there is none to do should be removed from a detective's active caseload.
		Supervisors should regularly review cases assigned non-criminal codes to ensure a full investigation was done and the case was not improperly coded.
		Supervisors should regularly review case coding and clearance for accuracy
		PDs should cultivate strong collaborative partnerships with community agencies working with sexual assault victims. Establish MOUS with community partners, include them in case reviews and discussions of community trends
		PDs should track the numbers of cases presented, filed, declined as well as the reasons for the decline
The You Have Options Program		Victim centered response
		Offer multiple ways to report sexual assault
		Offender focused investigations
		Ensure detectives are using all available databases to search for suspect background. An NCIC background check is not sufficient
		Participate in and coordinate with multidisciplinary team such as SART
		All reported sexual assaults will be documented and assigned for follow up investigation
		Provide periodic training to first responders and investigators

		Unit supervisor should regularly review case dispositions and if possible, include MDT members in the audit.
Effective Report Writing: Using the Language of Nonconsensual Sex https://evawintl.org/wp-content/uploads/Module-1_Report-Writing.pdf	Ending Violence Against Women International (EVAWI)	Make sure to include a summary of all evidence in your reports Record all interviews Detectives are providing the foundation upon which a prosecutor can build a case, therefore accuracy is paramount Make connections explicit – do not leave the reader to connect the dots. Make sure everything is documented as what is not written cannot be accounted for. Avoid using brief summaries of the investigation. The detective's report is the only place where everything is documented. Recreate the reality of the experience for the victim in the report Preserve exact phrases used by victim Ensure you include feelings and thoughts of the victim during the experience Describe – use a word picture Document force threat and fear in its entirety – include the context. Use language of nonconsensual sex, not "oral sex" "sexual intercourse" "fondling" "caressing"
Preliminary Investigations: Guidelines for First Responders	EVAWI and IACP https://evawintl.org/wp-content/uploads/Module-4_Prelim-Invest.pdf	When responding to a call of sexual assault, patrol should gather only the minimal information needed to establish a crime has occurred. Never conduct this preliminary interview in a public area. The officer should offer medical care and an MFE if it is appropriate Use simple language when speaking with a victim initially Preserve victim statements as spoken Patrol officer should without judgement document physical and emotional demeanor of the victim in their report. Be specific. Patrol officers and investigators must be patient with victims reporting sexual assault Delayed reporting reasons do not need to be documented and delayed reporting normalized for the victim Investigators should determine what issues will be raised in court, prioritize evidence, and determine probative value of statements and evidence on the investigation Investigators must develop and investigation strategy and the strategy should be clear from the documentation in the case file The absence of any injury or any physical resistance cannot be used to show the victim consented Understand and recognize common theories of sex crime offenders to make sure their investigation addresses any issues defense is likely to raise. Notify a victim advocate as soon as possible Make sure to identify and locate witnesses Allow victim to have a support person (victim advocate) in the interview

Appendix IV

Case Review Rubric Guidance (amended post project)

Note: Text in purple are changes and recommendations for future rubrics/projects.

Overall – Remind review team that if the officers and/or victim advocates (VAs) did not do the work, then they should be rated as zero. It is not an NA if work should have been performed and wasn't.

If officers do not call VAs, then the zero will be reflected in both the officer and VA sections. Please add a note in the VA section that the zero was not of their doing.

Consider implementing a scoring differentiation for when information on work completed is missing from the report vs the work was not done at all. If something is not documented in the case file, then a larger question for any review team should be whether that means it didn't happen for scoring purposes and thus a zero, or whether partial credit should be provided.

Weighted Questions

	Rubric Item	Criteria/Explanation
P1W	Report has been treated as valid from the outset	- Report language raises no doubt as to the veracity of the report - Report demonstrates officer responded with empathy (resource referral, calling a VA, explaining options) - Trauma informed principles utilized in initial report and interaction with survivor - Responding office demonstrates care and concern, refrains from judgment. - Absence of personal opinion in report - <24 hrs an RO should typically forward a SA report to an investigator. If this doesn't happen, is it documented as to why?
P2W	VA is called	- Did the responding officer call the VA? - Is contact documented in the Patrol Officer (PO) report - If contact is not listed, is an explanation provided? - Is there a "responding VA" listed in the VA notes (if in VA notes but not PO report, then 1.5)
P3W	Responding Officer offers victim medical care, including an MFE (if SA within 7-day time frame), if injury is visible and/or victim complains of pain	- Did the responding officer document the conversation about the MFE with the victim (if appropriate)? - If no MFE, did officer document why? - Did the responding officer provide a comprehensive overview of all choices available to the victim? - Clarify this would be an NA if the officer responds to the hospital as the V is already there receiving services - If the victim identifies injury **and** pain or if the officer can see an injury, medical care is offered

		- Could forensic evidence be collected? Even if not full MFE, swabs etc. - Clarify that when the response is a call, and the case is determined to be another jurisdiction that offering medical care wouldn't make sense
P4W	Was crime scene visited and documented?	- Does the case file identify the officer visited the crime scene? - Are there details documented in the report about the crime scene? - If no, why – is an explanation given? - No mention of crime scene or not visiting a known crime scene without explanation would be a o - Whether a patrol officer visits a crime scene is dependent on several things. However, a general rule should be if the crime occurred less than one week ago and the crime scene is **not** the suspect's house or would not tip off a suspect, the PO should make an attempt to visit. Rubric item should be amended to reflect this guidance - Perhaps consider not having this item as a weighted item for patrol given the case-by-case nature of expectations around this - If recent crime, and crime scene suspect house, rubric item should be scored be NA because no expectation for the patrol to go to suspect's house and tip them off
I1W	Victim was interviewed, and interview recorded (video/audio)	- Victim was interviewed - Trauma informed interview techniques - Supplemental report and/or transcripts included - Children should not be interviewed by the detective but rather at a Child Advocacy Center for a forensic interview (FI). If the detective does interview the child, then a clear reason why they are doing this must be listed.
I2W	Crime scene evidence collected and documented (bedding, clothing, environmental elements, photos of scene etc.)	- Is it clear from the report that documentation of the crime scene was considered, and done as soon as was reasonably possible, and in manner designed to preserve and document available evidence before it was lost, destroyed, or compromised? - Crime scene evidence properly collected, tagged, and clearly documented per chain of evidence policy - If crime scene evidence not collected, investigator has identified why in the case file - Intentional use of body worn camera or other recording device to document crime scene (report must note this and its inclusion into evidence)
I3W	Suspect has been interviewed and interview recorded (audio or video)	- If not, why not
I4W	If case is deemed "unfounded-false," is there concrete and	

	articulable evidence (not opinion, speculation) that an assault **did not** occur after a thorough investigation has been conducted? *Perceptions of victim credibility or reporting timeline is not evidence a crime did not occur.*	
I5W	Investigator contacted victim within 3 business days from assignment	- Clear notation in the file detective attempts to contact victim within 3 business days - Perhaps add a rubric item that documents the timeframe between report and assignment. Assuming everything is done correctly, then the ideal time frame from Sgt notification of the case and assignment is 24 hours. NOTE: other failures like not notifying detective, not taking a case report, not notifying the VA could lead to longer timelines that are not the detective's fault. Note this in the notes section for scoring.
A1W	VA has explained the YHOP (when applicable) to victim	- Discussion is documented and dated - If SAC, SA with position of trust, YHOP cannot be offered in its entirety because of mandatory reporting - Is this noted in the report? - YHOP not relevant for a DV SA

Initial (Patrol) Investigation

	Rubric Item	Criteria/Explanation
P1	Responding Officer established elements of a crime occurred	- Details of crime documented
P2	Responding Officer has documented victim demeanor as observed free of assumption and judgment	- **Note:** RO wouldn't talk to victim if: juvenile (SACs), 3rd party report, victim in detention, position of trust. Problem if RO is questioning a juvenile victim (detailed questioning). In these cases, an NA rating is appropriate. - Language used in report does not implicitly or explicitly include assumption or judgment about the victim's demeanor, appearance or emotional state. - Report is written objectively, only describing not evaluating
P3	SATF/Investigator called	- Did the responding office call the investigator (felony level crimes only)? - < 24 hours typically responding officer should forward a SA to investigations. Could be they are holding on to it for disbelief or over-zealous - Misdemeanor (USC) not protocol to call - If not, is an explanation provided?
P4	Investigative information, signs and/or symptoms of strangulation – responding	- Is it documented in the report the responding officer asked about strangulation and the victim's response is documented?

	officer asked and documented in report	- Did the responding officer ask the questions effectively? For example: "did suspect put their hands on your neck" vs "were you strangled or choked." Did the officer ask: "*what were you thinking and feeling when the suspect's hand was on your neck*"
P5	Initial report and interview focus on suspect behavior vs victim behavior (PERF)	- Is it clear from the report whether the responding officer focused on the suspect's behavior to a greater degree than the victim's behavior and demeanor? - **Remember**, this isn't necessarily the victim or suspect. It could be a RP, 3rd party who is initially interviewed
P6	Initial interview with victim is limited to questions establishing only the basic facts of the incident that occurred (IACP)	- Did the responding officer document the basic facts of the case free of personal opinion? - POs should not be interviewing children, so NA here (could be appropriate for a preliminary interview in some circumstances if there is safety concern with Qs directed at safety of child) - NA for third party reports
P7	If victim is apprehensive to continue report, process and options are explained	- Documentation of discussion about options and process in report - This item is only applicable if the victim is apprehensive - **Note**: At patrol level, RO would not be talking to a V with: SAC, detention, position of trust
P8	If victim agrees to medical care and/or an MFE, VA accompanies victim to the medical facility. If VA does not accompany victim, explanation provided in report.	- Was VA accompaniment offered? - If declined, why?
P9	Any injuries, no matter how slight, are documented thoroughly	- All injuries documented

P10	Did the responding officer go to the crime scene?
	Could split this item up:
	  1) Did officer ask about/attempt to identify crime scene
	  2) If crime scene identified, did the PO visit it. If not, is reason why not documented?
		- Yes/no
		- Think about why a crime scene was not identified. If the reason for non-identification is not because patrol didn't ask, didn't try, or didn't investigate then should this be rated differently or phrased differently.

P11	Are any witnesses (outcry/other) identified in the report	- Yes/No - **Note**: This doesn't mean interviewed, this means identified in the report.
P11	If a statement was obtained from the survivor, is it clear from the report the statement was given	- Yes/No - With this item, clarify whether the statement has to be an actual statement or if the officer writes down in the report

	voluntarily and, in the survivor's, own words.	what the Victim says and it is clear they are writing it verbatim, this counts as a statement

Investigation		
	Rubric Item	**Criteria/Explanation**
	Possible addition to the investigation section is "no supplement gaps of 30 days or more"	- SAKI monitoring performance standards list this as something a unit head should track. Best practice would require regular supplements being entered, with no gaps in time for more than 30 days.
I1	Origin of victim report is documented in file (phone call, in-person, web, medical report, anonymous report, LE report etc.) NOTE: The three types of report (LE, Medical, and Anonymous are CO specific state laws)	- Does the report identify the origin of the report? For example, does the detective say they received the report from an officer? Do they say when they were assigned the report? - If the victim has called LE and is working with them, an LE report should be assumed even if this is not specifically documented
I2	If case is a conversion from a medical or anonymous reporting case, timelines are documented in case file	- Are timelines clearly identifiable? - Has each key point been documented and a timeline identified?
I3	If MFE performed, and victim reporting to LE, evidence was sent for testing within 21 days (with victim consent) (state law)	- Was evidence sent for testing in the appropriate time frame? - Was victim's permission for testing documented via a consent form in the file?
I4	If case is a conversion from a medical or anonymous reporting case, evidence is sent for testing within 21 days of victim's conversion (with victim consent) (state law)	- Was evidence sent for testing in the appropriate time frame? - Was victim's permission for testing documented via a consent form in the file?
I5	Investigator has documented in case file attempts to keep victim up to date with investigation	- Attempts documented in detail - Attempts are robust (vs leaving a card on a door or a short VM message and then no f/u) - If victim is not contactable (i.e.: they are incarcerated), this is documented. - If a Victim disengages, are attempts beyond phone calls and voicemails documented?
I6	All witnesses have been interviewed and all leads followed and documented clearly	- All witnesses identified have been interviewed - All supplemental reports and/or transcripts of interviews are included in file - Is it clear from the report that every question, or lead, has been fully investigated? - No loose ends or unanswered questions?
I7	If crime scene was not photographed or videoed, and/or crime scene evidence not collected, a comprehensive reason why not is	- Reasons provided why crime scene was not investigated - No mention of crime scene or any attempts to document would mean a 0 - Consider making this a weighted item (in place of patrol PW4) because every detective should be trying to

	documented by investigator in case file	determine a crime scene and documenting it. Could rephrase to "was investigation work done to identify crime scene?" and "if crime scene identified, and the crime scene was not photographed or videoed, and/or crime scene evidence not collected, a comprehensive reason why not is documented by investigator in case file"
I8	Suspect's prior behavior is investigated, including speaking to witnesses (with victim permission) who may be able to shed light on serial behavior/pattern of offending, and consideration of possible co-occurring crimes A comprehensive background investigation on the suspect's criminal history and previous behavior	- Has investigator documented and clearly articulated their efforts to investigate a suspect's prior behavior? - Clear documentation about why any witnesses or contacts were not interviewed - Is it clear from the reports and overall case file, investigator has taken into consideration the possibility of co-occurring crimes, AND followed any leads uncovered to this effect? - Documentation of background check and investigation into previous criminal behavior - Point of discussion for review team: How to rate item when there is no suspect identified but there is no suspect because patrol and/or investigations did not investigate crime?
I9	Forensic evidence is collected from the suspect	- Hospital or buccal swabs at the PD - **Note**: If evidence from victim, should collect from suspect - If not, why not
I10	Investigative reports include information on how victim is/was feeling, thoughts, emotional responses, as well as any information they share related additional sensations recalled – smells, sounds, tastes, tactile etc., to the senses.	- Has investigator thoroughly identified and spoken to the victim about their thoughts and feelings during their assault experience? - Have these conversations been documented clearly and without personal bias? - Is the language used descriptive vs inflammatory (victim shared she felt frozen vs. victim didn't do anything to stop the assault)? - Language does not blame victim – implicitly or explicitly - If there is nothing in the report to this effect – why? Did the detective does not ask or did they not interview the victim. If they didn't do it, item should be rated as zero.
I11	Investigator has documented victim demeanor as observed free of assumption and judgment	- When the responding officer is also the investigator, only rate this once (Patrol or Investigator) - Unbiased language used - E.g. "Refused" or "Uncooperative" imply victim is the issue. "Hysterical" is a loaded word (draws on history of women in psychiatric wards and as a diagnosis to shame women, particularly SA survivors). Use instead: victim was crying, or victim exhibited a flat affect - We need to have something here that accounts for when an investigator doesn't speak to the V (like a child) or for a problematic reason. One is not the same as the other

		-	Does a recap of the FI count as meeting this criterion?
I12	Document and confirm what "no" looked like for the victim (the absence of a spoken no, for example, is not the determinant of lack of consent)	-	Has the investigator explored with the victim all the ways they may have indicated they did not consent beyond saying no?
		-	This should be a zero, and not an NA, when the detective didn't ask because they never made an attempt to speak with the victim or learn more about their experience. If there is a reason noted that precluded them asking this question, then consider an NA.
		-	In the cases of child SA, then there is not a need to document what no looked like because they are not able to give consent.
I13	A variety of investigative practices utilized (pre-text phone call, social media, text msg etc., per department policies/state law).	-	Is it clear from the investigation and documentation that investigators have utilized a variety of investigative practices?
I14	The investigative reports showed clear strategy and logic flow	-	Based on the totality of the investigation, is it clear to the reviewer that the investigator followed a strategy vs a hap hazard process of investigation
		-	Is a clear logic and flow easily identifiable in the documentation and process of investigation?
I15	Case disposition is not based upon perceptions of victim credibility	-	Case file makes no mention of – either implicitly or explicitly – victim credibility as a determining factor in the outcome of the investigation
I16	Investigator does not utilize "he said/she said" language or thought processes in the investigation and case documentation	-	Investigator has demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the unique dynamics associated with sexual assaults in their investigative process and language
		-	Investigator has not fallen into black and white, he said/she said patterns
I17	If case is investigated against victim's wishes, reasons for decision to do so documented in case file	-	This would be a NA if case investigation is not against victim's will
		-	For future break this into two items: → If the investigator investigates the case against the victim's will, the reasons for doing so are documented. →Should the detective have investigated the case against the victim's will but didn't (e.g., SAC, threat to public)
I18	Add an item related to documenting when the case was assigned	-	
I19	Add an item about AOAs and following up to ensure the case did arrive at location	-	
I20	Add an item about notifying the victim that their case is now at a different jurisdiction	-	

I21	Per 2021 CO state law, add an item related to victim notification of SA kit being sent to crime lab, any DNA uploads, and receipt of results from crime lab.	-

Advocacy – General (review VA files)

Overall, this section needs the addition of more nuanced VA items. Also, acknowledge that sometimes VA contact is frustrated by a detective not giving the VA updates. Sometimes the VA is not notified which also means they don't provide services. This is not the VA's fault. Important to understand not all os in these items are the fault of the VA.

Address situation where a VA is not involved because they wouldn't need to be (not SATF jurisdiction and this is known at time of initial report).

	Rubric Item	Criteria/Explanation
A1	Victim is kept abreast of investigation progress --Distinguish more carefully between the difference with A1 and A2	- Case file documents regular (at a minimum once weekly) communication attempts with victim - If communication is less than weekly, is the reason for this documented (e.g.: victim's request)
A2	Victim is in regular contact with VA	- Date when this happened, contact dates listed - Issues discussed documented - Resources provided to the victim documented
	Expectations around follow up even after case is closed	- call family next day and ask how things have been since the forensic, re-touch on resources, needs and the importance of therapy
	Another check in call in 2 weeks to a month would be ideal (although depending on case load perhaps not practical)	-
	Add a rubric item related to providing information on and assisting with crime victim compensation application	-
	Add a rubric item about comprehensive, clear, and regular documentation	-
	Add a rubric item for AOAs where the V has had some contact with the VA	- The VA has connected the victim to the new VA at the new agency

Case – General

	Rubric Item	Criteria/Explanation

G1	All language in summaries, reports, and other notated elements of case file use neutral, unbiased language	- Case investigation and its associated parts are based on facts and thorough investigation - No personal opinion apparent throughout - Language used is non-judgmental - Reports are free of assumption
G2	Case file includes all information related to the crime – times, dates, clear timelines, SA/SAC checklist, supplemental reports, evidence, forensics etc.	- *This is not a cookie-cutter criteria – remember every case is different and many are complex* - All required elements present - It is clear the investigator has followed all leads and documented every step and every conversation
	Consider adding some requirements around suspect background documentation	-
	Add an item related to reports written clearly and are easy to understand	- No major spelling or factual errors - No significant gaps in time between supplements and all supplements included
	Case closure/disposition is clearly documented in the case file	- If the DA declined, the DA decline email/letter is included - The case disposition and date of closure is noted in the narrative
	Use of running supplements	- If yes, score 0 - If no, score 3

Case Review Rubric – Original document is in MS Excel. Re-created here in MS Word.

Items scored 0-3 points

Dashboard Tab

Section	*% Weight*	*Section raw Score*	*Avg Sec. Score*	*Weighted Score*
Patrol	20	0.00	!	
Investigations	25	0.00		
VA-General	10	0.00		
Case-General	10	0.00		
Weighted	35	0.00		
Total	**100**	**0.00**		

<u>Five Sections:</u>

Weighted Questions (P = Patrol, I = Investigation, A = Advocacy)

P1 (W)	Report has been treated as valid from the outset
P2 (W)	VA is called
P3 (W)	Responding Officer offers victim medical care, including an MFE (if SA occurred within 7-day time frame), if injury is visible or victim complains of pain
P4 (W)	Was crime scene visited and documented?
I1 (W)	Victim has been interviewed and interview recorded (audio or video)
I2 (W)	Crime scene evidence collected and documented (bedding, clothing, environmental elements etc.)
I3 (W)	Suspect has been interviewed and interview recorded (audio or video)
I4 (W)	If case is deemed "unfounded-false," is there concrete evidence (not opinion, speculation) that an assault **did not** occur after a thorough investigation has been conducted? <u>Perceptions of victim credibility or reporting timeline is not evidence a crime did not occur.</u>
I5 (W)	investigator contacted victim within 3 business days from assignment
A1 (W)	VA has explained the YHOP (when applicable) to victim
	Section Score (Max: 30)
	Section Average

Patrol-Initial Investigation

P1	Responding Officer established elements of a crime existed

P2	Responding Officer has documented victim demeanor as observed – free of assumption and judgment
P3	SATF/Investigator called
P4	Signs and/or symptoms of strangulation – responding officer asked and documented in report
P5	Initial report and interview focuses on suspect behavior vs victim behavior
P6	Initial interview is limited to questions establishing only the basic facts of the incident that occurred
P7	If victim is apprehensive to continue report, process and options are explained
P8	If victim agrees to medical care and/or an MFE, VA accompanies victim to the medical facility. If VA does not accompany victim, explanation provided in report.
P9	Any injuries, no matter how slight, are documented thoroughly
P10	Did the responding officer go to the crime scene?
P11	Are any witnesses (outcry/other) identified in the report?
P12	If a statement was obtained, is it clear from the report, the statement was given voluntarily and, in the survivor's, own words.

Investigation

I1	Origin of victim report is documented in file (medical report, anonymous report, LE report)
I2	If case is a conversion from a medical or anonymous reporting case, timelines are documented in case file
I3	If MFE performed, and victim reporting to LE, evidence was sent for testing within 21 days (with victim consent) (state law)
I4	If case is a conversion from a medical or anonymous reporting case, evidence is sent for testing within 21 days of victim's conversion (with victim consent) (state law)
I5	Investigator has documented in case file attempts to keep victim up to date with investigation
I6	All witnesses have been interviewed and all leads followed and documented clearly
I7	If crime scene was not photographed or videoed, and/or crime scene evidence not collected, a comprehensive reason why not is documented by investigator in case file
I8	Suspect's prior behavior is investigated, including speaking to witnesses who may be able to shed light on serial behavior/pattern of offending, and consideration of co-occurring crimes. A comprehensive background investigation on the suspect's criminal history and previous behavior.
I9	Forensic evidence is collected from the suspect (e.g.: buccal swabs at PD, or MFE at hospital)
I10	Investigative reports include information on how victim is/was feeling, thoughts, emotional responses, as well as any information they share related to the senses.
I11	Investigator has documented victim demeanor as observed, free of assumption and judgment
I12	Document and confirm what "no" looked like for the victim (the absence of a spoken no, for example, is not the determinant of lack of consent)
I13	A variety of investigative practices utilized (pre-text phone call, social media, text msg etc., per department policies/state law).
I14	The investigative reports showed clear strategy and logic flow

I15	Case disposition is not based upon perceptions of victim credibility
I16	Investigator does not utilize "he said/she said" language or thought process in investigation and case documentation
I17	If case investigated against victim's wishes, reasons for decision to do so documented in case file
	Section Score (Max: 51)
	Section Average

Advocacy – General

A1	Victim is kept abreast of investigation progress
A2	Victim is in regular contact with VA
	Section Score (Max: 6)
	Section Average

Case – General

G1	All language in summaries, reports, and other notated elements of case file use neutral, unbiased language
G2	Case file includes all information related to the crime – times, dates, clear timelines, SA/SAC checklist, supplemental report, evidence, forensics etc.
	Section Score (Max: 6)
	Section Average

Annual 2018-2020 SWOT Analyses

	2018	2019	2020
Successes/ Strengths	Specialized employees Highly trained Good resources Support from community partners Funding Multi-disciplinary weekly case reviews Embedded partnership with victim advocates and district attorney representative	Specialization Teamwork Victim empowerment Openness to new ways of doing things Community partnerships Work ethic Pride in work product Varying levels of experience Training Transparency	Teamwork Specialized training Passion Team members want to be at the SATF Experience level Learning from each other Increased interviewing skills In-house advocacy Relationship with outside agencies Victim-centered approach Tenacity of team members
Weaknesses	Limited staffing Technology (i.e. access to various reporting systems and developing office technologies) Investigative equipment (i.e. cellular forensics, recorded interview room, pretext call system) Jurisdictional limits / need protocol	Two different organizational systems Lack of centralization with evidence and cases Inconsistencies between city processes Inconsistency with city ordinances Staffing levels Varying IT departments – logistics Varying levels of experience Internal perception Home agency isolation Workload Technology limitations Officer wellness	Staffing Out of touch with home agency IT issues (Combining two different agencies) Workload intensity and volume Lack of administrative support resources Physical resources Case related communication from home agency (esp. patrol level response) Limited training (affected by COVID) Prosecutor efficacy (filing rates)
Opportunities	Increased reporting and new access for victims	Recognition outside of BPD and CCPD	Community outreach and education with local organizations

	Thorough investigations. New relationships Opportunity to be a model program	Maximizing opportunity to work with all external organizations Bias management Training Increased efficiency in casework (not putting out fires) Innovation – push the boundaries Set the standard of SA investigations Perception improvement SOX: training for redundancy	(i.e., schools, bars etc.) Expand SATF by adding another agency Set the standard/model for agencies to replicate Give victims sense of justice Resource for other agencies (provide technical assistance) Training for other agencies
Threats	Burnout Lack of follow through Not establishing an identity in the community Sustainability Potential for work-group divisions Funding	Burnout Recognizing burnout Patrol level response --Young patrol staffs Caseload Staffing redundancy/staff turnover Gossip Financial resources Getting too comfortable Collateral duties External opinions Credibility	Caseload (scope of cases) Outside SATF casework Lack of timely victim contact Employee wellness Forensic interview delays/lack of FI capacity Prosecution rates Negative public perception of LE Budget

Implementation Evaluation Interview Questions

1. How has your experience been on the SATF so far?

2. What positive outcomes have you seen so far from the SATF?

3. What challenges have you encountered with:
    a. SATF implementation
    b. SATF Structure
    c. SA cases (what cases)

4. Any cases where being part of the SATF has been helpful (case # and share details)

5. What are the biggest things you have learned so far as being part of the SATF?

General Investigations/Taskforce Collaborator Questions

Explain why interview and that will be talking again. Ask to record. Mention confidentiality.

1. Thinking back to the start of the year, perspectives on SATF implementation at Brighton or Commerce City? Communication, clarity, understanding of purpose? Do anything differently?

2. In your opinion, how has the SATF affected your case load?

3. How many SA cases would you usually have?

4. Did you enjoy working on SA cases? Do you feel like you have lost something?

5. Any other impacts you can think of that the SATF has had on your work, your team's work? Culture?

6. Staffing effects (if they don't mention this).

7. Cross jurisdiction? Good/bad? Communication?

8. Anything else you would like to share about the process, implementation or impact of SATF on your work?